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Abstract 
This thesis provides the comprehensive understanding of investment, financing and mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As) in the shipping industry in three in-depth analyses. 
The first section of the thesis aims to document the evolution and the development in the 
shipping finance and investment literature by providing a comprehensive review of all existing 
research in the areas of (a) sources of finance and capital structure in shipping, (b) shipping 
investment and valuation, (c) corporate governance of shipping companies, and (d) risk 
measurement and management in shipping. For this purpose, a structured investigation of 137 
papers published in 43 scholarly journals during the past four decades (1979-2017) has been 
performed. Bibliometric analysis shows that shipping finance and investment literature has 
expanded its scope since 1990s covering a variety of emerging research topics (including 
M&As), largely triggered by profound changes in business practice in the shipping industry, 
through interdisciplinary and international collaborations. In addition, content analysis 
highlights that findings in the shipping finance and investment literature provide valuable 
insights into characteristics in financial management of shipping companies in terms of highly 
leveraged capital structure, diversification of financing sources, investment decision, risk-
return profile, value creation from M&As and gradual shift in corporate governance. 
Furthermore, the literature survey critically discusses research gaps, puzzling anomalies and 
under-explored areas providing promising directions of future research in this area. 
The second section of the thesis examines one of the most important angles of shipping 
investment documented in the review of the literature: inorganic investment. The aim is to draw 
the broad map of shipping M&A activity and to highlight the characteristics of this multi-
faceted market using an extensive and global sample of 2,261 deals consummated by shipping 
companies during 1990-2014. Especially, considering drawbacks of classification in the extant 
shipping M&A research, all shipping M&A deals in the sample are partitioned into a new 
industrial segmentation reflecting actual business areas of acquiring and target firms. The 
results indicate that M&As play a key role in shaping the current shipping industry through 
both horizontal and vertical consolidation. The results also document the significance of cross-
border deals as well as traditional European and emerging Asian initiatives in the shipping 
M&A market. In addition, the investigation of determinants of acquisition premium reveals 
that premium is negatively associated with the size and stock valuation of target firms. 
Furthermore, using the Tobit and the logit models, I analyse the choice of payment method in 
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shipping M&As. The results show that the use of cash in shipping M&As is negatively 
associated with the deals size, but positively with acquirer size. 
Finally, as a follow-up to the second section, the third section of the thesis investigates the 
valuation effects of shipping M&As. The results suggest that both acquiring and target firms 
achieve positive shareholder returns, measured in 5-day Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
around the announcement date, with statistical significance. The analysis also highlights 
several characteristics of value creation drivers in the shipping M&A market, such as, positive 
announcement returns in acquisitions of publicly listed targets and in stock-financed deals, 
outperformance of cross-border deals compared to domestic transactions, and the negative 
impact of the size of constituent firms. 
Overall, this thesis offers an extensive insight on investment, financing and M&A activity in 
the shipping industry from various perspectives ranging from the evolution of research 
contributions to empirical evidence on deal- and firm- characteristics and the value creation 
effect. The comprehensive synthesis of shipping finance and investment research findings 
offers invaluable information for understanding financial management in the shipping industry 
and shapes the future research topics in this area. Further, findings on shipping M&As based 
on the actual business areas of involved firms provide a comprehensive overview of the multi-
faceted consolidation market that is largely driven by industry-specific factors.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
1.1. Research Motivation 
The development of the financial system has long been instrumental to the healthy growth of 
the global economy, and various services provided by financial institutions play a key role in 
facilitating business proliferation and outlining major aspects of corporate financial 
management. This has especially been true for the shipping industry over the past few decades. 
As a growing number of shipping companies perceive financial management as a core part of 
their business strategies, the landscape of shipping finance and investment has changed 
remarkably in several respects. Notably, in a significant departure from their traditional 
preference for bank loans to secure funds for fleet expansion and replacement, ship-owners 
have gradually explored alternative financing sources since the 1990s, such as (both public and 
private) equity capitals and bond markets.1 While attempting to attract external funding from a 
wider range of potential shareholders and stakeholders, a number of shipping companies have 
transformed themselves from family-oriented businesses to corporate entities for more 
transparent corporate governance and better compliance with regulations required by 
international capital markets. Furthermore, shipping company managers who are concerned 
about their exposure to adverse movements of freight rates, fuel prices and exchange rates have 
paid a great deal of attention to risk management, especially with shipping derivatives. 
In an industry characterised by global competition, high-risk revenues and asset value, 
cyclicality and capital intensiveness, all of which cultivate a challenging business environment, 
corporate financial management is of crucial importance for shipping companies to navigate 
through the boom-bust cycles. Given the high degree of uncertainty in freight rates and the 
amount of capital required for vessel acquisition, the success or failure of even a single 
investment project has far-reaching effects on shipping companies’ prosperity. Furthermore, a 
shipping firm’s longevity generally depends on its access to financing sources with favourable 
terms (mostly, low interest rates). Especially amid the bleak financial situation of the decreased 
level of bank credit availability following the shipping market collapse in the second half of 
2008, during which freight rate earnings fell precipitously, securing funds for acquiring fuel-
                                                          
1 It is estimated that bank lending takes approximately 75% of funding requirements of the shipping industry (ABN AMRO, 
2011, Shipping Finance and Investment: Current Trends in Ship Finance, 3rd Mare Forum in Ship Finance, Istanbul, 22nd 
March). 
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efficient ships provides a competitive edge to shipping companies in preparation for future 
shipping market recovery.  
Considering the significance of corporate financial management for business in the real world, 
it is not surprising that a voluminous body of research has been conducted addressing issues 
unfolding in the areas of shipping finance and investment. Academic research in this field has 
attempted to identify underlying factors that trigger changes in business practice, to analyse the 
effect of those changes in more quantitative ways, and to suggest a potential ‘best practice’. 
Nonetheless, to the best of my knowledge, there is no comprehensive and structured survey of 
published research in this area with the exception of Kavussanos and Visvikis (2006b) who 
investigated papers in shipping derivatives. In stark contrast, there have been studies dealing 
with theoretical development, research evolution, academic taxonomy and future research 
directions in transportation-related areas, such as port operation, logistics and supply chain 
management, and maritime transport. Accordingly, the first objective of this thesis is to fill the 
research gap by providing a comprehensive analysis of existing shipping finance and 
investment literature. For this purpose, this thesis carries out bibliometric and content analysis 
of 137 shipping finance and investment papers published in scholarly journals during 1979–
2017. Furthermore, after analysing the research evolution in the shipping finance and 
investment area, this survey attempts to shape the future research agenda by critically 
discussing the gaps in the existing literature. 
Among the promising future research topics that this literature survey has identified, this thesis 
pays particular attention to inorganic investment (M&As) in the shipping industry, as 
significant unfilled gaps exist in this research area. Given the importance and far-reaching 
effects of M&A activity for the business practice of shipping companies, there are several 
reasons why the research topic of business consolidation deserves further attention from 
researchers in the shipping finance and investment area. First, the rise of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) constitutes one of the most remarkable phenomena in the shipping 
industry. Researchers have observed that the maritime industry, especially the liner sector, 
becomes concentrated at an ever-increasing pace, and this trend is to a large extent facilitated 
by consolidation activity during the past few decades. It is generally perceived that since the 
1990s, major market players in the liner sector have pursued both horizontal and vertical 
consolidation under challenging economic circumstances. For instance, as the enactment of the 
US Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA) in 1998 de facto phased out the shipping conference 
system, in which price collusion and anti-trust exemption were granted, liner shipping 
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companies were confronted with more intense competition, and consequently, increased 
uncertainty in freight rate earnings. As such, liner shipping companies had to strategically 
rationalise their operations through consolidating, pursuing economies of scale and improving 
asset utilisation. In addition, M&A activity is also prevalent in the tramp (dry bulk and tanker) 
industry, which is generally known to be fragmented compared to the liner sector. Gilje et al. 
(2002) reported that business consolidation in the tanker sector started to rise in the early 1990s 
and intensified in the second half of the same decade. Merikas et al. (2014) documented that 
the ownership structure of Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) was increasingly concentrated 
during 1993–2009. 
Second, M&As can provide a plethora of strategic and operational advantages. Shipping 
companies have taken advantage of M&As for complementing organic growth, gaining access 
to new markets and regional expertise, side-lining competitors from specific markets, 
expanding their client base and achieving cost reduction. In addition, the rapid transformation 
towards offshore production, largely seeking low-cost labour in developing countries, has 
motivated shipping companies to extend their geographical reach and to control a wider range 
of logistics service. 
Third, business consolidation has been proposed as a solution for the shipping industry’s 
current issues of overcapacity resulting from an ordering frenzy during the heyday of the mid-
2000s and a low rate of demand recovery largely attributable to the Chinese economy heading 
towards a soft or hard landing. For instance, Maersk Line, the largest containership operator, 
has recently been reported to be refraining from ordering newbuilding, relying instead on 
takeovers for its expansion and survival over the post-2008 shipping market recession, which 
is widely expected to persist for next few years.2 In such a difficult time, when the bulk of 
shipping companies are financially distressed due to vessel operation below the break-even 
point, consolidation can provide potential benefits such as freight rate recovery to a sustainable 
level, shipping market stability and cost reduction. 
Accordingly, this thesis aims to extend the previous literature and provide a comprehensive 
understanding of M&As in the shipping industry. To this end, this thesis targets three additional 
objectives. The second objective of this thesis is to provide an analysis of the market for 
corporate control in the shipping industry. One of the most serious drawbacks of prior research 
on shipping M&As is sample classification. Specifically, this thesis focusses on various 
                                                          
2 The Globe and Mail, ‘Maersk welcomes consolidation in shipping industry’, 1st November 2016. 
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business areas of acquirers and targets within the maritime spectrum (e.g. dry-bulk, tanker, 
container, passenger, port, freight forwarding) that are largely under-researched in the extant 
shipping M&A literature. Considering that previous shipping M&A literature has documented 
conflicting evidence on the value creation effect by sub-sectors within the shipping industry, it 
is particularly important to examine the business consolidation activity of shipping companies 
based on clear-cut categorisation. Specifically, the studies that utilise the SIC system in 
searching M&A deals of shipping companies may fail to identify actual business areas of 
constituent firms (e.g. ship-owning, port operation, freight forwarding). Moreover, the use of 
SIC is likely to either include non-shipping transactions or to exclude a substantial number of 
shipping transactions, as the classification system can be problematic in applying for service 
industries (Walker and Murphy, 2001), such as shipping. Although the sample in this thesis is 
also based on SIC, all transactions are double-checked with hand-collected information (e.g. 
press articles, annual reports, exchange filings) in order to identify the actual business areas of 
involved firms. This process ensures, to a considerable extent, that the findings in this thesis 
are based on the most bias-free sample of shipping M&A deals ever used. 
The vast majority of previous studies dealing with shipping and transportation M&As have 
focussed on horizontal consolidation and have paid relatively less attention to vertical 
integration or diversification. However, M&A activity in the various transportation and related 
service industries becomes increasingly multifaceted in terms of the business areas of 
constituent firms. As international division of the production process is unfolding, and 
consequently, synchronising the global supply chain from the sources of commodities to end-
users becomes a critical success factor, the importance of vertical integration between related 
transportation service companies has been elevated. Considering that shipping comprises a core 
part of the global supply chain by servicing approximately 80 to 90% of international trade, it 
is not surprising that leading shipping companies have sought to build up their logistical 
function by gaining access to port operation, hinterland activity and multi-modal transportation. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of vertical integration and diversification leads the scope of this 
thesis to cover shipping M&A market participants from other industries. For example, since 
shipping transportation plays a key role in the downstream in the oil and gas industry, major 
oil and gas companies pursue improving their downstream operations by acquiring tanker 
shipping companies. Merikas et al. (2014) reported that consolidation in the tanker sector 
coincided with the large-scale mergers in the oil industry in the late 1990s. In addition, the 
involvement of financial institutions (e.g. investment banks, private equity firms) driven by 
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desire for under-valued shipping assets in market deterioration and tight bank credit after 2008 
facilitates M&A activity in the shipping industry, calling for in-depth analysis. 
The third objective of this thesis is to investigate the characteristics of the shipping M&A 
market. Given that financial management of shipping companies is largely affected by 
idiosyncratic features of the maritime industry (e.g. shipping market uncertainty, international 
business, capital intensiveness), it is likely that shipping M&A activity illustrates industry-
specific characteristics. For example, ship-owning companies generally known to be concerned 
about ownership dilution are more likely to choose cash for M&A payment. By contrast, 
assuming that cash-financed deals increase acquirers’ financial leverage through additional 
debts, shipping companies generally known to be high leveraged are more likely to choose 
stock-for-stock exchange to relieve financial distress costs. Since the choice of payment 
method has far-reaching effects on post-merger capital structure and corporate governance of 
combined shipping companies, it is particularly important to address the conflicting theoretical 
explanations for financing decisions in shipping M&As. Thus, this thesis addresses several 
interesting observations regarding the characteristics of shipping M&A transactions. 
Finally, the fourth objective of this thesis is to examine the value creation effect in shipping 
M&A activity. To justify the costly and time-consuming process of combining independent 
business entities, an M&A transaction should offer economic or strategic benefits to both 
acquiring and target firms. However, the detrimental value creation effect of either negative or 
negligible gain for shareholders of acquiring firms around the deal announcement is one of the 
most stylised facts in the corporate finance literature. In sharp contrast, the vast majority of 
shipping M&A literature provides evidence that both acquiring and target firms achieve 
positive abnormal returns for their stock prices. Although shipping M&A studies offer some 
valuable insights concerning the gains in shipping business consolidation, their results are 
based on either anecdotal observations that are hardly generalisable or else samples that are too 
extensive and might be subject to ambiguous classification across different segments within 
the shipping industry. Thus, it is important to address the sample issue and to investigate 
variations in acquisition gains by different sectors. Using a fine-tuned dataset, this thesis 
presents findings on gains from shipping M&A deals by actual business areas of acquiring and 
target firms. In addition, the associations between announcement returns and the drivers of 
value creation are also investigated. 
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1.2. Outline of the Thesis and Research Contributions 
This thesis consists of five chapters focussing on financial management and business 
consolidation in the shipping industry. The current chapter presents a brief description of the 
research motivation, along with an outline and potential contributions of this thesis. 
Chapter 2 provides a review of the evolution of the shipping finance and investment literature, 
including shipping M&A research. For this purpose, a bibliometric analysis is performed for a 
sample of 137 papers published in 43 academic journals during 1979–2017 in terms of research 
topic diversification, methodological issues and authorship collaboration. The results reveal 
that the academic domain of shipping finance and investment research has expanded with the 
emergence of new topics addressing contemporary business issues in the shipping industry. 
Moreover, the findings of those papers, grouped by four major academic areas in the corporate 
finance literature (capital structure, valuation methods, corporate governance and risk 
measurement/management), are analysed and directions for future research are proposed. 
Chapter 3 offers an extensive overview of the shipping M&A market over approximately the 
last three decades. Using a sample of M&A transactions carried out by shipping and related 
transportation service companies during 1990–2014, the chapter presents the evolution and 
characteristics of shipping M&A activity over time. In particular, considering the drawbacks 
of the current industry classification system, as discussed earlier, all shipping M&A deals in 
the sample are partitioned into a new industrial segmentation. The results indicate that both 
horizontal consolidation and vertical integration consummated during three shipping M&A 
waves in the sample play a vital role in shaping the current structure of the international 
maritime industry. In addition, shipping M&A activity can be characterised with the traditional 
initiative of the European region, the recent rise of the Asian region and the predominant use 
of cash for M&A financing. Consistent with evidence presented in Alexandridis et al. (2013), 
it is found that acquisition premium is negatively associated with the target’s size (measured 
by pre-announcement market capitalisation) and stock valuation (measured by pre-
announcement market-to-book ratio). Moreover, for the first time in the maritime literature, 
this chapter examines the determinants of the payment method in shipping M&As. Supporting 
the information asymmetry hypothesis (Hansen, 1987), the results indicate that the use of cash 
is negatively associated with the deal size, as large-sized acquirers tend to pay with cash. 
Chapter 4 investigates the value creation effect in shipping M&As. While the previous 
corporate finance literature has provided evidence that M&As tend to be value-destroying for 
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acquirers and targets, shipping M&A studies have largely documented that both involved firms 
demonstrate positive abnormal returns around the deal announcement. Consistent with the 
results of the shipping M&A literature, the results in this chapter indicate that cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) for both acquirers and targets are positive, though a much larger part 
of acquisition gains is channelled into target firms. The effect of deal characteristics on 
acquisition gains also differs from general conclusions in the extant M&A literature, though 
the results are not supported in the multivariate analysis. First, acquisitions of publicly listed 
targets generate positive CARs for acquirers. Second, cross-border deals outperform domestic 
transactions for both acquiring and target firms. Third, stock-financed deals offer positive gains 
for acquirers and numerically outperform cash offers. Finally, it is found that gains from 
shipping M&As are generally well explained by the size of the acquirers and targets, consistent 
with the findings of Moeller et al. (2004) and Alexandridis et al. (2013), respectively. 
Furthermore, the results also document variations in CARs for involved firms and the effect of 
deal characteristics on acquisition gains according to business segments. While CARs for 
acquirers are higher in diversification deals, those for targets are higher in horizontal deals. In 
addition, the outperformance of cross-border deals is especially remarkable for ship-owning 
acquirers. Furthermore, firm valuation of ship-owning acquirers demonstrates a positive effect 
on acquisition gains in horizontal deals. Finally, firm-valuation of ship-owning targets is 
negatively associated with abnormal returns for both shipping and non-shipping acquirers.  
Finally, Chapter 5 provides the conclusions of this thesis, in addition to some suggestions for 
future research. 
  
 
 
8 
 
2.  SHIPPING TRANSPORTATION FINANCE AND INVESTMENT: A CRITICAL 
SURVEY OF THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SETTING THE FUTURE RESEARCH 
AGENDA 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The international maritime transportation industry facilitates between 80 and 90% of global 
commodity trade in terms of volume and contributes significantly to the welfare of nations.3 
The shipping transportation sector adds approximately $380 billion a year to the global 
economy, highlighting its importance to the world economy and international trade (see the 
“Global Shipping Market Report” in “Catalyst Corporate Finance”, 2016). According to data 
from Clarksons Platou, during the 2005–2017 period, the aggregate capital invested in 
newbuilding vessels alone exceeded $1.5 trillion, with $263 billion spent during the cycle peak 
of 2007. Raising large amounts of capital to meet investment needs tends to be challenging in 
an industry characterised by cyclical and seasonal fluctuations, often experiencing prolonged 
periods of uncertainty and volatility (Kavussanos, 2010). The distinctive characteristics of the 
shipping industry, such as its capital intensiveness and market cyclicality, render corporate 
financial management decisions a top priority for shipping companies, affecting almost every 
aspect of shipping businesses from cash flow generation capacity (Drobetz et al., 2016a) to 
corporate ownership/governance structures (Andreou et al., 2014) and, ultimately, their value 
creation potential (Kang et al., 2016). Naturally, investment decisions and the associated 
financing choices entail significant challenges for shipping companies (see Kavussanos and 
Visvikis, 2016 for a comprehensive overview of financial management in the shipping 
industry). In fact, their longevity is historically contingent on their access to financing with 
favourable terms and especially low interest rates (Stopford, 2009). Along these lines, the 
global financial crisis of 2008, and the ensuing environment of low freight rates, further 
highlighted the importance of access to financing for shipping companies, enabling those with 
the capacity to finance new projects to weather the storm. At the trough of the cycle, a large 
number of companies faced financial distress, with Hanjin Shipping filing for bankruptcy in 
August 2016 providing a notable example. The crisis also highlighted the need for risk 
management strategies and tools to understand and manage the risks involved in running a 
                                                          
3 The numbers on the shipping industry’s share of global trade are from UNCTAD (2015), retrieved from: http://unctad.org/ 
en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=1374 and the International Chamber of Shipping, retrieved in January 2017 
from http://www.ics-shipping.org/shipping-facts/shipping-and-world-trade. 
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shipping business (see, for instance, Kavussanos, 2010; Kavussanos and Visvikis, 2006a; 
2011). 
Early efforts to finance shipping projects largely involved own equity and, subsequently, 
relatively small amounts of capital provided by banks. Since the early 1990s, a growing number 
of shipping companies have relied on global capital markets—in a break from traditional 
sources of financing, such as bank loans—to diversify their funding sources and tap into a 
wider range of institutional and retail investors. To gain access to global capital markets, 
shipping companies had to evolve from typically family-oriented businesses to corporate 
entities, which in turn led to a structural transformation and expedited significant improvements 
in their corporate governance. Given the significance of shipping finance and investment as a 
specialised area of maritime transportation, the research conducted in this area has been 
voluminous since the first empirical study was published by Yolland (1979). In spite of the 
impact of shipping finance on both the academic community and business practice, to date, and 
to the best of my knowledge, there has been no comprehensive survey of published research in 
this area. Notwithstanding, a number of studies have attempted to address conceptualisation, 
methodological issues, theoretical developments, academic taxonomy and future research 
directions in areas relevant to transportation, such as in port management (Ng, 2013; Pallis et 
al., 2010; Pallis et al., 2011; Steenken et al., 2004; Woo et al., 2012; Woo et al., 2011), in 
logistics and supply chain management (Burgess et al., 2006; Ho et al., 2002; Mentzer and 
Kahn, 1995; Panayides, 2006), in shipping freight derivatives (Kavussanos and Visvikis, 
2006b), in container shipping (Lau et al., 2013) and in maritime transport (Shi and Li, 2017). 
To fill this research gap, the current study provides a critical survey and analysis of existing 
research by examining all academic studies published in scholarly journals in the area of 
shipping finance and investment during the 1979–2017 period, complemented with selected 
books and book chapters, and provides suggestions to set the future research agenda for 
scholars. In order to provide a complete review of the literature, I first reviewed 
transportation/logistics and maritime scholarly journals in searching for studies related to 
shipping finance and investment. Then, I investigated all other publications of authors who 
have at least one shipping finance and investment paper in those journals, as well as references 
of their journal articles, in order to identify other relevant research published in journals within 
various social science areas, such as finance, economics and management. This involves 137 
papers published in 43 scholarly journals. The journal titles along with aggregate 
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Table 2.1 List of Scholarly Journals Featuring Shipping Finance and Investment Articles 1979–2017 (paper counts) 
 Journal Title  All 
Pre- 
1990s 
1990- 
1999 
2000- 
2009 
Post- 
2010s 
       
African Journal of Business Management  1 0 0 0 1 
American Economic Review  1 0 0 0 1 
Applied Economics  3 0 1 1 1 
Applied Economics Letters  1 0 0 0 1 
Applied Financial Economics   1 0 0 0 1 
Applied Mathematical Finance  1 0 0 0 1 
Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics  3 0 0 0 3 
Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society 1 0 0 0 1 
Empirical Economics  1 0 0 0 1 
Energy Economics  1 0 0 0 1 
Eurasian Business Review  1 0 0 0 1 
European Financial Management  1 0 0 0 1 
International Journal of Financial Markets and Derivatives  1 0 0 0 1 
International Journal of Financial Services Management  1 0 0 1 0 
International Journal of Forecasting  2 0 0 1 1 
International Journal of Logistics Research and Applications  1 0 0 1 0 
International Journal of Production Economics  1 0 0 0 1 
International Journal of Theoretical and Empirical Finance  1 0 0 1 0 
International Journal of Transport Economics  3 0 0 3 0 
International Review of Financial Analysis  1 0 0 0 1 
Journal of Applied Business Research  1 0 0 0 1 
Journal of Banking and Finance   1 0 0 1 0 
Journal of Derivatives  1 0 0 1 0 
Journal of Derivatives & Hedge Funds  1 0 0 1 0 
Journal of Forecasting  1 0 0 1 0 
Journal of Futures Markets  6 0 2 3 1 
Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilisation  1 0 0 0 1 
Journal of Mechanical Engineering  1 0 0 0 1 
Journal of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis  1 0 0 1 0 
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy  1 0 1 0 0 
Maritime Economics and Logistics  17 0 2 8 7 
Maritime Policy and Management   34 4 8  12 10 
Multinational Finance Journal  1 0 0 0 1 
Quarterly Journal of Economics  1 0 0 0 1 
Review of Derivatives Research  2 0 0 2 0 
Review of Finance  1 0 0 0 1 
Review of Financial Economics  1 0 0 1 0 
The Journal of Alternative Investments  1 0 0 1 0 
Transportation Journal  1 0 1 0 0 
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice  2 0 0 0 2 
Transportation Research Part B: Methodological  2 0 1 1 0 
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review   31 0 1 7  23 
WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs  1 0 0 1 0 
Total   137 4 17 49 67 
 
paper counts for four sub-periods are presented in Table 2.1. It turns out that the majority of 
shipping finance and investment studies have been published in transportation and maritime 
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academic journals. Notably, 82 out of 137 papers have been published in the following three 
academic journals alone: Maritime Policy and Management (34 paper counts), Transportation 
Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review (31 paper counts) and Maritime 
Economics and Logistics (17 paper counts). I further classify the papers examined in this study 
into four major research areas inspired by the classification structure typically adopted in the 
mainstream corporate finance literature. These include (a) sources of finance and capital 
structure in shipping, (b) shipping investment and valuation methods, (c) corporate governance 
of shipping companies, and (d) risk measurement and management in shipping. 
This thesis also conducts a comprehensive bibliometric analysis of the related academic 
literature in shipping finance and investments. This aims to provide additional information 
concerning the frequency of publications in each research area, the methodological approaches 
utilised, co-authorship associations and research impact. The second part of the paper 
comprises a comprehensive review of the literature and critical discussion of the empirical 
evidence of the four aforementioned distinct research areas (a)–(d) of finance. Each section 
identifies pivotal gaps in the literature along with potential paths for further research. All 
sections include a summary of the research designs and findings, tabulated concisely for ease 
of reference.  
This survey paper contributes to the extant literature in several important ways. First, to the 
best of my knowledge, it is the first to offer a comprehensive overview of the research findings 
in the area of shipping finance. Second, the bibliometric analysis more succinctly highlights 
the research developments in the area of shipping finance. Third, the paper provides a 
comprehensive synthesis of all published research in shipping finance and investment, and it 
offers an invaluable source of information for both the academic community and business 
practice. Finally, this paper shapes the future research agenda for shipping finance and 
investment by critically discussing the gaps in the extant literature and the potential avenues 
for further research. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 provides a bibliometric overview of 
all studies included in this survey. Sections 2.3–2.6 offer, respectively, a comprehensive review 
of the literature, key empirical findings and suggestions for future research on four major 
research areas in shipping finance and investments. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes the paper. 
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2.2. Bibliometric Review 
As a first step, I provide an overview of the evolution of the literature in the area of shipping 
finance, investments and risk management, and I identify trends in key bibliometric statistics 
on the research topics covered, the methodologies employed, the papers’ research impact and 
co-authorship collaborations. Table 2.2 provides a classification of existing shipping finance 
and investment literature by research topic, journal discipline and regional focus of the research 
topics. In terms of research topics (see Panel A), it appears that during 1979–2017, risk 
measurement and management in shipping (54 papers) and shipping investment/valuation 
methods (51 papers) have attracted significant attention, followed by sources of finance/capital 
structure in shipping (26 papers). Moreover, the focus of shipping finance research seems to 
have evolved over time. For instance, during the pre-1990s period, only three studies examined 
valuation methods. Thereafter, the literature has progressively expanded on alternative topics 
that fall broadly within the areas of capital structure, inorganic investments (M&As), and 
corporate governance and risk management. Furthermore, Panel B illustrates the distribution 
of studies published in shipping finance partitioned by journal discipline. Journals in the broad 
transportation and maritime disciplines account for the vast majority of academic publications 
(70%). Academic journals in the fields of finance, economics, and operations and management 
have also published papers focussing on shipping finance and investment. However, their share 
is significantly lower, although it has gradually increased post-2009. 
Finally, Panel C classifies the studies by the regional focus of their empirical investigation. 
Evidently, the regional scope of the shipping finance literature is primarily US oriented, 
especially for studies examining samples of listed shipping companies. This can be attributed 
to the fact that the US money and capital markets have been developed much earlier and cater 
to a more suitable financial environment for shipping companies to seek capital. Thus, certain 
areas of shipping finance, such as initial public offerings (IPOs) and high-yield bonds, have 
taken place primarily in US markets since the mid-90s. Another contributing factor is that, 
depending on the research question examined, there is broader data availability for US-listed 
shipping companies. This can in turn be attributed to more stringent regulations in US capital 
markets, requiring full disclosure of corporate information when raising capital. 
Further, I group the studies included in this survey paper according to the methodological 
approach they follow. To that end, I adopt a classification scheme in line with the one in the 
field of operations management research put forward by Wacker (1998). The classification 
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differentiates between two main research approaches. The analytical approach includes 
deductive methods (‘drawing logically certain conclusions through the process of reasoning’), 
while the empirical approach includes inductive methods (‘deriving general principles from 
specific observations’). Each approach comprises three sub-categories; the analytical approach 
consists of conceptual, mathematical and statistical methods while the empirical approach 
includes experimental, statistical and case studies. 
Table 2.2 Research Topics, Journal Disciplines and Regional Focus (paper counts) 
     All 
Pre- 
1990s 
1990- 
1999 
2000- 
2009 
Post- 
2000s 
        
Panel A: Research Topics       
                
Sources of Finance in Shipping and Capital Structure  26 1 1 9 15 
Shipping Investment and Valuation Methods  51 3 6 18 24 
Corporate Governance of Shipping Companies  6 0 0 1 5 
Risk Measurement and Management in Shipping   54 0 10 21 23 
        
Panel B: Journal Discipline      
                
Maritime   52 4 10 21 17 
Transportation and Logistics 44 0 4 12 28 
Finance   22 0 2 12 8 
Economics  8 0 1 1 6 
Management  5 0 0 1 4 
Operations   4 0 0 2 2 
Engineering  1 0 0 0 1 
Sociology  1 0 0 0 1 
       
Panel C: Regional Focus of the Research Topic       
                
Country  31 0 3 10 18 
 US  18 0 3 6 9 
 Greece  4 0 0 1 3 
 China  2 0 0 1 1 
 Germany  2 0 0 0 2 
 Japan  2 0 0 0 2 
 Brazil  1 0 0 1 0 
 South Korea  1 0 0 0 1 
 UK  1 0 0 1 0 
Region  7 0 1 6 0 
Global  30 0 3 7 20 
N/A   69 4 10 26 29 
Note: In Panel B, the journals included in each discipline are as follows (in alphabetical order): Maritime (Maritime Economics and Logistics, 
Maritime Policy and Management, WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs); Transportation and Logistics (Asian Journal of Shipping and 
Logistics, International Journal of Logistics Research and Applications, International Journal of Transport Economics, Journal of Transport 
Economics and Policy, Transportation Journal, Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Transportation Research Part B: 
Methodological, Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review); Finance (Applied Financial Economics, Applied 
Mathematical Finance, European Financial Management, International Journal of Financial Markets and Derivatives, International Journal of 
Financial Services Management, International Journal of Theoretical and Empirical Finance, International Review of Financial Analysis, 
Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal of Derivatives, Journal of Derivatives and Hedge Funds, Journal of Futures Markets, Multinational 
Finance Journal, Review of Derivatives Research, Review of Finance, Review of Financial Economics, The Journal of Alternative 
Investments); Economics (American Economic Review, Applied Economics, Applied Economics Letters, Empirical Economics, Energy 
Economics, Quarterly Journal of Economics); Management and Business (African Journal of Business Management, Corporate Governance: 
The International Journal of Business in Society, Eurasian Business Review, Journal of Applied Business Research, Journal of Multi-Criteria 
Decision Analysis); Operations (International Journal of Forecasting, International Journal of Production Economics, Journal of Forecasting); 
Engineering (Journal of Mechanical Engineering); and Sociology (Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilisation). 
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Table 2.3, Panel A illustrates the distribution of shipping finance studies classified according 
to Wacker’s (1998) framework. The vast majority of the studies (112 paper counts or 82% of 
all papers) employ employed empirical methodologies, mostly using statistical measures to 
provide empirical evidence. This pattern is rather different from that observed in survey studies 
in other shipping-related fields, such as for port studies (Woo et al., 2011) and logistics/supply 
chain management (SCM) studies (Burgess et al., 2006), where the analytical-conceptual 
research designs are the most popular among the methodological approaches adopted. 
 
Table 2.3 Methodological Issues (paper counts) 
     All Pre-1990s 1990-1999 2000-2009 Post-2000s 
        
Panel A: Theory-building Types       
                
Analytical - Total  25 1 3 8 13 
 Conceptual 3 1 0 1 1 
 Mathematical 16 0 3 6 7 
 Statistical  6 0 0 1 5 
Empirical - Total  112 3 14 41 54 
 Experimental 1 0 0 0 1 
 Statistical  105 1 14 39 51 
  Case study 6 2 0 2 2 
       
Panel B: Data Analysis Techniques       
                
Regression  43 1 6 11 25 
Error Correction Model  21 0 1 14 6 
Real Option Modelling  14 0 2 5 7 
Descriptive  13 3 1 5 4 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity  10 0 2 2 6 
Event Study Analysis  8 0 0 6 2 
Autoregressive Moving Average  3 0 2 0 1 
Simultaneous Equations Modelling 3 0 0 0 3 
Analytical Hierarchy Process 2 0 0 0 2 
Efficient Frontier Analysis 2 0 0 1 1 
Principal Component Analysis 2 0 0 1 1 
Simulation 2 0 0 0 2 
Utilites Additives Discriminantes 2 0 0 1 1 
Value-at-Risk 2 0 0 1 1 
Others     10 0 3 2 5 
 Notes: In Panel C, data analysis techniques of the same modelling family are grouped under the same category. For example, regression 
incudes univariate, multivariate and logit models, options pricing includes both closed-form solutions and dynamic programming, and 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) also includes generalised ARCH models. The ‘Others’ group includes cost-benefit 
analysis, regime switching and other techniques that have only one paper count. 
 
Table 2.3, Panel B takes a step further in classifying shipping finance literature by focussing 
specifically on the data analysis techniques utilised. The most frequently employed technique 
for data analysis is the classical regression model (43 papers or 31% of the total), followed by 
the error correction model (21 papers or 15% of the total), real options modelling (14 papers 
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or 10% of the total), descriptive analysis (13 papers or 9% of the total), autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity modelling (10 paper or 7% of the total) and event study analysis 
(8 papers or 6% of the total). The recent surge in popularity of event study analysis and options 
pricing models can be attributed to the emergence of new research strands in the shipping 
finance literature, such as M&As, IPOs, and real options analysis (ROA). 
Finally, Table 2.4, Panel A presents additional information for the studies examined, namely, 
the number of authors and the type of co-authorship, while Panel B illustrates their research 
impact in terms of citations. The number of authors per paper has gradually increased over the 
past four decades from an average of one author during pre-1990s to 2.7 during post-2000s. 
See Appendix A for the number of scholarly publications per author over the 137 papers in 
shipping finance and investment literature. Along with the increase in the number of authors 
per paper, the extent of international collaborations has also notably increased, possibly due to 
recent globalisation trends along with the authentically international nature of the shipping 
industry. 
 
Table 2.4 Authorship and Citations 
  
 All Pre-1990s 1990–1999 2000–2009 Post-2000s 
       
Panel A: Authorship       
              
Average number of authors  2.4 1 1.6 2.3 2.7 
Collaboration  68 0 2 23 43 
International collaboration  40 0 2 15 23 
Academic-industrial collaboration   19 0 1 7 11 
       
Panel B: Citation Statistics       
         
Shipping finance papers       
Average citations per article  24.6 5.0 38.0 36.2 10.0 
Annual average citations per article  2.6 0.1 1.9 3.0 2.6 
Other papers in the same volume or issue       
Average citations per article  37.6 9.5 39.4 59.6 17.3 
Annual average citations per article   4.2 0.3 2.0 4.7 4.8 
Notes: In Panel A, the three types of collaboration are determined in terms of institutions to which individual authors are affiliated in the 
year of publication. Specifically, ‘collaboration’ indicates co-authorship between researchers from different institutions; ‘international 
collaboration’ indicates co-authorship between researchers from institutions in different countries; and ‘academic-industrial collaboration’ 
indicates co-authorship between researchers from academic and industrial (or business) institutions.  
 
In addition, a growing number of papers have more recently been co-authored by both 
academics and practitioners, pointing to an acceleration in interconnectedness between 
academia and the industry. In terms of research impact reported in Table 2.4, Panel B, the 
average paper is cited 24.6 times throughout the entire sample period. The average annual 
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number of citations has increased from 0.1 during pre-1990s to 2.6 during post-2000s, 
indicating an increasing interest in the shipping finance area from the academic community. 
The bibliometric analysis presented in this section illustrates the ways in which the literature 
on shipping finance, investments and risk management has evolved over time in terms of topics, 
academic disciplines, methodologies, collaborations and research impact. It is evident that 
researchers in this area have gradually addressed more diverse topics and expanded their 
networks and extent of collaborations through more international co-authorships. The 
following sections provide a thorough critical review of the literature, structured along the four 
major research areas in shipping finance, investments and risk management discussed earlier. 
 
2.3. Sources of Finance in Shipping and Capital Structure 
The inherently capital-intensive nature of the shipping industry places issues directly associated 
with ship financing decisions, such as the potential sources of finance and the choice of capital 
structure, at the forefront of shipping finance research. The importance of these topics is 
highlighted by the significant size of the capital invested in newbuilding vessels (on average, 
more than $130 billion per annum), with one vessel needing more than $60 million, subject to 
the vessel’s type and size. In addition, the fact that second-hand vessels are frequently traded 
in the sale and purchase (S&P) market further adds to the demand for capital in the shipping 
industry.4  
In addition to being capital intensive and highly liquid, the shipping industry is also affected 
by extreme fluctuations in vessel revenues, operating cash flows, and asset values, which 
altogether form a challenging business environment for shipping companies (Kavussanos and 
Visvikis, 2006a). Given the long-term economic life of the projects (vessels) in shipping, one 
might expect that the financing of shipping assets would primarily involve the use of debt. 
However, as in other industrial sectors, shipping companies also tend to adopt an optimal 
capital mix in order to best manage their cost of capital and tackle the severe troughs of 
shipping business cycles. 
                                                          
4 According to Clarksons Platou, over 1,000 vessels per annum on average changed hands during the period 2005-2015. 
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In the 1980s, the shipping industry raised as much as 75% of its external funding from banks 
in the form of loans, while bonds and public equity accounted for only approximately 5%.5 
However, shipping finance has transformed significantly since the early 1990s, reflecting that 
a number of shipping companies began evolving from predominantly family businesses to 
more corporate-oriented structures in order to gain access to global capital markets. The need 
for shipping companies to diversify their sources of finance was further dictated by the tight 
credit markets in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. 
Figure 2.1 depicts the global evolution of shipping finance sources during the 2007–2016 
period. The collapse of newbuilding vessel contracting and second-hand purchases, along with 
a steep surge in global economic risk levels, led to a sharp decline in the volume of bank debt 
(typically syndicated bank loans) raised by shipping companies in 2009. Following the onset 
of the global financial crisis, ship-lending banks reduced their exposures to the shipping 
industry and shifted their main operations from issuing new shipping bank loans to 
restructuring existing ones in order to minimise their losses. Even when they approved new 
bank loans, banks strived to minimise their risks. This was facilitated by requiring significantly  
 
Figure 2.1 Sources of Capital in the Shipping Industry (2007–2016, in USD Billion) 
 
Source: Marine Money International (as of January 2017); the 2016 figure is based on the first nine months only. 
 
                                                          
5 ABN AMRO (2011), Shipping Finance and Investment: Current Trends in Ship Finance, 3rd Mare Forum in Ship Finance, 
Istanbul, 22nd March. 
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lower loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, shorter amortisation maturities (the maximum maturity of 
new bank loans may be five years), higher margin spreads and more substantial covenants and 
collateral to grant a credit facility (see Kavussanos and Tsouknidis, 2016). During this period, 
high-yield bond issues and private equity (PE) played a more important role as alternative 
sources of capital for shipping (see Kavussanos and Tsouknidis, 2014). These trends triggered 
the interest of academic research focussing on evaluating the effectiveness of alternative 
sources of capital in the shipping industry. This section aims to provide a critical review of the 
main findings with regards to different financing sources and capital structure in the shipping 
industry, shaping the future research agenda. 
 
2.3.1. Shipping Bank Loans and Credit Risk Analysis 
As can be observed in Figure 2.1, shipping bank loans have traditionally been the most popular 
source of financing in the shipping industry, accounting for approximately 70% of the total 
ship-funding requirements during the 2007–2016 period. This can be primarily attributed to 
the fact that a bank loan constitutes the cheapest and simplest external funding source for 
shipping projects. In addition, bank loans do not affect the ownership structure of a shipping 
company. This is a markedly desirable feature for shipping businesses, since they are typically 
reluctant to endure significant changes in their traditional family-oriented and highly 
concentrated ownership structures. Perhaps even more importantly, raising funds through bank 
loans does not require the public disclosure of (generally confidential) strategic, financial and 
operational information. By contrast, IPOs and bond issues require making such information 
public to investors to a much larger extent (Kavussanos and Tsouknidis, 2014; 2016). 
Historically, shipping bank loans have been granted on the basis of relationship banking, 
through which a long-term rapport is established based on amicable trust and information 
sharing between the obligor and the bank (Gavalas and Syriopoulos, 2015; Kavussanos and 
Tsouknidis, 2016; Mitroussi et al., 2016). Proper assessment of default risk in shipping bank 
loan agreements requires taking into account qualitative factors, such as the owners’ reputation, 
background, business commitment, know-how and credit history; along with quantitative 
factors, such as their financial status, market share and fleet composition. To this end, the multi-
criteria decision-making (MCDM) approach—a process of decision-making optimisation with 
multiple criteria—can provide a tool for developing a systematic default risk assessment model 
for shipping bank loan applications. 
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Dimitras et al. (2002) employ the Utilities Additives Discriminants (UTADIS) method to 
assess the default risk for a sample of 17 granted shipping bank loans drawn over the 1999–
2001 period.6 Initially, the authors investigate a wide set of credit criteria for loan evaluation, 
the weights of which are set based on the subjective opinion of financial professionals working 
on a specific consulting firm (the decision makers). Subsequently, the UTADIS method is used 
to specify a utility function for each group of bank loan applications according to their default 
risk and the cut-off utility level for granting a loan. The most important factors in assessing the 
default risk of shipping bank loans are found to be the ownership structure and the 
quality/experience of the management team (34%), followed by the credit history of the obligor 
(20%) and fleet characteristics (12%). However, as acknowledged by the authors, these weights 
and utility thresholds might change if a new sample with different characteristics is employed 
in the analysis or if there is a change in the perspective of the decision makers regarding which 
criteria are relevant for assessing the default risk of a new potential obligor. 
In a related study, Gavalas and Syriopoulos (2015) draw inferences regarding the relevant 
factors for assessing default risk of shipping bank loans from primary data collected through a 
bank survey questionnaire. The authors survey a sample of 16 managers working in different 
ship-lending commercial banks in Greece. These bank managers were asked to identify the 
factors that they considered important when assessing shipping bank loan applications. Having 
specified an initial set of credit criteria, Gavalas and Syriopoulos (2015) also utilise the 
UTADIS method to determine a utility function and the cut-off utility thresholds for granting 
a loan in a manner similar to Dimitras et al. (2002). The results indicate that the credit rating 
migration probability, the debt-to-equity ratio and the asset coverage ratio are the most 
important factors for classifying shipping bank loan applications according to their default risk. 
However, it can be argued that specifying the relevant factors in assessing the default risk of 
shipping bank loans through a survey questionnaire entails significant subjectivism, as each 
manager may evaluate the weighting and composition of the relevant factors differently when 
assessing a loan agreement. 
After the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, the landscape of bank financing for the 
shipping industry changed drastically. As seen in Figure 2.1, the amount of shipping 
investments fell by more than 60% during the 2007–2016 period, with bank debt following suit. 
                                                          
6 The UTADIS method belongs to the wider family of the UTA multicriteria methods – for details see Devaud et al. (1980). 
Given a pre-specified grouping of criteria, in this case credit loan criteria, the UTADIS method seeks to provide an additive 
utility function and the corresponding utility thresholds that leads to the minimum error when evaluating default risk. 
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According to a questionnaire-based survey by Gong et al. (2013), among 12 ship-lending banks 
in Hong Kong over the years 2008–2009, banks appear to assign larger weights to loan quality 
and loan security rather than expanding their market share in shipping finance. In the face of 
tightening financial regulations and credit requirements, ship-lending banks started reducing 
their exposures to the shipping industry and have been more reluctant to provide new debt 
capital for shipping investments.  
In parallel to the retreat of bank lending in shipping, the rising uncertainty in the global 
economy, coupled with the absence of liquidity in the banking sector (Santos, 2011), has led 
to a significant increase of default risk in capital markets, which in turn led several banks and 
bank-dependent businesses to bankruptcy (Chava and Purnanandam, 2011). For this reason, 
identifying default risk drivers in shipping bank loans is of paramount importance for the 
survival of ship-lending financial institutions and other shipping market participants. 
Kavussanos and Tsouknidis (2016) address this point using a logit credit scoring model to 
identify the default risk drivers of shipping bank loans for the first time in the literature. The 
authors use data compiled from the credit portfolio of a Greek commercial ship-lending bank, 
which includes 128 loans issued to 63 shipping companies over a 14-year period spanning from 
1997 to 2011. Their sample includes shipping bank loans for newbuildings and second-hand 
vessels in four main segments of the shipping industry, namely, dry bulk, tankers, 
containerships and gas carriers. The authors find that industry-specific variables, which capture 
current and expected (forward-looking) conditions in the extremely volatile global freight 
markets, the risk appetite of shipowners proxied by the chartering policy employed, as well as 
a pricing variable—the arrangement fee over the amount of loan— – are the most significant 
factors explaining defaults of bank loans.  
In a similar vein, Mitroussi et al. (2016) document that market conditions and chartering policy 
are important factors in determining the performance risk of shipping bank loans. The authors 
utilise a logit credit scoring methodology to examine the performance risk drivers for a sample 
of 30 shipping bank loans for dry bulk vessels during the 2005–2009 period. In a more recent 
study, which examines the default risk drivers of 192 shipping companies during the 2001–
2016 period, Lozinskaia et al. (2017) document that the probability of default increases with 
one-year lags of Tobin’s Q (proxied by the ratio of market value / book value) and EBITDA 
(earnings before interest, tax, dividends and amortisation) and decreases with one-year lags of 
the total assets (size) of the company and the growth in GDP (gross domestic product). 
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Despite the contribution of existing literature focussing on the assessment of default risk in 
shipping bank loan agreements, a shortcoming of this work stems from the lack of sufficient 
publicly available data on such deals to build representative samples of the global portfolio of 
shipping bank loans. Kavussanos and Tsouknidis (2016) examine the largest such portfolio of 
shipping bank loans in the extant literature. Despite the fact that Greek banks are regulated by 
the European Central Bank and must comply with the Basel regulatory framework, even this 
extensive portfolio may not be representative of the global shipping bank loans’ industry. 
Future studies can address this gap by focussing on larger shipping bank loan portfolios, ideally 
across different regions of the world. This is especially important from a regulatory point of 
view, since banks operating in different countries or regions are subject to different regulatory 
frameworks and authorities. For example, in the US, lending banks are primarily supervised by 
one of the following institutions: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal 
Reserve Board, or the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. In the EU, by contrast, the 
framework on the supervision of credit institutions comprises the following: (i) the Directive 
2013/36/EU of the European Parliament concerning access to the activity of credit institutions 
and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, and (ii) Regulation 
(EU) 575/2013 of the European Parliament concerning prudential requirements for credit 
institutions and investment firms, which amends Regulation (EU) 648/2012.7 Such divergence 
in regulatory frameworks may exert varying degrees of pressure on financial institutions to 
reduce their exposures, especially to risky industries, such as the shipping sector. This can be 
primarily implemented by imposing stricter—and less favourable for shipowners—terms on 
shipping bank loans agreements. 
Furthermore, given the deadlock in bank credit and the tightened financial regulations in the 
post-crisis period, another important question that naturally arises concerns whether bank 
lending is likely to remain the primary source of ship financing. Along these lines, banking 
industry practice that evolves as seen in the survey results of Gong et al. (2013) reflects that 
banks have implemented measures to limit their exposure to the shipping industry. Their 
lending capacity is hampered by the weak shipping market conditions and the implementation 
of new banking regulations, such as the stricter capital requirements under BASEL III by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which aims at tightening regulation, monitoring and 
                                                          
7 In the U.S., bank lending is regulated primarily through the following Acts: The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) 
of 1975, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) of 1974, The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) of 1968, and The Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA) of 1970. 
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risk management across the banking industry. Thus, future research can offer insights on this 
issue by exploring whether alternative sources of shipping finance can effectively fill the bank-
lending gap when the market recovers and under what conditions bank lending to the shipping 
industry might recover. 
 
2.3.2. Public Debt and Shipping Bond Pricing 
Financing shipping projects by tapping the public debt market has gradually gained popularity 
in recent decades (see Kavussanos and Tsouknidis, 2014 for details). Sea Containers Ltd. was 
the first shipping company to issue a public debt of $125 mil. in 1992. As reflected in Figure 
2.1, on average, bond issues account for approximately 15.4% of the total capital provided for 
shipping investments over the 2007–2016 period.  
Issuing public debt has gained pace as a source of funding for the shipping industry for several 
reasons. First, many shipping companies evolved from traditional family businesses to 
corporate entities—in several cases publicly listed—and, as a result, adopted a modern 
corporate structure that can support the issuance of public debt. Second, shipping bonds often 
provide borrowers with more flexible terms compared to shipping bank loans, since ship-
lending banks generally insist on floating interest rates and high collateral value—typically, 
the vessel being financed. Third, issuing public debt involves a less cumbersome and time-
consuming process than issuing equity capital. This is mainly because bonds typically involve 
fixed coupon rates and often lower borrowing cost due to risk sharing, less documentation and 
debt covenants, among other things. Fourth, bond issues do not change the ownership structure 
of the shipping company, whereas issuing equity capital dilutes its ownership. Fifth, raising 
funds through bond issues offer borrowers the opportunity to realise tax benefits. Accordingly, 
from an accounting perspective, interest coupon payments are treated as costs and reduce the 
tax-bill and the cost of capital for the shipping companies. Sixth, bond issues can provide an 
alternative to traditional bank finance during periods of credit crunches, such as during the 
recent global financial crisis. Seventh, the bulk of repayment for a bond issue comes at its 
maturity, thus easing the cash flows of shipping companies during its life; this is not the case 
for bank loans, where the repayment schedule is typically more evenly distributed, as it also 
involves capital repayment. Despite their benefits, however, shipping bonds tend to expose 
shipping investors to higher financial distress costs. This is mainly because renegotiating their 
terms with the bondholders is more complex and costly relative to shipping bank loans. This 
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limitation became more pronounced during the late 1990s and again during the global financial 
crisis when a number of shipping companies failed to restructure or renegotiate their repayment 
schedules with bondholders and defaulted on their bond payments (Stopford, 2009).  
A primary concern for shipping companies issuing public debt is its relatively higher cost of 
capital relative to shipping bank loans. This is reflected in the so-called ‘bond spread’, defined 
as the additional yield over the risk-free rate, that bond investors require as compensation for 
the risk premium they incur. Kavussanos and Tsouknidis (2014) document that, on average, 
the spreads of shipping bonds globally are between two and three times larger than the typical 
spread of corporate bonds in other sectors, placing them well into the high-yield segment of 
bond issues. One of the main reasons for carrying such large spreads relative to the rest of the 
corporate bond issues is to compensate the bondholder for the risks incurred when exposed to 
the shipping industry. These risks are primarily linked with the unique characteristics of the 
shipping industry outlined earlier in this paper.  
The extant literature investigating the factors explaining shipping bond spreads is relatively 
thin. Leggate (2000) focusses on 33 newly issued European shipping bonds over the 1997–
2000 period and reports a negative relation between credit ratings and bond coupons, and a 
positive relation between credit ratings and shipping market conditions. Grammenos and 
Arkoulis (2003) explore bond spread determinants of 30 new high-yield offerings issued by 
US-listed shipping companies during the 1993–2008 period. They document that shipping 
bond spreads are positively related to the issuer’s financial leverage and negatively related to 
credit ratings and shipping market conditions. However, these studies only examine the cross-
sectional variation in bond spreads, thus missing the time dimension that might be prevalent in 
the data. Grammenos et al. (2007) examine shipping bond spread determinants by estimating 
panel data regressions that capture this time dimension. The authors analyse a sample of 40 
seasoned high-yield bond offerings issued by US-listed shipping companies during the 1998–
2002 period. They find the main drivers of shipping bond spreads to be credit ratings, changes 
in shipping market earnings—which matched the findings of their 2003 study—as well as the 
term to maturity, the yield of 10-year treasury bonds and the yield of the Merrill Lynch single-
B index. 
In a related study, Grammenos et al. (2008) examine the default risk drivers of shipping bonds 
instead of bond spread determinants. The key financial variables associated with the probability 
of default are found to be the gearing ratio, the amount (value) raised through the bond issue 
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over the total assets ratio, the working capital over total assets ratio, the retained earnings over 
the total assets ratio and an industry-specific variable that captures the shipping market 
conditions at the time of issuance. They find that higher values of the gearing ratio, defined as 
the amount (value) of the bond issue raised over total assets, to be associated with higher 
probabilities of default. By contrast, variables capturing the shipping market conditions, the 
working capital over the total assets ratio and the retained earnings over the total assets ratio 
are all negatively related to the default probability of a company issuing high-yield bonds. 
Identifying the relevant factors for explaining the observed defaults in shipping bond issues is 
important if it leads to a model that is able to predict a-priori the probability of default of such 
bond issues. The authors assess the predictive ability of their model in a Type I and Type II 
errors framework (see Zavgren, 1983). A Type I error occurs when the model predicts that a 
bond will not default when it actually does. A Type II error occurs when the model predicts 
that a bond will default when it does not. Naturally, a Type I error is costlier than a Type II 
error. Overall, when forecasting in-sample, the specified model correctly predicts 96% of the 
observations, and the Type II error is 2.70%, whereas the Type I error is 7.69%.  
Finally, Kavussanos and Tsouknidis (2014) provide new empirical evidence concerning the 
determinants of global shipping bond spreads. They utilise a sample of 54 shipping bonds 
issued by listed shipping companies around the world during the 2003–2010 period. Panel data 
regressions are estimated and show significantly different results when two-way adjusted 
clustered standard errors (Petersen, 2009) are utilised. This casts doubt on previously reported 
findings in published studies, as evidently, results may be biased due to a lack of this correction. 
The main determinants of shipping bond spreads in the aforementioned study are found to be 
the liquidity and credit rating of the bond issue, the volatility of the stock market, the bond 
markets’ cyclicality and freight earnings. These findings are different from previous published 
research on this issue, as they reveal that shipping bond spreads reflect also the cyclicality 
observed in freight rates under different shipping market conditions. Specifically, no previous 
study has assessed the explanatory power of the cyclical bond issuers’ index—the Global 
Services Cyclical Index, GISC—on shipping bond spreads. Cyclicality is well known to be a 
major issue in the shipping industry (see Kavussanos and Alizadeh, 2001; Stopford, 2009), and 
such cyclicality is also revealed to be reflected in shipping bond spreads’ determinants. 
However, the GISC bond index is significant during the pre-crisis period, but becomes 
insignificant during the crisis period; it may be argued that under ‘normal’ market conditions, 
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market participants paid more attention to the cyclical variables prevailing in shipping when 
compared to the global financial crisis period. 
Overall, the literature on shipping bond spreads can be enriched by examining several 
significant aspects of the general corporate bond pricing literature. For example, existing 
studies have focussed primarily on assessing the liquidity risk involved in bond trading and 
reflected in bond spreads. The utilised measures include the number of trades for each bond 
per day or month, the number of zero trading days, an Amihud (2002)-inspired measure for 
bonds defined as the ratio of the daily absolute change in the bond’s price over the daily volume 
of the bond, and the bid-ask spread using Roll’s (1984) measure.8 Since the evidence in the 
general corporate bond pricing literature strongly points to bond markets compensating 
bondholders for bearing liquidity risk, it would be interesting to assess whether this is also the 
case for shipping bond issues, or whether other shipping-industry-related characteristics are 
more important for explaining the observed variation in shipping bond spreads. 
 
2.3.3. Public Equity and IPO Performance 
This section reviews empirical evidence on public equity financing and shipping IPO 
performance. It was only in the 1990s that the shipping industry started tapping the equity 
market as a funding source, and since then, a growing number of shipping companies have 
viewed public equity capital as an important source of capital. As Figure 2.1 illustrates, the 
estimated share of public equity, including both IPOs and follow-on offers, in shipping 
financing is approximately 12.1% during the 2007–2016 period. The comparative advantage 
of equity financing over debt comes from its strategic flexibility; that is, it comprises a 
sustainable financial management strategy regardless of shipping market conditions. When the 
shipping market is bullish, raising equity capital enables shipping companies to capture future 
growth opportunities, such as for vessel acquisition or replacement and increasing their market 
share. Conversely, when the market is bearish, equity capital can serve as a buffer against 
financial distress and as a source of financial flexibility. 
One of the stylised facts in companies’ public debut is the initial under-pricing, which 
comprises the difference between the closing price on the first day of trading minus the initial 
offer price. An under-priced offering indicates that a company sells its shares at a discount, 
                                                          
8 For details on bond liquidity measures, see Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012). 
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which eventually increases the cost of equity. This peculiarity of the IPO market also manifests 
in the shipping industry. In this vein, Cullinane and Gong (2002) report as much as 70.64% 
under-pricing in terms of initial raw returns and 70.70% in terms of market-adjusted abnormal 
returns in the Chinese transportation IPO market during the 1972–1998 period. Contrary to the 
fast-growing and volatile Chinese equity market, shipping IPOs in other markets exhibit a 
relatively lower degree of under-pricing. For example, Merikas et al. (2009) find an average of 
17.69% under-priced shipping IPOs—in terms of market-adjusted returns—in 14 major stock 
exchanges around the world during the 1984–2007 period. Investigating the US shipping IPO 
market, Merikas et al. (2010) and Grammenos and Papapostolou (2012b) report under-pricings 
of 4.44% and 2.69%, respectively.9 
Explanations for under-pricing in shipping IPOs rely largely on the existence of asymmetric 
information between participants. Cullinane and Gong (2002) argue that the severe under-
pricing of Chinese shipping IPOs is attributed to the higher level of ex ante uncertainty among 
investors for the transportation sector, as their heterogeneous estimates for the intrinsic value 
of a company lead to the initial over-valuation (Miller, 1977). Grammenos and Papapostolou 
(2012b) support the partial adjustment theory, which states that investors that provide their 
positive will to bid for offerings are rewarded in the form of under-pricing. 
Another puzzling price anomaly in the IPO market is the long-term underperformance, that is, 
the observation that IPO companies tend to underperform relative to the market—or the 
matched companies—in one to five years after their listing date. Grammenos and Arkoulis 
(1999) examine the performance of the IPOs in the shipping industry for the initial 24 months 
of trading in the secondary market. The portfolio of the examined shipping IPOs 
underperformed the local stock market indices by 36.79% 24 months after their initial offering. 
Moreover, the two-year holding period returns are positively related to the gearing ratio and 
negatively related to the fleet age of the examined shipping companies. In a related study, 
Merikas et al. (2009) explore the short- and long-term performance for a sample of 143 
shipping IPOs during the 1984–2007 period. By calculating buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHAR), the authors document an average under-pricing for shipping IPOs equal to 17.69% 
on the first day of the initial offering. This relatively small under-pricing is positively related 
to the age of the company, the reputation of the stock exchange where the IPO took place, and 
                                                          
9 Although the two studies are based on a similar period and on the same market (U.S.), there is a difference in the sample size. 
In Merikas et al. (2010), the sample includes 61 shipping IPOs during 1987-2007, while Grammenos and Papapostolou (2012b) 
examine 51 IPOs during 1987-2008. The variation in the number of observations results from different sampling criteria. For 
example Grammenos and Papapostolou (2012b) do not consider IPOs of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPAC). 
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the stock market’s conditions during the period when the shipping firm went public. 
Furthermore, the authors report an average underperformance of 4.40% when comparing the 
price of the initial listing of the stock to its price after 24 months.  
Similarly, post-IPO underperformance is also documented in the initial offerings of port 
operators. For example, Satta et al. (2017) examine  a sample of 93 IPOs in the port industry 
over the 2000–2015 period. Overall, the sample of examined port IPOs experienced poor long-
term performance, as both BHAR and CAR measures are negative for 24- and a 36-month 
time-frames. For example, the authors report a 24-month BHAR equal to 5.13%. Regarding 
the determinants of IPOs’ long-term performance, all the macroeconomic variables possess 
some degree of explanatory power; they include financial-market-related variables, host 
country’s institutional factors and port-industry-specific variables. Favourable market 
conditions have been found to increase stock prices and reduce risk perception in the port 
industry, where a number of institutional investors operate (Rodrigue et al., 2011), and in this 
way, to favour higher long-term performances. Regarding institutional factors, IPOs issued in 
host capital markets with a high level of political stability have displayed higher long-term 
performance, whereas the level of voice and accountability has not been found to impact IPOs’ 
performance. Finally, industry-specific characteristics, such as IPOs issued by port authorities 
in countries that have started port liberalisation and privatisation processes for a long time, 
have exhibited lower 36-month BAHRs and CARs. 
The empirical literature on public listing of shipping companies has suggested that IPO 
performance is driven by industry characteristics, such as shipping market conditions and 
freight rate volatility, as well as general economic factors. However, the impact of some 
important drivers of IPO performance identified in the general finance literature have not been 
investigated in shipping IPOs. For instance, given the more recent evolution of corporate 
governance and ownership structure in the shipping industry, as discussed later in this paper, 
future research can examine how these trends affect post-shipping IPO performance. For 
instance, if better corporate governance can result in better motivated, planned and executed 
IPOs, it is likely that investors will observe a positive association between governance metrics 
and IPO performance. Further, McBain and Krause (1989) and Bruton et al. (2010) find that 
insider ownership and ownership concentration, respectively, can affect IPO performance, 
which provides fruitful ground for further research in the shipping industry. 
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Furthermore, future research should attempt to offer insights concerning the evolution of 
shipping companies’ access to public equity markets. During the post-crisis period, raising 
funds from capital markets has been relatively scarce, despite the slight recovery in 2010–2011. 
Whether the shipping IPO market will recover and when remains an open question, and 
opinions in the industry on this matter diverge significantly. 10 , 11  The differences in the 
characteristics and drivers of the shipping public equity markets before and after the 2008 crisis 
deserves further investigation. For instance, Pribor and Lind (2016) point out that the success 
of IPOs during the post-crisis period largely depends on segment-specific drivers based on the 
observation that roughly half of shipping IPOs in the US during the 2013–2015 period were 
carried out by gas carriers during relatively favourable freight market conditions. One 
interesting topic of future research would be identifying the key attributes of successful 
shipping IPOs and assessing their impact within different shipping sub-segments. In addition, 
it would also be interesting to investigate whether listed shipping companies are willing to 
strive for a secondary public offering during the post-crisis period. The growth of private 
placements among listed shipping companies (so-called ‘private investment in public equity’, 
or PIPE) in 2016 was compelling, which was not the case before.12 Due to its characteristics, 
namely, shorter issuance time and cheaper costs, a PIPE can form an effective financing option 
for companies facing difficulties in raising equity capital. 13  Chen et al. (2010a) find that 
companies with high levels of information asymmetry and poor operating performance tend to 
prefer PIPEs over public offerings. Future research can shed light onto the pros and cons of 
this alternative financing form. 
 
2.3.4. Ship Funds and Their Performance 
Shipping funds constitute a distinct source of financing for the shipping industry. Vessels 
financed through shipping funds are off-balance sheet assets, and thus offer financial flexibility 
and tax benefits to shipping companies. The German Kommanditgesellschaft (KG) and 
Norwegian Kommandittselskap (KS) have been regarded as the most successful forms of 
shipping funds, as from just 2000 to 2008, approximately €20 billion of equity investment in 
commercial ships was raised in the German KG market alone (Johns and Sturm, 2015). 
                                                          
10 Lloyd’s List, ‘Shipping IPOs will return’, March 21, 2017. 
11 Shipping Watch, ‘Lloyd Fonds: Shipping markets too weak for IPO’, March 22, 2016. 
12 IHS Fairplay, ‘Shipping sees more signs of life in US capital markets’, June 10, 2016. 
13 Hogboom, J. D. ‘Private investment in public equity: An overview’, New Jersey Law Journal, 177(7), August 16, 2004. 
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However, since the post-Lehman Brothers financial and economic crisis, there has been limited 
new financing activity in the primary KG market (Simic et al., 2016). Except for some minor 
differences, the KG and KS funds are tax-driven leasing schemes, where typically a special 
purpose company (SPC) is established for the purpose of owning and chartering a single vessel. 
The management company is in charge of negotiating with banks and selling equities to private 
or institutional investors, as approximately 70% of vessel acquisition costs are covered from 
bank loans in the case of KG funds. Prior to 2008, many shipping companies were significantly 
expanding their fleets via ordering newbuilding vessels or purchasing second-hand ones. Such 
extensive investment in shipping assets was justified by the record high freight rates and the 
numerous financing options available at the time, which involved favourable terms and 
conditions. In particular, the German KG scheme was responsible for financing almost 26% of 
all containership newbuilding orders during the 2006–2008 period, as well as a third of the 
world fleet as of March 2013.14 However, following the KG market collapse during the post-
2008 period, more than 300 one-ship companies funded via the KG financing scheme were 
declared insolvent, rendering the prospects of this form of shipping funds market in doubt. 
Currently, activity in this market remains low, despite the occasional but weak signs of 
recovery for the Norwegian KS market.15,16 
Shipping funds are closed-end funds that are legally treated as limited partnerships. Therefore, 
shipping funds are not publicly traded once their target capital amounts are raised. Accordingly, 
potential investors in shipping funds possess limited information regarding the risk-return 
profile of their investment. These features lead to a lack of reliable performance data due to 
non-observable market prices during the funds’ lifetime. The lack of observable market prices 
is also the reason why few studies have examined the shipping funds market. Drobetz and 
Tegtmeier (2013) construct a performance index for the German KG funds based on aggregate 
data for 323 one-ship companies over the 1996–2007 period. The authors construct indices of 
German KG funds for the container, dry bulk and tanker shipping sub-segments, as well as an 
aggregate KG index, using information from cash flow statements of each fund, and they 
compare their statistical properties with those of existing shipping-related indices. They find 
that the variation of the constructed indices depends more on vessel price indices, such as 
Clarksons’ newbuilding price index and Clarksons’ second-hand price index, than on freight 
                                                          
14 Journal of Commerce, ‘Container ship financing remains available despite collapse of Germany’s KG system; March 12th, 
2013.  
15 Lloyd’s List, ‘KG insolvencies accelerate past the 300 mark’, November 26, 2013. 
16 Clarksons Platou, Market Report, July 2015. 
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rate indices, such as the ClarkSea Index.17 The authors use principal component analysis (PCA) 
to examine whether common structures and linkages exist between the different indices they 
construct. The resulting factor loadings indicate that the KG index exhibits peculiar risk-return 
characteristics. Specifically, the PCA identifies one statistical factor that is specific to KG funds 
in the sense that only the KG index loads significantly on this particular factor. For this reason, 
the authors argue that their constructed index constitutes a new index for measuring the 
development of the market value of equity and distributions in the form of a performance index 
and incorporates specific information that is primarily of importance for one-ship companies. 
In another study, Simic et al. (2016) investigate the valuation efficiency of the secondary 
market for the German KG ship funds. To this end, they examine whether the asset value of 
shipping funds is derived primarily from the market value of the KG equity traded in the 
secondary market and the book value of debt. The authors utilise a sample of 341 transactions 
of container shipping funds executed during the 2007–2012 period. The results reveal that 
variations in the value of shipping fund can be explained by the ship values derived from the 
market of second-hand ships, the value of their time-charter contracts and the value of the 
option to extend the time-charter contracts. They also find that KG funds are traded at a 
discount relative to their fundamental values, possibly due to the characteristics of closed-end 
funds; the latter include market illiquidity, lack of information and management costs. 
Overall, the literature devoted to ship funds as an alternative source of capital is relatively thin. 
An interesting and underexplored research avenue in this area would be to examine whether 
the use of shipping funds as a source of capital exerts a positive influence on shipping 
companies’ financial performance. Future research in the area should also investigate the effect 
of regulatory changes on shipping funds’ performance. Specifically, the new German Capital 
Investment Act (Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch – KAGB), which came into force in July 2013, sets 
several rules for improving the financial status and management quality of KG funds. However, 
strict regulations are likely to prevent KG companies from launching new funds and to hamper 
private investor participation in the market. In addition, the clause that a single KG fund should 
invest in several assets, such as vessels, real estate, aircraft and forest, in order to maintain and 
increase its risk diversification is expected to fundamentally transform the structure and 
characteristics of these funds.  
                                                          
17 The ClarkSea Index is a weighted average index of earnings for the main vessel types, where the weighting is based on the 
number of vessels in each fleet sector. 
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2.3.5. Other Financing Sources 
This section reviews the previous research focussing on alternative sources of shipping finance. 
Special financing schemes for the shipping industry trace back to the time when commercial 
shipping originated, namely, since the Bottomry in the Code of Hammurabi in 1792 BCE.18 
During the era of rapid industrialisation in the second half of the 20th century, major 
shipbuilding countries in East Asia (Japan, South Korea and China) indirectly subsidised their 
shipbuilding industry by offering loans to shipowners at competitive interest rates, mainly 
through export credit agencies (ECAs). As traditional bank lending became scarce post-2008, 
the role of such alternative ship financing sources became instrumental. Much of the funding 
needs of the shipping industry during other historical market collapses, such as those of the 
mid-1970s or the early 1980s with the oil crisis, was met through state-backed financing. This 
type of financing typically entails governments of shipbuilding countries providing incentives 
to place newbuilding orders to their domestic shipyards, giving rise to shipbuilding credit 
(Stopford, 2009). In the 1920s, the German and French governments offered favourable credit 
terms to help their yards win business against the then dominant British shipbuilding industry. 
During the recession of the 1930s, the Danish, French and German governments all offered 
government credit schemes to owners. The practice of subsidising credit reappeared in the first 
major post-Second World War recession of 1958–1963, and it was regulated by the OECD 
Understanding on Export Credit in 1969 (Stopford, 2009).  
While many banks were adversely affected by the recent shipping market collapse as well as 
the ensuing regulatory constraints, such as the implementation of BASEL III, which forced 
them to cut back their ship-lending business, the question of whether alternative financing 
sources can meet the funding requirements of the shipping industry thus far remains 
unaddressed. Various market sources have highlighted that the resurgence of ECAs of major 
shipbuilding countries and the recent involvement of PE funds have played a key role in closing 
the funding gap during the post-2008 era. Although the contribution of ECA financing was 
quite limited during the pre-crisis period, during which bank loans were easily accessible at 
attractive leverage and pricing terms, there has been growing interest among the shipping 
                                                          
18 Bottomry in the maritime jargon is the keel of a vessel. It is a legal arrangement under which a shipowner borrows money 
from underwriters and distributes a pre-specified amount of money after the ship’s safe return. If the voyage is not successful 
due to force majeure, the shipowner is exempted from repayment. In this regard, this form of financing is regarded as the 
origin of both bank mortgages and insurances. 
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industry in such government-backed schemes for the past few years (Alexopoulos and Stratis, 
2016). At the same time, ECAs—mostly based in China, South Korea and Japan—are willing 
to expand their lending to shipping companies in an effort to support the domestic shipbuilding 
industry, which is considered a major driver of their export-driven economies. The growth of 
ECA financing is highlighted in the rise of the Bank of China, the Korea EXIM Bank, and the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in the league table of ship-lending banks. 19 
Specifically, the lending portfolio of the Bank of China shot up from USD 12 billion in 2012 
to USD 21 billion in 2015. Considering that ECAs are playing an increasingly important role 
in shipping finance, they are directly affecting the shipbuilding and the shipowning businesses. 
Their importance is expected to increase even further as a result of the increased regulatory 
environment in shipping and the governments’ efforts to promote their shipbuilding industries 
and exports. As a result, future research should focus on analysing ECAs’ lending policies, 
their lending parameters (which are governed by OECD rules) as well as the credit criteria and 
credit scoring or rating models that are employed by these institutions in lending practice. 
Pires et al. (2005) examine the economic significance of the Merchant Marine Fund, a subsidy 
scheme for Brazilian shipping and shipbuilding companies. The analysis reveals that the ship 
financing system’s effectiveness in reducing capital costs of Brazilian shipping companies is 
not significant. In another study, Yolland (1979) discusses the use of Eurodollars as a potential 
funding source for shipping companies amid the depressed market conditions in the mid-
1970s.20 Considering the fact that shipping freight rates are paid primarily in US dollars, the 
author argues that the Euro-market can be a favourable financing source for shipping 
companies seeking to reduce their exposure to foreign exchange risk.  
Ship leasing is another source of shipping finance with unique characteristics. In general, 
leasing has been extensively utilised by financially constrained shipowners in the form of sale 
and leaseback agreements. Under such an agreement, the vessel is sold to a SPC controlled by 
a new owner (the lessor), and at the same time is chartered back—under a long-term bareboat 
or time-charter agreement—by the shipowner who originally sold it (the lessee). In this way, 
the original shipowner cashes in approximately 80–90% of the vessel’s fair market value (FMV) 
while retaining its operation under the lease agreement. Under a finance lease, a purchase 
obligation exists after the bareboat charter (or time-charter) agreement expires and the lease is 
                                                          
19 Lloyd’s List, ‘Asian shipping banks move up top lenders league table’, December 2, 2015. 
20 Eurodollars are defined as dollar-denominated deposits at banks outside the U.S. 
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treated as an on-balance sheet item. In contrast, under an operating lease agreement, there is 
not a purchase obligation and the lease is treated as an off-balance sheet item. The popularity 
of both operating and finance leases in shipping became more prevalent following the onset of 
the financial crisis in 2008 as an alternative source of finance, especially in China (according 
to Marine Money). 
A study by Li (2006) discusses the pros and cons of ship leasing. The author argues that ship 
leasing can allot shipping business risk equally among the partaking sides. In addition, lessors 
can benefit from tax redemptions, retaining the company’s working capital and longer 
repayment structures relative to other funding sources. Furthermore, retaining the working 
capital is possible since the lessee shipping company is not required to make a capital outlay 
for acquiring a vessel. With respect to financing newbuildings through a leasing scheme, stage 
payments are made under the building contract. In this case, the interest payable on the funds 
raised during the construction period can be capitalised into the transaction. However, leasing 
is not free of issues as a shipping financing source. For example, ship leasing is likely to restrict 
the lessee’s control over the vessel’s operations and can often set-off legal conflicts due to early 
contract termination. In addition, the benefits of leasing as a shipping financing scheme are 
limited when the shipping company is subject to low creditworthiness and operating profits. 
In addition, PE funds comprise another important (alternative) shipping financing source, 
despite being largely untapped in the shipping finance area prior to 2008. Since then, however, 
PE companies have played an active role in providing funding required by shipping companies, 
especially when traditional bank financing became scarce. During the 2007–2016 period, PE 
accounted for approximately 3.2% of shipping company financing, reaching a peak of USD 
7.5 billion in 2013 (see Figure 2.1). The relatively recent surge of PE interest in shipping 
investment is largely driven by the deadlock in bank lending coupled with the historically low 
valuations of shipping assets during the post-crisis period. Although the growing presence of 
PE funds in shipping may positively affect the funding gap discussed earlier, it needs to be 
noted that such funds typically target investment opportunities at the bottom of the market 
cycle, which could in turn potentially lead to worsening the prolonged oversupply problem and 
exert a destabilising impact on the market.21 Despite its economic importance, PE participation 
in the shipping industry has not attracted much research to date. Only Abdullah et al. (2016) 
propose a conceptual framework for the use of Islamic PE in shipping. The authors argue that 
                                                          
21 UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 2014. 
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Islamic PE can be attractive to retail and institutional investors to promote and develop 
international shipping in Malaysia, which is also an aim of government policies on shipping 
and Islamic PE issues. 
Future research in the area of PE involvement in the shipping industry can provide valuable 
contributions by investigating the real economic effect of PE participation in the shipping 
industry. In this regard, it is worthwhile to examine the relation between the different forms of 
PE participation and financial performance. Broadly, PE companies’ investments in the 
shipping industry can be divided into (i) acquisition of equity, (ii) bridge or mezzanine finance, 
(iii) purchase of debt, (iv) sale-leaseback transactions, and (v) formation of joint ventures.22 
Thus, how PE participation affects different performance metrics, such as short- and long-term 
abnormal stock returns, internal rate of return, accounting profits, operation improvement, and 
ultimately, company value deserves further investigation. 
 
2.3.6. Capital Structure of Shipping Companies 
A company’s capital structure is a function of the sources of capital used in the financing of 
investment projects. As highlighted earlier in this section, shipping companies have gradually 
diversified their sources of capital by reducing their dependence on traditional bank financing 
and relying more on alternative sources of capital, such as equity capital (IPOs and seasoned 
equity offerings, or SEOs), PE funds, ship funds, corporate bonds and alternative financing 
schemes, such as ship leasing and ECAs.  
Since the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), three major competing theories have 
been offered to explain the drivers of corporate capital structure, namely, the trade-off theory 
(Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973), the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and the 
market timing theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). The trade-off theory posits that the optimal 
capital structure balances the benefits and costs of debt. In contrast, the pecking order theory 
and market timing theories essentially imply that there is no optimal capital structure. Instead, 
the pecking order theory suggests that companies should follow a certain financing hierarchy 
contingent on the cost of each source of capital. Thus, they should first utilise internal financing 
where available, followed by debt financing, with equity being raised only as a last resort. 
Finally, the market timing theory broadly argues that a company’s capital structure should be 
                                                          
22 UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 2013. 
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driven by the extent to which its equity is misvalued by the market. This theory suggests that a 
company’s capital structure is essentially determined by its past market-timing behaviour and 
not driven by an optimal financing mix. However, a great deal of research has suggested that 
none of these three major theories can entirely explain corporate financing decisions, but rather, 
that capital structure is time-varying and shaped by company-specific and industry-specific 
factors (Graham and Leary, 2011; Lemmon et al., 2008). 
Regarding the literature devoted to the capital structure of shipping companies, Grammenos 
and Papapostolou (2012a) argue that the capital structure of shipping companies in the 2000s 
best corresponds to the market timing theory, while the pecking order theory is more 
representative of the 1990s. The authors argue that the increase in IPOs and the issuing of 
public debt in the 2000s is driven by shipping companies seeking alternative funding sources, 
which is consistent with the theoretical prediction of the market timing theory. However, 
Drobetz et al. (2013) study 155 listed shipping companies around the world during the 1992–
2010 period and find that there is weak evidence in favour of the market timing theory. 
Specifically, the authors explore whether listed shipping companies follow a target capital 
structure and its adjustment dynamics when there are deviations from the target leverage ratio. 
Their results indicate that when compared with industrial companies from the G7 countries, 
shipping companies exhibit higher leverage ratios and financial risk. Moreover, asset 
tangibility is shown to be positively related to leverage, and its economic impact is more 
pronounced compared to other industries; while profitability and asset risk are inversely related 
to leverage. Moreover, their results suggest that shipping companies’ speed of adjustment to 
the target leverage ratio is much higher than for other industrial companies. The authors 
attribute this to the substantial costs of deviations from the target leverage ratio due to shipping 
companies’ high expected costs of financial distress. Finally, Drobetz et al. (2013) report that 
the leverage ratio of shipping companies is significantly higher (41%) than that of the average 
industrial company in major developed countries (25%).  
In another study, Drobetz et al. (2016a) investigate the impact of cash flow shocks on 
investment and financing decisions of shipping companies in different economic conditions. 
They report that, due to the high volatility in operating cash flows and asset values, the 
financing behaviour of shipping companies is more sensitive to adverse cash flow effects 
relative to companies operating in other industries. However, there are differences in financing 
and investing behaviours between financially healthy and weak shipping companies. While 
financially healthy companies could increase their long-term debt even in the post-2008 crisis 
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period, financially weak companies fail to raise sufficient funds regardless of the economic 
conditions. The authors also examine the importance of financial flexibility by investigating 
the level of excess cash holdings of shipping companies in different economic situations. They 
document that financially weak shipping companies tend to have higher cash reserves during 
‘non-crisis’ periods in order to mitigate the adverse effects of cash flow deterioration during 
‘crisis’ periods. However, the authors provide evidence that while financially weak shipping 
companies had very limited access to the debt markets during the recent crisis, financially 
healthy companies have still been able to increase long-term debt. 
The importance of maintaining a high level of cash holdings (financial flexibility) is also 
supported by Drobetz et al. (2013) in order for shipping companies to overcome the counter-
cyclicality in their financial leverage. The authors further argue that shipping companies 
incorporate risk management considerations into their financing decisions (see also Albertijn 
et al., 2011; Meulbroek, 2002). Similarly, Nam and An (2017) highlight the importance of 
financial flexibility by investigating the impact of default risk on company value. They show a 
positive relationship between Altman’s K-Score—instead of Altman’s Z-score (where a higher 
score means lower default risk)—and financial performance, as measured by return on assets 
(ROA) for a sample of Korean shipping and logistics companies during the 2003–2012 
period.23  
Future research on the highly levered capital structure of shipping companies should provide 
more insights by investigating the benefits of debt financing with regards to reducing agency 
costs and facilitating tax savings. Overall, diversification in the sources of finance is arguably 
the most significant evolution in shipping companies’ modern financial management, and as a 
consequence, it has motivated a significant amount of research. Table 2.5 summarises the 
current evidence on the available sources of finance and the determinants of capital structure 
in the shipping industry. 
 
                                                          
23 Altman K-Score (1996) is an alternative model of Altman Z-Score (1968) for estimating the default risk of (South) Korean 
companies. While the original Z-Score model considers five financial ratios (working capital/total assets, retained 
earnings/total assets, earnings before interest and tax/total assets, equity/debt, sales/total assets), the K-Score model consists 
of four variables (total assets, retained earnings/total assets, sales/total assets, equity/total assets). 
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Table 2.5 Summary of Literature on Sources of Finance in Shipping and Capital Structure (sorted by year of 
publication and names of authors) 
STUDY DESCRIPTION 
SAMPLE 
MAIN RESULTS 
Observations Period 
Yolland (1979) 
Assessing the use of Eurodollars in 
shipping finance 
Descriptive study - 
 Short-term Eurodollar deposits can be beneficial for long-term 
ship lending 
Grammenos and 
Arkoulis (1999)  
Exploration of the long-term 
performance of shipping IPOs 
27 IPOs 
1987–
1998 
 IPOs underperform stock indices by 37% when calculating 24-
month CARs 
 Long-term performance is positively associated with the 
shipping market condition and financial leverage at the time of 
IPOs, but negatively with the fleet age 
Leggate (2000)  
Investigation of the determinants of 
bond spreads for a sample of 
European shipping companies 
33 bond  
issuances 
1997–
2000 
 Credit ratings are negatively associated with bond coupons, 
but positively with shipping market conditions 
Cullinane and Gong 
(2002)  
Investigation of the short-term 
performance of the Chinese 
transportation IPOs 
84 IPOs 
1972–
1998 
 IPOs are under-priced by 70.76% due to their higher level of 
uncertainty 
Dimitras et al. (2002)  
Application of the UTADIS method 
for constructing a credit evaluation 
model of bank shipping loans 
Case study - 
 The following criteria along with their weights are found to be 
relevant: quality of management (33.97%), credit history 
(19.59%), financial characteristics (12.35), fleet (10.63%), and 
special proposal (8.25%) 
Grammenos and 
Arkoulis (2003)  
Investigation of factors affecting 
shipping high yield bonds in the US 
30 bond  
issuances 
1993–
1998 
 Bond spreads of shipping companies are positively related to 
issuer’s financial leverage, but negatively to credit rating and 
shipping market conditions 
Pires et al. (2005)  
An analysis of the effectiveness of 
the Brazilian special shipping 
financing system 
Case study - 
 The effectiveness of the Brazilian shipping financing system 
is not significant for reducing the capital cost of shipping 
companies 
Li (2006)  
A review of the advantages and 
disadvantages of ship leasing 
Case study - 
 Advantages of ship leasing: tax redemptions, efficient working 
capital management and better financing conditions 
 Disadvantages of ship leasing: limited vessel control and 
potential legal conflicts 
Grammenos et al. 
(2007)  
Investigation of factors affecting the 
pricing of seasoned shipping high-
yield bonds in US 
40 seasoned bond 
issuances 
1988–
2002 
 The following factors are important in explaining US shipping 
bond spreads: credit rating, years to maturity, changes in 
earnings, yields and US equity market indices 
Grammenos et al. 
(2008) 
Exploration of the factors explaining 
and predicting defaults for US-listed 
shipping bonds 
50 bond  
issuances 
2003–
2010 
 The probability of default is positively associated with 
leverage and issue amount/total assets, but negatively with 
liquidity and shipping market conditions 
Merikas et al. (2009)  
Investigation of short- and long-term 
performance of global shipping 
IPOs 
143 IPOs 
1984–
2007 
 Using market-adjusted returns, IPOs are revealed to undergo 
under-pricing equal to 18% in the first day and 16% in the 
long-term 
 Long-term performance is positively related to the company 
age and the reputation of the exchange, but negatively to the 
reputation of the underwriter and the hot IPO market 
Merikas et al. (2010)  
Investigation of short-term 
performance of shipping IPOs in US 
61 IPOs 
1987–
2007 
 IPOs are under-priced by 4.4% when using market-adjusted 
returns 
Grammenos and 
Papapostolou 
(2012b) 
Testing hypotheses on under-pricing 
in US shipping IPOs 
51 IPOs 
1987–
2008 
 IPOs are under-priced by 2.69% in market-adjusted returns 
 The partial adjustment theory is supported when explaining 
under-pricing in IPOs 
Drobetz et al. (2013)  
Analysis of the capital structure 
choices of shipping companies 
1,442  
company-years 
1992–
2010 
 Capital structure of shipping companies demonstrates higher 
speed of rebalancing towards the target leverage ratio. 
 Financial leverage ratio of shipping companies is positively 
associated with asset tangibility, but negatively with 
profitability, asset risk and operational leverage 
Drobetz and 
Tegtmeier (2013)  
Constructing and assessing 
performance indices of German KG 
funds 
323 funds 
1996–
2007 
 The indices appear to depend on ship prices and reflect 
idiosyncratic risk-return characteristics of KG funds 
Gong et al. (2013)  
A questionnaire-based survey of 
bank financing practices for 
shipping projects in Hong Kong 
12 banks 2008 
 Banks assign higher weighting to loan quality and security 
 Banks are overall reducing their exposures to shipping after 
the global financial crisis 
Kavussanos and 
Tsouknidis (2014)  
Investigation of factors explaining 
the bond spreads changes of global 
shipping bonds 
54  
bond issuances 
2003–
2010 
 Bond liquidity is the most influential factor in explaining 
changes in shipping bond spreads as well as stock market 
volatility and cyclicality in bond and shipping markets 
Gavalas and 
Syriopoulos (2014)  
Developing a multi-criteria 
assessment model for shipping bank 
loans applications 
Case study - 
 The following criteria, along with their weights, are identified: 
quality of management (36.37%), financial ratios (29.52%), 
leverage (18.67%) and market characteristics (15.05%) 
Drobetz et al. 
(2016a)  
Investigation of the financing and 
investment decisions’ sensitivity to 
changes in cash flows for listed 
shipping companies 
3038  
company-years 
1989–
2012 
 The financing decision of shipping companies is more 
sensitive to adverse cash flow effects compared to companies 
in other industries 
 Financing and investing behaviours vary depending on 
financial conditions of shipping companies 
 Shipping companies adjust their excess cash holdings to 
maintain financial flexibility 
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STUDY DESCRIPTION 
SAMPLE 
MAIN RESULTS 
Observations Period 
Kavussanos and 
Tsouknidis (2016) 
 
Developing a logit credit scoring 
model for assessing default risk in 
shipping bank loans 
484  
loan-years 
1997–
2011 
 The following variables are important in assessing default risk 
in shipping bank loans: current and future shipping market 
conditions, shipowner’s chartering policy and loan pricing 
Mitroussi et al. 
(2016)  
Application of logit credit scoring 
model for shipping bank loans 
30 loans 
2005–
2009 
 Both financial and non-financial factors explain the 
performance of shipping bank loans 
 Borrower’s experience and market conditions are important in 
assessing default risk for shipping bank loans 
Simic et al. (2016)  
Testing the valuation efficiency of 
the secondary market for KG funds 
341 funds 
2007–
2012 
 The secondary market for KG funds exhibits a high degree of 
valuation efficiency 
 KG funds are traded at discount relative to their fundamental 
values 
Lozinskaia et al. 
(2017) 
Investigation of the determinants of 
observed defaults for shipping 
companies 
826 
company-years 
2001–
2016 
 The probability of default for shipping companies is positively 
associated with overvaluation (Tobin’s Q), but negatively 
associated with GDP growth and company size 
Nam and An (2017) 
Investigation of the impact of 
default risk on company value for 
Korean shipping and logistics 
companies 
2,755 
company-years 
2003–
2012 
 The higher the Altman K-Score (the lower default risk), the 
higher the company value 
Satta et al. (2017)  
Investigation of the long-term 
performance of global port 
operators’ IPOs 
93 IPOs 
2000–
2015 
 Port IPOs underperform by 12.18% 
 Port IPO performance is positively associated with political 
stability of the host capital market, but negatively associated 
with a bullish stock market, the state-ownership of the issuer 
and the period of port privatisation in the issuer’s country 
 
2.4. Shipping Investment and Valuation Methods 
Having reviewed the financing choices and associated implications for companies operating in 
the shipping industry, this section focusses on investment decisions and their impact on 
company value, as well as the most common investment valuation methods (capital budgeting) 
employed in shipping. One of the instrumental factors determining the success or failure of a 
company is the growth and value creation it achieves through internal and inorganic (M&As) 
investments. Given the capital intensiveness of shipping investments and the high degree of 
uncertainty pertaining to the associated assets, the choice of investment projects, along with 
their profitability, is of critical importance to the value of shipping companies. To this end, this 
section provides an overview of existing research on the key considerations and factors that 
affect shipping investment decisions, the core and alternative investment valuation methods 
employed, the cost of capital and shipping investments, the risk-return trade-off of different 
market segments, and the value creation potential of inorganic investment decisions in the 
shipping industry. 
 
2.4.1. Key Considerations in Shipping Investment Decision 
A company’s value is conditional on the combined value of the assets it holds. Equally, the 
value of a shipowning company can be derived by taking the present value of the vessels in its 
fleet. The primary scope of the investment appraisal process within the context of corporate 
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financial management in shipping companies is to reach value-enhancing investment decisions 
based on the effects of and interactions among several structural industry-specific factors. Such 
factors include freight rates, newbuilding and scrapping volumes, demand for shipping services, 
newbuilding and second-hand vessel prices, ship-building costs and bunker fuel prices, among 
others (Beenstock, 1985; Strandenes, 1984). Along these lines, an important question the extant 
literature has attempted to address is what the drivers of shipping investment decisions are. 
To address this question, Miyashita (1982) examines the dry bulk segment during the 1963–
1976 period and reports several determinants of shipping investments, such as freight rate 
income per unit of transport capacity, the growth in freight rate income, average vessel size, 
marginal capital efficiency (freight rates-to-newbuilding prices ratio) and the ratio of broken-
up tonnage to total fleet. Xu and Yip (2012) investigate the factors affecting shipping 
investment decisions by analysing annual newbuilding contracts in 15 major shipbuilding 
countries during the 1996–2008 period. Their results indicate that spot freight rates, existing 
fleet size (market supply) and world trade volume (demand for shipping services) are the key 
determinants of shipowners’ contracting decisions. The authors argue that their findings 
highlight the important role that shipowner’s confidence in the freight market plays in making 
newbuilding investment decisions.  
Another strand of research has suggested that shipping investments can be explained in part by 
heuristics based on behavioural or psychological patterns, such as attitude towards risk, market 
sentiment, intuition and gut feeling. Along these lines, Berg Andreassen (1990) proposes an 
investment decision-making stochastic model for the tramp (dry bulk and tanker) sector based 
on shipowners’ attitude towards risk. According to the model, shipowners can be divided into 
two groups based on their investment behaviour: ‘risk averters’ and ‘risk lovers’. The analysis 
shows that ‘risk averters’ tend to adjust their fleet capacity towards a long-term average 
regardless of shipping market conditions. On the other hand, ‘risk lovers’ tend to expand their 
fleet capacity in volatile markets. 
While heuristics-induced decision making possesses benefits in the sense that it allows 
shipowners to swiftly exploit the dynamics of the shipping market, it can also lead to systematic 
errors or cognitive biases under certain conditions (Gigerenzer, 1991). This manifests in the 
rather unpredictable shipping market collapses that can be largely attributed to false consensus 
or herding behaviour among shipowners, leading to biased investment decision making in 
relation to newbuilding orders (Scarsi, 2007). Accordingly, Greenwood and Hanson (2015) 
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find shipowners to be subject to behavioural effects that can explain the fluctuation in vessel 
prices and, as a result, shipping investment activity. Based on a sample of monthly second-
hand vessel prices and time-charter rates in the dry bulk segment during the 1976–2011 period, 
they find the return on capital of a benchmark investment strategy (operating a newly acquired 
vessel and selling it one year later) to be highly volatile. However, they document that the 
returns of the investment strategy are predictable and associated with shipping investment 
cycles; that is, investment booms are followed by low future returns. They conclude that the 
association between boom-bust patterns and returns of shipping investment can be explained 
by two biases, which concurrently affect shipowners’ behaviours. First, they tend to be too 
optimistic concerning the persistence of demand shocks, and second, they are competition 
negligent in the sense that they underestimate their competitors’ investment response to 
demand shocks. The authors develop a model of industry equilibrium dynamics that shows that 
errors in shipowners’ expectations about future demand and market competition leads 
companies to overpay for vessels and overinvest during booming markets. 
Papapostolou et al. (2017) further examine the impact of shipowners’ behaviour in shipping 
investments by decomposing the overall psychology effect into unintentional and intentional 
herding.24 Examining newbuilding and scrap tonnage for the 1996–2015 period, they find that 
the decision of ordering new vessels and scrapping old ones is largely affected by unintentional 
herding in the shipping industry. This implies that shipowners’ herd behaviour is driven by 
common characteristics (e.g. their information analysis skills, academic background), leading 
them to make comparable investment decisions. They also report that herding behaviours spill 
over from the newbuilding market to the scrap market, while the unintentional herding effect 
in the latter market is more significant during periods of shipping market deterioration. 
Similarly, Alizadeh et al. (2017) investigate the impact of speculative investor behaviour 
associated with heterogeneous beliefs on the volatility of second-hand dry bulk vessel prices 
during the 1991–2016 period. For this purpose, they segregate speculative investors in the 
second-hand market into momentum investors who tend to follow market trends (i.e. 
buying/selling vessels after a period of high/poor returns from the sale and purchase of vessels) 
and contrarian investors who tend to follow counter-cyclical strategies (i.e. buying and selling 
vessels in contrast to the prevailing market sentiment). They report that momentum strategies 
perform better than contrarian (buy-and-hold) strategies, and also that a higher degree of 
                                                          
24 While the intentional herding indicates behaviours of less informed or less established investors mimicking reputable peers, 
the unintentional herding indicates co-movement of investors driven by similar market fundamentals and characteristics. 
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momentum (contrarian) in investors’ participation can lead to an increase (decrease) in the 
volatility of second-hand vessel prices. 
The ‘time-to-build’ effect can also influence shipping investment decisions. Since the freight 
market is highly volatile and its outlook can change rapidly, market conditions are likely to 
change during the period in which a vessel is being built, which is typically between two to 
three years. Consequently, shipowners’ contracting decisions are more sensitive to vessel 
employment prospects and freight rate forecasts than the order price. To this end, Kalouptsidi 
(2014) investigates the impact of newbuilding delivery time on vessel prices. A dynamic entry 
and exit model for a vessel is estimated using a dataset of second-hand prices, time-charter 
rates and the newbuilding orderbook in the dry bulk segment. In this setting, the construction 
lag for a newbuilding vessel represents a combination of adjustment costs and uncertainty in 
the shipping investment process.25  The results indicate that the shipping investment level 
becomes significantly more volatile as the ‘time-to-build’ effect declines, implying that 
shipowners respond to economic conditions more swiftly as the construction lag for a 
newbuilding vessel reduces. 
Finally, Goulielmos and Psifia (2006a; 2006b) focus on the importance of the stochastic 
properties of freight rates in shipping finance and investment decisions. They analyse monthly 
trip-charter and time-charter rates during the 1971–2002 period and report that freight rates 
exhibit long-term persistence (memory). Specifically, the Hurst exponent (H) of trip-charter 
rates (time-charter rates) is found to be between 0.55 and 0.93 (0.59 and 0.95) over the sample 
period, which rejects the assumption of a normal distribution (H = 0.5) employed in standard 
time-series econometric models.26 They further argue that the statistical property of long-term 
persistence in freight rates should be considered by both shipowners and shipping bankers 
when making investment and financing decisions.  
The empirical evidence reviewed in this section suggests that shipping investment decisions 
tend to be driven by a number of macro-economic and shipping-specific factors, all of which 
render estimating the value of a particular shipping investment project a challenging task. 
Accordingly, the next part of this section focusses on investment valuation models, the 
                                                          
25 Shipping companies are unlikely to be able to adjust their fleet capacity to an increase in demand for shipping services 
during the vessel construction lag. 
26 The Hurst (H) exponent (H, Hurst, 1951) is a quantification of the long-term persistence in a time series. When the value of 
H equals to 0.5, the current value of a time-series is assumed to be independent from past values, which is consistent with the 
assumption of normality. On the other hand, the value of H is 0.51 ~ 1.00 a time-series is assumed to have long-term memory 
(i.e. the current value is dependent on past values). 
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limitations of the popular NPV and IRR techniques, and the alternative valuation methods put 
forward by the shipping finance and investment literature. 
 
2.4.2. Core Investment Valuation Methods 
The investment appraisal process deals with the analysis of future cash flows, their degree of 
uncertainty and their expected value, and it is employed as a tool to facilitate company value 
maximisation (Peterson and Fabozzi, 2002). The net present value (NPV) is the most widely 
utilised approach in the investment appraisal context that takes into account the time value of 
money. However, other valuation approaches, such as the internal rate of return (IRR) and the 
accounting rate of return (ARR) are also widely used in business practice, while a large number 
of companies rely on more than one investment appraisal method as part of their financial 
management decision-making process (see Alkaraan and Northcott, 2006 for a comparison; 
Graham and Harvey, 2001). In the shipping industry, Cullinane and Panayides (2000) conduct 
a survey of 65 UK-based shipping companies and report that the IRR is the most commonly 
employed investment valuation method, followed by the NPV and the payback period 
approaches. Evans (1984), Goss (1987) and Albertijn et al. (2016) present examples of how 
investment appraisal techniques (NPV and IRR) can be utilised by shipping companies. 
Cullinane and Panayides (2000) report that the IRR method is probably favoured due to its 
simplicity and ease of use. In addition, they also document that shipping practitioners tend to 
consider qualitative factors (e.g. corporate strategy, vessel employment prospects, investment 
objectives and investor psychology) to be as important as quantitative estimates from 
investment valuation (e.g. IRR, NPV and sensitivity analysis) in the investment decision-
making process. For instance, small shipping companies are likely to focus on short-term 
profitability and funding availability when making investment decisions since, by and large, 
their primary business interest lies with vessel ‘asset play’. On the other hand, large companies 
place more weight on customer relations, strategic market positioning and long-term fleet 
replacement. Given the complexity of shipping investments and the fact that they are affected 
by a number of macro-economic and shipping-specific factors, the next section focusses on the 
limitations of the popular NPV and IRR approaches and reviews alternative techniques 
employed in the shipping finance literature.  
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2.4.3. Alternative Valuation Methods 
Despite the benefits and popularity of investment appraisal techniques based on discounted 
cash flows (i.e. NPV and the IRR), they are also subject to important limitations. First, DCF 
valuation is sensitive to assumptions related to a number of inputs (for instance, future cash 
flows, growth rates and discount rates) that are challenging to project with certainty. Second, 
the DCF method does not take into account non-purely financial factors, such as behavioural 
effects or managerial flexibility in tackling business contingencies. Third, previous literature 
had pointed to a misuse of DCF methods. For example, a less rational top management team 
may regard the DCF as a set of checks (Lai and Trigeorgis, 1995) or utilise it to justify 
investment decisions that have already been made (Bendall and Manger, 1991). To tackle the 
drawbacks of the DCF methods, shipping finance literature has examined alternative 
investment appraisal techniques that can be broadly categorised into MCDM, relative valuation 
(RV) and real-options analysis (ROA). 
The MCDM is a decision-making optimisation process employing multiple criteria. It involves 
a trade-off between factors that are generally at odds with each other (for example, cost 
minimisation and quality of management in the service industries). As already mentioned, 
shipping companies consider not only quantitative (financial), but also qualitative (non-
financial) factors in their investment decision-making process. Various MCDM solutions focus 
on incorporating qualitative elements into the investment valuation process through 
quantification. Rousos and Lee (2012) propose an analytic hierarchy process (AHP) to a 
shipowner’s market segmentation choice in the dry bulk and tanker segments. As a form of 
MCDM, the suggested AHP model can complement the traditional DCF methods by adding 
multicriteria analysis in the evaluation of shipping investments. The model can produce the 
optimum trade-off between the results provided by the NPV and IRR, the risk profile of a 
project, and the psychology of the decision maker. Similarly, Clintworth et al. (2017) provide 
support for a AHP-based MCDM solution for shipping investments financed by the European 
Investment Bank (EIB). The investment decision-making model in this case takes into account 
not only purely economic aspects (NPV, IRR and economic rate of return, or ERR), but also 
other factors, such as environmental protection, support for small- and medium-sized 
companies and regional policies. 
The RV technique essentially compares the value of an investment to those of similar assets in 
the market. For comparability, values are standardised using multiples, such as price-earnings, 
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value-EBITDA or market-to-book (MTB) value ratios. The RV method does not require 
assumptions or the forecasting of cash flows. In finance literature, the RV has been widely used 
for developing trading rules, timing investment or disinvestment decisions, and predicting 
stock returns (Jaffe et al., 1989). Trading rules based on the RV can also be applied to shipping 
investment decisions. Alizadeh and Nomikos (2007) use the long-term equilibrium 
(cointegrating) relationship between second-hand vessel prices and time-charter earnings 
(price-earnings ratio) to construct trading rules for the purchase vessels. According to the 
trading strategy based on technical analysis, deviations of the price-earnings ratio from its long-
term mean could be used as an indicator of investment timing in the second-hand vessel market. 
For example, a positive difference between the slow (e.g. 12-month) and the fast (e.g. three-
month) moving averages of the price-earnings ratio signals a sell decision, while a negative 
difference signals a buy decision. Similarly, Papapostolou et al. (2014) find that market 
sentiment can serve as a contrarian predictor of future vessel prices in the dry bulk segment; 
that is, high sentiment in the current phase indicates  future market contraction, and vice versa. 
Moreover, they show that shipping sale and purchase strategies based on sentiment outperform 
a benchmark buy-and-hold strategy. Merikas et al. (2008) claim that the ratio of second-hand 
or newbuilding prices can be used as an indicator for deciding between purchasing a second-
hand vessel and ordering a newbuilding vessel. They further argue that the movement of the 
ratio depends on the shipping cyclicality and the expectations formed by market participants. 
Finally, the ROA technique is an application of the financial option valuation techniques to 
investment appraisal under uncertainty. Following the implementation of an investment, a 
company is likely to encounter contingencies during the life of a project. In contrast to the 
passive role of management implicitly assumed in the DCF, the management may be faced 
with ‘options’ related to project size (e.g. expanding, contracting), timing (e.g. deferring, 
abandoning) or operating strategies (product mixing, operation scale). In this, ROA can be used 
as a tool to attach a value to the options embedded in certain projects or strategies. The pricing 
models in real option valuation can be classified in three categories: closed-form solutions, 
dynamic programming and simulations. For shipping investments, previous studies have 
primarily examined closed-form solutions and dynamic programming.27 
                                                          
27 An equation is a closed-form solution if the solution of a given problem is derived from a generally-accepted set of functions. 
Dynamic (optimization) programming is a technique for estimating a composite problem by breaking it down into a group of 
simpler sub-problems. 
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Bendall and Stent (2003; 2005; 2007) utilise a dynamic programming approach in ROA to 
assess the value of options in liner shipping investment in terms of fleet expansion or 
replacement, service network development and strategic flexibility. In order to derive a closed-
form solution for ROA, it is essential to identify the stochastic properties of the cash flows 
pertaining to a shipping investment. Bjerksund and Ekern (1995) conjecture that cash flows in 
shipping are characterised by a mean-reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, implying that 
freight rates follow a normal distribution and gradually revert to a constant mean following a 
shock. 28  Based on the assumption that freight rates follow a mean-reverting Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process, they derive a closed-form solution for the valuation of a time-charter 
contract. Similarly, Jørgensen and De Giovanni (2010) introduce a closed-form solution for the 
valuation of a time-charter contract with purchasing options (TC-POP), which can be classed 
as European options in the sense that they can be exercised only at the option’s expiration date. 
In addition, Sødal et al. (2008) advocates a closed-form solution for valuing the embedded 
option to switch a combination carrier that can be deployed in both the dry bulk and the tanker 
segments. Tvedt (1997) suggests that the valuation of a VLCC reflecting the options of lay-up 
and scrapping can be approximated using a geometric mean reversion process.  
Along these lines, Kyriakou et al. (2017b) propose an ROA model for investment valuation 
and timing in the dry bulk segment based on the exponential mean-reverting property of freight 
rates. Adland et al. (2017) employ an ROA model with a stochastic freight rate differential to 
estimate optimal triggers for an Aframax-type tanker vessel to switch between ‘clean’ (refined) 
oil products and ‘dirty’ oil products (crude oil and heavy fuel oil) and to gauge the value of the 
switching option. The authors argue that the value of the switching option has increased over 
time and is higher than the investment premium associated with buying such a vessel. Rau and 
Spinler (2016) propose a real options approach for optimal investment decisions in liner 
shipping under the assumption of oligopolistic competition. They find the number of market 
participants and the intensity of competition to affect optimal capacity, company values and 
investments. In an analysis of the relationship between tanker newbuilding orders and time-
charter rates using an ROA framework, Dikos and Thomakos (2012) find that tanker owners 
systematically account for the option’s value to weight in their investment decision. Axarloglou 
et al. (2013) utilise a real options framework to investigate the determinants of the time-varying 
spread between spot (voyage) and time-charter rates. They argue that the time-varying spread 
                                                          
28 The Ornstein-Ulhenbeck process is a stochastic process which is widely used for describing mean-reverting properties 
commodity and interest rate pricing. 
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is as directly related to the shipping business cycle, to demand expectations, and to market 
volatility. They further argue that the spread is the result of the strategic decision to commit 
vessels for a short period (long period) of time during a market upturn (downturn), and thus 
maintain flexibility (commitment).29 
While investment valuation in the shipping industry may be seen as a complex and challenging 
task that is riddled with uncertainty in future cash flows and sizeable capital requirements, it 
becomes obvious that existing research has gone a long way in quantifying extraordinary value 
driving factors and deriving clear-cut criteria for investment decision making. A summary of 
the literature on these alternative valuation methods is presented in Table 2.6. Despite these 
attempts, however, it appears that the impact of behavioural factors on shipping investments 
has remained relatively under-explored. Baker and Wurgler (2013) argue that the general 
literature on behavioural finance typically adopts two approaches in rationalising the empirical 
evidence. While the ‘market timing and catering’ approach assumes that arbitrage in markets 
is imperfect and rational managers can perceive and exploit opportunities arising from 
mispricing, the ‘managerial biases’ approach assumes that managers are biased, but investors 
are rational. Given anecdotal and empirical evidence pointing that irrationality and behavioural 
biases are commonplace in the shipping industry, focussing on how behavioural biases affect 
shipping valuation and investment would offer novel valuable insights, potentially with 
significant implications for existing research. 
Furthermore, one underexplored area in the broader spectrum of evaluating corporate 
investment decision making in shipping relates to the efficiency of shipping investments. 
Although existing research has focussed on the outcomes and performance of inorganic M&A 
investment (reviewed in section 2.4.6), to my knowledge, no study has examined the efficiency 
of organic corporate investment (i.e. CAPEX). Along these lines, Richardson (2006) employ a 
measure of total investment efficiency capturing corporate investment that diverges from its 
expected level, given a set of factors that have been revealed to predict the optimal investment 
level. This investment efficiency metric captures both internal and inorganic investment and 
could provide insights into how optimally shipping companies allocate funds for investment 
purposes, as well as to what extent investment efficiency is rewarded by the market. Given the 
capital/investment intensive nature of the shipping industry, this constitutes a promising 
research avenue to explore. 
                                                          
29 For evidence of ROA in port terminal investments see Zheng and Negenborn (2017).  
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Table 2.6 Summary of Literature on Shipping Investment and Valuation Methods (sorted by year of publication and 
names of authors) 
STUDY DESCRIPTION 
SAMPLE 
MAIN RESULTS 
Observations Period 
Miyashita (1982)  
An investigation of the determinants of 
the dry bulk shipping investments.  
53 quarters 1963–1976 
 The determinants of the dry bulk shipping investments 
are as follows: the shipping service sales volume per 
unit of transport capacity, growth of the shipping service 
sales volume, average vessel size, freight rate-to-
newbuilding price ratio and the ratio of broken-up 
tonnage to the total fleet. 
Evans (1984)  
Practical examples of the use of NPV 
and IRR in shipping investments. 
Case study - 
 Formulas for NPV and IRR calculation for shipping 
investments are derived. 
Goss (1987)  
Applications of the use of NPV for 
shipbuilding loans. 
Case study - 
 Formulas for NPV calculation in various shipbuilding 
loans are derived. 
Berg Andreassen (1990)  
A risk-adjusted decision-making 
model for investments in tramp 
shipping. 
Case study - 
 Risk-averse investors tend to adjust their fleet capacity 
to a long-term mean regardless of the prevailing 
shipping market conditions. 
 Risk lovers tend to expand their fleet capacity even 
during volatile periods of the shipping markets. 
Tvedt (1997)  
Deriving closed-form solutions for the 
valuation of VLCC vessels. 
Case study - 
 ROA for valuing VLCC vessels taking into account the 
lay-up and scrapping options. 
Cullinane and Panayides 
(2000)  
A questionnaire-based survey of 
investment appraisal practices applied 
in shipping investments. 
65 companies 2000 
 IRR is the most popular method, followed by NPV and 
payback period. 
 Qualitative factors are as important as quantitative ones 
in investment decisions.  
Bendall and Stent (2003) 
 
Constructing a binomial tree for ROA 
in liner shipping. 
Case study - 
 Applying ROA to evaluate investments for fleet 
expansion/replacement in liner shipping. 
Bendall and Stent (2005)  
Constructing a binomial tree for ROA 
in liner shipping. 
Case study - 
 Comparing the value of managerial flexibility in service 
network development in liner shipping. 
Goulielmos and Psifia 
(2006a)  
Investigation of the statistical 
properties of trip-charter rates. 
379 monthly  
observations 
1971–2002 
 Hurst exponent of trip-charter rates ranges between 0.55 
and 0.93 over time, which is far from the values of the 
normal distribution. 
Goulielmos and Psifia 
(2006b)  
Investigation of the statistical 
properties of time-charter rates. 
379 monthly  
observations 
1971–2002 
 Hurst exponent of time-charter rates ranges between 
0.59 and 0.93 over time, which is far from the values of 
the normal distribution. 
Alizadeh and Nomikos 
(2007)  
Investigation of the profitability of 
trading strategies based on relative 
valuation. 
348 monthly 
observations 
1979–2004 
 The deviation of the price-earnings ratio from its long-
term average can be used as an indicator of investment 
timing in the second-hand market. 
Bendall and Stent (2007)  
Constructing a binomial tree for ROA 
on fleet replacement strategies in liner 
shipping. 
Case study - 
 Evaluating the performance of ROA in valuing strategic 
flexibility in liner shipping. 
Merikas et al. (2008)  
The use of second-hand-newbuilding 
(SH/NB) price ratio for investment 
decision.  
144 monthly 
observations 
1995–2006 
 SH/NB ratio is cointegrated with freight rates and can 
be used as a signal in selecting between newbuilding 
and second-hand vessels. 
Sødal et al. (2008)  
Deriving closed-form solutions for 
valuing real options in shipping. 
Case study - 
 Proposing ROA for valuing flexibility (switching 
options) in a combination carrier vessel. 
Jørgensen and De 
Giovanni (2010) 
Deriving closed-form solutions for 
ROA in time-charter with purchasing 
options. 
Case study - 
 Proposing ROA in various strategies in a time-charter 
contract with purchasing options. 
Dikos and Thomakos 
(2012)  
Testing the use of ROA in tanker 
investment decisions. 
455 quarterly 
observations 
1980–2002 
 Tanker owners systematically account for the value of 
waiting in investment decisions. 
Rousos and Lee (2012)  
Proposing AHP for market 
segmentation of shipping companies. 
Case study - 
 Analysis shows that incorporating qualitative factors 
can change a shipowner’s decision for diversifying the 
fleet of the shipping company.  
Xu and Yip (2012)  
Exploring the factors that affect 
newbuilding investment decisions. 
185 country-years 1996–2008 
 Spot freight rates, existing fleet size and world trade 
volume are the main determinants of newbuilding 
investment decisions. 
 The cluster effect of major shipbuilding countries is 
significant. 
Axarloglou et al. (2013)  
Investigation of the determinants of the 
time-varying spread between short- 
and long-term charter rates using 
ROA. 
237 monthly 
observations 
1992–2011 
 Time-varying risk premium is directly related to the 
shipping business cycle, the market demand 
expectations, and the market’s volatility. 
 Shipowners’ decision on the commitment of vessels 
depends on the value of flexibility against the value of 
commitment. 
Kalouptsidi (2014)  
Investigation of the impact of time-to-
build of newbuildings on shipowners’ 
response to demand shocks in dry bulk 
market. 
1,838 weekly 
observations 
1998–2010 
 With reduced time-to-build, the fluctuations in 
newbuilding order increase considerably. 
Papapostolou et al. (2014)  
Investigation of the predictive power 
of market sentiment in shipping 
investment strategies. 
192 monthly 
observations 
1996–2012 
 Sentiment proxies contain information about future 
shipping market conditions. 
 Trading strategy based on sentiment information is 
more profitable than a buy-and-hold strategy. 
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STUDY DESCRIPTION 
SAMPLE 
MAIN RESULTS 
Observations Period 
Greenwood and Hanson 
(2015)  
Investigation of the impact of 
shipowners’ behaviours on second-
hand prices in the dry bulk market. 
420 monthly 
observations 
1976–2011 
 A large part of fluctuations in shipping investments is 
triggered by shipowners’ behavioural biases; that is, 
they are overoptimistic regarding the persistence of 
demand shocks and competition negligence. 
Rau and Spinler (2016)  
Application of ROA in liner shipping 
under oligopolistic market structure. 
Case study - 
 Proposing ROA for investment decision in liner 
shipping under oligopolistic competition. 
Adland et al. (2017) 
Estimation of entry-exit optimal 
triggers for an Aframax tanker to 
switch between refined oil products 
and ‘dirty’ oil products. 
987 weekly 
observations 
1997–2015 
 The value of switching has increased over time and is 
higher than the additional construction cost of a 
product tanker. 
Alizadeh et al. (2017) 
Investigation of the impact of 
heterogeneous investing activities on 
the volatility of second-hand ship 
prices. 
312 monthly 
observations 
1991–2016 
 Higher participation of momentum (contrarian) 
investors can lead to an increase (decrease) in the 
volatility of second-hand ship prices. 
Clintworth et al. (2017)  
Fuzzy-AHP-based shipping investment 
decision model for non-profit financial 
institutions. 
Case study - 
 An investment decision-making model is proposed, 
reflecting both economic factors (NPV, IRR, ERR) and 
public factors (environment protection, support for 
small and medium-sized companies, and regional 
policies). 
Kyriakou et al. (2017b)  
Closed-form solutions for valuation in 
the dry bulk segment. 
Case study - 
 Proposing ROA for valuing dry bulk investments with 
options of newbuilding orders based on the exponential 
mean-reverting property of freight rates. 
Papapostolou et al. (2017)  
Investigation of the impact of herding 
behaviour in the dry bulk segment. 
233 monthly  
observations 
1996–2015 
 Unintentional herding affects decisions on newbuilding 
ordering and scrapping. 
 The impact of unintentional herding is more significant 
in the scrapping market during unfavourable shipping 
market conditions. 
 
2.4.4. Cost of Capital and Systematic Risk in Shipping Investments 
This section discusses the estimation issues in the cost of capital in shipping. One of the 
fundamental inputs for investment valuation is a company’s cost of capital. In DCF valuation, 
for instance, the expected cash flows during a project’s life—which effectively determine the 
value of an investment—are discounted by the cost of capital (or required rate of return) in 
order to adjust for their riskiness. The cost of capital is also used in alternative valuation 
methods discussed in the previous section. For instance, cost of capital is typically employed 
when valuing financial flexibility in ROA, while it is also one of the assessment criteria in 
MCDM. Given the capital-intensiveness and the long horizon (typically, more than 15–20 
years) of shipping investments, the estimation of the cost of capital is of paramount importance 
in the investment decision-making process. The weighted average of cost of capital (WACC), 
which weights the required return for each source of capital proportionately, is by and large the 
most commonly used by corporate financiers (McLaney et al., 2004). However, a common 
issue with WACC arises from estimating the cost of individual funding sources, especially the 
cost of equity, as it requires a great deal of assumptions and forecasts for a number of inputs 
(e.g. future equity risk premium and riskiness of the business). Much of the general finance 
literature has concentrated on asset pricing models and identifying the underlying risk factors 
that can also be used in estimating the cost of capital. From the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM) (Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966; Sharpe, 1964) to CAPM variants (Black, 1972; Merton, 
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1973) and multi-factor models (Fama and French, 1992; Ross, 1976), these models aim to 
capture the relationship between risk and return. 
Survey evidence has suggested that many financiers use CAPM to derive the cost of equity 
(and thus the WACC) for NPV investment appraisal (Graham and Harvey, 2001; McLaney et 
al., 2004). At the heart of CAPM lies the estimation of the asset beta, which is the sensitivity 
of an asset’s return to market movements (risk). A beta value higher (lower) than one indicates 
that the asset has a higher (lower) risk or sensitivity than the market (typically, a general market 
index). Given that the beta reflects a company’s business and financial risk, and the fact that 
shipping is regarded as a volatile business, most research on asset pricing models in the 
shipping industry has offered the surprising finding that betas of shipping companies are 
typically lower than or not different from one. Kavussanos and Marcoulis (1997a; 1997b; 
2000a; 2000b) find stock betas of US shipping companies to be significantly lower than the 
market average during the 1985–1995 period. Similarly, Kavussanos et al. (2003) and Drobetz 
et al. (2010) find the betas of publicly listed shipping companies across the world to be 
significantly lower than the used market index in their models during the periods 1996–1999 
and 1973–2014, respectively. Kavussanos and Marcoulis (1998) compare stock betas of US 
shipping companies with those of companies in other transport modes (air, rail, truck) and other 
industries (electricity, gas, petrol, real estate) during the 1984–1995 period. They argue that 
shipping is the only transportation sector with betas significantly lower than the beta of the 
used market index, while the betas of air, rail and truck sectors are not different from one. In 
addition, shipping stock betas are significantly higher than those of real estate. 
Moreover, the existing literature has also examined the characteristics of stock betas in 
different shipping sub-sectors, in different phases of the shipping business cycle, and in 
comparison with other industries. Along these lines, Kavussanos et al. (2003) find that shipping 
stock betas vary among the different segments of the shipping industry. More specifically, 
while they found shipping stock betas in the ferry, tanker, dry bulk and container segments to 
be significantly lower than the best of the used market indices, they report betas in the drilling 
segment that are significantly higher than the market, and those in the cruise, offshore and 
‘diversified’ (involving both shipping and non-shipping businesses) segments to be not 
different from one. There is also empirical evidence on the time-varying properties of shipping 
stock betas. Tezuka et al. (2012) report that betas of Japanese liner shipping companies during 
the 1980–2006 period are positively associated with the degree of shipping market competition 
(due to regulatory changes), but negatively associated with the level of shipping market 
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concentration. Drobetz et al. (2016b) find that stock betas of shipping companies around the 
world during the 1990–2013 period fluctuate with shipping market conditions. In addition, they 
also report various company-specific and macro-economic determinants of shipping stock 
betas. Specifically, shipping stock betas are found to be positively related to operating leverage, 
financial leverage, growth opportunities, default risk, freight rate volatility and the credit spread, 
but negatively linked to corporate liquidity and industrial production growth. 
 
2.4.5. Determinants of Shipping Stock Returns and Investment Strategies 
The findings in the above studies suggesting that the betas of shipping stocks are either lower 
than or not different from the market average imply that stock returns can be partly explained 
by non-systematic (idiosyncratic) risk factors. Accordingly, a strand of literature has examined 
the factors that influence shipping stock returns beyond betas. More specifically, regarding 
micro-economic factors, Kavussanos and Marcoulis (1997b; 2000b) report that the asset-to-
equity (book value) ratio is negatively related to the returns of shipping stocks in the US market 
during the 1984–1995 period. Panayides et al. (2013) find the existence of illiquidity risk 
premium in the stocks of 76 US shipping companies during the 1960–2009 period. They also 
report that illiquidity risk is priced in shipping stocks over and above market-wide illiquidity 
and other risk factors, indicating higher returns for shipping stocks with higher illiquidity, and 
vice versa. Regarding macro-economic factors, Kavussanos and Marcoulis (2000a; 2000b) find 
that stock returns of US shipping companies during the 1984–1995 period are positively 
associated with changes in oil prices, but negatively associated with changes in industrial 
production. Finally, Drobetz et al. (2010) document similar findings regarding the impact of 
oil prices and industrial production on stock returns of globally listed shipping companies 
during the 1999–2007 period, as well as the negative impact of the value of the US dollar 
relative to major currencies. 
Turning next to the determinants of stock returns and shipping stock investment strategies, 
from the perspective of equity investors, the risk-return profile of shipping stocks discussed 
above offers opportunities for diversifying their portfolios by including an alternative (low 
correlation) asset class. Conventional wisdom on diversification suggests that investors can 
reduce their portfolio risk by holding assets of different risk-return profiles. Therefore, 
investors may achieve more efficient risk-return combinations by diversifying their portfolios 
with shipping stocks, offering a higher expected return for a given risk level or lower risk for 
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a given expected return. Cullinane (1995) argues that the construction of a shipping investment 
(hedging) strategy can be seen as a portfolio optimisation problem. By applying the Markowitz 
optimisation portfolio framework in the dry bulk market, the author reports that the use of 
freight futures enables shipowners to effectively hedge their freight rate risk and construct 
optimal shipping portfolios using different trade routes and types of charter contracts. Grelck 
et al. (2009) examine the impact of including shipping stocks in investment portfolios on 
diversification efficiency. They find an increase in the Sharpe ratio (the risk-adjusted 
investment performance) when a shipping index consisting of 41 equally weighted stocks of 
shipping companies is included in the existing combination of stock and bond indices. They 
also document that diversification benefits are more pronounced during a bearish market 
(2000–2003) compared to a bullish market (2004–2007).  
Andriosopoulos et al. (2013) replicate the performance of shipping indices (a shipping stock 
composite index, the Baltic Dry Index  (BDI), and the Baltic Dirty Tanker Index  (BDTI) using 
stocks traded only in US stock exchanges. This is achieved through the differential evolution 
algorithm (DEA) and the genetic algorithm (GA) approaches in order to construct two 
shipping-index-tracking portfolios: the first comprised 65 stocks constituting the Dow Jones 
composite average (DJCA), and the second comprised 37 shipping stocks traded in the US 
exchanges. When replicating a shipping stock composite index, the DJCA basket based on the 
GA outperforms other specifications in terms of its tracking error and its mean excess return. 
The results are similar when tracking the evolution of the BDI and BDTI shipping indices. 
However, the tracking errors observed are much higher compared to the performance of the 
shipping stock composite index due to lower correlations between shipping stocks and physical 
indices.  
Overall, the literature devoted to the risk-return profile of shipping stocks offers important 
implications for both financiers of shipping companies and financial investors (see Table 2.7). 
In particular, the analysis of the impact of systematic and unsystematic risks on stock returns 
is of particular importance for equity and company valuation, portfolio diversification and risk 
management through hedging. An interesting extension of the previous findings could be the 
analysis of the difference between company-wide and segment-wide betas among shipping 
companies running their business in more than one segment. More recently, a fairly large 
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number of shipping companies have gained control over diversified fleets and a wider range of 
global supply chain services.30 
 
Table 2.7 Summary of Literature on Cost of Capital in Shipping Investments and Shipping Stocks Betas (sorted by 
year of publication and names of authors) 
STUDY DESCRIPTION 
SAMPLE 
MAIN RESULTS 
Observations Period 
Cullinane (1995)  
An investigation of optimal shipping 
investment strategies in the context 
of portfolio theory. 
Case study - 
 Shipping investment strategy can be constructed based on the 
portfolio optimisation problem. 
 Shipowners can construct optimal shipping portfolios using a 
mix of different chartering contracts and freight rate futures. 
Kavussanos and 
Marcoulis (1997a)  
An investigation of the betas of 
shipping stocks in the US. 
3,360  
company-months 
1985–
1994 
 Betas of shipping stocks are lower than market’s beta (one), 
but not always statistically significant. 
 Volatility in shipping stock prices can be largely explained by 
non-systematic risk factors. 
Kavussanos and 
Marcoulis (1997b)  
An exploration of the betas of 
transportation stocks in the US and 
micro-economic risk factors. 
21,912  
company-months 
1984–
1995 
 Betas of shipping stocks are lower than one and statistically 
significant. 
 Returns of shipping stocks are negatively related to assets-to-
equity (book value) ratio. 
Kavussanos and 
Marcoulis (1998)  
An empirical study of the betas of 
shipping stocks in the US and their 
comparison with stocks in other 
industries. 
21,912  
company-months 
1984–
1995 
 Betas of shipping stocks are lower than market’s average beta. 
 Betas of air, rail and truck sectors are not different from the 
market average. 
 Betas of real estate stocks are significantly lower than those of 
shipping stocks. 
Kavussanos and 
Marcoulis (2000a)  
 A study devoted to the impact of 
macro-economic factors on shipping 
stock returns in the US. 
19,920  
company-months 
1985–
1995 
 Betas of shipping stocks are lower than one and statistically 
significant. 
 Returns of shipping stocks exhibit a positive association with 
changes in oil prices and a negative one with changes in 
industrial production. 
Kavussanos and 
Marcoulis (2000b)  
An investigation of the impact of 
both macro- and micro-economic 
factors on shipping stock returns in 
the US. 
19,800  
company-months 
1985–
1995 
 Returns of shipping stocks are positively associated with 
changes in oil prices, but negatively associated with assets-to-
equity (book value) ratio and changes in industrial production. 
Kavussanos et al. 
(2003)  
An empirical study of the betas of 
publicly listed shipping companies 
by segments. 
3,996  
company-months 
1996–
1999 
 On average, betas of shipping stocks are significantly lower 
than the average beta in the market. 
 Betas of the drilling sector are significantly higher than the 
market average, while those of other sectors are either lower 
(or not different) when compared to the market average. 
Grelck et al. (2009)  
Testing portfolio efficiency when 
including shipping stocks. 
41 stocks 
1999–
2007 
 Inclusion of shipping stocks improves the overall portfolio 
efficiency. 
 Benefits from diversification are more significant during 
bearish markets. 
Drobetz et al. (2010) 
An investigation of the impact of 
macro-economic factors on global 
shipping stock returns. 
1,728  
company-months 
1999–
2007 
 Betas of shipping stocks are lower than one and statistically 
significant. 
 Returns of shipping stocks are positively related to the changes 
in oil prices, but negatively related to the changes in industrial 
production and the value of the US dollar relative to other 
major currencies. 
Tezuka et al. (2012)  
An exploration of the time-varying 
beta of stocks of Japanese liner 
shipping companies. 
3,240  
company-months 
1980–
2006 
 Betas of stocks of Japanese liner shipping companies are time-
varying. The fluctuations observed are associated with policies 
and regulation regarding market competition in Japan. 
Andriosopoulos et al. 
(2013)  
A replication of shipping indexes 
and construction of portfolios of US 
stocks. 
1,514  
daily prices 
2006–
2012 
 The portfolio consisting of Dow Jones stocks constructed 
(based on a genetic algorithm procedure) produces minimum 
errors when tracking a shipping stock composite index. 
Panayides et al. 
(2013)  
An empirical study of the impact of 
liquidity risk premium on shipping 
stock returns in the US. 
76 companies 
1960–
2009 
 Illiquidity risk is priced in shipping stocks beyond market-
wide illiquidity and other risk factors. 
Drobetz et al. 
(2016b)  
An investigation of the impact of 
macro- and micro-economic and 
industry-specific factors on betas of 
global shipping stocks. 
1,363  
company-years 
1990–
2013 
 Betas of shipping stocks fluctuate with shipping market cycles. 
 Betas of shipping stocks are positively affected by operating 
leverage and financial leverage, growth opportunities, default 
risk, freight rate volatility and credit spread, but negatively 
affected by corporate liquidity and changes in industrial 
production. 
 
                                                          
30 For example, a growing number of major companies in the container shipping sector involve port operation, multi-modal 
transportation (combination of different modes of transportation for door-to-door service) and logistics services. 
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As documented in Kavussanos et al. (2003), shipping stock betas vary according to different 
segments in the shipping industry, and so stocks of shipping companies with diversified fleets 
or business sectors/areas might have different risk-return profiles than those of single-segment 
companies. Indeed, Krüger et al. (2015) find that the use of a single discount rate (based on 
company-wide beta) can lead to sub-optimal investment decision making of conglomerate 
companies. Given that the previous shipping literature has considered only company-level risk-
return profiles, further analysis of the segment-specific beta and its impact on investment 
decision making could provide valuable insight into the capital budgeting process of shipping 
companies. 
 
2.4.6. Shipping M&As: Drivers and Value Creation 
As highlighted in the previous sections, organic (or internal) investment in the shipowning 
world primarily entails projects involving the purchase of new vessels. In more recent years, 
inorganic investment in the form of M&As has gained pace, becoming a fundamental source 
of growth for shipping companies. In the aftermath of the post-2008 crisis, market 
consolidation has picked up significantly across an industry that traditionally resisted it, with 
the total value of shipping M&As in 2015 reaching 31.86 billion, ahead of any other year since 
the financial crisis struck.31 Alexandridis and Singh (2016) argue that although the heightened 
deal activity in more recent years is driven by the low asset values and more pronounced 
financial distress, it is very likely that, given the highly fragmented nature of the shipping 
industry, market consolidation is very much likely to continue. In view of the growing 
importance of inorganic investment in shipping, this section reviews the existing research on 
its characteristics and influence on company value. 
A merger or acquisition can be broadly defined as the corporate activity of combining two or 
more companies into a new economic entity in the pursuit of shared goals and/or synergistic 
gains. Business combination tends of be more complex than merely asset combination, 
however, and involves the re-alignment of corporate resources, as well as the amalgamation of 
business operations, tangible and intangible assets, client bases, and corporate cultures. 
Accordingly, there should be sound economic and/or strategic justifications for such capital-
intensive and time-consuming investments. In the maritime spectrum, major shipping 
companies carry out M&As for profit maximisation, enhancing market share, gaining control 
                                                          
31 Tradewids, ‘Shipping plays its part in record M&A year’ using data from Dealogic.  
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over the global supply chain and operational diversification (Brooks and Ritchie, 2006; Heaver 
et al., 2000). Moreover, the multi-national nature of many shipping corporations involves 
global supply chains, as well as data synchronisation, scheduling and operations among 
business partners located in different countries. Therefore, combining shipping and related 
transportation services (e.g. stevedoring, logistics, warehousing and other ancillary services) 
can offer a valuable competitive edge to shipping companies, such as expanding the 
geographical reach and control of a broader logistics chain, while facilitating enhancement of 
customer service.32 
With regards to the M&A drivers in the shipping industry, Fusillo (2009) investigates 54 M&A 
transactions in US liner shipping consummated between 1993 and 2007 and argues that their 
drivers are consistent with the neo-classical merger theory postulating that M&A activity is a 
process of natural adjustment to changes in economic environments or industrial shocks (Gort, 
1969). The author postulates that liner shipping companies are more likely to become takeover 
targets, since they are less likely to be able to adjust their business operations in response to a 
new economic environment given their high fixed costs.33 Along these lines, a main finding in 
this study is that the heightened M&A activity in the US liner shipping industry in the late 
1990s can be largely attributed to the introduction of the US Ocean Shipping Reform Act 
(OSRA) in 1998, which technically undermined the roles of the conventional shipping 
conference system and collusive pricing. 34  More specifically, the author argues that liner 
shipping companies that are faced with more intense competition, and consequently, increased 
uncertainty in freight rate earnings, pursue economies of scale through business consolidation 
as a process of adjustment to a new economic environment. In addition, Fusillo (2009) also 
report that M&As in the US liner shipping industry is positively associated with excess capacity 
and negatively related to the level of freight rates. This finding is in stark contrast with the 
evidence provided by Alexandridis and Singh (2016) pointing to a 50–60% correlation between 
freight rates and global M&A activity during 1990–2014.35 
Further on M&A motives, Syriopoulos and Theotokas (2007) and Merikas et al. (2011) provide 
evidence in support of the disciplinary motive for takeovers in the shipping industry, more 
                                                          
32 For a detailed overview of shipping M&As process and motives, see Alexandridis and Singh (2016). 
33 Liner shipping is much more capital intensive than other sectors in the shipping industry, as its network-based service with 
regular frequencies requires a substantial amount of capital for acquiring a fleet consisting of multiple vessels. In addition, 
liner shipping operations require higher overhead costs to deal with shore-based activity and documentation. 
34 The OSRA of 1998 is the amendment to the Shipping Act of 1984 for stimulating market-driven competition in the liner 
shipping industry.  
35 It is possible that this divergence can be attributed to the somewhat different time-periods and shipping segments examined 
with more M&As in container/liner shipping being triggered at bad times than good times.  
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specifically in the form of the poor management hypothesis (e.g. Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984). 
The authors argue that in the case of Stelmar Shipping—a tanker shipping company that 
received three bids in 2004 and was finally acquired by a competitor in the same year—part of 
the reason the company became a takeover target was its inefficient corporate governance 
coupled with conflicts between founding-family members and major shareholders. 
Furthermore, Merikas et al. (2011) compare the financial performance of 60 shipping 
companies involved in M&A transactions consummated during 1994–2009. They document 
that acquirers tend to outperform targets in terms of five financial criteria (ROA, gross margin, 
enterprise value, debt-to-capital, and debt-to-market capitalisation), highlighting that M&As 
are motivated by the desire to improve inefficient and less profitable targets. 
Finally, Yeo (2013) focusses on the geographical distance between acquiring and target 
companies as a key determinant of shipping M&A activity, examining 120 transactions in the 
liner segment consummated during 2006–2007. The results indicate that the geographical 
distance negatively affects takeover flows; that is, there are more M&A activities among 
companies located close to each other. The rationale behind the argument is that the 
information cost increases between acquiring and target companies as the geographic distance 
does. The author also reports that the larger the company size is—having more expertise and 
economies of scale—the higher the probability for inter-regional and cross-border M&As.  
Despite the sound economic and/or strategic rationale behind M&A activity, one of the stylised 
facts in the corporate finance literature is that business combinations tend to destroy value for 
acquiring companies more often than they create value, while the bulk of the gains from the 
transactions is typically captured by target companies (Bruner, 2002). Accordingly, existing 
general M&A literature has identified a plethora of determinants for acquisition gains ranging 
from deal and company characteristics (e.g. method of payment, company size, public status 
of target, company valuation, etc.) to market-wide factors (e.g. the degree of investor protection, 
market valuation cycle, competition in the corporate takeover market, etc.). Existing literature 
on M&As in shipping that focusses on the effect of these value creation drivers has produced 
results that largely diverge from conventional wisdom. 
Turning the focus towards value creation in shipping M&As, Panayides and Gong (2002) 
examine the stock market reaction to two deals in the liner segment (one between P&O and 
Nedlloyd, the other between NOL and APL) completed in 1997. They report that the average 
CARs to acquirers and targets, measured over 11 days around the deal announcement (from 
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day -5 to +5), are 83% and 148%, respectively.36 In contrast, Syriopoulos and Theotokas (2007) 
focus on the tramp sector and examine three bids for acquiring Stelmar Shipping that were 
carried out during 2004, and they find negative (positive) acquirer (target) returns, consistent 
with the general consensus in the M&A literature. Using various event windows, they 
document that the average acquirer CAR ranged from -22.4% to 1.58%, while that of the target 
is between 5.06% and 22.13%. Moreover, Samitas and Kenourgios (2007) present mixed 
results concerning the gains of tramp shipping acquirers listed on NYSE and NASDAQ for the 
2004–2007 period. They find an average fve-day acquirer CARs of between -0.3% and 0.8% 
for various event windows while CARs tend to be generally positive for post-announcement 
windows. Choi and Yoshida (2013) examine the long-term operating performance of two M&A 
deals of Japanese shipping companies (one between NYK and Showa, the other between OSK 
and Navix) carried out in 1998. They report enhanced market share of the combined entities 
driven by the aggregation of their fleets, as well as improvements in asset turnover, profitability 
and gearing ratio during the five-year post-merger period. 
While the above studies offer valuable insights concerning the benefits of shipping M&As, 
their conclusions can hardly be generalised due to their mostly exploratory nature, as reflected 
in their restrictive sample sizes and potential sample selection bias. There are three recent 
studies that provide more comprehensive evidence based on larger samples. Darkow et al. 
(2008) investigate value creation from 200 M&As between logistics companies that took place 
globally for the 1991–2006 period and report that both acquiring and target companies achieve 
positive three-day CARs of roughly 1.6% and 10.6%, respectively.37 Moreover, the synergistic 
gains, estimated as value-weighted average of abnormal returns for acquirers and targets, seem 
to be larger for horizontal, cross-border and large-sized deals. Andreou et al. (2012), 
meanwhile, focus on a sample of 285 M&A deals in the US transportation industry (railroad, 
trucking shipping and freight service) consummated between 1980 and 2009. They report 
CARs to acquiring and target companies of 2.3% and 24.5%, respectively, during the event 
window [-10, +1]. In contrast to Darkow et al. (2008), they document that vertical integration 
yields higher synergistic gains relative to horizontal consolidation. It is possible that this 
divergence can be attributed to differences in the regions examined, time periods and event 
windows employed in the two studies. In fact, when utilising a pre-announcement window, 
                                                          
36 CARs in M&As is the sum of the Abnormal Returns (AR), differences between the expected return on a stock and its actual 
return, over a window of [-t1, +t2] centred around the deal announcement. 
37 According to the authors’ own definition, the logistics industry covers all sub-sectors with first two-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code of 40-49 including rail transportation, passenger transportation, trucking, shipping, parcel delivery 
and related services. 
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some findings in Darkow et al. (2008) skewed towards the pre-announcement period [-20, -
1]—similar to that in Andreou et al. (2012)—pointing to the outperformance of vertical deals. 
Finally, Alexandrou et al. (2014) examine the most comprehensive sample consisting of 1,266 
global M&A deals in freight shipping, passenger shipping and cargo handling segments during 
1984–2011. Consistent with the findings in Darkow et al. (2008) and Andreou et al. (2012), 
this study documents that both acquirers and targets realise positive CARs of 1.2% and 3.3% 
over four days [-3, +1] around the deal announcements. Moreover, a particularly compelling 
result in this study is the outperformance of acquisitions of publicly listed targets compared to 
those of private companies. This is inconsistent with previous evidence that acquirers achieve 
higher gains when buying private targets, which has been largely attributed to the creation of 
block-holders, leading to better post-merger monitoring (Chang, 1998), as well as, to the 
liquidity discount of non-tradeable target shares (Faccio et al., 2006). Although Alexandrou et 
al. (2014) discuss possible explanations for the under-performance of private deals, such as the 
likelihood of private targets attracting hefty premiums due to their superior bargaining power 
or the strategic importance of private targets (such as access to regional markets and sector-
specific know-how), there is no concrete evidence that supports this conjecture, which would 
require additional investigation into the characteristics of these deals. For example, Conn et al. 
(2005) document that acquisitions of listed targets results in non-negative announcement 
returns for UK acquirers in cross-border deals. Additionally, Alexandridis et al. (2010) report 
positive announcement returns for public acquisitions in regions where there is less competition 
in the market for corporate control. Accordingly, the higher announcement returns in 
acquisitions of listed targets may result from deals in countries where the takeover market is 
less competitive. 
The findings of the extant empirical literature on shipping M&As is summarised in Table 2.8. 
Further research in the area of inorganic corporate investment in the shipping industry could 
focus on a number of questions that remain unaddressed. First, prior studies have not examined 
value creation differentials among various segments within the shipping industry (e.g. dry bulk, 
tanker, liner, passenger and offshore). Even though Alexandrou et al. (2014) provide a 
comparison among shipping, passenger shipping and cargo handling segments, a more detailed 
classification differentiating between the various shipowning segments as well as shipping 
services can provide further insights. Further, the utilisation of standard industrial classification 
(SIC) codes might fail to provide clear-cut segmentation for service industries, like shipping 
(Walker and Murphy, 2001). Discrepancies among popular databases in reporting company 
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SIC codes (Guenther and Rosman (1994) might result in a less than optimal segmentation of 
shipping companies based on business areas. Accordingly, future research could concentrate 
on examining the drivers of value creation in M&As based on a more comprehensive and 
consistent segmentation of shipping companies in business areas or sub-segments of interest. 
Second, considering PE as an alternative funding source has become increasingly important 
amid the current credit deadlock, which has affected traditional funding sources such as bank 
loans, the participation of PE funds in the market for corporate control in the shipping industry 
also calls for further investigation. 38  Previous literature has largely suggested that PE 
transactions enhance the target’s shareholder value (Renneboog et al., 2007). Thus, the 
shareholder wealth effects of shipping M&A deals by PE companies, as well as their 
determinants, deserves further investigation. Given that the majority of PE-driven M&A deals 
in shipping were carried out post-2008, when the value of maritime assets was at a historical 
low, it is also worth investigating whether PE funds have generated gains for their own 
investors. The extant literature on the performance of PE funds point to great deal of variations 
in fund performance (e.g. Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Phalippou and Gottschalg, 2009). A 
question relevant to the shipping industry, which also possesses significant implications for 
future trends in shipping financing with respect to the sources of capital utilised, involves 
whether, in general, PE investment in shipping offers an attractive risk-return profile for 
investors. 
The financing choice in shipping M&As is another underexplored area. Since most transactions 
require sizeable capital, the choice of the payment currency can significantly affect the 
ownership and capital structure of the combined entities following the deal completion.39 From 
the perspective of an acquiring company, the choice of payment method in M&As involves a 
trade-off between the ownership dilution from stock-swap offerings and potential financial 
distress costs from cash offerings (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). Considering the typically highly 
concentrated ownership of shipping companies, they are likely to opt for cash offers to avoid 
ownership dilution. However, shipping is a notably highly leveraged industry, which provides 
an incentive to pay with stock. These contradictory dynamics on the financing choice of 
shipping M&As, along with their wealth effects, deserve further investigation. 
                                                          
38 As pointed out in Alexandridis and Singh (2016) around 23% of acquirers in shipping M&A during the period 1990-2014 
are financial institutions (i.e. banks, private equity companies and investment holdings). 
39 For example, if an acquirer pays for the deal with cash, an increase in financial leverage of the merged company is expected 
since issuing debt is the major funding source for cash offers, considering liquidity constraints, lower issuance costs and tax 
benefits. Alternatively, if a deal is a stock-for-stock exchange, it is likely to end up with creation of additional block-holders. 
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Table 2.8 Summary of Literature on M&As in Shipping and Value Creation (sorted by year of publication and names 
of authors) 
STUDY DESCRIPTION 
SAMPLE 
MAIN RESULTS 
Observations Period 
Panayides and Gong 
(2002)  
Investigation of short-term value 
creation (changes in stock returns) in 
liner shipping M&As. 
2 deals 1995–1999 
 Synergistic effects are found (Acquirer CAR: 83%; 
Target CAR: 148%). 
 Larger share of synergy gains accrues to targets. 
Samitas and Kenourgios 
(2007)  
Investigation of short-term value 
creation in tramp shipping M&As. 
15 deals 2004–2007 
 Five-day CAR for acquirers is between -0.3% and 0.8%. 
 CAR for acquirers is generally negative in pre-
announcement periods, but positive in post-
announcement periods. 
Syriopoulos and 
Theotokas (2007)  
Investigation of short-term value 
creation for M&A of a tramp shipping 
company. 
3 bids 2004 
 CAR for target is between 5.06% and 22.13%, while 
CAR for acquirer is between -22.4% and 1.58%. 
Darkow et al. (2008)  
Investigation of short-term value 
creation for M&As in the logistics 
industry. 
200 deals 1991–2006 
 Synergistic effects are found (Acquirer CAR: 1.6%, 
Target CAR: 10.60%). 
 Synergy gains are positively associated with horizontal, 
cross-border and large-sized deals. 
Fusillo (2009)  
Investigation of factors stimulating 
M&As in US liner shipping. 
54 deals 1993–2006 
 M&A activity is positively associated with excess 
capacity, demand growth and changes in regulation, but 
negatively with freight rates. 
Merikas et al. (2011)  
Testing disciplinary motives for 
takeovers in shipping by comparing 
financial profiles of constituent 
companies. 
60 companies 1994–2009 
 Supporting poor management hypothesis. 
 Acquirers have better financial profiles than targets in 
terms of ROA, gross margin, enterprise value and debt-
to-capital. 
Andreou et al. (2012)  
Investigation of short-term value 
creation in US transportation M&As. 
285 deals 1980–2009 
 Synergistic effects are found (Acquirer CAR: 2.3%, 
Target CAR: 24.5%). 
 Vertical integration outperforms horizontal 
consolidation. 
Choi and Yoshida (2013)  
Investigation of long-term value 
creation in Japanese shipping M&As. 
2 deals 1998–1999 
 Economies of scope is realised. 
 Consolidated companies exhibit improved financial 
status, asset turnover and profitability. 
Yeo (2013)  
Investigation of the impact of 
geographical distance on shipping 
M&A activity. 
120 deals 2006–2007 
 Geographical distance between acquirer and target has 
a negative impact on M&A intensity in the shipping 
industry. 
 The negative impact of distance is mitigated as the size 
of the acquirer increases. 
Alexandrou et al. (2014)  
Investigation of short-term value 
creation in global shipping M&As. 
1,266 deals 1984–2011 
 Synergistic effects are found (Acquirer CAR: 1.2%, 
Target CAR: 3.3%). 
 Acquirer CAR is higher in acquisitions of publicly listed 
targets. 
 
2.5. Corporate Governance of Shipping Companies 
Given the high degree of capital intensiveness associated with the shipping industry, along with 
the more recent trend of attracting external funding from public equity, bond markets and 
private investors, as highlighted in the previous sections, the governance of shipowning 
companies is of great importance. This is especially the case with publicly listed shipping 
companies, where the separation of ownership and control becomes pronounced and 
information asymmetry and conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers give rise 
to agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Corporate governance entails the legal, 
institutional and cultural mechanisms to reduce these agency problems (John and Senbet, 1998) 
and enables shareholders to monitor managers more effectively and align their interests. It also 
has an important role to play as a key risk management tool, considering that regulators and 
industry supervisory and policy bodies are more vigilant than ever before. Thus, a structured 
system of corporate governance that meets the requirements of the regulators, satisfies the 
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needs of quality-driven business partners and caters to the interests of a shipping company’s 
shareholders is becoming more of a necessity today than ever before. 
Shipping companies have traditionally been known as conservative, and this characteristic is 
reflected well in the concentrated ownership structure prevalent in the shipping industry (Glave 
et al., 2014). Ownership in a shipowning company tends to be concentrated in the hands of a 
founding family, and a dual role chairperson-CEO representing the interests of the family is 
also common practice (Theotokas, 2007). In a survey research on the corporate governance 
structure of 27 Greek shipping companies, Koufopoulos et al. (2010) report relatively small 
board size (with 4.4 directors on average), low board independence (with only 30% 
independent directors) and high incidence of CEO-chairperson duality (55.5%). Tsionas et al. 
(2012) find the average ownership of the largest shareholders in 126 publicly listed shipping 
companies to be 31.15%, and there are no significant variations in the ownership concentration 
across different institutional environments in North America, Europe and Asia. Pastra et al. 
(2015) examine the findings of the Hellenic Observatory of Corporate Governance (HOCG) 
concerning board characteristics (age, gender, tenure, cross directorships, independent 
directors, board size and CEO duality) of Greek-owned publicly listed shipping companies 
between 2001 and 2012. They argue that in 15 out of 28 companies, the CEO is also the 
chairman, the typical board size is 6–7 members and directors stay in office for 48.33 months 
on average. Finally, diversity in corporate boards is poor, with only 13 out of 305 seats being 
held by women. 
Although the subject of corporate governance has attracted a great deal of attention from 
academics and practitioners alike, there is also a great deal of disagreement concerning the 
effectiveness of existing governance mechanisms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), as well as the 
impact of different corporate governance dimensions, such as ownership structures and boards 
of directors. For example, family ownership, which is common among shipping companies, 
can effectively reduce agency costs by enhancing monitoring (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) and 
inciting long-term commitment (Anderson et al., 2003). However, family ownership can also 
be associated with conflicts of interest between family and non-family members (DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo, 1985), as well as a managerial entrenchment effect (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001). 
The literature on corporate governance in the shipping industry is divided in terms of the 
effectiveness of most governance elements, with the exception of the positive association 
between family ownership and financial performance (Randøy et al., 2003; Syriopoulos and 
Tsatsaronis, 2011). 
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Randøy et al. (2003) examine the corporate governance of 32 publicly listed shipping 
companies in Norway and Sweden and find financial performance to be positively associated 
with founding family CEOs and board independence (percentage of outside directors). 
Syriopoulos and Tsatsaronis (2011) also find a positive relation between founding family CEOs 
and company performance in a sample of 11 Greek shipping companies listed in US exchanges. 
Furthermore, there appears to be a curvilinear relation between the financial performance of 
Greek shipping companies and board ownership (percentage of ownership controlled by board 
members), where profitability increases with the level of insider ownership at a diminishing 
and eventually negative rate. 40  Syriopoulos and Tsatsaronis (2012) document that CEO-
chairperson duality exerts a negative influence on financial performance in terms of return-on-
equity and return-on-assets for 21 US publicly listed shipping companies. Tsionas et al. (2012) 
investigate the association between ownership concentration (ownership of largest shareholder) 
and company performance for 126 public shipping companies in three major economic blocks 
(North America, Europe and Asia) and report a positive and bi-directional relationship. 
Andreou et al. (2014) examine the impact of corporate governance on financial management 
and company performance. Using a sample of 32 publicly listed US shipping companies, they 
investigate how earnings management, sub-optimal investment and company performance are 
affected by three dimensions of corporate governance: ownership structure, board structure and 
CEO duality. The results indicate that some corporate governance mechanisms can effectively 
mitigate agency costs, and in effect, improve financial management and performance, 
ultimately enhancing company value. The authors also document that (i) earnings management 
is positively associated with board ownership; (ii) the over-investment problem can be 
mitigated the larger the board size, when a corporate governance committee is in place and the 
more the busy directors (percentage of directors serving on other companies); (iii) financial 
performance is positively affected by CEO duality and the presence of a governance committee, 
but negatively affected by board size41; and (iv) that company value is positively associated 
with board size and the number of busy directors. Table 2.9 provides a summary of the evidence 
in all papers discussed above. 
Considering the perceived importance of corporate governance for the future of the shipping 
industry, a number of issues deserve further investigation. First, existing research on the role 
                                                          
40  The association between board ownership and financial performance (profitability) is found to be insignificant for 
Norwegian and Swedish shipping companies in Randøy et al. (2003).  
41 The positive impact of CEO duality on company performance is also consistent with Syriopoulos and Tsatsaronis (2012) 
findings. 
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of independent directors has failed to shed light on whether the introduction of such outside 
monitoring improves performance of shipping companies. In light of the evidence in the 
general finance literature that stock ownership of independent directors is one of the most 
consistent predictors of company performance among other corporate governance indices and 
variables (Bhagat et al., 2008), future research should consider whether independent director 
ownership in the shipping industry can also serve as an effective interest alignment vehicle that 
positively affects company performance. Along these lines, the impact of board attributes, such 
as past specialisation and experience (generalists vs. specialists), of corporate board members 
and the management team (see, for example, Custódio et al., 2013; Kroll et al., 2008) have 
largely been overlooked in shipping-oriented research, although they are particularly important 
dimensions of corporate governance for shipping companies. A third and related point is that 
the board structure of listed shipping companies that have recently attracted more institutional 
and PE investors than in the past has evolved significantly over time. However, the effect of 
this dynamic on corporate financing, investment decisions and company performance in 
general remains unexplored. 
 
Table 2.9 Summary of Literature on Corporate Governance of Shipping Companies (sorted by year of publication and 
names of authors) 
STUDY DESCRIPTION 
SAMPLE 
MAIN RESULTS 
Observations Period 
Randøy et al. (2003)  
Investigation of the impact of corporate 
governance on financial performance of 
Scandinavian shipping companies. 
91  
company-years 
1996–1998 
 Positive impact of founding-family CEO and board 
independence on financial performance. 
 Board ownership has no impact on financial 
performance. 
Koufopoulos et al. (2010)  
Investigation of the corporate governance 
structure of Greek shipping companies. 
27 companies 2006 
 High-level CEO influence is found with incidence of 
CEO duality, small-sized board and low board 
independence. 
Syriopoulos and 
Tsatsaronis (2011)  
Investigation of the impact of corporate 
governance on financial performance of 
Greek shipping companies. 
55  
company-years 
2004–2008 
 Corporate performance is positively affected by 
founding-family CEO, but negatively by board 
independence. 
 Curvilinear influence of board ownership on 
corporate performance. 
Syriopoulos and 
Tsatsaronis (2012)  
Investigation of the impact of CEO 
duality on corporate performance of 
Greek shipping companies listed in the 
US. 
301  
company-years  
2002–2008 
 CEO duality has a negative impact on financial 
performance. 
Tsionas et al. (2012)  
Investigation of the impact of corporate 
governance on financial performance of 
global shipping companies. 
126 companies 2009 
 Positive impact of ownership concentration on 
corporate performance. 
 Company size, stock market liquidity and financial 
performance are major determinants of ownership 
concentration. 
Andreou et al. (2014)  
Investigation of the impact of corporate 
governance on financial management and 
performance of US shipping companies. 
273  
company-years 
1999–2010 
 Concentrated ownership has no significant impact on 
financial management of shipping companies. 
 Board size is positively associated with company 
value, reduced overinvestment problem and higher 
operational performance. 
Pastra et al. (2015) 
Investigation of board characteristics of 
Greek-owned publicly listed shipping 
companies. 
28 companies 2001–2012 
 In 15 companies, duality between CEO and chairman. 
 Board size is 6–7 members with a tenure of 48.33 
months on average. 
 Only 13 women (out of 305) in directorships. 
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2.6. Risk Measurement and Management in Shipping 
As highlighted earlier in the paper, operating within the shipping industry entails significant 
business, operational and financial risks. Perhaps the most important source of risk for a 
shipping company is the freight-rate risk, which refers to variability in the earnings of a 
shipping company due to changes in freight rates. This is because volatility in the freight market 
directly influences the company’s profitability. Another important risk is the so-called ‘asset-
price risk’, which arises from fluctuations in the value of the assets (vessels) of the company. 
Such fluctuations affect not only the book value of the ship-owning company, but also its 
creditworthiness, since it is directly associated with the ability to service debt obligations. 
Bunker fuel price fluctuations may also affect the profit margins of shipping companies, as 
bunker fuel costs, on average, account for more than 60–70% of the total voyage costs. 
Furthermore, credit risk has a notable impact on the short- and long-term performance of a 
shipping company, encompassing the uncertainty about whether a counter-party to a 
transaction will perform its financial obligations in full and on time. Credit risk is focal in the 
shipping business, as most of the deals, trades and contracts are negotiated directly between 
the counterparties (bilateral OTC agreements). Interest rate risk constitutes another form of risk 
pertaining to shipping business, given its capital-intensive nature, and it arises from 
unanticipated changes in floating interest rates, which can give rise to cash flow and liquidity 
problems. Finally, foreign exchange rate fluctuation forms another important source of risk in 
shipping since, due to the international nature of the business, most major revenue streams are 
in US dollars, while a number of capital expenditures in most cases involve a different currency. 
The next section discusses studies devoted to freight rate volatility modelling and the existence 
of volatility spillovers across the freight rates and vessel prices of different segments and sub-
segments of the shipping industry. However, apart from recognising the sources of risk and 
measuring the associated exposures to each type of risk, shipping market participants also need 
to manage risks in an effective way. One of the most effective ways to manage risks in the 
shipping industry is through the use of freight derivative contracts. Thus, sub-sections 2.6.2 
and 2.6.3 are devoted to reviewing the empirical evidence associated with the most important 
features of the freight derivatives asset class. 
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2.6.1. Freight Rate Volatility and Volatility Spillovers across Shipping Segments 
Having discussed the key considerations of shipping investment decisions, the core and 
alternative investment valuation methods, and the cost of capital and shipping investments, this 
section focusses on the business risk that shipping companies face, which primarily relates to 
their ability to generate cash flow. The level and volatility of cash flows generated affect 
directly investment and valuation methods, as discussed earlier, along with the optimal mix of 
alternative sources of finance to be used in shipping investments. However, cash flows in the 
shipping business depend crucially on the shipping company’s ability to charter its vessels in 
attractive freight rates and collect the agreed freight rates on time, along with its ability to 
correctly time the vessels market and benefit through asset-play (trading of ships). Naturally, 
cash flows in the shipping industry are affected by the diversification of the fleet its shipping 
company owns and operates. A fleet that is well diversified in terms of vessel types and sizes 
provides the benefit of an overall lower risk regarding the shipping company’s ability to 
generate cash flow. However, shipping sub-segments based on vessel type and size exhibit 
rather distinct characteristics due to the shipping segmentation effect. More specifically, the 
shipping industry is characterised by a distinct segmentation effect, as the demand for the 
transportation service varies according to the cargo transported and the size and type of vessels 
employed. 42  Thus, this section is devoted to the different risk-return choices of shipping 
investors in terms of the different vessel market segments and the different lengths of 
charterparties. 
Kavussanos (1996; 1997; 2003) was the first to document the segmentation effect in both 
freight rates and vessel prices for different types and vessel sizes; that is, the smaller the vessel 
and the lengthier the time-charter contract, the lower the risk from vessel operations and 
chartering activities, respectively. This segmentation effect is induced by different segments of 
the shipping industry, typically following fairly distinct business cycles, which are, in turn, 
primarily driven by the demand for the respective commodities transported (Kavussanos and 
Visvikis, 2006a). Even if the theory and empirical evidence support the pronounced market 
segmentation within shipping freight rates and vessel prices, shipping segments are not 
                                                          
42 Vessels employed in the liner sector are classified into Feeder (100 to 500 twenty-foot equivalent units or TEU), Feedermax 
(500 to 1,000 TEU), Handysize (1,000 to 2,000 TEU), Sub-Panamax (2,000 to 3,000 TEU), Panamax (3,000 to 4,000 TEU) 
and Post-Panamax (more than 4,000 TEU). The dry bulk sector differentiates into five categories per cargo-carrying capacity: 
Handysize (20,000 to 35,000 dwt), Handymax (35,000 to 45,000 dwt), Supramax (45,000 to 55,000 dwt), Panamax (60,000 
to 75,000 dwt) and Capesize (more than 80,000 dwt). The tanker sector is also classified in five sub-sectors: Handysize (20,000 
to 45,000 dwt), Panamax (50,000 to 80,000 dwt), Aframax (80,000 to 120,000 dwt), Suezmax (130,000 to 160,000 dwt) and 
Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC) (more than 160,000 dwt, typically around 250,000 to 300,000 dwt). 
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completely isolated from each other (Stopford, 2009). This is because vessels of different types 
and sizes often compete for the same cargo, and as such, create competition among the different 
market segments. Moreover, several shipping companies hold a well-diversified fleet and enter 
different market segments if they see a business opportunity. Therefore, demand and supply 
imbalances in one segment quickly ripple across to other segments of the shipping industry. In 
this way, the examination of risk (volatility) and returns between freight rates and vessel prices 
of different shipping segments has been a major research topic in the relevant literature. The 
investigation of volatility and return spillovers has a number of implications for participants in 
the shipping market, such as ship-lending financial institutions, investors, regulators, 
shipowners and charterers alike. Shipping freight rates directly affect the operational cash flows 
generated by shipping companies, which form a major concern of institutional investors 
financing shipping projects. Therefore, volatility spillovers indicate the extent to which a 
diversified fleet can act as an insurance mechanism for a ship-lending bank when assessing the 
default risk of a specific ship obligor. However, Tsouknidis (2016) has shown that having a 
well-diversified fleet does not produce tangible benefits during crises periods, as the volatility 
spillovers are large across shipping market segments. 
Several studies have been devoted to the spillovers of information between the returns and 
volatilities of freight rates between different segments of the shipping industry. Kavussanos 
(1996; 2003) utilises monthly data on spot and time-charter freight rates for the dry bulk and 
tanker segments, respectively, revealing a pronounced segmentation effect when modelling the 
time-varying volatilities (with GARCH-type models) of different vessel sizes. Kavussanos 
(1997) extends the examination of volatility spillovers into dry bulk second-hand vessel prices 
and provides empirical evidence supporting the existence of the segmentation effect. In a 
related study, Chen et al. (2010b) investigate daily freight rates over the 1999–2008 period and 
provide evidence that volatility dynamics between Capesize and Panamax freight rates change 
over time. Similarly, Drobetz et al. (2012) examine daily data over the 1999–2011 period to 
reveal significant spillovers among time-varying freight rate volatilities for the dry bulk and 
tanker segments. Finally, Tsouknidis (2016) utilizes shipping freight rate indices for the dry 
bulk and tanker segments over the 2006-2015 period and reveals that freight rate volatility 
spillovers are strongly time-varying across the different freight segments. This result is more 
pronounced during the 2008 global financial crisis. Furthermore, the author also provides 
evidence that smaller vessels transmit volatility spillovers to larger vessels within the dry bulk 
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segment, and that there are considerable volatility spillovers transmitted from the tanker to the 
dry bulk segment during the 2010–2012 period. 
The literature on risk-return segmentation provides clear and convincing evidence that different 
segments within the shipping industry are interconnected and that the associations are time-
varying (see Table 2.10). Research topics in the area that deserve further attention include the 
inter-relationship with shipping freight derivatives, as discussed in Section 2.6.3.  
 
Table 2.10 Summary of Literature on Freight Rate Volatility and Shipping Segmentation Effects (sorted by year of 
publication and names of authors) 
STUDY DESCRIPTION 
SAMPLE 
MAIN RESULTS 
Observations Period 
Kavussanos (1996)  
Examination of volatility in freight 
rates of dry bulk segment. 
720 monthly 
freight rates 
1973–1992 
 Volatility in dry bulk freight rates is time-varying. 
 The larger the vessel size and the lengthier the time-
charter contract, the higher the volatility in freight rates 
and vessel prices, respectively. 
Kavussanos (1997)  
Examination of volatility in the dry 
bulk second-hand market. 
708 monthly 
prices 
1976–1995 
 Volatility in second-hand vessel prices is positively 
related to the size of the vessel. 
Kavussanos (2003) 
Examination of volatility in the tanker 
segment. 
732 monthly 
freight rates 
1979–1994 
 Volatility in tanker freight rates is time-varying. 
 Volatility is higher in spot freight contracts and larger 
vessels. 
 
Chen et al. (2010b)  
Investigation of spillover effects 
between Capesize and Panamax freight 
markets. 
19,500 daily 
freight rates 
1999–2008 
 Markets are interrelated in terms of returns and 
volatilities. Shipping market conditions affect the 
degree of the identified spillovers. 
Drobetz et al. (2012)  
Investigation of the impact of macro-
economic variables on volatility in dry 
bulk and tanker markets. 
12,000 daily 
freight rates 
1999–2011 
 Yield curve explains volatility in both the dry bulk and 
tanker freight rate markets. 
 Asymmetric effects are documented only in the tanker 
freight rate market. 
Tsouknidis (2016)  
Investigation of time-varying spillover 
effects between and within the dry 
bulk and tanker freight rate markets. 
21,578 daily 
freight rates 
1998–2015 
 Volatility spillovers are overall large and time-varying 
between shipping freight rates markets. 
 The volatility spillovers revealed are more pronounced 
during and after the global financial crisis period. 
 The direction of spillovers is from small-sized vessels 
to large-sized vessels and from tanker to dry bulk freight 
rate markets. 
 
2.6.2. Measuring Market Risk in Shipping 
Kavussanos and Dimitrakopoulos (2007; 2011) develop a framework for measuring market 
risk in the shipping freight markets by applying two alternative risk measures: value-at-risk 
(VaR) and expected shortfall (ES). The authors provide an in-depth assessment of the forecasts 
produced by alternative VaR and ES models for short- and medium-term risk exposures in the 
tanker sector. The results suggest that the parametric approach of GARCH models and the non-
parametric approach of filtered historical simulation produced the most accurate forecasts for 
short-term (daily) risk. However, when drawing forecasts for long-term risk, the most accurate 
method is the empirically scaled historical simulation model.  
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In another study, Lu et al. (2007) examine data for a freight rates index of the dry bulk market 
and report that the most accurate forecasts of market risk (VaR) are produced by the parametric 
approach of a generalised error distribution (GED) exponential GARCH model. In a similar 
study, Angelidis and Skiadopoulos (2008) apply a horse-race of several parametric and non-
parametric VaR models in the dry bulk and tanker freight rates and suggest that the simplest 
non-parametric methods are producing the most accurate VaR forecasts. 
 
2.6.3. Managing Business Risks in Shipping with Freight Derivatives 
Despite the extreme risks involved in the shipping business, and the importance of effectively 
managing them, the use of derivatives as a way to mitigate such risks has a relatively short 
history. Freight derivatives allow for managing exposures in the freight rate, while bunker fuel 
derivatives are used to manage exposures to unfavourable fluctuations in bunker fuel prices. 
However, there have been notably fewer studies devoted to freight derivatives than those 
devoted to other commodity derivatives markets. This can be partially attributed to the 
difficulty of obtaining accurate data almost until the mid-2000s, when clearing houses (market 
makers) began offering their freight derivatives services, and in this way, started recording 
trading activity and prices in a systematic way for this asset class. 
The first freight derivatives contract, introduced in 1985 until 2002, was the so-called Baltic 
International Freight Futures (BIFFEX) contract written on the Baltic Freight Index (BFI) and 
trading in London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE), while forward freight 
agreements (FFAs) were introduced in 1992 as OTC derivatives contracts. The FFA contracts 
are private, principal-to-principal contracts-for-difference (CFDs) between a seller and a buyer, 
who agree to settle a freight rate for a specified quantity of cargo or type of vessel, usually for 
one, or a combination, of the major trade routes of the dry bulk, tanker or container sub-sectors 
of the shipping industry. Kavussanos and Visvikis (2006a; 2011; 2014), Alizadeh and Nomikos 
(2009) and Kavussanos (2010) provide detailed descriptions and applications of the freight 
derivatives market; for surveys of the available empirical literature on freight derivative 
markets, see Kavussanos and Visvikis (2006b; 2008) and Kavussanos et al. (2014). 
As freight derivatives comprise a relatively new tool for managing risks in shipping, academic 
researchers have come up with market survey papers in order to assess the awareness and 
familiarity of the participants in the shipping markets regarding the existence of freight 
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derivatives and their attitude towards this investment tool. To this end, Cullinane (1991) 
investigated shipowners’ attitudes towards the now non-existent BIFFEX contract. The author 
collected questionnaire replies from a sample of 85 shipowners residing across four countries 
(UK, Greece, Hong Kong and Norway). The results suggest that the shipping market 
participants were fully aware of the existence of the BIFFEX contract as a way to hedge freight 
rate risk. However, the majority of the surveyed shipowners did not assess the BIFFEX contract 
as an effective hedging mechanism. In another survey study, Dinwoodie and Morris (2003) 
explore the attitude of tanker shipowners and charterers towards hedging freight rate risk 
through FFAs. Their findings suggest that despite the fact that FFAs are widely perceived as 
an important step towards managing freight rate risk, several respondents were not familiar 
with them, and the vast majority had never used them. In turn, Kavussanos et al. (2007) 
investigate common perceptions regarding the use of shipping derivatives by Greek shipowners 
operating within the dry bulk and tanker segments. The results indicate that Greek shipowners 
are reluctant to use FFAs for managing freight rate risk, mainly because of the issues of thin 
trading and high credit risk such contracts entail. Professional education relevant to the 
practical use of shipping derivatives has been revealed to be of paramount importance for the 
respondents analysed. The following sections investigate the price discovery and hedging 
effectiveness functions of freight derivatives, their forecasting performance and their impact in 
the physical freight rate market, along with market microstructure effects and pricing. 
 
2.6.3.1. Price Discovery, Economic Market Relationships and Forecast Performance 
One of the most important research questions in the freight derivatives literature is whether trading 
activity in the derivatives market leads to observed fluctuations in the corresponding spot market. 
Several empirical studies have been devoted to this issue, as if the derivatives market contains 
information regarding the future evolution of the spot market, this could be exploited by shipping 
market participants for realising profits by trading in both markets. The first such empirical studies 
were from Kavussanos and Visvikis (1999; 2003) and Haigh (2000), who examine the validity of 
the unbiasedness hypothesis in the early freight derivatives market of BIFFEX using the empirical 
estimation framework of cointegration techniques. Specifically, Kavussanos and Visvikis (1999; 
2003) reveal that the unbiasedness hypothesis in the BIFFEX market holds for futures prices of 
one- and two-months from maturity. The authors attribute this finding to the fact that these short-
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in-maturity freight futures contracts can be considered unbiased forecasts of the realised spot 
freight prices. 
Kavussanos and Visvikis (2004) was the first study in the FFA market, empirically exploring 
the lead-lag relationships between FFA and spot freight prices. The results reveal a bi-
directional causal relationship between spot and FFA returns. However, the causality tests 
employed suggest that causality from FFA to spot returns runs stronger than in the opposite 
direction for the great majority of the freight routes investigated. In turn, the results for 
volatility spillovers suggest that the volatility of the FFA contracts account for a large 
percentage of the observed volatility of the corresponding spot freight rates across all routes 
examined. In another study, Kavussanos et al. (2004b) explore the relationship between FFA 
prices and spot prices of the underlying asset at maturity and reveal that FFA prices one and 
two months prior to maturity form unbiased predictors of the realised spot prices at maturity in 
all investigated routes. The same results are mixed for the case of three-month FFA contracts. 
The unbiasedness hypothesis has also been studied by Alizadeh et al. (2007), where the implied 
forward six-month time-charter rates in the dry bulk freight market have been shown to be 
efficient and unbiased predictors of the future time-charter freight rates. The authors also report 
that even if the unbiasedness hypothesis is true on average, shipping market players can still 
generate economic profits by following technical analysis rules for their chartering strategies. 
In a related study, Chou and Huang (2010) investigate the interactions between the FFA market 
and the global steel price index and report that the global steel price index exhibits significant 
forecasting power for the FFA prices. In a related study, Li et al. (2014) explore spillover 
effects and dynamic correlations between spot freight rates and freight derivatives prices. The 
results reveal unilateral spillovers from one-month FFA to spot markets returns, while these 
relationships are bilateral between one-month and two-month FFA contracts. The same 
bilateral relationships also hold for the case of volatility spillovers effects.  
Kavussanos et al. (2010; 2014) explore cross-market information flows and spillover effects 
between the freight derivatives market (FFAs) and commodity futures markets. Their results 
point to the existence of significant spillover effects between the two, and specifically in the 
direction from the commodity futures to the freight derivatives market. Thus, shipping market 
players may benefit by monitoring fluctuations in the commodity futures markets and take 
appropriate positions in the FFA markets. In a related study, Alexandridis et al. (2017c) explore 
for the first time the interactions across freight rates, freight futures and freight options. The 
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results reveal considerable information transmission in both returns and volatilities of the three 
markets examined. Specifically, the freight futures market leads fluctuations observed in the 
freight rate market, but freight options are shown to lag behind both the spot and future freight 
markets. Yin et al. (2017) explore causality relationships between spot and futures freight 
markets for the dry bulk segment, along with the effects of exogenous factors, such as market 
demand and supply forces, along with economic indices. In all cases, the results document that 
freight rates follow a mean-reverting process that adjusts to their long-term equilibrium levels.  
The vast number of studies devoted to the interactions of the spot and derivatives freight 
markets, and the growing body of empirical evidence documenting that freight derivatives 
market leads the freight spot market (price discovery function), has triggered a number of 
studies developing forecasting models for the spot market and assessing their performance. To 
this end, Chang and Chang (1996) have explored whether BIFFEX contract prices can be used 
to predict the spot dry bulk shipping market, while Cullinane et al. (1999), building on Cullinane 
(1992), employ the Box-Jenkins autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) 
methodology in order to empirically test whether the BFI behaviour has been altered due to the 
exclusion of all Handysize trades from its calculation. The author proposes that this exclusion 
had a weak impact on improving BFI behaviour as a general freight rates index.  
In another study, Batchelor et al. (2007) empirically investigate the forecasting performance of 
a set of time-series models in predicting spot and FFA rates for the Panamax dry bulk segment. 
The results reveal that using information from FFA prices enhances the forecasting 
performance of time-series models when predicting spot freight prices for all forecasting 
horizons up to 20 days ahead. In a related study, Lyridis et al. (2013) rely on an artificial neural 
network (ANN) in order to draw forecasts for FFAs. The ANN model trained and estimated 
can provide guidance to investors regarding which position (long or short) to take in the 
derivatives market. In the same vein, Zhang et al. (2014) propose a forecasting approach for 
spot freight rates based on the price discovery function of freight derivatives. The authors 
suggest that both spot and time-charter freight rates can improve forecasts of the spot freight 
rates. 
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2.6.3.2. The Hedging Performance of Freight Derivatives 
The hedging function of freight derivatives constituted the main driving force behind their 
development. For this reason, studies devoted to assessing the hedging performance 
(effectiveness) of such contracts have been prominent in the extant literature of freight 
derivatives. Early efforts by Thuong and Vischer (1990), Haralambides (1992), Haigh and Holt 
(2002) and Kavussanos and Nomikos (2000a; 2000b; 2000c) assessed the hedging 
effectiveness of the BIFFEX freight derivatives market. Relatively recent studies by Samitas 
and Tsakalos (2010) investigate how important is the use of financial derivatives for shipping 
companies and whether the use of such products have a notable (positive) impact on the 
shipping company’s value by mitigating (hedging) specific business risks. The results suggest 
that the extensive use of derivatives products by shipping companies minimise their risk 
exposures and enhance their economic growth. In another study, Prokopczuk (2011) assesses 
the pricing and hedging functions of single-route dry bulk freight futures contracts traded on 
the now non-existent International Maritime Exchange (IMAREX) market. The results reveal 
that the inclusion of a second stochastic factor significantly improves the pricing accuracy and 
hedging effectiveness of these freight futures contracts. In a similar study, Goulas and 
Skiadopoulos (2012) empirically examine whether the IMAREX freight futures market is 
efficient over daily and weekly time horizons, revealing that IMAREX contracts are not 
efficient during shorter (daily) horizons.  
For the FFA market, Kavussanos and Visvikis (2010) estimate constant and time-varying 
(dynamic) hedge ratios using alternative specifications and compare hedging effectiveness both 
in-sample and out-of-sample. In a related study, Alizadeh et al. (2015a) explore the hedging 
effectiveness of tanker freight derivatives in six major tanker routes. They employ the bivariate 
Markov regime switching (MRS) GARCH model and reveal the existence of distinct regimes 
within the tanker freight market. The MRS-GARCH model yields significant improvements in 
the hedging effectiveness when examined in-sample, but the results are mixed when examined 
out-of-sample.  
In another study, Adland and Jia (2017) explore over time the difference between the Baltic 
Exchange global trip-charter average and simulated earnings from a fleet of Capesize vessels. 
The authors utilise this difference as a measure of physical basis risk in the freight derivatives 
market. The results suggest that the increasing fleet size lowers the basis risk overall, but this 
diversification effect is relatively small. The authors attribute this to a moving-average effect 
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in earnings, and to the fact that basis risk is on average larger for shorter hedging durations. In 
a related study, Alexandridis et al. (2017b) introduce a portfolio-based methodological 
framework to examine the hedging performance of the container freight futures contracts. The 
authors use constructed portfolios comprising container, dry bulk and tanker freight futures, 
along with portfolios of physical freight rates, and examine whether there is a benefit from 
greater risk diversification effects of these combined portfolios. The results reveal that a 
decrease in freight rate risk up to 48% can be achieved by creating a diversified portfolio of 
physical freight rates, and an additional decrease of up to 8% in freight rate risk can be achieved 
by including futures contracts in the portfolio.  
 
2.6.3.3. Market Microstructure Effects in Freight Derivatives 
A series of studies have investigated various special topics involving freight derivatives, such 
as the relationships across freight derivatives returns, trading volume, volatility and trading 
characteristics. To this end, Kavussanos et al. (2004a) explore the effect of FFA trading on the 
spot market volatility of the dry bulk Panamax segment. The results indicate that after FFA 
trading was introduced, the spot price volatility was reduced across all investigated routes. In 
addition, FFA trading in dry bulk Panamax routes exerted a decreasing pressure on the 
asymmetry of volatility while notably improving the quality and speed of information flow in 
the spot market. In another study, Koekebakker and Adland (2004) model the forward freight 
rate dynamics under a term-structure model. Their results indicate that the volatility of the 
forward curve is relatively high, reaching a peak for the one-year forward freight rate contracts.  
Several studies have been devoted to the trading characteristics of FFA contracts. To this end, 
Batchelor et al. (2005) investigate the existence of a positive relationship between the expected 
volatility and bid-ask spreads in the FFA Panamax market. This relationship is motivated by 
the rationale that the greater the variability in price, the greater the risk associated with the 
performance of the brokers. The results reveal the existence of a positive relationship between 
expected price volatility and bid-ask spreads across the vast majority of the investigated 
Panamax routes. The authors conclude that an increasing bid-ask spread reflects an expectation 
for higher future volatility in the FFA Panamax market. In the same vein, Alizadeh (2013) 
provides empirical evidence of a positive and contemporaneous relationship between price 
volatility and trading volume in the dry bulk FFA market. The results suggest that an increase 
in price volatility leads to lower future trading activity. In a related study, Alizadeh et al. (2015b) 
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investigate the existence of liquidity premia in freight derivatives returns. The results indicate 
that liquidity is priced by the FFA market and that both the Amihud (2002) measure of 
illiquidity and the bid-ask spread explains a large percentage of the observed variation in freight 
derivatives returns. Finally, Nomikos and Doctor (2013)  explore the profitability of trading 
rules and market timing strategies in freight rates and freight derivatives across available 
contracts and maturities. The results suggest that following the proposed trading rules 
outperforms the return of the buy-and-hold benchmark strategy.  
 
2.6.3.4. Freight Options Pricing 
Despite the fact that FFA contracts provide reasonable hedging effectiveness and allow market 
participants to ‘lock’ a fixed freight rate over a period of time, they lack the flexibility to offer 
their users not only the option of maintaining the hedge if the market moves against them, but 
also of participating in the market when market conditions are favourable. This led to the 
creation of the freight options contracts that, in exchange for a fee (premium), provide this type 
of flexibility to their users. Empirical investigations of freight options have primarily 
concentrated on their pricing mechanism. For example, Tvedt (1998) derives an analytical 
pricing formula for European futures options on BIFFEX. This analytical formula takes into 
account special features related to the freight rate market, such as the fact that the lay-up of 
vessels is always an option, and that the BFI as the underlying asset is never close to zero. For 
this reason, the authors assume that the BFI and the futures contracts on BFI are restricted 
downwards to a level above zero. The authors also assume that freight rates are mean reverting 
because of the existence of frictional capacity adjustments to changes in the demand for sea 
transportation.  
In another study, Koekebakker et al. (2007) introduce a mathematical framework for pricing 
Asian-type freight options. The authors assume that FFAs returns are lognormally distributed 
prior to the settlement period, but this assumption breaks down in the settlement period. For 
this reason, they propose an approximate structure in the settlement period for the FFA, 
deriving a closed-form option pricing formula for Asian call and put options on spot freight 
rate indices. In a related study, Nomikos et al. (2013) extend the lognormal representation of 
the dynamic process governing the risk neutral spot freight rates and propose a diffusion model 
that incorporates jumps of random magnitude and arrival to the process. The results reveal that 
the developed model of freight options’ pricing is significantly improved when it incorporates 
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jumps into the generating process instead of assuming the generic lognormal setting. Similarly, 
Kyriakou et al. (2017a) extend the diffusion model of Nomikos et al. (2013) by incorporating 
the mean-reverting property of freight rates. They find that the freight option valuation model 
exhibits significantly lower pricing errors than the generic lognormal model. 
 
2.6.3.5. Bunker Fuel and Vessel Values Derivatives 
Turning the attention to studies on other shipping derivatives markets, Mayr and Tamvakis 
(1999) investigate the causal relationship between refinery margins (crack spreads) of gasoline 
and heating oil futures contracts and physical Brent crude oil traded in the New York 
Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). The results reveal a unidirectional Granger-causality 
relationship from the two-month crack spread contract to crude oil imports. Thus, the authors 
suggest that crack spreads can serve as a leading indicator for short-term developments in the 
tanker vessels’ demand.  
In another study, Alizadeh et al. (2004) assess the hedging effectiveness of different crude oil 
and petroleum futures contracts on bunker fuel prices in Rotterdam, Singapore and Houston. 
Their results indicate that out-of-sample, the hedging effectiveness varies significantly across 
the bunker markets when using constant and time-varying hedge ratios. In addition, crude oil 
futures traded in the International Petroleum Exchange (IPE) exhibit the highest degree of 
hedging effectiveness for the underlying spot bunker prices in Rotterdam and Singapore. In a 
related study, Alizadeh and Nomikos (2004) investigate the dynamics of the relationship 
between oil futures and the corresponding spot oil markets, along with their interactions with 
tanker spot freight rates. Specifically, the authors empirically examine the existence of a cost 
of carry relationship in the WTI futures market. In addition, they investigate whether the 
differential between futures-physical oil markets contains relevant information regarding the 
future evolution of the tanker freight rates. However, the reported results fail to confirm a 
statistically strong relationship between the two. This finding points to the existence of 
arbitrage opportunities between oil futures and tanker spot freight markets. Finally, Wang and 
Teo (2013) investigate a possible re-planning of the bunkering network configuration and 
financial hedging to reduce bunker fuel price risk in the container segment. The authors assume 
that the container liner network is initially planned, and then bunker fuel hedging is performed 
based on information regarding fuel consumption and the expectations for the future bunker 
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fuel prices. Thus, the authors highlight the benefits of building an integrated supply chain for 
bunkers that combines network planning and bunker hedging activities. 
Regarding vessel value derivatives, Å dland et al. (2004) suggests a framework for pricing the 
OTC sale and purchase forward rate agreements for dry bulk vessels. They estimate the implied 
forward price from historical data for vessel prices and the term structure of freight rates. The 
results indicate that the unbiasedness hypothesis is rejected in all the investigated cases studied, 
supporting the existence of a risk premium in the vessel derivatives prices. 
Table 2.11 summarises the available empirical literature in derivatives and risk management in 
shipping. For the better part of the last three decades, there has been a number of research 
streams investigating the major economic functions and market microstructure effects in the 
freight derivatives market. This market, however, has lost much of its trading volume and 
liquidity since the international financial crisis of 2008. Future research in the area could 
potentially investigate the consequences of this major decrease in liquidity, as well as the 
market conditions that need to prevail in order for the freight derivatives market to regain its 
trading volume. 
 
Table 2.11 Summary of Literature on Risk Measurement and Management in Shipping (sorted by year of publication 
and names of authors) 
STUDY DESCRIPTION 
SAMPLE 
MAIN RESULTS 
Observations Period 
Thoung and Visscher 
(1990) 
Investigation of the hedging 
effectiveness of BIFFEX contracts. 
154 weekly prices 1986–1988 
 BIFFEX contracts can be an effective hedging tool for 
shippers of grain and coal, with long-haul cargo, and 
in need of Panamax vessels. 
Cullinane (1991) 
Questionnaire survey of the use of 
BIFFEX contracts among shipping 
companies. 
85 companies - 
 Shipping companies are aware of the existence of 
BIFFEX. 
 However, BIFFEX is not accepted as a viable hedging 
tool by most shipping companies. 
Cullinane (1992) 
Investigation of the forecasting 
performance of BFI. 
1,000 daily prices 1985–1988  ARIMA models can predict short-term BFI. 
Chang and Chang (1996) 
Examination of the predictability of 
dry bulk spot rates using BIFFEX. 
15,820 daily 
prices 
1985–1993 
 BIFFEX can predict the spot freight rates up to six 
months. 
Tvedt (1998) 
Closed-form pricing for options on 
BIFFEX futures. 
Case Study - 
 A pricing model that takes into account special 
features of shipping derivatives market, such as 
downward restriction of the prices of underlying 
assets. 
Cullinane (1999) 
Examination of the impact of changes 
in the BFI composition. 
600 daily prices 1993–1996 
 The exclusion of Handysize routes has a weak impact 
on improving BFI behaviour as a general freight rates 
index. 
Kavussanos and Nomikos 
(1999) 
Investigation of the unbiasedness 
hypothesis of freight futures prices. 
106 monthly 
prices 
1988–1997 
 Short-term freight futures can be regarded as unbiased 
forecasts of the realised spot freight prices. 
Mayr and Tamvakis 
(1999) 
Investigation of the casual relationship 
between oil product futures and 
physical crude oil. 
148 monthly 
prices 
1985–1997 
 There is a causality running from the two-month crack 
spreads to crude oil imports. 
 The causality can serve as a leading indicator for 
short-term tanker vessel demand. 
Haigh (2000) 
Investigation of cointegration between 
freight futures and spot freight rates. 
111 monthly 
prices 
1985–1999 
 BIFFEX futures can be regarded as unbiased forecasts 
of the spot freight prices. 
 The futures price for the current month contract 
outperforms time-series models in forecasting spot 
prices. 
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STUDY DESCRIPTION 
SAMPLE 
MAIN RESULTS 
Observations Period 
Kavussanos and Nomikos 
(2000a) 
Investigation of hedging effectiveness 
of BIFFEX contracts. 
267 weekly prices 1992–1997 
 Time-varying hedging outperform other models in 
reducing freight rate risks, but with large basis risk. 
Kavussanos and Nomikos 
(2000b) 
Examination of hedging performance 
of BIFFEX contracts and the impact of 
the change in contract composition. 
487 weekly prices 1988–1997 
 The change in BIFFEX composition enhances 
hedging performance of freight futures contracts. 
Kavussanos and Nomikos 
(2000c) 
Comparison of performance of 
constant and time-varying hedging 
models. 
267 weekly prices 1992–1997 
 The GARCH-X model outperforms a simple GARCH 
and constant hedging specifications. 
Haigh and Holt (2002) 
Examination of the relationships 
between freight rates, commodity and 
foreign exchange futures markets. 
715 weekly prices 1985–1998 
 Traders can achieve better hedging effectiveness when 
they incorporate inter-dependence of various futures 
contracts. 
 Freight futures are not a crucial hedging tool for 
traders. 
Dinwoodie and Morris 
(2003) 
Questionnaire survey of the use of 
FFAs among tanker shipowners and 
charterers. 
30 companies 2001 
 Although FFAs are widely perceived, the vast 
majority of respondents had never used them. 
 Technical education is essential to widespread 
acceptance. 
Kavussanos and Nomikos 
(2003) 
Investigation of the causal relationship 
between freight futures and spot 
freight rates. 
2,462 daily prices 1988–1998 
 Futures prices tend to discover new information more 
rapidly than spot prices. 
 Freight futures can be used as unbiased forecasts of 
the realised spot freight rates. 
Alizadeh et al. (2004) 
Investigation of the hedging bunker 
price fluctuations using crude oil and 
petroleum futures. 
642 weekly prices 1988–2000 
 Hedging performance varies across the different 
bunker markets. 
 Crude oil futures exhibit the highest hedging 
effectiveness for Rotterdam and Singapore spot 
bunker prices. 
Alizadeh and Nomikos 
(2004) 
Examination of the relationships 
between oil futures and spot oil 
markets and tanker freight rates. 
451 weekly prices 1993–2001 
 There is no significant relationship between tanker 
freight rates and physical-futures differentials in the 
oil market. 
Adland et al. (2004) 
Estimate implied forward prices for 
vessel prices and investigate for the 
unbiasedness hypothesis. 
156 monthly 
prices 
1990–2003 
 The unbiasedness hypothesis is rejected in all cases 
 Evidence of the presence of a risk premium. 
Kavussanos and Visvikis 
(2004) 
Investigation of the lead-lag 
relationship in returns and volatilities 
between shipping spot freight and FFA 
markets. 
1,078 daily prices 1997–2000 
 A bidirectional causality between spot and FFA 
returns is reported. 
 A unidirectional spillover from FFA to the spot 
market. 
Kavussanos et al. (2004a) 
Examination of the impact of FFA 
trading on volatility of spot freight 
rates. 
3,038 daily prices 1989–2001 
 FFA trading has a stabilising impact in the spot freight 
rate market. 
 FFA trading has an impact on asymmetric volatility 
and enhances the quality and speed of information 
flowing. 
Kavussanos et al. 
(2004b) 
Investigation of the unbiasedness 
hypothesis of FFA prices. 
240 monthly 
prices 
1996–2000 
 FFA prices of one- and two-month prior to maturity 
are unbiased predictors of the realised spot prices. 
Koekebakker and Adland 
(2004) 
Examination of the volatility of 
forward freight rates of time-charters. 
555 weekly prices 1992–2002 
 Volatility of the forward curve is relatively high, 
reaching a peak for the one-year forward freight rate 
contracts. 
Batchelor et al. (2005) 
Examination of the relationship 
between expected volatility and bid-
ask spreads in the FFA market. 
897 daily prices 1997–2000 
 Positive relationship between expected price volatility 
and bid-ask spreads in the Panamax FFA market. 
Alizadeh et al. (2007) 
Investigation of the unbiasedness 
hypothesis of implied forward charter 
rates in dry bulk shipping. 
754 weekly prices 1989–2003 
 Implied forward six-month time-charter rates are 
unbiased predictors of the future freight rates. 
 Trading rules based on technical analysis generate 
economic profits. 
Batchelor et al. (2007) 
Examination of the forecasting 
performance of time-series models for 
spot freight rates and FFA prices. 
1,080 daily prices 1997–2001 
 Incorporating information from FFA prices enhances 
the forecasting performance of time-series models for 
Panamax spot freight rates. 
Kavussanos et al. (2007) 
Questionnaire survey of the use of 
shipping derivatives among Greek 
shipowners. 
31 companies - 
 Greek shipowners are reluctant to use FFAs for 
reduction of freight rate risk due to thin trading 
volume and high credit risk. 
Koekebakker et al. 
(2007) 
Deriving a closed-form solution for 
pricing Asian-style freight options. 
Case Study - 
 The proposed model assumes lognormal distribution 
of the underlying spot freight rates. However, the 
lognormality breaks down during the settlement 
period due to the average-based settlement pricing. 
 To deal with this issue, the model suggests lognormal 
approximation of volatility of spot fright rates during 
the settlement period.  
Angelidis and 
Skiadopoulos (2008) 
Investigation of the performance of 
VaR and ETL models in forecasting 
risks in dry bulk and tanker markets. 
1,875 daily prices 1999–2006 
 Non-parametric specifications outperform parametric 
methods. 
Chou and Huang (2010) 
Investigation of the interactions 
between dry bulk FFA and steel 
markets. 
396 weekly prices 2002–2009 
 The global steel price index exhibits significant 
forecasting power for the FFA prices. 
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STUDY DESCRIPTION 
SAMPLE 
MAIN RESULTS 
Observations Period 
Kavussanos et al. (2010) 
Investigation of the spillover effect 
between freight rate and commodity 
derivatives markets. 
821 daily freight 
rates 
2005–2008 
 Return and volatility spillovers are generally 
unidirectional from commodity futures to FFAs. 
Samitas and Tsakalos 
(2010) 
Investigation of the impact of the use 
of shipping derivatives on company 
value. 
116 company-
quarters 
2005–2008 
 The use of shipping derivatives has a positive impact 
on shipping company value by mitigating business 
risks. 
Kavussanos and 
Dimitrakopoulos (2011) 
Derivation of framework for tanker 
shipping market risk measurement 
using VaR and ETL. 
2,035 daily prices 1998–2006 
 Parametric GARCH models and non-parametric 
filtered historical simulation outperform other 
specifications in forecasting short-term freight rate 
risk. 
 For long-term forecasting, the scaled historical 
simulation model is the most accurate method. 
Prokopczuk (2011) 
Examination of pricing and hedging 
models of IMAREX freight futures. 
262 weekly prices 2005–2009 
 The inclusion of a second stochastic factor enhances 
pricing accuracy and hedging effectiveness. 
Goulas and Skiadopoulos 
(2012) 
Examination of the market efficiency 
of dry bulk IMAREX freight futures. 
1,073 daily prices 2005–2009 
 The IMAREX futures market is not informationally 
efficient, as trading-strategies-based forecasts can 
produce a positive risk premium. 
Alizadeh (2013) 
Investigation of the trading volume-
price volatility relationship in the dry 
bulk FFA market. 
217 weekly prices 2007–2011 
 Positive and contemporaneous relationship between 
trading volume and volatility. 
 Increases in price volatility lead to lower future FFA 
trading activities. 
Lyridis et al. (2013) 
Examination of the forecasting 
performance of ANN models for FFA 
prices. 
1,060 daily prices 2005–2009 
 Applied connectionist models generally yield better 
accuracy with high success rates for modelling FFA 
prices. 
Nomikos and Doctor 
(2013) 
Investigation of the profitability of 
market timing trading strategies in the 
dry bulk FFA market. 
1,699 daily prices 2005–2011 
 Trading rules generally outperform the benchmark 
buy-and-hold strategy. 
Nomikos et al. (2013) 
Valuation framework for options on 
the average freight rate. 
Case Study - 
 A jump diffusion process enhances pricing accuracy 
of the proposed model. 
Wang and Teo (2013) 
Business model combining network 
planning and bunker hedging in 
container shipping. 
Case Study - 
 Integration of network planning and bunker hedging 
activity enables shipping companies to achieve 
optimal managerial decisions. 
Kavussanos et al. (2014) 
Investigation of the spillover effect 
between dry bulk FFA and commodity 
derivatives market. 
868 daily prices 2006–2009 
 Agricultural commodity futures informationally lead 
freight markets. 
Li et al. (2014) 
Investigation of the spillover effects 
between spot and FFA prices in tanker 
shipping. 
1,489 daily prices 2006–2011 
 Unilateral spillovers from 1-month FFA to spot 
returns. 
 Bilateral volatility spillovers between spot freight rate 
and FFA prices. 
Zhang et al. (2014) 
Examination of the forecasting 
performance of time-series models for 
Capesize freight rates. 
230 weekly prices 2005–2009 
 Cointegration relationships between FFA and spot 
freight rates, and between time-charter and spot rates, 
enhance forecasting performance of time-series 
models. 
Alizadeh et al. (2015a) 
Investigation of the hedging 
performance of tanker FFAs. 
442 weekly prices 2005–2013 
 Regime-switching GARCH model improves the 
hedging effectiveness in the in-sample estimation, 
while the results are mixed in the out-of-sample. 
Alizadeh et al. (2015b) 
Investigation of the impact of liquidity 
risk on dry bulk FFA returns. 
306 weekly prices 2008–2014 
 Liquidity risk is priced and has a positive impact on 
FFA returns. 
Adland and Jia (2017) 
Examination of the physical basis risk 
in dry bulk shipping. 
2,872 daily prices 2002–2014 
 Increasing fleet size lowers the basis risk, but the 
diversification effect is relatively small. 
Alexandridis et al. 
(2017b) 
Investigation of information 
transmission in returns and volatilities 
of spot, futures and options in 
shipping. 
849 daily prices 2013–2016 
 Freight futures market informationally lead spot 
freight rate market. 
 Freight options market informationally lag behind 
both spot freight rate and freight futures markets. 
Alexandridis et al. 
(2017c) 
Portfolio-based methodological 
framework aiming to improve freight 
rate risk management. 
263 weekly prices 2011–2016 
 Decrease in freight rate risk up to 48% by holding a 
diversified portfolio of freight rates. 
 An additional decrease of up to 8% by hedging freight 
rate risk with futures contracts. 
Kyriakou et al. (2017a) 
Valuation of freight options reflecting 
mean-reverting property of freight 
rates. 
336 weekly prices 2008–2014 
 The jump diffusion model incorporating mean-
reverting property of freight rates outperforms the 
generic lognormal model in terms of pricing accuracy. 
Yin et al. (2017) 
Investigation of the causal relationship 
between FFA and spot prices in dry 
bulk shipping. 
1,730 daily prices 2007–2013 
 Bidirectional causality between FFA and spot freight 
rates. 
 Both FFA and spot prices follow a mean-reverting 
process. 
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2.7. Summary of Chapter 
Three main reasons have led academic researchers to devote a large number of empirical 
studies to exploring topics in shipping finance: first, the profound importance of the shipping 
industry in the global transportation system and for the economic welfare of countries; second, 
the unique characteristics in shipping, such as its highly cyclical, seasonal, volatile and heavily 
capital-intensive nature; and third, the growing number of shipping companies relying on 
global capital equity and debt markets to raise the required funds for shipping investments, and 
the increasing interest and support of governments to provide subsidies. The current survey 
paper comprises the first attempt, to the best of my knowledge, to provide a comprehensive 
and in-depth review of the shipping finance and investment literature. It examines 137 shipping 
finance studies published in 43 scholarly journals between 1979 and 2017, presents a 
bibliometric review and analysis, highlights the current research gaps, and provides fruitful 
avenues for future research that can serve as a stepping stone for researchers in the area. 
Among the promising future research topics identified in this chapter, the rest of this thesis 
pays particular attention to M&As in the shipping industry, as significant unfilled research gaps 
remain in this area. Considering that M&As have a far-reaching impact on the business practice 
of shipping companies, there are several reasons why consolidation activity in the shipping 
industry deserves further research attention. First, market concentration largely driven by 
M&As has been unfolding in the shipping industry for the last few decades. Second, business 
consolidation has been proposed as one of the solutions for the shipping industry, which is still 
beleaguered with overcapacity resulting from ordering frenzy during the heyday of the mid-
2000s. Finally, given the elevating importance of PE as a source of capital for shipping 
companies in recent years, participation of PE firms in business consolidation in the shipping 
industry calls for further research shedding light on the multi-faceted market. 
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3.  MAPPING M&As IN THE SHIPPING INDUSTRY 
3.1. Introduction 
One of the significant features that has delineated the shipping industry during last three 
decades is a substantial increase in market concentration. The most notable example is that the 
combined market share of the 20 leading containership operators in the liner segment has 
steadily escalated from 59.1% in 2000 to 86.1% in (as of July) 2017 in terms of cargo-carrying 
TEU capacity. 43  Given that the tendency towards concentration is largely enhanced by 
expansion of the top five liner operators, whose combined market share has grown from 27.7% 
to 57.1% during the same period, international shipping transportation market is increasingly 
dominated by fewer and larger service providers. A similar tendency of market concentration 
has also been reported in the tanker sector. Merikas et al. (2014) document that the CR4, a 
widely used measure of concentration calculated as the cumulative share of the four largest 
companies, of the VLCC sector has increased from 10.4% in 1993 to 27.3% in 2010. They also 
report an increase in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), another commonly accepted 
measure of market concentration, during the same period. Broadly, fleet expansion of shipping 
companies can be categorised into internal and external growth options (Cariou, 2008; Slack 
et al., 2002). Internal or organic growth is attained by newbuilding investment, purchase of 
second-hand vessels and long-term chartering. Alternatively, external growth is achieved by 
co-operation agreements (slot sharing, strategic alliances) and M&As. Compared to other 
expansion strategies, M&As offer the fastest growth option with full control over the newly 
acquired vessels. In addition, since business consolidation includes not only physical fleets, but 
also intangible assets, such as the goodwill of specific markets, regional expertise and client-
base, M&As provide the merged firms with a valuable competitive edge to pave its way for 
accomplishing long-term strategic goals. 
While horizontal consolidation activity has played a vital role in outlining the market structure 
of the shipping industry, vertical integration carried out by shipping companies seeking access 
to a wider range of logistics activity has had a far-reaching effect on supply chain management 
and the strategies of constituent firms on a global scale. As a growing number of shipping 
companies attempt to take advantage of the economies of scope by acquisitions of stevedoring 
business (Heaver et al., 2000), the struggle for initiative in the supply chain between carriers 
and port operators has been intensified (Midoro et al., 2005). Moreover, in a strategic response 
                                                          
43 Review of Maritime Transport (UNCTAD), compiled from various issues. 
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to the concentration among shipping companies, terminal operating companies also seek 
consolidation. As shipping companies gain more bargaining power, requiring efficient cargo 
handling on the quayside and minimising the number of calling ports, port operators have to 
address their customer’s needs by a scale increase or extension of their service coverage. As a 
result, the port operating area has also experienced concentration dominated by few multi-
national players involving cargo handling on a global basis (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2012; 
Notteboom, 2002). In a similar vein, it has been documented that fewer leading logistics service 
providers have taken a larger market share (Carbone and Stone, 2005). 
Although shipping M&A activity is multifaceted in terms of the industrial segments of 
participants, transaction types, takeover motives and form of the deal, little is known about 
various aspects of the market. Findings in previous literature on shipping M&As have largely 
been based on anecdotal evidence, thus far from generalisation. Brooks and Ritchie (2006) 
utilise an extensive dataset of maritime M&A deals for the 1996–2000 period and find major 
motives (aggressive extraction, synergistic and strategic expansion) and importance of 
minority acquisitions. However, the sample period appears to be insufficient to demonstrate 
how M&As in shipping have changed over last few decades, and the use of SIC for industrial 
segmentation is likely to be subject to heterogeneity in the sample. Moreover, the shifts in the 
economic landscape of the shipping industry after the 2008 market collapse, such as the 
deadlock in bank lending, depressed shipping asset value and prolonged supply-demand 
imbalance, foster the market sentiment that further consolidations across shipping and related 
transportation industries are inevitable, in-depth analysis on shipping M&A market is of 
particular importance. 
In this chapter, I provide an extensive view of the shipping consolidation market based on a 
sample of M&A deals carried out by shipping and related companies over the 1990–2014 
period. However, since several drawbacks have been detected in using the industry 
classification of the database, which is the most popular source of information concerning 
M&A deals (e.g. inappropriate segmentation among sub-sectors in shipping, inclusion of 
transactions between non-shipping companies, incorrect information on individual deals), I 
categorise all acquiring and target companies into a new industry classification reflecting their 
actual business areas based on a variety of hand-collected materials. Then, I describe industrial 
segmentation and deal characteristics of shipping M&A activity linking theoretical hypotheses 
and explanations in previous literature. Finally, the determinants of acquisition premium and 
the choice of financing decision are investigated. 
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The multi-fold analysis in this chapter deals with several unanswered questions in the shipping 
M&A market that remain quite under-explored and makes important contributions to shipping 
and corporate finance literature alike. First, by utilising an extensive sample free from bias or 
heterogeneity, I illustrate the key constituent firms according to their business areas and 
directions of M&A activity (or acquisitiveness flows) in the shipping industry. The results 
indicate that horizontal consolidation is prevalent in the liner, port and logistics segments. 
Vertical integration between those segments for establishing reliable and efficient global 
supply chain is also salient in shipping M&As. Particularly interesting is the participation of 
non-shipping companies, such as financial institutions, steel-makers, oil and gas companies 
and conglomerates. 
Second, the sample period of roughly three decades allows for detecting how shipping M&A 
activity has changed over time. Specifically, this chapter documents three M&A waves in the 
shipping industry, the first two of which are almost concurrent to the fifth (1993–1999) and the 
sixth (2003–2007) rounds of M&A frenzies in history, as reported in Alexandridis et al. (2012). 
The third wave is still ongoing amid a prolonged recession in shipping following the 2008 
financial crisis. During this period, financial institutions (especially PE funds) play a key role 
in acquiring shipping and port operating companies for taking advantage of opportunities 
created by tightened bank lending to the shipping industry and the historical low value of 
shipping assets. 
Third, an analysis of firm- and deal-specific factors reveals that shipping M&A transactions 
are characterised by several interesting features. Consistent with the international nature of the 
shipping industry, the share of cross-border deals is approximately 37%, which is fairly higher 
than the average of other industries (29%). In addition, the evolution of regional M&A activity 
indicates that Europe has traditionally been the largest market for corporate control in shipping 
with an average share of 36.4%. However, the share of the European shipping M&A market 
has been shrinking over the sample period, which is in sharp contrast with the recent rise of 
intra-Asia deals (East and Southeast Asia combined). With regard to the method of payment, 
cash is the most popular form of M&A financing in the shipping industry.  
Fourth, I find that acquisition premium is negatively associated with the target size, which is 
consistent with evidence presented in Alexandridis et al. (2013). Moreover, supporting the mis-
valuation hypothesis (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) and related empirical evidence (Dong et al., 
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2006), the higher target mis-valuation, measured by the pre-announcement MTB ratio, is 
associated with the lower acquisition premium. 
Finally, I find that larger acquirers tend to choose cash for M&A financing, since they are likely 
to be less constrained by financial distress costs (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). In addition, larger 
deals are more likely to be financed with stock and other forms of payment due to the concern 
about post-merger integration risk (Hansen, 1987). 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 points out drawbacks of the 
sampling process in previous shipping M&A literature and describes how shipping M&A 
transactions are selected. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 analyse industrial segmentation, along with deal 
and firm characteristics, respectively. Section 3.5 investigates the determinants of acquisition 
premium. Section 3.6 examines the choice of payment method. Section 3.7 concludes this 
chapter. 
 
3.2. Sample Selection 
The sample of M&As in shipping comes from Thomson-Reuters SDC and covers the 1990–
2014 period. It comprises completed or withdrawn deals where either the acquirer or the target 
has an SIC code associated with the shipping industry (4412–4449). 44  Spinoffs, 
recapitalisations, self-tenders, exchange offers and repurchases are omitted, as they are not 
classified as M&As. I obtained 6,443 deals that satisfy the above criteria. 
Figure 3.1 provides a breakdown of this sample based on the public status of acquiring and 
target companies. More than 50% of M&As involve both a non-publicly listed acquirer and 
target, while in 12% of the deals, non-listed acquirers bid for listed targets. Only 5% of M&As 
involve both a listed acquiring and target company, while in the remaining 28% of the cases, 
listed firms acquire unlisted ones. Non-listed firms include predominantly private companies, 
while a very small fraction comprises government organisations or individuals (3% of acquirers 
and 2% of targets, respectively). The documented public-status profile of shipping M&As is 
quite similar to that of other industries in Thomson-Reuters SDC.45 Since the availability of 
stock price and accounting data is a key requirement for any further analysis of the shipping 
                                                          
44 The sample also includes deals announced in 2013 and 2014 but still indicated as pending by year-end 2014 when the sample 
was collected. 
45 A sample of 668,836 M&As for all other industries satisfying the same criteria yields 5.3% Public-to-Public deals, 32.6% 
Public-to-Non-Public, 53.9% Non-public-to-Non-public and 8.2% Non-public-to-Public. 
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M&A market, I retain the 2,896 deals where either the acquirer or the target is a publicly listed 
company. 
 
Figure 3.1 Public Status of Acquirers and Targets in Shipping M&As 
 
 
Table 3.1 provides a breakdown of the sample consisting of 2,896 deals according to the SIC 
code of acquirers and targets, along with the corresponding business descriptions. One key 
issue with prior research is that it does not provide a comprehensive mapping of the shipping 
M&A market based on the sector’s business areas. Existing research has relied on SIC codes 
that do not provide a clear-cut categorisation of business segments within the shipping industry. 
According to Walker and Murphy (2001), the SIC classification system was originally designed 
in the 1930s with a focus on the manufacturing sector, and thus, it provides a problematic 
classification for service industries. As a result, the employment of SIC codes may fail to 
encompass the dynamic developments in shipping since the 1960s (e.g. containerisation, 
specialisation, non-vessel-owning common carriers).46 For example, the SIC code 4412 (Deep 
sea foreign transportation of freight) includes both ship-owning and support services, while 
business segmentation based on cargo type (e.g. liner, dry bulk, tanker, offshore) is not possible 
at all using SIC codes.47 Moreover, the SIC classification in the SDC is often inconsistent with 
                                                          
46 Non-vessel operating common carriers (NVOCCs) are companies arranging transportation for shippers. Although they do 
not own ships, NVOCCs legally act as carriers (i.e. shipping companies) and issues their own bill of ladings for cargo owners. 
As discussed later in this section, not a few number of deals in the sample are carried out by NVOCCs with the SIC code of 
ship-owning business (4412). However, their business is actually similar to the description of the SIC 4731 (arrangement of 
transportation of freight and cargo).  
47  In September 2006, Nippon Yusen Kaisha (a Japanese shipping company) acquired RO-RO terminal operations in 
Zeebrugge and Antwerp (Belgium) from PSA International (a Singaporean port operator) for $ 27 million. While both the 
acquirer and target have been assigned SIC code 4412 by SDC, the business operations of the two firms are actually quite 
different: one is a ship-owning firm and the other is a port operator. This is a typical example of vertical, rather than horizontal, 
342
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actual business descriptions, and there are frequent classification errors (e.g. ship-owning firms 
may be classified as a shipping service firm or even a non-shipping business).48 
 
Table 3.1 SIC Codes and Corresponding Business Descriptions of Acquiring and Target Companies in 
Shipping Industry M&As 
SIC Business Description Acquirers Targets 
4412 Deep sea foreign transportation of freight 1,012 1,111 
4424 Deep sea domestic transportation of freight 69 62 
4449 Water transportation of freight, not elsewhere classified 68 155 
4481 Deep sea transportation of passengers, except by ferry 35 74 
4482 Ferries 25 45 
4489 Water transportation of passengers, not elsewhere classified 17 29 
4491 Marine cargo handling 284 431 
4492 Towing and tugboat services 24 39 
4499 Water transportation services, not elsewhere classified 1 149 
60–67 Finance, insurance, real estate 586 130 
40–49 Transportation and public utilities, except water transportation (44) 318 273 
Other Manufacturing, mining, construction, trade, etc. 457 398 
Note: SIC code 4432 (Freight transportation on the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway) in not included in this table, as there are no transactions 
where either the acquirer or target is a listed company in this segment. 
 
Going through all the transactions, I have identified significant classification flaws with regard 
to the business description or SIC code of the companies involved, which would possibly result 
in misleading segmentation. For example, I found that 382 (385) deals where the acquirer 
(target) with the first two-digit SIC codes other than 44 actually run their business in ship-
owning or shipping-related services, and 45 (28) deals where acquirers (targets) are assigned a 
44 SIC code, but are not shipping related. This is consistent with the view that SIC codes may 
fail to segregate firms based on homogeneity in business operations (Clarke, 1989) or industry 
relatedness (Fan and Lang, 2000).  In fact, Guenther and Rosman (1994) and Kahle and 
Walkling (1996) find discrepancies in more than 70% of the cases in four-digit SIC codes 
                                                          
integration that may be associated with different motives and outcomes. Andreou et al. (2012) find that targets gain more from 
vertical integration in the freight transportation industries (railroad, trucking, shipping and transportation arrangement) 
whereas Alexandrou et al. (2014) report that horizontal deals are more value-enhancing for targets in shipping. 
48 For example SCD classifies Hapag-Lloyd’s acquisition of CP Ships in 2005 as an acquisition of a shipping company by a 
tourism company. This is due to the fact that, according to SDC, the acquirer is TUI AG, the parent of Hapag-Lloyds, which 
is a multinational travel and tourism company with SIC code 4724 (Travel agencies). A similar misleading classification is 
also found in Neptune Orient Lines (NOL) - American President Line (APL) deal in 1997. Although both acquirer and target 
are liner shipping companies, NOL is reported with SIC 4491 (Marine cargo handling). 
 
 
85 
 
between databases (Compustat and CRSP), which can in turn affect the quality of findings in 
finance research. 
In a departure from the standard approach followed by previous research on shipping M&As, 
namely, bundling all deals in the same basket, I follow a comprehensive mapping method of 
the 2,896 transactions in order to provide a more relevant and complete classification. To this 
end, I reviewed 1,665 business press articles and hand-collected information regarding 
companies and M&A deals (e.g. exchange filings, annual reports, analyst reports). 49  This 
painstaking approach has allowed for acquiring and target companies to be grouped in three 
broad segments and 11 sub-segments, as illustrated in Table 3.2.50 
 
Table 3.2 Business Segmentation in Shipping 
Segment Sub-Segment Description 
Ship-Owning 
Tramp Shipping companies that operate fleets of dry bulk, (dirty and clean) tanker and/or 
gas carriers 
Liner Shipping companies that operate fleets of containerships 
Offshore Shipping companies that operate fleets of offshore-supporting vessels and/or oil-
drilling rigs 
Passenger Shipping companies that operate fleets of ferries and/or cruise vessels 
Diversified Shipping companies that operate diversified fleets in multiple ship-owning 
segments 
Other 
Ship-Owning 
Shipping companies that operate fleets of PCTCs, RO-ROs, reefers and/or barges 
Shipping 
Services 
Port Terminal operating and/or stevedoring companies 
Logistics Companies that provide freight forwarding, warehousing, distribution and/or 
arrangement of transportation services 
Other Services Other support services, including ship management, towage, pilotage, dredging 
and/or manning 
Other 
Financial Financial institutions and investment companies (e.g. banks, PE firms, investment 
holdings) 
Industrial Agriculture, mining, oil and gas, machinery, steel-making, construction, trade, 
etc.  
 
As part of the hand-collection process, I also updated key information related to the 
announcement date, relationship between the acquiring and target companies (e.g. subsidiaries 
of the same parent company or joint venture partners), the nature of the target in the deal (a 
company or an asset), the percentage of ownership acquired and the value of the transaction. 
                                                          
49 The number of hand-collected materials is lower than that of deals as a number of deals are carried by the same acquirers 
or targets in the sample. 
50 This approach is similar to previous attempts to propose new classification schemes for industries where standardised codes 
(e.g. SIC, NAICS and GICS) are inappropriate, for example Amit and Livnat (1990) for conglomerates and Kile and Phillips 
(2009) for high-tech firms, respectively. 
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This process allowed for identifying and excluding a number of additional cases that cannot be 
regarded as conventional M&A deals, or where both the acquirer and the target were unrelated 
to the core shipping industry. First, 213 deals are identified as straightforward acquisitions of 
assets. Since there are considerable differences between asset acquisitions and direct business 
consolidation (e.g. integration complexity, synergies, legal considerations), those deals are 
excluded. Second, I exclude 10 deals that are referred to as equity carve-outs (or partial 
spinoffs). Third, in 191 cases, I was unable to determine the business area of acquirers and 
targets due to limited information in the press and other hand-collected material. Since this 
research is subject to the segmentation of deals according to business areas, I exclude those 
deals.51 Finally, I identify and omit 221 deals where both the acquirer and the target are 
unrelated to the shipping industry. This is attributable to the aforementioned classification 
inconsistencies related to the SIC code.52 Following this process, it can be argued with a 
considerable degree of confidence that I have managed to put together the most comprehensive 
and bias-free sample of M&As ever used in the shipping industry. 
Figure 3.2 depicts annual shipping M&A activity during 1990–2014 for the final sample 
consisting of 2,261 transactions. In terms of both deal count and deal value, shipping M&A 
activity reached its peak during the mid-2000s when the global shipping market was at an all-
time high.53 The availability of abundant liquidity coupled with exuberant sentiment and an 
appetite for growth during a bullish market can explain this trend for consolidation. This is 
consistent with the evidence presented in Alexandridis et al. (2012) concerning a prevalent 
merger wave between 2003 and 2007, the sixth wave in M&A history. This period corresponds 
to the second shipping M&A wave (in terms of the number of transactions) in the sample in 
this section, as one also occurred during the late 1990s, again during a positive period for the 
shipping industry. Despite the slump after the economic slowdown of 2008, the shipping M&A 
market remained relatively upbeat, and in fact, activity points to a new wave by 2014. It is 
important to note that the drivers of this wave were diametrically opposed to the previous one, 
                                                          
51 It fails to identify the business area of both the acquirer and target in 66 cases while in the remaining 125 cases either the 
acquirer’s or target’s business is unknown. The combined value of 89 of those deals where transaction value information is 
available from SDC is $9,797 million in 2014 dollars. Including all unidentified deals in the overall sample does not alter the 
statistics and announcement returns (addressed in the next chapter) significantly. 
52 A salient example in this category is Steady Safe’s (SIC code 4412) acquisition of Volgren Indonesia (SIC code 3713), a 
bus manufacturer, for $ 192 million in 1994. Although the acquirer is also in the business of passenger water transportation 
through its river taxi service, (as well as others such as bus and taxis limousine services), it is, by no means, hard to be regarded 
as a shipping service provider.  
53 Although the deal value information is available for only 1,355 deals, the correlation between deal value and number is 
50.6%. 
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since freight rates recorded lows on a number of occasions, and therefore, consolidation this 
time was propelled by a deteriorating market. 
 
Figure 3.2 Annual Evolution of Shipping M&A Activity 
 
Note: Deal value is based on 1,365 deals with complete transaction value data and converted into 2014 dollars. 
 
3.3. Industrial Segmentation of Shipping M&A Market Participants 
In this section, I explore the industrial segmentation of acquirers and targets as a first step to 
illustrate a comprehensive picture of the shipping M&A market. In addition, I also provide 
explanations for the driving force behind consolidation activity in each segment. Table 3.3 
presents a breakdown of shipping business segments of acquiring and target companies for the 
sample of 2,261 deals. 
As illustrated in Panel A, while the majority of acquirers (45.7%) and target (49.4%) operate 
in the ship-owning segment, shipping service firms also play a key role in shipping M&As with 
a 27% (40%) share of acquirers (targets). Moreover, 27.2% of acquirers and 10.6% of targets 
are firms outside the wider shipping industry. In the ship-owning segment, the largest acquiring 
group is diversified shipping companies (16.4%) that operate various types of fleets (e.g. 
Maersk, COSCO, NYK, MOL) followed by those in tramp shipping (10.1%). Regarding target 
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groups, the two largest categories are tramp (17.3%) in the ship-owning segment and port 
(17.1%) in the shipping services segment, followed by logistics (12.5%). 
 
Table 3.3 Business Segments of Acquirers Targets in Shipping M&As (number of deals) 
 
Panel A: Business Segments of Acquirers and Targets 
        Ship-Owning  Shipping Services  Other 
        Tramp Liner Diversified Offshore Passenger 
Other 
Ship- 
Owning 
 Port Logistics 
Other 
Shipping 
Services 
 Financial Industrial 
                 
Acquirer 
 228 91 371 164 114 66  251 224 136  221 395 
 (10.1%) (4.0%) (16.4%) (7.3%) (5.0%) (2.9%)  (11.1%) (9.9%) (6.0%)  (9.8%) (17.5%) 
                 
Target 
 391 118 124 216 156 113  386 282 236  18 221 
  (17.3%) (5.2%) (5.5%) (9.6%) (6.9%) (5.0%)   (17.1%) (12.5%) (10.4%)   (0.8%) (9.8%) 
                 
Panel B: Transactions by Segment 
        Target 
    Ship-Owning  Shipping Services  Other 
        Tramp Liner Diversified Offshore Passenger 
Other 
Ship- 
Owning 
 Port Logistics 
Other 
Shipping 
Services 
 Financial Industrial 
                 
A
cq
u
ir
er
 
Ship- 
Owning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tramp  156 2 14 8 3 5  3 1 17  2 17 
 (6.9%) (0.1%) (0.6%) (0.4%) (0.1%) (0.2%)  (0.1%) (0.0%) (0.8%)  (0.1%) (0.8%) 
Liner  3 44 1 3 1 2  3 15 5  2 12 
 (0.1%) (1.9%) (0.0%) (0.1%) (0.0%) (0.1%)  (0.1%) (0.7%) (0.2%)  (0.1%) (0.5%) 
Diversified  53 27 52 27 20 23  45 41 28  6 49 
 (2.3%) (1.2%) (2.3%) (1.2%) (0.9%) (1.0%)  (2.0%) (1.8%) (1.2%)  (0.3%) (2.2%) 
Offshore  3              -    - 110 2 1  2 6 24  1 15 
 (0.1%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (4.9%) (0.1%) (0.0%)  (0.1%) (0.3%) (1.1%)  (0.0%) (0.7%) 
Passenger  2 4 - 2 56 4  6 9 7  14 10 
 (0.1%) (0.2%) (0.0%) (0.1%) (2.5%) (0.2%)  (0.3%) (0.4%) (0.3%)  (0.6%) (0.4%) 
Other 
Ship- 
Owning 
  
5 - - 3 3 33  4 1 5  - 12 
(0.2%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.1%) (0.1%) (1.5%)   (0.2%) (0.0%) (0.2%)   (0.0%) (0.5%) 
                
Shipping 
Services 
 
 
 
 
 
Port  9 5 4 2 0 1  160 15 17  5 33 
 (0.4%) (0.2%) (0.2%) (0.1%) (0.0) (0.0%)  (7.1%) (0.7%) (0.8%)  (0.2%) (1.5%) 
Logistics  4 2 1 1 3 1  14 144 11  2 41 
 (0.2%) (0.1%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.1%) (0.0%)  (0.6%) (6.4%) (0.5%)  (0.1%) (1.8%) 
Other 
Shipping 
Services 
 5 2 
                                
-    
3 10 1  2 2 93                            -    18 
  (0.2%) (0.1%) (0.0%) (0.1%) (0.4%) (0.0%)   (0.1%) (0.1%) (4.1%)   (0.0%) (0.8%) 
                
Other 
 
 
Financial  60 10 20 28 26 9  47 13 8    
 (2.7%) (0.4%) (0.9%) (1.2%) (1.1%) (0.4%)  (2.1%) (0.6%) (0.4%)    
Industrial  91 22 32 29 32 33  100 35 21    
  (4.0%) (1.0%) (1.4%) (1.3%) (1.4%) (1.5%)  (4.4%) (1.5%) (0.9%)    
                                  
 
3.3.1. Ship-Owning Segment 
Panel B of Table 3.3 illustrates the business combination of shipping M&A transactions 
according to segments of acquirers and targets. In the sample, 29% of the deals involve broadly 
horizontal integration between ship-owning companies where both the acquirer and the target 
operate in the ship-owning segment. The diversified and the tramp firms comprise the largest 
horizontal deal groups with 202 and 188 deals, respectively. On the other hand, congeneric 
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deals between different ship-owning segments are relatively rare and mostly carried out by 
diversified shipping companies (9.8%). 
Given that a large number of diversified shipping companies in the sample involve the liner (or 
container shipping) business, it is worth noting that horizontal consolidation between 
containership operating firms takes a substantial proportion of M&As in the ship-owning 
segment. In 112 deals where diversified shipping companies acquired ship-owning targets, 
acquirers run the liner shipping business as an important part of their shipping portfolios. 
Aggregated cargo-carrying capacity of those acquirers is approximately 10 million TEU, 
equivalent to 50.3% of the world containership fleets as of July 2016.54 However, it was not 
until the mid-1990s that M&As were regarded as a breakthrough (Brooks and Ritchie, 2006; 
Song and Panayides, 2002) when container carriers were required to cope with the massive 
increase in demand resulting from globalised manufacturing and retailing (Das, 2011), as well 
as regulatory changes provoked by the Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA) of the US in 1998 
(Fusillo, 2009). While the OSRA forced liner shipping companies into much tougher 
competition by technically dwindling the traditional shipping conference system and collusive 
pricing, which indicates increased risk in freight rate revenues, the rapid transformation 
towards offshore production, mainly seeking low-cost labour in developing countries, 
motivated liner operators to extend their geographical reach and improve service frequency. 
Under these circumstances, liner shipping companies had to strategically rationalise their 
operations through consolidation pursuing economies of scale and improving utilisation of 
their assets.  
As such, the liner shipping sector has demonstrated a clear tendency of concentration since the 
late 1990s. For instance, Maersk Line, the largest containership operator in terms of TEU 
capacity, has taken advantage of M&As to complement organic growth and take a leading 
position in the market. Particularly, Maersk Line’s acquisition of P&O Nedlloyd in 2005 
expanded its market share substantially from 10.7% to 15.9%, twice that of the second largest 
liner operator at that time. Figure 3.3 provides an extensive view of ongoing market 
concentration in the liner segment by illustrating the evolution of market shares of leading 
containership operators in terms of TEU capacity. It is obvious that the liner shipping market 
has become concentrated and dominated by fewer leading companies. While the combined 
market share of the top 20 companies has increased from 59.1% in 2000 to 86.1% in 2017, it 
                                                          
54 The TEU figure is based on Alphaliner Top 100 Operators. 
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is evident that a large part of the increase is attributed to the growth of the top five companies, 
the combined market share of which has increased from 27.7% to 57.1% during the same period. 
 
Figure 3.3 Market Shares of the Top 20 Liner Operators 2000–2017 (in terms of TEU capacity) 
 
Source: Review of Maritime Transport (UNCTAD), compiled by authors from various issues. 
 
Globalisation in manufacturing also has a far-reaching effect on vertical integration in the 
shipping M&A market. As an increasing number of manufacturers have outsourced their 
production on a global basis, operation in collaborative supply chain networks via 
synchronising flows of information and goods has become a critical success factor. In response 
to manufacturers’ need for logistic management, improved service reliability (e.g. transit time, 
service frequency) and value-added services, shipping companies, especially in the liner 
segment, have gained control over a broader scope of activities in the supply chain by 
integrating port and logistics operations through forward vertical consolidation (Midoro et al., 
2005). Along similar lines, Heaver et al. (2000) argue that liner shipping companies have 
increasingly gained control over hinterland activities (i.e. ports, haulage and logistics) and that 
the balance of power between shipping carriers and terminal operators has tilted in favour of a 
limited number of large carriers. 
Panel B of Table 3.3 illustrates that vertical integration of ship-owning acquirers is also salient 
in the sample. Approximately 9.8% of the overall sample involves deals where ship-owning 
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acquirers buy shipping services targets in forward vertical integration deals. Moreover, the 
majority of these acquirers are liner or diversified ship-owners whose main line of business is 
associated with liner shipping. This is consistent with the fact that most major liner shipping 
companies tend to own port and logistics businesses in the form of subsidiaries or assets in an 
effort to support or complement their core shipping business operations. For example, among 
the top 20 containership operators, 12 companies with a combined share of 69.8% of the 
world’s liner fleets in terms of TEU own terminal operations.55 
 
3.3.2. Shipping Services Segment 
Similar to the ship-owning sector, acquirers and targets possess the same business area in most 
deals within the shipping services segment. It appears that M&As have played a pivotal role in 
the development of the current network of the port segment, since 160 have taken place during 
the sample period (see Panel B in Table 3.3). Consolidation in the port segment started with 
the emergence of global terminal operators (GTOs) involved in multi-national port terminal 
operations on a global basis. Along these lines, Peters (2001) provides three broad 
categorisations of major GTOs: the first group (e.g. HPH, P&O Ports) pioneering geographic 
expansion; the second group (PSA International, CSX) seeking international expansion after 
witnessing successful internationalisation of the first group; and the third group invested by 
major deep sea liner carriers (Evergreen, CMA CGM), as previously discussed in this section.56 
Horizontal consolidation in the port segment has largely been facilitated by privatisation of 
port activities since late 1980s when the first wave of GTOs’ geographical expansion occurred 
(De Souza et al., 2003; Midoro et al., 2005; Notteboom, 2002). Since a growing number of 
port authorities and governments have sought new funding sources for port development and 
efficient utilisation of cargo handling assets, private terminal operators (mainly GTOs) have 
participated in port development projects usually through M&As. According to the World Bank, 
private participation in port development has been accelerated, involving 607 projects with the 
investment amount of $81 billion during 1991–2016 (see Figure 3.4). 
                                                          
55 The aggregate share of container shipping companies is from Alphaliner Top 100 Operators as of July 2016 and the number 
of terminal-owning shipping companies is based on Drewry Global Container Terminal Operators Annual Review and Forecast. 
56 Nevertheless, it should be noted that all port operating acquirers of the third group (i.e. subsidiaries of shipping companies) 
in the sample are classified as liner or diversified ship-owning companies. This is for the reason that their consolidations are 
strategically decided by their parent carriers for supporting the core shipping business despite recent emergence of hybrid 
GTOs that are established by liner carriers, but handle both in-house volume and third-party business (e.g. APM Terminals, 
NYK Line). 
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Another driving force in the port horizontal consolidation is a chain reaction of port operators 
(or stevedoring companies) confronted with concentration in the ship-owning segment. As the 
concentration trend has unfolded in the shipping industry, shipping companies have acquired 
increasing bargaining power over port operators during the last few decades (Heaver et al., 
2000). In recent decades, for example, liner carriers with wider control over whole supply chain 
and sizeable cargo-carrying capacity have been able to re-arrange their calling ports for 
rationalising transhipment activity and multi-modal transportation, which means that port 
operators are required to deal with the risk of losing major customers. Accordingly, terminal 
operators pursue scale increase through consolidation as an effective means to respond to the 
concentration in the liner shipping sector (Notteboom, 2002). Reflecting concentration in the 
port operating segment, Notteboom and Rodrigue (2012) report increasing market share of the 
top 10 terminal operators from 41.5% in 2001 to 64.6% in 2009 in terms of world container 
handling throughput. One of the notable examples of growth via horizontal consolidation in 
the port segment is DP World, the fourth largest terminal operator, with 33.4 million TEU 
container throughput in 2012 (5.4% of the world market share).57 In particular, its acquisitions 
of CSX in 2005 and P&O Ports in 2006, largely backed by sovereign wealth fund of Dubai, 
widened the gap between the top four operators (namely, PSA International, HPH, APM 
Terminals and DP World) and other global players.58 
 
Figure 3.4 Private Participation in Port Development 1991–2016 
 
Source: World Bank, Private Participation in Infrastructure Database 
Note: The total number of projects during 1991–2016 is 607. However, investment amount is based on the dataset of 534 
projects with complete information on investment value. As of July 2017, there is no deal reported year-to-date. 
                                                          
57 Drewry, “Top Ten Global Terminal Operators”, Press release, 27th August 2013. 
58 Drewry Annual Review of Global Container Terminal Operators. 
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The sample also presents the intense consolidation activity in the logistics segment, where 144 
purely horizontal deals took place during the sample period.59 M&As in the logistics segment 
are also propelled by globalisation in manufacturing and retailing. Since global or multi-
national companies increasingly take advantage of offshore manufacturing and concentrate on 
their focal points, their logistics operations have been outsourced to specialist logistics service 
providers, so-called ‘third-party logistics’. In order to satisfy the needs of globalised customers, 
logistics service providers should expand both geographical and service coverages. M&As 
have been regarded as the fastest way of up-scaling and are preferred by leading logistics 
companies, as reported by Carbone and Stone (2005). The logistics segment has also been 
undergoing market concentration, as fewer and larger logistics companies have increased their 
market shares. For instance, the top 100 logistics companies controlled a third of the estimated 
$270 billion annual market sales in 2015, and the aggregate annual sales of seven elite 
companies exceeds that of the other top 25 competitors.60 
 
3.3.3. Other Segment 
Acquirers outside the wider shipping industry (i.e. other segment) also play an important role 
in the shipping M&A market. Specifically, one of the major parts in this segment is investor-
led transactions by a growing number of financial institutions entering the shipping industry, 
such as investment banks, PE investors and hedge funds. The involvement of financial 
institutions in the shipping industry significantly varies among segments in regards to the 
driving force and timing of the investment. Comparable to the horizontal consolidation in the 
port segment, financial institutions’ acquisitions of port assets or stevedoring companies have 
primarily been motivated by port privatisation since late 1980s. In addition, their investment 
has also led to higher valuation (in terms of price-to-EBITDA), since the timing was largely 
concurrent with the booming period (2000–2007) of the shipping industry (Notteboom and 
Rodrigue, 2012). In the ship-owning segment, financial investment is especially driven by the 
stellar growth of PE funds in recent years targeting opportunities created by the deadlock in 
bank financing for shipping companies, as well as plummeting values of shipping assets since 
                                                          
59 Note that this sample is still insufficient to provide comprehensive description of M&As in the logistics segment. Since I 
focus on the shipping industry and regard others as ancillary or supporting business in order to keep the sample manageable, 
the SIC code 4731 (Arrangement of Transportation of Freight and Cargo) which appears to include deals by a large number 
of logistics service providers are not included in the sample. 
60 Supply Chain Brain, “Top 25 Third-Party Logistics Providers Extend Their Global Reach”, 
(http://www.supplychainbrain.com/content/sponsored-channels/kenco-logistic-services-third-party-logistics/single-article-
page/article/top-25-third-party-logistics-providers-extend-their-global-reach) 
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the global economic downturn of 2008. The annual influx of PE funds into the shipping market 
is estimated at roughly $5 billion and $7 billion in 2013 and 2014, respectively.61 
 
3.4. Deal and Firm Characteristics 
Based on the segmental distribution of the shipping M&A market discussed in the previous 
section, this section analyses deal- and firm-specific characteristics of acquiring and target 
companies. Figure 3.5 provides the sample distribution by the percentage of the target’s shares 
acquired through shipping M&A deals. The percentage of shares acquired is the pre-to-post 
announcement change in the ownership of the target firm. Transactions are partitioned into four 
groups: (1) majority, where the acquirer owns less than 10% of the target’s share prior to the 
announcement of the deal and seeks to acquire more than 50% after its completion; (2) control, 
where the acquirer owns between 10% and 50% prior to the acquisition announcement and 
seeks to acquire more than 50% after the deal; (3) minority stake purchases (‘minority’), where 
the acquirer owns less than 50% after the deal; and (4) acquisition of remaining interest 
(‘remaining interest’), where the acquirer owns more than 50% prior to the announcement. In 
over half of the transactions (56%), acquirers seek to gain a controlling stake in the target 
companies. 
 
Figure 3.5 Ownership Acquired in Shipping M&As 
 
                                                          
61 The estimated figures are from Bloomberg for 2013 and Hellenic Shipping News for 2014, respectively. 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-02-18/private-equity-funds-bet-5-billion-on-shipping-rebound-freight) 
(http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/private-equity-funds-pour-at-least-7-billion-into-shipping-in-2014/) 
48.8%
7.3%
32.1%
11.9%
Majority
(Pre-deal: < 10%, Post-deal: > 50%)
Control
(Pre-deal: 10 ~ 50%, Post-deal: > 50%)
Minority
(Post-deal: < 50%)
Remaining Interest
(Pre-deal: > 50%)
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Table 3.4 presents firm- and deal-specific statistics for the sample of 2,261 M&A transactions 
in the shipping industry. Deals are partitioned according to target segments, and all monetary 
values are reported in 2014 dollars. Since a large fraction (44%) of the sample consists of deals 
of post-announcement target ownership less than 50% or acquisitions of remaining interest (see 
Figure 3.5 above), I also report descriptive statistics for the sub-sample of deals of post-
announcement ownership over 50% (i.e. majority and control groups in Figure 3.5) separately 
in Panel B, which ensures that this chapter’s analysis satisfies the criterion that most M&A 
studies employ.62 
 
3.4.1. Size-Related Factors 
In the overall sample, the largest deals are carried out in the passenger ship-owning group with 
an average transaction value of $320 million, followed by the liner and diversified ship-owning 
groups and port with an average of $286 million, $284 million and $282 million, respectively 
(see Panel A of Table 3.4). The smallest group is logistics with an average deal value of $61 
million. However, in the majority and control subsample (M&C henceforth), the largest deals 
occurred in the diversified ship-owning segment with an average deal value of $684 million, 
followed by port, passenger and liner (see Panel B of Table 3.4). The largest bidder in terms of 
market size (market capitalisation measured four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement) 
and total assets (at the year-end prior to the announcement) is the acquiring group ‘other’. This 
is corroborated by the fact that the ‘other’ group mainly consists of conglomerates and financial 
institutions (banks, PE firms and investment holdings), which are generally much larger than 
shipping other ancillary service firms. 
On average, acquirers are approximately five times as large as targets in terms of market 
capitalisation measured four weeks prior to the deal announcement. The size gap between 
acquirers and targets becomes as much as roughly seven times wider in terms of total assets 
measured at the end of year prior to the transaction announcement. The findings for the average 
sizes of acquirers and targets are similar in the M&C subsample. However, the size  
 
                                                          
62 Nonetheless, it does not necessarily mean that deals of post-announcement ownership over targets less than 50% and 
acquisitions of remaining interest do not have any impact of business of combined entities or additional value created through 
shipping M&As. For example, an acquirers can gain an effectively controlling interest in a target with 30% ~ 50% of ownership 
in case target’s bylaw requires a majority of votes, rather than a majority of shares outstanding, for approval of important 
managerial decisions (DePamphilis, 2009). 
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Table 3.4 Summary Statistics for Deal- and Firm-Specific Factors in Shipping M&As 
The sample includes all shipping M&As in the Thomson-Reuters SDC between 1990 and 2014 that satisfy the same criteria described in the previous section. Statistics are reported for the entire sample and target segments. All monetary values are in 
millions of 2014 dollars. DEAL VALUE is the transaction value. ACQUIRER SIZE (TARGET SIZE) is the market capitalisations of the acquirer (target) four weeks prior to the transaction announcement. ACQUIRER ASSETS (TARGET ASSETS) 
are from the year-end prior to the deal announcement. ACQUIRER MTB (TARGET MTB) is the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer (target) four weeks prior to the deal announcement and winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. RELATIVE 
SIZE is the target-to-acquirer relative market value four weeks prior to the deal announcement (winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels). TARGET SIZE/DEAL VALUE is the target market capitalisation over the transaction value four weeks prior 
to the deal announcement (winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels). PREMIUM is the offer price over the target’s share price four weeks prior to the deal announcement for observations with values between zero and two. Values beyond the range 
[0, 2] are winsorised. CROSS-BORDER is the share of transactions where the acquirer and target are located in different domiciles. PUBLIC TARGET is the share of publicly listed targets. ALL CASH is the percentage of deals financed with pure 
cash. ALL STOCK includes pure stock transactions, and MIXED/OTHERS comprises all remaining others. It should be noted that statistics for financing mix are based on a sample of 815 deals with the complete method of payment data. M&C 
(majority and control) groups include the deals of post-announcement target ownership over 50%. 
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  Ship-Owning Target   Shipping Services Target   Others Target 
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Ship- 
Owning 
Target 
Tramp 
Target 
Liner 
Target 
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Target 
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Target 
Passenger 
Target 
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Ship- 
Owning 
Target 
Intra- 
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Deal 
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Services 
Acquirer 
Others 
Acquirer 
 
All 
Shipping  
Services 
Target 
Port 
Target 
Logistics 
Target 
Other 
Shipping 
Services 
Target 
Intra- 
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Deal 
Ship- 
Owning 
Acquirer 
Others 
Acquirer 
 
Ship- 
Owning 
Acquirer 
Shipping 
Services 
Acquirer 
                          
Panel A: All Sample 
                         
Observations   2,261   1,118 391 118 124 216 156 113 672 54 392   904 386 282 236 458 222 224   140 99 
Deal 
Value 
($ mil.) 
Mean  180.4  211.6 195.3 286.3 283.6 140.0 320.8 97.9 252.2 132.8 152.1  166.2 281.9 61.3 80.4 192.1 61.1 211.6  62.9 90.5 
Median  24.4  39.8 39.4 31.6 38.6 50.9 53.3 18.1 51.3 45.4 26.5  15.4 33.6 9.6 9.1 17.5 11.2 14.7  13.3 15.4 
N  1365  717 242 60 86 151 109 69 433 36 248  505 228 137 140 258 119 128  81 62 
Acquirer 
Size 
($ mil.) 
Mean  2,836.2  2,642.3 3,282.2 2,672.2 1,776.9 1,272.9 5,316.0 2,627.5 1,768.4 4,157.5 4,864.9  3,219.5 5,105.6 2,472.1 1,447.6 2,977.5 2,169.8 5,399.1  2,285.2 1,602.3 
Median  478.2  422.0 308.9 882.3 958.3 261.7 622.7 385.7 477.2 400.0 254.2  605.2 1,352.8 329.1 306.5 648.5 296.6 1,055.0  335.7 332.7 
N  905  367 114 40 30 107 37 39 260 15 92  430 173 126 131 227 120 83  58 50 
Target 
Size 
($ mil.) 
Mean  549.0  579.9 698.1 619.6 856.9 367.7 431.9 139.6 516.7 425.6 657.4  415.3 583.7 171.6 211.4 458.0 363.2 394.9  624.0 928.4 
Median  155.1  177.4 125.7 164.5 325.2 265.3 157.0 70.8 190.7 108.2 164.8  117.5 169.5 86.8 29.1 83.5 196.1 128.7  87.9 50.4 
N  539  370 128 23 65 75 57 22 184 12 174  133 77 39 17 48 10 75  24 12 
Acquirer 
Assets 
($ mil.) 
Mean  7,411.2  9,561.9 12,642.9 7,637.1 8,429.2 7,546.5 13,284.6 3,886.9 3,688.5 4,036.1 30,561.9  6,573.8 8,949.5 5,460.5 4,399.5 3,804.0 3,760.9 19,267.1  3,757.5 1,240.4 
Median  894.5  916.0 778.7 1,348.2 2,770.7 643.1 1,801.7 829.7 906.8 499.4 1,036.4  967.7 1,775.8 1,056.3 468.5 686.5 1,048.1 2,371.7  935.4 487.8 
N  1431  615 200 82 39 145 77 72 449 32 134  656 268 195 193 360 178 118  85 75 
Target 
Assets 
($ mil.) 
Mean  995.9  1,007.7 777.1 1,593.4 2,202.8 612.0 1,033.8 309.4 939.3 1,204.8 1,065.8  496.1 649.8 373.4 230.3 565.5 525.2 412.0  3,667.7 655.0 
Median  300.5  442.4 413.7 798.4 1,499.1 329.1 687.1 145.1 447.7 279.7 520.8  143.6 176.4 122.9 19.6 110.0 240.0 148.6  176.3 93.5 
N  895  570 203 36 85 104 89 53 288 24 258  255 137 72 46 116 32 107  48 22 
Relative 
Size 
Mean  0.90  0.88 0.39 0.25 1.81 1.20 1.04 0.27 0.89 0.29 0.90  1.21 1.71 1.34 0.27 0.20 3.32 0.10  0.56 0.04 
Median  0.24  0.33 0.24 0.25 2.55 0.50 0.07 0.02 0.37 0.29 0.19  0.10 0.09 0.10 0.25 0.17 0.17 0.08  0.47 0.04 
N  119  89 27 8 11 25 14 4 63 2 24  21 7 9 5 7 7 7  6 3 
Target Size 
/Deal Value 
Mean  15.62  18.97 21.95 5.51 24.24 23.80 8.01 14.98 17.54 7.06 21.77  8.16 5.62 15.47 2.06 4.91 12.85 9.93  8.00 7.63 
Median  2.77  2.84 2.02 1.86 6.32 3.69 1.87 10.30 2.10 1.48 5.25  2.26 2.18 4.20 0.82 1.98 4.40 2.19  3.38 5.36 
N  432  299 97 20 53 63 49 17 160 11 128  103 56 32 15 41 8 54  20 10 
Premium Mean  27.6%  24.9% 21.9% 35.4% 18.4% 23.8% 34.6% 23.1% 25.3% 45.2% 22.1%  34.0% 36.8% 26.9% 40.8% 35.7% 13.5% 36.0%  29.5% 49.4% 
Median  14.7%  12.3% 11.3% 17.7% 5.1% 13.7% 28.8% 3.8% 14.1% 32.3% 9.0%  23.1% 26.3% 13.1% 36.9% 30.9% 10.3% 18.6%  28.7% 30.0% 
N  357  256 85 17 39 57 42 16 138 11 107  82 42 28 12 31 7 44  12 7 
Acquirer 
MTB 
Mean  3.45  2.83 1.84 2.31 2.30 3.34 3.50 4.06 2.88 2.62 2.71  3.82 3.45 4.98 3.23 4.96 2.04 3.23  4.15 4.00 
Median  1.73  1.64 1.24 1.47 1.48 1.67 2.32 2.86 1.52 2.59 1.73  1.84 1.63 1.92 1.97 2.52 0.99 1.48  1.61 1.76 
N  965  390 114 39 29 118 43 47 282 17 91  460 186 132 142 245 129 86  56 59 
Target 
MTB 
Mean  2.02  1.94 1.85 2.07 1.40 1.67 3.50 1.16 2.01 0.91 2.08  2.29 2.57 1.76 2.20 1.89 1.83 2.63  1.83 1.44 
Median  1.07  1.00 0.97 1.15 0.77 1.07 1.19 0.69 1.15 0.65 0.86  1.32 1.46 1.09 1.01 1.26 1.77 1.34  1.16 0.22 
N  479  327 115 19 59 67 47 20 162 10 155  124 74 37 13 47 9 68  23 5 
Cross-Border  36.7%  38.7% 41.2% 49.2% 36.3% 41.7% 28.8% 30.1% 44.5% 35.2% 29.3%  35.5% 31.3% 39.0% 38.1% 40.2% 37.8% 23.7%  29.3% 34.3% 
All Cash  65.8%  65.8% 67.3% 64.5% 78.0% 62.2% 65.5% 55.0% 61.0% 45.0% 78.1%  66.2% 71.8% 66.7% 59.4% 57.9% 74.6% 74.7%  62.8% 65.2% 
All Stock  12.0%  12.0% 16.0% 16.1% 12.0% 10.2% 5.5% 7.5% 13.9% 20.0% 7.3%  11.9% 12.8% 19.0% 5.0% 13.8% 9.0% 10.8%  18.6% 6.5% 
Mixed/Others  22.2%  22.2% 16.7% 19.4% 10.0% 27.6% 29.1% 37.5% 25.1% 35.0% 14.6%  21.9% 15.4% 14.3% 35.6% 28.3% 16.4% 14.5%  18.6% 28.3% 
Public Target   39.1%   54.8% 58.1% 33.9% 79.0% 49.1% 59.6% 43.4% 44.6% 48.1% 73.2%   23.2% 30.6% 23.4% 11.0% 17.0% 10.8% 48.2%   32.9% 16.2% 
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Ship- 
Owning 
Acquirer 
Shipping 
Services 
Acquirer 
 
Panel B: Majority and Control 
                         
Observations   1,269   570 189 73 42 119 87 60 392 32 146   554 194 188 172 322 134 98   73 72 
Deal 
Value 
($ mil.) 
Mean  264.8  326.0 290.0 417.1 684.6 186.1 476.4 164.9 383.9 175.2 214.4  236.9 472.9 78.2 101.5 239.8 79.3 415.2  71.9 109.2 
Median  41.6  86.8 94.9 52.3 136.7 82.8 94.5 63.2 94.0 92.6 58.6  19.4 81.5 12.0 11.9 18.3 15.2 71.4  15.0 14.5 
N  766  376 128 37 26 83 64 38 253 24 99  306 117 87 102 179 69 58  38 46 
Acquirer 
Size 
($ mil.) 
Mean  2,424.9  2,079.3 1,617.3 1,921.9 2,071.6 884.6 7,647.1 2,361.3 1,888.1 5,656.9 2,041.4  2,973.2 5,451.7 1,759.2 1,589.7 2,944.9 1,808.0 4,809.7  824.8 1,772.0 
Median  414.2  314.3 259.9 557.7 1,072.9 195.6 622.7 597.5 464.7 387.1 125.2  594.7 1,372.5 184.4 336.9 680.2 292.1 1,033.4  252.4 319.1 
N  621  242 78 30 11 71 21 31 176 10 56  304 105 89 110 169 81 54  36 39 
Target 
Size 
($ mil.) 
Mean  480.2  458.4 348.6 762.2 669.0 377.4 546.6 121.0 550.6 118.0 325.5  649.4 943.5 121.9 347.3 784.6 150.9 610.3  197.4 31.8 
Median  164.5  181.3 117.7 267.0 216.1 269.9 215.9 65.0 215.9 108.2 170.1  132.3 186.7 55.6 159.4 131.5 153.3 132.3  79.1 28.1 
N  221  155 57 13 22 29 27 7 97 6 52  51 30 11 10 22 4 25  9 6 
Acquirer 
Assets 
($ mil.) 
Mean  4,908.0  4,969.9 3,907.3 6,309.9 6,696.6 2,551.6 12,131.2 3,524.7 3,463.2 4,884.7 11,042.6  5,513.6 8,399.4 2,536.6 5,296.7 3,504.5 3,361.6 17,043.8  2,783.4 1,312.3 
Median  737.8  754.6 585.3 1,231.7 2,418.1 472.9 2,049.1 879.1 879.2 388.8 272.9  800.5 1,510.5 820.0 507.0 586.1 1,031.4 2,257.6  850.8 444.9 
N  934  382 124 58 17 92 44 47 289 21 72  450 156 140 154 266 116 68  48 54 
Target 
Assets 
($ mil.) 
Mean  718.8  892.0 734.8 1,649.7 1,645.9 453.5 1,112.7 326.6 1,051.6 236.2 675.2  506.9 784.8 173.3 318.9 571.7 133.2 503.7  320.8 250.3 
Median  239.1  391.5 357.3 844.2 1,354.0 248.1 598.1 126.9 469.5 75.7 384.1  102.6 163.5 54.6 43.2 92.5 86.8 149.9  68.6 37.3 
N  364  217 82 15 25 39 40 16 139 12 66  118 57 30 31 71 12 35  14 15 
Relative 
Size 
Mean  0.62  0.74 0.32 0.20 1.18 1.90 0.10 0.35 0.62 0.42 1.81  0.19 0.11              -    0.27 0.29 0.15 0.13  0.30 0.04 
Median  0.24  0.26 0.25 0.11 0.53 0.63 0.02 0.04 0.26 0.42 0.14  0.20 0.05              -    0.25 0.25 0.17 0.14  0.30 0.04 
N  59  46 16 5 3 12 7 3 40 1 5  10 5              -    5 3 3 4  2 1 
Target Size 
/Deal Value 
Mean  5.44  7.04 1.48 2.38 11.98 24.33 1.45 0.95 4.05 1.08 14.07  1.76 1.42 3.14 1.12 2.51 1.78 1.04  2.16 2.38 
Median  1.04  1.11 1.05 0.78 1.11 1.71 1.16 0.98 1.14 1.13 0.99  0.89 0.92 1.41 0.79 0.90 0.78 0.92  1.20 1.23 
N  200  138 52 12 18 25 26 5 89 6 43  47 26 11 10 21 4 22  9 6 
Premium Mean  34.3%  33.2% 28.3% 58.3% 16.1% 32.2% 45.7% 26.3% 33.4% 39.1% 31.8%  36.2% 40.8% 24.6% 35.9% 36.7% 22.5% 38.5%  30.0% 53.7% 
Median  26.6%  24.8% 18.2% 23.7% 12.8% 21.1% 37.0% 26.1% 24.2% 38.1% 18.0%  31.5% 34.4% 14.8% 35.9% 35.5% 17.8% 26.4%  23.8% 30.0% 
N  180  127 49 10 16 23 25 4 82 6 39  41 23 9 9 18 4 19  7 5 
Acquirer 
MTB 
Mean  3.76  2.90 1.78 2.41 3.31 3.91 3.16 3.28 2.91 2.97 2.87  4.26 3.93 5.68 3.41 5.83 2.14 2.53  5.02 4.11 
Median  1.88  1.69 1.26 1.47 2.33 2.18 2.57 2.31 1.66 2.65 1.71  1.99 1.68 2.21 2.03 2.84 0.92 1.28  1.99 1.76 
N  653  256 77 31 13 77 23 35 194 10 52  318 105 95 118 177 87 54  34 45 
Target 
MTB 
Mean  2.36  2.16 1.96 2.97 1.16 1.14 4.54 1.10 2.28 1.25 2.02  2.99 3.68 1.44 2.51 2.64 1.77 3.46  2.17 2.35 
Median  1.21  1.09 1.27 1.15 0.77 0.90 1.21 0.66 1.10 0.65 1.00  1.57 1.59 1.68 1.40 1.57 1.77 1.35  1.12 1.72 
N  189  133 53 11 19 23 21 6 82 4 47  46 28 10 8 20 3 23  7 3 
Cross-Border  36.7%  38.6% 42.3% 46.6% 35.7% 41.2% 28.7% 28.3% 43.4% 31.3% 27.4%  36.8% 29.9% 42.0% 39.0% 41.9% 31.3% 27.6%  27.4% 30.6% 
All Cash  54.8%  53.1% 54.5% 62.5% 68.4% 45.2% 58.3% 40.7% 50.8% 41.2% 63.3%  54.9% 62.5% 50.0% 52.0% 49.6% 61.1% 64.3%  52.0% 66.7% 
All Stock  15.4%  16.8% 22.7% 20.8% 21.1% 16.1% 5.6% 7.4% 16.8% 23.5% 15.0%  14.5% 12.5% 29.6% 5.3% 15.7% 11.1% 14.3%  24.0% 5.1% 
Mixed/Others  29.8%  30.1% 22.7% 16.7% 10.5% 38.7% 36.1% 51.9% 32.4% 35.3% 21.7%  30.6% 25.0% 20.4% 42.7% 34.8% 27.8% 21.4%  24.0% 28.2% 
Public Target   24.4%   38.4% 41.8% 20.5% 66.7% 34.5% 50.6% 20.0% 35.5% 40.6% 45.9%   12.1% 18.0% 10.1% 7.6% 10.2% 4.5% 28.6%   20.5% 12.5% 
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gap between acquirers and targets is considerably reduced when it comes to the acquisitions of 
publicly listed targets, which take a proportion of 39.1% (24.4%) in the overall sample (the 
M&C sample). Specifically, the relative size measured using the ratio of target-to-acquirer 
market capitalisations four weeks prior to the deal announcement is 0.90 in the overall sample, 
which indicates that acquiring and target companies are similar in market size when both of 
them are publicly listed. The increased relative market size in the subsample of both publicly 
listed acquirers and targets appears to be driven primarily by two types of transactions: intra-
segmental (or horizontal) deals within the ship-owning segment and acquisitions of ship-
owning targets by ‘other’ acquirers. 
 
3.4.2. Acquisition Premium 
Premium is the offer price over the target’s share price four weeks prior to the deal 
announcement with values between zero and two. Values beyond the range [0, 2] are 
winsorised as in Officer (2003). In shipping M&As, premium is generally higher in acquiring 
shipping service targets (34.0%) and lower in acquisitions of ship-owning targets (24.9%) 
when compared with the average of all transactions. 
In order to detect variations in the premium offered by target segments, t-tests for mean 
differences are performed, the results of which are presented in Table 3.5. The first two 
columns indicate the mean differences between the sample average and target segments for the 
overall sample and the M&C subsample, respectively. The third column provides the mean 
difference between the overall sample and the M&C sample by target segments. The average 
premium offered in the M&C subsample is higher than that in the overall sample by 6.7%, and 
the difference is significant at the 5% level. This is quite reasonable from the perspective that 
the premium can be considered the price at which the acquirer gains control over the target (i.e. 
over 50% of ownership). In the overall sample, the tramp and diversified ship-owning targets 
receive a significantly lower premium than the sample average, while the port targets are paid 
with a significantly higher premium. Although the direction of the sign remains unchanged in 
the M&C subsample, the magnitude and statistical significance vary across target segments. In 
the M&C subsample, the diversified ship-owning targets are paid with a significantly lower 
premium than the subsample average, while the line and passenger ship-owning targets gain a 
significantly higher premium. 
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Table 3.5 Mean Difference in Premium Offered by Target Segments 
This table presents mean differences in the premium offered by target segments. The first two columns report the mean difference between 
the sample average and target segments for the overall sample and the M&C subsample, respectively. The third column provides the mean 
difference between the overall sample and the M&C subsample by target segments. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
Target Segment 
 Mean Difference (Segment - Average)  Mean Difference 
(M&C - All) 
  All Sample  M&C Sample   
           
All   - -  6.7% ** 
           
Ship- 
Owning 
Target 
All Ship-Owning Target  -2.7%   -1.1%   8.3% ** 
Tramp Target  -5.7% *  -6.0%   6.3%  
Liner Target  7.8%   24.0% *  22.9%  
Diversified Target  -9.2% *  -18.2% ***  -2.2%  
Offshore Target  -3.8%   -2.1%   8.4%  
Passenger Target  7.0%   11.4% *  11.1%  
Other Ship-Owning Target  -4.5%   -8.0%   3.2%  
Intra-Segment  -2.3%   -0.9%   8.1% * 
Shipping Services Acquirer  17.6%   4.8%   -6.1%  
Others Acquirer  -5.4%   -2.5%   9.6%  
 
          
Shipping 
Services 
Target 
All Shipping Service Target  6.4%   1.9%   2.1%  
Port Target  9.2% *  6.5%   4.0%  
Logistics Target  -0.7%   -9.7%   -2.3%  
Other Shipping Services Target  13.2%   1.6%   -4.9%  
Intra-Segment  8.1%   2.4%   0.9%  
Ship-Owning Acquirer  -14.1% **  -11.8%   9.0%  
Others Acquirer  8.4%   4.2%   2.5%  
           
Others 
Target 
Ship-Owning Acquirer  1.9%   -4.4%   0.5%  
Shipping Service Acquirer  21.8%   19.4%   4.2%  
                      
 
3.4.3. Market Valuation 
Firm over-valuation is measured using the MTB ratio, which is the market value over the book 
value of shares four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement and winsorised at the top and 
bottom 1% levels. It appears that acquirers are generally more highly valued with the average 
MTB ratio of 3.45 than targets with 2.02 in the overall sample despite the exceptions in the 
tramp and passenger ship-owning targets. A similar observation of MTB differential is also 
found in the M&C subsample. The average MTB of acquirers is 3.76, much higher than that of 
targets with 2.36, with exceptions in the tramp, liner and passenger ship-owning targets. 
Table 3.6 reports MTB differentials between acquiring and target firms over the sample period. 
It is evident that both acquirer and target MTBs fluctuate over time. The acquirer MTB peaks 
at 4.80 in the first half of the 2000s, while the target MTB peaks at 2.56 in the second half of 
the 2000s. Dong et al. (2006) find that the MTB differential between acquirers and targets 
affects the choice of payment method. The smallest MTB differential between acquirers and 
targets is 0.88 during the 2004-2009 period. Regardless of post-announcement ownership over 
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the target, the MTB differential between constituent firms over the sample period is similar in 
the M&C sample. 
 
Table 3.6 Valuation Differentials by Year of Announcement 
An MTB (T MTB) is the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer (target) four weeks prior to the deal announcement and winsorised at the top 
and bottom 1% levels. M&C means a subsample consisting of deals with post-announcement target ownership over 50%. Panel A reports 
MTBs for all deals in the overall sample. Panel B reports MTBs for a subsample of deals where both acquirer and target are publicly listed 
companies. The statistical significance is obtained using t-tests for means and Wilcoxon tests for medians. ***, ** and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
          All   1990–1994   1995–1999   2000–2004   2005–2009   2010–2014 
                      
Panel A: All Sample                   
                                            
All  A MTB Mean  3.45  3.70  3.90  4.80  3.45  2.66  
   Median  1.73  2.27  2.39  1.88  1.92  1.36  
   N  965  20  43  184  371  347  
                     
  T MTB Mean  2.02  2.12  1.55  2.00  2.56  1.65  
   Median  1.07  1.27  1.00  0.79  1.35  1.00  
   N  479  19  53  89  156  162  
                      
  A MTB - T MTB (Mean)  1.43 ***  1.58 *  2.35 ***  2.80 ***  0.88 **  1.01 *** 
   (Median) 0.65 ***  1.00 **  1.39 ***  1.09 ***  0.57 ***  0.36 *** 
                           
M&C  A MTB Mean  3.76  3.95  4.97  5.61  3.81  2.69  
   Median  1.88  2.31  2.67  2.18  1.93  1.63  
   N  653  16  24  115  257  241  
                     
  T MTB Mean  2.36  4.32  1.59  2.02  3.35  1.74  
   Median  1.21  1.99  1.13  0.81  1.51  1.00  
   N  189  4  22  46  61  56  
                     
  A MTB - T MTB (Mean)  1.39 ***  -0.38  3.38 ***  3.60 ***  0.46  0.95 *** 
      (Median) 0.68 ***   0.32    1.54 ***   1.36 ***   0.42    0.63 *** 
                      
Panel B: Public Acquirer and Target Sample               
                                            
All  A MTB Mean  2.47  1.33  2.49  2.31  2.50  2.74  
   Median  1.44  1.20  2.36  2.02  1.35  1.19  
   N  141  6  11  28  59  37  
                      
  T MTB Mean  2.11  2.77  1.86  2.05  2.68  1.20  
   Median  1.23  1.68  1.17  0.99  1.33  1.11  
   N  146  8  26  31  52  29  
                      
  A MTB - T MTB (Mean)  0.36  -1.44  0.63  0.26  -0.18  1.54 * 
   (Median) 0.22 **  -0.47  1.19 *  1.03 **  0.02  0.08  
                          
M&C  A MTB Mean  2.41  1.56  2.60  2.39  2.84  1.78  
   Median  1.55  1.51  2.13  2.32  1.38  1.10  
   N  66  4  6  15  27  14  
                      
  T MTB Mean  2.65  4.32  1.80  2.21  4.28  0.90  
   Median  1.18  1.99  0.69  0.82  1.70  0.74  
   N  72  4  15  21  21  11  
                      
  A MTB - T MTB (Mean)  -0.23  -2.76  0.79  0.18  -1.43  0.88 * 
      (Median) 0.37 **   -0.48    1.44    1.50 *   -0.32    0.36  
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The higher acquirer MTB than that of the target is generally consistent with the theoretical 
prediction of the mis-valuation hypothesis. According to Shleifer and Vishny (2003), 
acquisitions are largely driven by efforts of over-valued acquirers to buy targets at a price below 
fundamental value or less over-valued than themselves. However, since the current sample 
includes both public and unlisted acquiring and target firms, the above results might not 
correspond to the findings in the previous studies using transactions of only publicly listed 
acquirers and targets. For the sake of comparison, I thus report MTB statistics for a subsample 
that consists of deals where both acquirer and target are publicly listed companies in the 
shipping M&As (see Panel B of Table 3.6). Strikingly, although acquirer MTBs are slightly 
higher than target MTBs, the acquirer-target valuation differentials by period are not significant 
if post-announcement target ownership (overall sample) is not considered. More compelling is 
that target MTB is numerically higher than acquirer MTB in the M&C group, despite no 
statistical significance. The only exception is the 2010–2014 period when the average MTBs 
of acquirers and targets are 2.74 and 1.20 in the overall sample, respectively. Similar MTB 
differentials are found in the M&C subsample. 
 
3.4.4. Nationality Mix and Geographical Distribution 
Consistent with the international nature of the shipping industry, cross-border deals constitute 
37% of M&As in the sample. Despite a similar proportion of cross-border deals (39.6%) in the 
maritime transport M&As during 1995–2000, Brooks and Ritchie (2006) conclude that 
shipping does not significantly differ from other industries in terms of the nationality mix of 
acquiring and target firms for the reason that domestic deals take the majority of the sample. 
However, I find cross-border deals to constitute 29% of all 393,106 M&A transactions in 
Thomson-Reuters SDC that satisfy the same criteria as the sample in this chapter (i.e. after 
excluding transactions by both non-public acquirer and target). Similarly, Conn et al. (2005) 
report that the proportion of cross-borders deals is 26% on a global scale during 1986–2000. 
As such, evidence in this section apparently supports that inter-border transactions are more 
widespread in the shipping industry than others. 
Table 3.7 reports the regional distribution of shipping M&A activity through the sample period. 
In addition to the relatively high share of cross-border deals, another particularly interesting 
observation in the regional distribution is that North America is not a major M&A market in 
shipping. The proportion of intra-North American deals reaches only 6.2% in shipping M&A 
 
 
102 
 
activity. This is in sharp contrast with findings in other M&A studies. For example, 
approximately 61% of all publicly listed targets are from either the US or Canada in 
Alexandridis et al. (2010), who investigate the association between the level of competition 
and abnormal returns from M&As around the world. 63  Similarly, intra-North America 
transactions (the US and Canada) constitute 33.3% of all M&A transactions in Thomson-
Reuters SDC that satisfy the same criteria as the sample in this paper, confirming the unique 
feature in the geographical spreading of shipping M&A activity. Instead, intra-European deals 
comprise 36.4% of the global shipping M&A activity, even though their contribution has been 
shrinking from 48.8% in the 1990–1994 period to 29.4% in the 2010–2014 period. On the other 
hand, the share of deal activity in Southeast and East Asia combined has grown significantly 
from 14.1% to 39.1% during the sample period. China (including Hong Kong), Singapore, 
Malaysia and Japan are the most particular contributors of shipping M&A activity in the Asian 
region (untabulated). Alexandrou et al. (2014) report a fairly similar regional distribution of 
shipping M&A activity during 1984–2011, but without presenting annual development. 
 
Table 3.7 Regional Distribution (number of deals) 
  All 
1990 
–1994 
1995 
–1999 
2000 
–2004 
2005 
–2009 
2010 
–2014 
All 2,261 240 455 413 582 571 
Domestic 1,432 148 266 249 363 406 
 (63.3%) (61.7%) (58.5%) (60.3%) (62.4%) (71.1%) 
Cross-Border 829 92 189 164 219 165 
 (36.7%) (38.3%) (41.5%) (39.7%) (37.6%) (28.9%) 
Inter-Region 469 57 108 90 116 98 
 (20.7%) (23.8%) (23.7%) (21.8%) (19.9%) (17.2%) 
Europe 823 117 187 149 202 168 
 (36.4%) (48.8%) (41.1%) (36.1%) (34.7%) (29.4%) 
Southeast Asia 361 20 56 74 102 109 
 (16.0%) (8.3%) (12.3%) (17.9%) (17.5%) (19.1%) 
East Asia 286 14 35 46 77 114 
 (12.6%) (5.8%) (7.7%) (11.1%) (13.2%) (20.0%) 
North America 140 23 32 18 36 31 
 (6.2%) (9.6%) (7.0%) (4.4%) (6.2%) (5.4%) 
Oceania 7 6 22 12 20 10 
 (3.1%) (2.5%) (4.8%) (2.9%) (3.4%) (1.8%) 
Central & South America 55 3 7 10 9 26 
 (2.4%) (1.3%) (1.5%) (2.4%) (1.5%) (4.6%) 
South Asia 23 0 1 8 11 3 
 (1.0%) (0.0%) (0.2%) (1.9%) (1.9%) (0.5%) 
Africa 20 0 3 4 6 7 
 (0.9%) (0.0%) (0.7%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.2%) 
Middle East 14 0 4 2 3 5 
 (0.6%) (0.0%) (0.9%) (0.5%) (0.5%) (0.9%) 
                                                          
63 It should be noted that the sample of Alexandridis et al. (2010) includes only domestic transactions. Thus, the share of North 
American deals in their study is not directly comparable to the finding in this section since the North American group in this 
sample includes M&A transactions between the countries, which are not domestic deals.  
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3.4.5. Method of Payment 
Concerning the method of payment, 65.8% of a sample of 815 shipping M&A transactions 
with complete payment data is purely cash-paid (see Table 3.4).64 Despite a slightly lower share 
of cash offers (54.8%) in the M&C sample of 513 deals with complete payment data, cash 
remains the dominant form of M&A financing in the shipping industry. Figure 3.6 provides 
detailed information on the financing mix in the shipping M&As grouped by the year of 
announcement and acquirer’s geographical region. It is notable that the proportion of cash-
financing M&As in the shipping industry increased during the second half of the 2000s (see 
the upper part of Figure 3.6). This corroborates this chapter’s analysis on the M&A wave over 
the same period, namely, that the main driver was the availability of abundant liquidity and 
low-interest financing, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Although the share of cash payment  
 
Figure 3.6 Financing Mix in Shipping M&As 
All Sample M&C Sample 
Year of Announcement  
  
Acquirer’s Region  
  
                                                          
64 Unfortunately, to the best knowledge of author, there is no comparable literature documenting the distribution of the method 
of payment in shipping M&As and explaining the reasons for the remarkable share of cash-paid deals. Although Andreou et 
al. (2012) and Alexandrou et al. (2014) investigate the value creation effect in shipping M&A according to the method of 
payment, both studies fail to describe the comprehensive distribution of financing mix. While the sample in Andreou et al. 
(2012) includes deals by US-listed companies only and consists of different modes of transportation, Alexandrou et al. (2014) 
do not provide the number of observations for each financing source. 
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marginally contracted due to credit crunch after the financial crisis and subsequent collapse in 
the shipping market in 2008, cash financing is still prevalent in shipping M&As. While the 
popularity of cash payment in shipping M&A financing is also noticeable in most regions, the 
only exception is the North American region, where the share of cash financing is much lower 
than other regions (see the lower part of Figure 3.6).65 This can be attributed to the market-
oriented financial system in the US and Canada, where stock markets play a major role in 
allocating capital and exerting corporate control. 
 
3.5. Determinants of Acquisition Premium 
This chapter’s initial analysis on deal and firm characteristics reveals several unique features 
in shipping M&A activity, such as a relatively common occurrence of cross-border deals, 
geographical divergence of acquirer and targets other than the North America region and the 
prevalence of cash offers, as well as variations among segments within the shipping industry. 
On top of that, I further explore potential associations between deal- and firm-specific factors, 
as earlier studies on M&As have found that those factors are not independent, but inter-related. 
In this section, I first investigate the determinants of premiums in shipping M&A deals. 
The takeover premium is the difference between the offer price and target value prior to the 
deal announcement. Since offer price is determined in negotiation between constituent firms, 
it can be viewed that an acquisition premium reflects how much envisaged synergistic gains 
from M&As are channelled into acquiring and target firms. In this regard, Walkling and 
Edmister (1985) argue that a premium is positively associated with potential acquisition-related 
benefits, but negatively with the bargaining power of acquiring firms. Previous literature on 
M&As has provided evidence concerning the determinants of offer premiums from deal and 
firm characteristics (e.g. the method of payment, acquirer’s public status, horizontal 
transactions, nationality mix, firm size and firm valuation) to market-wide factors (e.g. stock 
market runup, competition in the market for corporate takeover). In sharp contrast, there is no 
relevant empirical evidence on takeover premiums for business consolidation in the shipping 
industry. Accordingly, this section fills this gap by providing evidence on the determinants of 
acquisition premiums in shipping M&As. 
                                                          
65 Financing mix by regions of targets shows only a marginal difference. 
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3.5.1. Univariate Tests 
3.5.1.1. Deal and Firm Characteristics 
Previous literature has identified a plethora of driving forces behind variations in takeover 
premiums. I examine the impact of the method of payment, acquirer’s public status, stock 
market valuation, horizontal deals and nationality mix, the results of which are presented in 
Table 3.8. Huang and Walkling (1987) document that acquirers pay higher premiums in cash-
financed deals than in equity offers, since shareholders of target companies require 
compensation for the immediate tax liability of capital gains in cash transactions (Ayers et al., 
2003). In Panel A of Table 3.8, I compare premiums in shipping M&As in both cash- and 
stock-financed deals. Although the mean difference is not significant due to the low number of 
observations in equity offers, it is obvious that acquirers in cash deals are likely to pay heftier 
premiums than in stock-for-stock exchanges by 12.43% (6.84%) in the M&C sample (the 
overall sample). Moreover, the median difference based on Wilcoxon tests is statistically 
significant at conventional levels. 
Panel B of Table 3.8 presents premiums by the acquirers’ public status. Bargeron et al. (2008) 
find that publicly listed acquirers generally pay a higher premium than private ones, especially 
when managerial ownership is low. I also test the difference of takeover premiums in shipping 
M&As between public and non-public acquirers. However, no significant or striking patterns 
in premiums by acquiring firms’ public status are found. The acquisition premium is also 
affected by stock market valuation. Bouwman et al. (2009) report that the average premium is 
significantly lower when acquisitions take place during booming markets. In light of that, I 
also classify the sample deals by stock market valuation (high versus others) based on de-
trended monthly price-earnings ratio of the S&P500 index.66 The results reveal that acquiring 
firms pay lower premiums during high market valuation, but the difference is insignificant for 
both the mean and median level (see Panel C of Table 3.8). 
Officer (2003) find that premiums are generally larger in intra-industry deals than inter-
industry transactions. To test the effect of intra-industry acquisitions, deals in the sample are 
grouped into horizontal, defined as transactions within the ship-owning and shipping services 
segments, and others. However, the results are mixed, indicating that premiums in horizontal 
deals are slightly lower in mean difference, but higher in median difference (see Panel D of 
                                                          
66 For classification of high market valuation, the price-earnings ratio of each month is partitioned into above and below the 
average of preceding five years. The top half of the above-average are defined as high-valued markets. 
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Table 3.8). In reporting gains in shipping M&A transactions, Alexandrou et al. (2014) argue 
that insignificant abnormal returns for acquiring firms in cross-border deals are attributable to 
hefty premiums, as foreign acquirers are seeking access to specific regional markets. However, 
as seen in Panel E of Table 3.8, there is no significant difference in premiums between cross-
border and domestic deals. 
 
Table 3.8 Premium by Deal and Firm Characteristics 
This table reports premiums by method of payment, acquirer’s public status, market high valuation, horizontal deals and nationality mix. High 
Valuation indicates that the acquisition is announced within a high-valuation market using a de-trended monthly price-earnings ratio of the 
S&P500, in line with Bouwman et al. (2009). Horizontal includes deals within either ship-owning or shipping services segments. The statistical 
significance is based on t-tests for means and Wilcoxon tests for medians. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
   All Sample   M&C Sample 
               
Panel A: Method of Payment           
                             
  Cash  Stock  (Cash - Stock)  Cash  Stock  (Cash - Stock) 
               
Mean  27.06  20.22  6.84  33.43  21.00  12.43  
Median  15.73  2.71  13.02 **  26.67  2.71  23.96 *** 
N   202  21        109  19      
               
Panel B: Acquirer Public Status            
                             
  Public  
Non- 
Public 
 
(Public - 
Non-Public) 
 Public  
Non- 
Public 
 
(Public - 
Non-Public) 
               
Mean  27.31  27.77  -0.46  36.95  32.28  4.67  
Median  13.91  14.81  -0.90  26.52  26.84  -0.32  
N   132  225        78  102      
               
Panel C: High Valuation            
                             
  High  Others  (High - Others)  High  Others  (High - Others) 
             
Mean  26.88  27.98  -1.10  30.67  36.62  -5.95  
Median  17.65  12.63  5.02  25.51  27.37  -1.86  
N   126  231        70  110      
               
Panel D: Horizontal Deals            
                             
  Horizontal  Others  
(Horizontal 
 - Others) 
 Horizontal  Others  
(Horizontal 
 - Others) 
             
Mean  27.24  27.91  -0.67  34.02  34.67  -0.65  
Median  16.88  12.80  4.08  26.71  25.19  1.52  
N   169  188        100  80      
               
Paned E: Nationality Mix                  
                       
  
Cross- 
Border 
 Domestic  
(Cross-Border 
 - Domestic) 
 
Cross- 
Border 
 Domestic  
(Cross-Border 
 - Domestic) 
               
Mean  27.88  27.42  0.46  36.44  32.85  3.59  
Median  17.65  14.29  3.36  28.06  26.26  1.80  
N   136  221        73  107      
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3.5.1.2. Firm Sizes 
Furthermore, I examine the size effect in determining acquisition premiums. Moeller et al. 
(2004) find that larger acquirers tend to pay heftier premiums. This is consistent with what the 
hubris hypothesis explains: overconfident managers are more likely to overpay due to the 
overestimation of their ability to create synergies from combined entities (Malmendier and 
Tate, 2008). I also investigate the possible association between acquirer size and premium in 
shipping M&As. To mitigate time-series fluctuations by the year of announcement, 
observations of acquirer size, measured using acquirer market capitalisations four weeks prior 
to the transaction announcement, are ranked into terciles in each year. The results indicate a 
positive relationship between acquirer size and acquisition premium. The average premium 
paid by the large acquirer group (large) is 35.8% in the overall sample, which is significantly 
higher than that paid by the small group (small) by 24.4% (see Table 3.9). The positive 
association (as well as the significant mean difference) is also observed in the M&C subsample 
with the increase in the average of premiums for each acquirer size tercile. 
However, predictions regarding the association between target size and premium are rather 
contradictory. In a similar vein to the hubris hypothesis on acquirer size, empire-building 
managements tend to pay larger premiums for large targets, as they overestimate their ability 
to run the combined entities. In addition, larger targets are more likely to have bargaining power 
in negotiating offer prices, resulting in higher premiums. By contrast, given the high value-at-
stake involving the acquisition of large-scale targets, for example, post-merger integration is 
more complex than combining relatively smaller targets, which might lead to elevating 
uncertainty in synergy realisation. Accordingly, managers of acquiring firms may more 
deliberately evaluate the intrinsic value of targets, potentially resulting in lower offer prices. In 
support of this view, Alexandridis et al. (2013) document a negative relation between target 
size and premium: larger targets are acquired at a discount relative to smaller ones. They 
attribute the negative association between target size and premium to potential post-merger 
integration complexity. The finding regarding M&As in the shipping industry is consistent with 
the negative relation between target size and premium in Alexandridis et al. (2013). The larger 
target size, measured using target market capitalisations four weeks prior to the deal 
announcement, is associated with the lower acquisition premium, as seen in Table 3.9. In each 
year, targets are ranked into terciles by the amount of market capitalisations. The average 
premium paid in the top target size tercile (large) is 17.6% (25.2%), and the mean difference 
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from the bottom tercile (small) is 21.9% (17.3%), with significance at the 1% level in the 
overall sample (M&C sample). 
 
Table 3.9 Premium by Acquirer and Target Size 
A Size (T Size) is the market capitalisations of the acquirer (target) four weeks prior to the transaction announcement. In each year, A Size 
and T Size are ranked into terciles, with Small being the lowest size. Premium is the offer price over the target’s share price four weeks prior 
to the deal announcement for observations with values between zero and two. Values beyond the range [0, 2] are winsorised. The statistical 
significance is obtained using t-tests for means and Wilcoxon tests for medians. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
        All Sample   M&C Sample 
      Small Medium Large  (Large - Small)  Small Medium Large  (Large - Small) 
                 
A Size  Mean  69.99 586.96 7,866.62  7,796.63 ***  69.14 518.32 6,687.20  6,618.05 *** 
  Median  55.54 478.20 3,813.70  3,758.15 ***  53.69 414.15 3,094.37  3,040.69 *** 
  N  301 303 301    207 207 207   
                 
Premium  Mean  11.36 26.60 35.77  24.41 ***  21.11 44.38 39.59  18.48 * 
  Median  4.01 14.68 22.89  18.89 *  9.20 21.12 28.94  19.74  
  N  10 28 44    5 15 30   
                                  
T Size  Mean  45.92 216.48 1,377.28  1,331.35 ***  68.46 240.85 1,137.99  1,069.54 *** 
  Median  32.53 149.59 869.00  836.47 ***  40.57 131.98 682.96  642.39 *** 
  N  181 177 181    73 75 73   
                 
Premium  Mean  39.50 28.01 17.62  -21.88 ***  42.51 35.62 25.25  -17.26 *** 
  Median  21.21 15.82 10.34  -10.87 **  27.24 28.51 21.61  -5.63  
    N   107 124 119        59 59 62      
 
3.5.1.3. Firm Valuations 
Previous literature has provided evidence concerning the relation between valuations and 
acquisition premiums (Ang and Cheng, 2006; Dong et al., 2006). Specifically, Dong et al. 
(2006) find the association between premium and valuation to depend on the MTBs of acquirer 
and target: the higher acquirer (target) MTB, the higher (lower) the premium. Table 3.10 
presents how the premium is related to the degrees of acquirer and target MTBs. Panel A and 
Panel B report statistics for the overall sample and the subsample of both publicly listed 
acquirers and targets, respectively. Since MTBs vary over time, as seen earlier in this chapter 
(see Table 3.6), acquirer and target MTBs in each year are ranked into terciles. This yearly 
sorting ensures that the results remain free from potential swings in the time-series. 
The findings confirm the negative association between target valuation and acquisition 
premium. In all four groups partitioned according to public status and post-announcement 
target ownership, the average premium in the top tercile (large) is higher than that in the bottom 
tercile (small). The most salient result occurs in the M&C group of the public acquirer and 
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target subsample (see the right-hand side of Panel B). In this subsample, the mean difference 
of the premium between the top and bottom terciles of target MTB is 51.1%, and this is 
significant at the 1% level. The mean differences in the other three groups are also significant 
at conventional levels. In contrast, the relation between acquirer MTB and premium in the 
sample is generally opposed to the findings of Dong et al. (2006). Although the mean 
differences are insignificant in most subsamples, the results is this paper indicate that higher  
 
Table 3.10 Premium by Acquirer and Target MTB Ratios 
A MTB (T MTB) is the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer (target) four weeks prior to the deal announcement and winsorised at the top and 
bottom 1% levels. In each year, MTBs are ranked into terciles, with Small being the lowest tercile. Premium is the offer price over the target’s 
share price four weeks prior to the deal announcement for observations with values between zero and two. Values beyond the range [0, 2] are 
winsorised. M&C means a subsample consisting of deals with post-announcement target ownership over 50%. Panel A reports MTBs for all 
deals in the overall sample. Panel B reports MTBs for a subsample of deals where both acquirer and target are publicly listed companies. ***, 
** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
        All Sample   M&C Sample 
      Small Medium Large  (Large - Small)  Small Medium Large  (Large - Small) 
                 
Panel A: Overall Sample            
                                  
A MTB  Mean  0.67 1.87 7.78  7.11 ***  0.71 2.13 8.40  7.69 *** 
  Median  0.63 1.70 4.67  4.05 ***  0.63 1.80 5.03  4.40 *** 
  N  323 319 323    219 215 219   
                 
Premium  Mean  39.18 17.88 32.03  -7.15  40.75 31.94 38.51  -2.24  
  Median  29.71 3.28 12.73  -16.98  29.71 15.70 13.83  -15.88  
    N   26 33 24    20 15 13   
                 
T MTB  Mean  0.41 1.11 4.52  4.11 ***  0.58 1.23 5.23  4.65 *** 
  Median  0.42 1.09 2.36  1.94 ***  0.54 1.10 2.38  1.83 *** 
  N  161 157 161    64 61 64   
                 
Premium  Mean  31.75 22.96 22.43  -9.31 **  40.23 27.46 27.68  -12.54 ** 
  Median  18.05 14.46 14.81  -3.24  32.08 26.26 18.09  -13.99  
    N   96 101 104        48 51 50      
                 
                 
Panel B: Public Acquirer and Target Sample           
                                  
A MTB  Mean  0.78 2.06 4.60  3.82 ***  1.10 1.88 4.33  3.23 *** 
  Median  0.67 1.71 3.05  2.38 ***  0.77 1.72 3.15  2.38 *** 
  N  46 49 46    21 24 21   
                 
Premium  Mean  43.36 17.15 27.39  -15.97  52.27 34.73 22.50  -29.77 ** 
  Median  29.71 3.28 8.87  -20.84  36.03 16.16 11.62  -24.41  
    N   26 29 25    17 17 11   
                 
T MTB  Mean  0.53 1.24 4.53  4.01 ***  0.72 1.49 5.88  5.17 *** 
  Median  0.47 1.27 2.37  1.90 ***  0.65 1.12 2.25  1.60 *** 
  N  49 48 49    23 26 23   
                 
Premium  Mean  41.93 24.99 13.21  -28.72 ***  70.14 24.72 19.00  -51.14 *** 
  Median  35.87 6.30 9.61  -26.27 ***  56.41 26.35 15.7  -40.71 *** 
    N   28 36 34        16 21 21      
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acquirer MTB is associated with a lower premium. Specifically, the mean difference in 
premium between the top and bottom terciles in the M&C group of the public acquirer and 
target subsample is 29.8% and significant at the 5% level. 
 
3.5.2. Multivariate Tests 
The results of the univariate tests indicate that target size and valuation are the two most 
significant determinants of premiums in shipping M&A transactions. In this section, I test the 
robustness of the two factors in multivariate regressions by controlling other variables. Table 
3.11 illustrates the results of OLS regressions of acquisition premiums in shipping M&As. In 
regressions (1)–(3), the main explanatory variable is the logarithm of target size (lnTSIZE).67 
In regression (2), I include several indicator variables: CASH, CROSS BORDER, HIVAL, 
HORIZONTAL and NON-PUBLIC, with a value of one for acquisitions with 100% cash 
financing, different nationalities of acquirers and targets, occurring during high valuation 
markets using the de-trended monthly price-earnings ratio of the S&P500 index, within either 
ship-owning or shipping services segments and by non-publicly listed acquirers, respectively. 
The coefficient of target size is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level after 
controlling the dummy variables. The signs of the dummy variable coefficients are largely 
consistent with the results of univariate tests, with the exception of CASH, but there is no 
statistical significance. In regression (3), logarithms of acquirer size (lnASIZE) and valuation 
(lnAMTB) are included. The negative coefficient of target size is still significant at the 5% 
level. The signs of acquirer size and valuation are consistent with the results of univariate tests, 
but they are not statistically significant. 
The main explanatory variable of regressions (4)–(6) is the logarithm of the target MTB ratio 
(lnTMTB), and the regression design is the same as regressions (1)–(3). The negative impact 
of target valuation is statistically significant in all specifications for the overall sample, except 
in regression (5) where it unexpectedly flips sign.   One interesting observation in the group of 
regressions is that there are positive coefficients of cash deals, and it is significant in regression 
(6) for the whole sample. Finally, both main explanatory variables of target size and valuation 
are included in regressions (7)–(9), and the signs of coefficients generally remain unchanged 
and are significant at conventional levels in the both (all and M&C) samples. 
                                                          
67 In order to obtain regression residuals being homoscedastic, the independent variables in money term (T SIZE, A SIZE) or 
market multiples (T MTB, A MTB) are transformed into logarithm.  
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Table 3.11 Multivariate Regressions of Premium 
The table reports OLS regression estimates of acquisition premium on target size, target market-to-book and other characteristics. lnTSIZE 
(lnASIZE) is the natural logarithm of target (acquirer) market capitalisations four weeks prior to the deal announcement. lnTMTB (lnAMTB) 
is the natural logarithm of target (acquirer) market-to-book ratio four weeks prior to the deal announcement. CASH, CROSS BORDER, 
HIVAL, HORIZONTAL and NON-PUBLIC are indicator variables with a value of one for acquisitions with 100% cash financing, different 
nationalities of acquirers and targets, occurring during a high valuation market using the de-trended monthly price-earnings ratio of the 
S&P500, within either ship-owning or shipping services segments and by non-public acquirer, respectively. p values are reported in brackets. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  
                            
Panel A: All Sample                           
                                                       
lnTSIZE -9.289 ***  -9.811 ***  -7.973 **           -6.656 ***  -6.534 ***  -5.694 *  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.018)           (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.065)  
lnTMTB          -5.008 ***  1.449 ***  -21.549 ***  -3.263 **  -3.349 **  -22.791 ***  
          (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.022)  (0.020)  (0.000)  
CASH    -0.959  12.788     4.036  14.767 *     4.705  13.278  
    (0.816)  (0.238)     (0.341)  (0.098)     (0.233)  (0.129)  
CROSS BORDER    4.377  8.905     4.206  12.389     4.677  14.632  
    (0.314)  (0.499)     (0.824)  (0.246)     (0.263)  (0.165)  
HIVAL    -4.587  -6.431     4.368  7.494     -2.414  7.266  
    (0.302)  (0.562)     (0.794)  (0.427)     (0.574)  (0.431)  
HORIZONTAL    -0.658  2.545     7.326  -1.766     -6.254  1.019  
    (0.929)  (0.878)     (0.411)  (0.893)     (0.393)  (0.937)  
NON-PUBLIC    -2.825        4.387        -2.843     
    (0.532)        (0.837)        (0.505)     
lnASIZE       4.248        3.587        5.306 **  
       (0.166)        (0.115)        (0.030)  
LNAMTB       -3.591        -3.743        -2.276  
       (0.327)        (0.215)        (0.455)  
C 75.420 ***  78.378 ***  26.647  25.260 ***  6.324 ***  -13.115  60.203 ***  57.332 ***  -0.763  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.397)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.577)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.975)  
                            
Obs. 350  350  78  301  301  69  297  297  69  
Adj. R2 0.138  0.158  0.167  0.040  0.091  0.429  0.120  0.163  0.463  
Time-Fixed No   Yes   Yes   No   Yes   Yes   No   Yes   Yes  
Industry-Fixed No     Yes     Yes     No     Yes     Yes     No     Yes     Yes    
                            
Panel B: M&C Sample                           
                                                       
lnTSIZE -5.579 ***  -6.343 ***  -10.328 **           -2.790 *  -2.454  -11.066 ***  
 (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.035)           (0.088)  (0.166)  (0.008)  
lnTMTB          -8.733 ***  -9.062 ***  -24.583 ***  -8.270 ***  -8.811 ***  -28.186 ***  
          (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
CASH    -0.640  25.832     3.642  16.655     4.221  18.662  
    (0.917)  (0.111)     (0.493)  (0.197)     (0.427)  (0.111)  
CROSS BORDER    7.063  16.508     6.648  15.870     8.079  22.385 *  
    (0.271)  (0.366)     (0.230)  (0.239)     (0.151)  (0.074)  
HIVAL    -7.005  -18.548     2.685  9.083     1.824  6.736  
    (0.279)  (0.324)     (0.639)  (0.566)     (0.751)  (0.635)  
HORIZONTAL    4.140  19.102     -6.897  4.377     -5.749  13.154  
    (0.678)  (0.417)     (0.456)  (0.799)     (0.534)  (0.405)  
NON-PUBLIC    -6.603        -7.618        -7.420     
    (0.340)        (0.206)        (0.217)     
lnASIZE       4.119        5.547        9.418 ***  
       (0.397)        (0.115)        (0.009)  
LNAMTB       -4.392        -7.358        -4.176  
       (0.457)        (0.094) *        (0.302)  
C 62.900 ***  71.185 ***  28.994  32.729 ***  30.689 ***  -36.416  47.288 ***  41.931 ***  -20.348  
 (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.513)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.263)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.491)  
                            
Obs. 180  180  47  149  149  42  149  149  42  
Adj. R2 0.053  0.077  0.271  0.087  0.169  0.570  0.106  0.181  0.665  
Time-Fixed No   Yes   Yes   No   Yes   Yes   No   Yes   Yes   
Industry-Fixed No     Yes     Yes     No     Yes     Yes     No     Yes     Yes   
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3.6. Choice of Payment Method 
In this section, I examine the determinants of payment method in shipping M&As. The choice 
of payment method is a key element in the deal-structuring process and has various 
implications for both acquiring and target firms. Considering the size of capital required for 
acquisitions of other firms, the M&A financing decision exerts a significant influence on the 
corporate governance and capital structure of the combined entities. For instance, if the acquirer 
pays for the deal with cash, an increase in the financial leverage ratio of the merged company 
is expected.68 Alternatively, if a deal is a stock-for-stock exchange, it is likely to end with the 
creation of additional block-holders. In addition, making a decision regarding M&A currency 
is a process pertaining to how the potential gains and risks resulting from business 
consolidation are shared between acquiring and target firms. As such, a plethora of 
explanations have been suggested to account for the financing decision in M&A transactions. 
The determinants of acquirers’ decision regarding the financing mix in M&As can be broadly 
categorised into three groups: the concern for losing corporate control, financial constraint and 
information asymmetry. Considering several characteristics of the shipping industry, the 
investigation of financing mixes in shipping M&As is of utmost importance. First, the 
ownership structure of shipping companies is generally known to be concentrated, and 
managers tend to combine ownership and corporate control. Thus, it is likely that shipping 
companies prefer to pay M&A transactions with cash in order to avoid ownership dilution. 
Second, given the fact that bank financing constitutes the major source of capital in shipping, 
shipping companies that may have a limited capability of raising additional debt are likely to 
choose stock-for-stock exchange as M&A currency. Third, since asset tangibility is positively 
associated with debt-raising capacity, it can be conjectured that shipping companies whose 
main assets are ships may choose cash-financed M&A deals. Given the lack of empirical 
evidence regarding shipping M&As, this section examines the impact of shipping industry 
characteristics on the choice of payment method. In this regard, this section first reviews 
potential determinants of financing mix in corporate consolidation in the shipping industry, 
followed by the explanatory power of those factors in Tobit and logit regressions. 
                                                          
68 According to Pecking Order Theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984), companies have priority when they raise capital in the order 
of internal funds, debt issuance and equity capital. In this regard, the argument that cash-financed M&A deals can increase the 
financial leverage of the combined entities is hardly able to hold when internal funds are used as a form of payment. However, 
the extant literature largely assumes that issuing debt (e.g. bank loans and corporate bonds) is the major funding source for 
cash offers, considering liquidity constraints, lower issuance costs and tax benefits. Thus, a cash-financed M&A transaction 
can increase post-merger financial leverage, and consequently financial distress costs. 
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3.6.1. Determinants of Payment Method 
3.6.1.1. Corporate Control Loss 
From the perspective of acquiring companies, the choice of payment method involves the trade-
off between concern for corporate governance dilution from stock offering and an increase in 
financial distress costs from cash offering (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). Thus, managers who 
value corporate control are more likely to prefer cash financing, since they are reluctant to 
dilute ownership by issuing stock (Amihud et al., 1990; Ghosh and Ruland, 1998; Jung et al., 
1996; Martin, 1996). Especially when a target is a private company closely held by a few 
owners, acquisition financed by stock is likely to lead to the emergence of new block-holders. 
In the shipping industry, ownership is generally concentrated, and the largest shareholder is 
either a manager or a board member (Tsionas et al., 2012). Accordingly, it can be argued that 
shipping company managers who already combine ownership and control tend to choose cash 
for acquisition payment to avoid ownership dilution. This is also associated with the regional 
distribution of shipping M&A activity, as discussed previously in this chapter. Given that the 
majority of deals in the sample were carried out in Europe, where corporate ownership is much 
more concentrated (Faccio and Lang, 2002), it can be conjectured that cash is used more 
frequently as a form of payment in shipping M&As. 
In order to capture the risk of losing corporate control, the ownership structure of target firms 
prior to the deals should be considered, as acquisitions of targets with concentrated ownership 
are more likely to create new block-holders of combined entities. However, since information 
regarding the ownership structure of shipping companies is not available, I use the proxy, 
CONTROL LOSS, computed using deal size divided by the sum of the acquirer’s market size 
and deal size. Given that corporate ownership of shipping companies is generally concentrated 
(Randøy et al., 2003; Syriopoulos and Tsatsaronis, 2011; Tsionas et al., 2012), and 
consequently, the emergence of post-merger block-holders is expected in stock-financed deals, 
the likelihood of cash financing is expected to be positively associated with the relative deal 
size. 
 
3.6.1.2. Debt-Raising Capacity and Financial Constraints 
The debt-raising capacity of acquiring firms is also a critical factor for the choice of M&A 
financing mix. Assuming that cash-financed M&A deals are funded by debt, acquirers with 
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high leverage ratio or financial distress costs possess a limited ability to issue additional debt, 
and thus prefer stock financing. In this regard, I first employ the acquirer’s LEVERAGE, 
calculated as debt-to-asset ratio at the year-end prior to the deal announcement. Given that bank 
lending is a major funding source for shipping companies, the concern about financial distress 
costs seemingly fails to account for the large fraction of cash payment in shipping M&A 
deals.69 This is because shipping is notably a high-leveraged industry, as Drobetz et al. (2013) 
report that the average leverage ratio (debt-to-assets) of listed shipping companies is 41% while 
that of other industries in major countries is 25%. 
However, as asset tangibility is found to be positively associated with debt level (Hovakimian 
et al., 2001), shipping companies whose assets are mostly vessels can possess higher collateral 
value, and consequently raise additional debt. This is consistent with the finding of Drobetz et 
al. (2013) that the ratio of fixed-to-total assets is positively related to the leverage ratio in 
capital structure of listed shipping companies. In their sample, the average asset tangibility of 
shipping companies is 63%, more than twice of that of other industries (28.9%). Accordingly, 
I include COLLATERAL, the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) to total 
assets of shipping acquirers at the year-end prior to M&A announcement. 
In a similar vein to the rationale behind the impact of the corporate collateral value, larger 
acquirers generally possess lower financial distress costs, and as a consequence, better access 
to debt market and more favourable interest rates. Thus, I include the size of the acquirer 
proxied by ASSET, the value of the acquirer’s total asset at the year-end prior to the deal 
announcement. Finally, as another measure of acquirers’ financial constraints, I assess the 
importance of CASH HOLDING, the ratio of cash and equivalents over the total assets at the 
year-end prior the deal announcement. 
 
3.6.1.3. Information Asymmetry 
Hansen (1987) proposes that acquirers choose stock financing to share the post-merger risks 
when they are concerned about the intrinsic value of target firms. The asymmetric information 
about target value is likely to rise as the target size increases. This is consistent with 
Alexandridis et al. (2013), documenting that a negative association between the deal size and 
                                                          
69 For the period 2007-2016, approximately 70% of external financing of shipping companies comes from bank debts (Marine 
Money International, January 2017). 
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the abnormal returns for acquiring firms due to complexity in post-merger integration. Thus, 
the explanatory power of DEAL SIZE for the choice of payment method in shipping M&As is 
examined. 
Information asymmetry is also found in the value of acquirer. Myers and Majluf (1984) predict 
that over-valued companies prefer stock financing when insiders are better informed. In this 
regard, I consider the acquirer MTB, calculated using the market value over the book value of 
shares four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement. In addition, I include ASSET 
GROWTH, the percentage annual increase in total assets of acquiring firms prior to the deal 
announcement.  
 
3.6.2. Data Description 
For analysing the determinants of payment method in shipping M&As, I partition the initial 
sample of 815 deals with payment data into three groups: ALL CASH, including 100% cash-
financed deals; MIXED CASH, including partially cash-financed deals; and NO CASH, 
including 100% stock-financed deals or payments consisting of stock and others. However, 
data unavailability, such as stock prices and accounting measures, reduces the number of 
observations to 543 deals. Table 3.12 provides descriptive statistics for the data variables by 
the method of payment and the business areas of acquirers. 
Based on the overall sample, it is noticeable that cash financed deals possess a significantly 
lower CONTROL LOSS (0.099) than mixed (0.211) and no cash (0.212) deals (see Panel A). 
While similar distributions are found in ship-owning and other acquirer groups, the gap 
becomes narrow in the shipping service group. Another interesting observation is that cash-
financed acquirers are much larger than other groups in terms of total assets (ASSET), and they 
also possess a significantly higher asset growth rate (ASSET GROWTH). 
While the deal size of cash-financed deals is much smaller than that of other groups (0.38 times 
compared to MIXED, 0.49 times compared to NO CASH), each acquirer type exhibits 
variations: the smallest deal size is found in all cash, mixed and no cash in ship-owning, 
shipping services and others acquiring groups, respectively. With regard to other variables, no 
significant variations or patterns are found by method of payment or acquirers’ business areas. 
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Table 3.12 Descriptive Statistics by Method of Payment 
All Cash includes 100% cash-financed deals. Mixed includes partially cash-financed deals. No Cash incudes deals that are 100% stock-
financed or payments consisting of stock and others. CONTROL LOSS is the ratio of deal value to the sum of market capitalisations of the 
acquirer four weeks prior to the deal announcement and deal value winsorised at the top and bottom 5% levels. LEVERAGE is the ratio of 
total debt to total assets of the acquirer at the year-end prior to the deal announcement winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. DEAL 
VALUE is the transaction value. ASSET is from the year-end prior to the deal announcement. COLLATERAL is obtained using the ratio 
of tangible assets (Property, Plant and Equipment) to total assets of the acquirer at the year-end prior to the deal announcement. MTB is 
the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer four weeks prior to the deal announcement winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. CASH 
HOLDING is the ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets of the acquirer at the year-end prior to the deal announcement. ASSET 
GROWTH is the growth rate of the acquirer’s total assets in the year prior to the deal announcement winsorised at the top and bottom 1% 
levels. 
        All   Ship-Owning   Shipping Services   Others 
        
All 
Cash 
Mixed 
No 
Cash 
  
All 
Cash 
Mixed 
No 
Cash 
  
All 
Cash 
Mixed 
No 
Cash 
  
All 
Cash 
Mixed 
No 
Cash 
                   
Panel A: All Sample                 
                                      
CONTROL LOSS  Mean  0.099 0.211 0.212  0.105 0.264 0.227  0.084 0.117 0.164  0.107 0.255 0.231 
  Median  0.033 0.130 0.172  0.034 0.231 0.182  0.031 0.064 0.077  0.107 0.241 0.218 
  N  208 60 84  114 29 44  66 21 21  28 10 19 
                   
LEVERAGE  Mean  0.311 0.268 0.327  0.356 0.344 0.399  0.266 0.218 0.227  0.255 0.153 0.299 
  Median  0.305 0.299 0.322  0.337 0.348 0.406  0.260 0.225 0.205  0.232 0.112 0.234 
  N  283 75 111  146 36 56  100 27 34  37 12 21 
                   
COLLATERAL  Mean  0.482 0.461 0.500  0.532 0.590 0.590  0.474 0.383 0.448  0.310 0.247 0.344 
  Median  0.493 0.487 0.546  0.574 0.624 0.630  0.471 0.375 0.429  0.301 0.190 0.316 
  N  283 75 111  146 36 56  100 27 34  37 12 21 
                   
ASSET  Mean  5,296.7 2,921.8 2,430.4  4,495.0 2,242.8 3,596.4  2,666.2 606.4 1,122.2  14,350.2 10,975.8 1,197.1 
  Median  773.0 530.4 483.4  1091.6 793.4 779.2  527.6 458.8 388.8  1876.5 697.2 262.6 
  N  285 74 109  148 35 57  96 28 31  41 11 21 
                   
CASH HOLDING  Mean  0.127 0.139 0.148  0.130 0.137 0.141  0.111 0.117 0.145  0.155 0.192 0.169 
  Median  0.096 0.108 0.090  0.096 0.111 0.098  0.086 0.070 0.075  0.127 0.163 0.057 
  N  283 75 111  146 36 56  100 27 34  37 12 21 
                   
DEAL SIZE  Mean  142.0 372.1 291.7  148.2 600.5 388.3  146.0 90.6 244.0  113.1 257.5 84.7 
  Median  19.3 53.3 51.4  21.6 123.6 55.2  14.3 15.3 54.5  27.4 62.9 21.6 
  N  326 85 132  172 43 69  103 30 40  51 12 23 
                   
MTB  Mean  3.33 3.76 2.38  2.68 2.82 2.76  4.48 5.47 2.14  3.24 3.46 1.65 
  Median  1.47 2.16 1.61  1.18 2.02 1.72  2.05 2.37 1.61  1.70 1.99 0.97 
  N  225 58 81  123 30 43  73 18 23  29 10 15 
                   
ASSET GROWTH  Mean  0.265 0.176 0.122  0.243 0.263 0.129  0.324 0.133 0.102  0.195 0.013 0.133 
  Median  0.082 0.071 0.038  0.072 0.085 0.023  0.105 0.092 0.059  0.083 0.029 0.044 
    N   283 75 111   146 36 56   100 27 34   37 12 21 
                   
Panel B: M&C Sample                 
                                      
CONTROL LOSS  Mean  0.108 0.216 0.240  0.112 0.275 0.264  0.094 0.103 0.178  0.140 0.309 0.257 
  Median  0.043 0.130 0.213  0.043 0.275 0.266  0.033 0.060 0.078  0.122 0.323 0.220 
  N  121 54 69  63 26 35  46 20 18  12 8 16 
                   
LEVERAGE  Mean  0.306 0.266 0.317  0.340 0.336 0.384  0.276 0.213 0.235  0.275 0.170 0.276 
  Median  0.308 0.309 0.299  0.334 0.347 0.378  0.278 0.225 0.212  0.240 0.112 0.232 
  N  173 63 93  81 30 46  75 25 29  17 8 18 
                   
COLLATERAL  Mean  0.498 0.465 0.497  0.537 0.602 0.580  0.485 0.355 0.468  0.366 0.296 0.335 
  Median  0.536 0.487 0.552  0.574 0.624 0.631  0.487 0.365 0.430  0.408 0.235 0.297 
  N  173 63 93  81 30 46  75 25 29  17 8 18 
                   
ASSET  Mean  3,715.5 3,311.7 2,088.0  4,977.2 2,541.7 3,300.4  2,241.0 627.0 1,034.9  3,726.1 14,827.9 510.9 
  Median  762.3 522.0 413.3  1,343.1 793.4 700.6  502.8 458.8 364.7  1,211.1 370.7 68.8 
  N  173 63 90  84 29 46  72 26 26  17 8 18 
                   
CASH HOLDING  Mean  0.125 0.133 0.161  0.133 0.118 0.157  0.107 0.125 0.153  0.169 0.218 0.187 
  Median  0.084 0.088 0.096  0.084 0.098 0.103  0.069 0.070 0.082  0.127 0.234 0.068 
  N  173 63 93  81 30 46  75 25 29  17 8 18 
                   
DEAL SIZE  Mean  192.7 416.4 331.0  216.7 692.5 462.7  157.9 96.4 255.6  208.6 293.9 88.7 
  Median  25.3 90.7 59.7  31.1 138.0 123.7  17.5 17.8 54.9  39.1 132.2 35.4 
  N  196 72 109  97 36 55  77 28 35  22 8 19 
                   
                   
MTB  Mean  3.77 3.81 2.53  2.84 2.77 3.01  5.36 5.59 2.27  2.53 3.55 1.51 
  Median  1.67 2.08 1.66  1.18 2.03 1.87  2.18 2.32 1.76  1.64 1.56 0.81 
  N  133 52 66  69 27 35  51 17 19  13 8 12 
                   
ASSET GROWTH  Mean  0.358 0.190 0.098  0.334 0.289 0.148  0.385 0.151 0.050  0.355 -0.060 0.049 
  Median  0.112 0.071 0.034  0.117 0.084 0.023  0.112 0.098 0.038  0.068 -0.004 0.044 
    N   173 63 93   81 30 46   75 25 29   17 8 18 
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3.6.3. Tobit Regression Results 
The potential associations between payment method and explanatory variables are assessed in 
Tobit specifications (see Appendix B). In the Tobit regressions, the dependent variable is the 
percentage of cash use, the value of which is within the interval between zero and one. In order 
to correct heteroscedasticity, z-statistics calculated from quasi-maximum likelihood are used 
for statistical significance, and independent variables in monetary terms (ASSET, DEAL 
VALUE) and market multiples (MTB) are transformed into logarithm. To identify variations 
in the significance of each independent variable by the acquirer’s business areas, regression 
results of ship-owning, shipping services and others are also provided. 
The robustness of the Tobit regression results is assessed by including additional independent 
variables possibly related to information asymmetry. I consider the public status of target firms, 
similarity of business areas and nationality mix. Thus, I include indicator variables UNLISTED 
T, HORIZOTAL and CROSS BORDER, which are equal to one for acquisitions of non-public 
targets, within either ship-owning or shipping services segments and different nationalities of 
constituent firms, respectively. In addition, for further estimation of asymmetric information 
about acquirers, I consider the cumulative daily return (RUNUP) and weekly volatility 
(STDEV) of acquirer stocks for the past 12 and 24 months (two years) prior to the deal 
announcement, respectively. 
Table 3.13 presents the results of Tobit regressions for the overall sample and the M&C sample 
in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. Based on the overall sample in Panel A, Tobit estimates 
for the sample, including all business areas of acquirers, are indicated in regressions (1) and 
(2). I find the use of cash in shipping M&As to be positively associated with the size of the 
acquirer’s total assets (lnASSET) and its growth rate (ASSET GROWTH), but negatively with 
deal size (lnDEALVALUE). Based on the z-statistics, the coefficients of the three independent 
variables are significant at conventional levels. Although the coefficients are not significant, I 
also find negative coefficients of financial leverage (LEVERAGE), target public status 
(UNLISTED T) and nationality mix (CROSS BORDER), which is consistent with previous 
evidence (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). However, the signs of other coefficients, such as concern 
for corporate control loss (CONTROL LOSS), debt-raising capacity (COLLATERAL, CASH 
HOLDING) and some proxies of information asymmetry (MTB, HORIZONTAL, RUNUP) 
are inconsistent with the predictions of existing hypotheses or empirical evidence in the 
previous literature. The results remain unchanged in the M&C sample (see Panel B). 
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Table 3.13 Tobit Regressions of Cash Financing by Acquirer’s Segments 
The table reports Tobit regression estimates of the percentage of cash financing. CONTROL LOSS is the ratio of deal value to the sum of market capitalisations of the acquirer four weeks prior to the deal announcement 
and deal value winsorised at the top and bottom 5% levels. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets of the acquirer at the year-end prior to the deal announcement winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. 
COLLATERAL is obtained using the ratio of tangible assets (Property, Plant and Equipment) to total assets of the acquirer at the year-end prior to the deal announcement. lnASSET is the logarithm of the acquirer’s total 
assets from the year-end prior to the deal announcement. CASH HOLDING is the ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets of the acquirer at the year-end prior to the deal announcement. lnDEAL VALUE is the 
logarithm of the transaction value. lnMTB is the logarithm of the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer four weeks prior to the deal announcement winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. ASSET GROWTH is the 
growth rate of the acquirer’s total assets in the year prior to the deal announcement winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. UNLISTED T, HORIZONTAL and CROSS BORDER are indicator variables equal to one 
for acquisitions of unlisted targets, different nationalities of acquirers and targets, and within either ship-owning or shipping services segments. RUNUP is the cumulative stock price returns of the acquirer over the year 
prior to the deal announcement. STDEV is the annualised standard deviation of daily stock returns of the acquirer during the two years prior to the deal announcement. 
    All   Shipping   Shipping Services   Others 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                                         
Panel A: All Sample                                        
                                                                              
CONTROL LOSS  -1.534  -1.650  -1.507  -1.560  -2.218  -2.646 *  -2.527  -2.971 *  4.109  3.823  4.200  3.668  -3.333  -3.986  -2.855  -3.160  
LEVERAGE  -1.095  -1.594 *  -0.832  -1.350  -1.389  -1.706  -1.081  -1.300  -0.779  -1.687  0.037  -1.031  -3.220  -2.956  -1.850  -1.718  
COLLATERAL  -0.108  0.052  -0.298  -0.038  -1.594  -1.305  -2.352 ** -1.992 *  0.826  1.618  0.610  1.490  1.573  1.311  0.093  -0.059  
lnASSET  0.288 *** 0.277 ***  0.266 ** 0.259 **  0.190  0.176  0.107  0.096  0.785 *** 0.805 ***  0.798 ** 0.803 **  0.296  0.251  0.224  0.211  
CASH HOLDING  -0.451  -0.678  -0.630  -0.870  -1.752  -1.680  -2.373  -2.571  -0.764  -0.821  0.425  0.032  0.430  0.341  -0.857  -0.700  
lnDEAL VALUE  -0.282 *** -0.251 ***  -0.280 *** -0.243 **  -0.218 * -0.163  -0.160  -0.118  -0.753 *** -0.769 ***  -0.775 *** -0.780 ***  0.033  0.047  0.118  0.129  
lnMTB  0.034  0.079  0.027  0.087  -0.070  -0.012  -0.006  0.035  0.456 * 0.470 *  0.402  0.409  0.061  0.015  0.094  0.061  
ASSET GROWTH  0.399 * 0.336  0.561 ** 0.490 *  0.329  0.284  0.832 * 0.828 *  0.827  0.749  0.735  0.723  -0.410  -0.371  -2.396 * -2.337 * 
UNLISTED T       -0.462  -0.417       -0.359  -0.262       -0.819  -1.124       -0.500  -0.512  
HORIZONTAL       -0.028  -0.156       -0.338  -0.174       -0.007  0.290           
CROSS BORDER       -0.256  -0.238       -0.070  -0.063       -0.822  -0.704       0.459  0.510  
RUNUP       0.056  -0.008       -0.466  -0.360       0.355  0.152       -0.263  -0.292  
STDEV       -0.029  0.022       -0.255  -0.583       -0.515  -0.325       -0.018  0.012  
C  1.053  -0.367  1.628  0.000  2.883 ** 1.642  4.289 ** 3.004  -2.014  -4.394 **  -1.138  -3.459  -0.244  0.831  0.599  0.892  
                                         
Obs.  330  330  307  307  176  176  161  161  104  104  99  99  50  50  47  47  
McFadden R2  0.433  0.445  0.472  0.484  0.430  0.444  0.483  0.494  0.496  0.526  0.539  0.571  0.436  0.439  0.497  0.498  
Time-Fixed  No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes  
Industry-Fixed   No   Yes     No   Yes    No   No     No   No    No   No     No   No    No   No     No   No   
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    All   Shipping   Shipping Services   Others 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                                         
Panel B: M&C Sample                                       
                                                                              
CONTROL LOSS  -0.056  -0.284  -0.001  -0.184  -0.234  -0.707  -0.724  -1.125  4.683  3.451  3.861  2.390  -3.473  -4.840  -0.050  -2.587  
LEVERAGE  -0.716  -1.046  -0.697  -1.001  -1.443  -1.543  -1.286  -1.212  -0.690  -1.146  -0.433  -0.946  -1.228  -0.732  2.530  5.890 * 
COLLATERAL  -0.287  -0.103  -0.264  -0.092  -1.126  -1.000  -1.741  -1.737  0.494  1.159  0.403  1.230  1.452  1.059  -0.743  -2.558  
lnASSET  0.375 *** 0.351 ***  0.393 *** 0.370 ***  0.332 ** 0.308 *  0.261  0.231  0.730 ** 0.667 **  0.718 ** 0.652 **  0.093  0.005  0.324  0.213  
CASH HOLDING  -0.921  -1.051  -0.906  -1.036  -1.844  -1.840  -1.866  -1.967  -1.570  -1.430  -0.084  0.001  -0.070  0.278  -2.447  -2.599  
lnDEAL VALUE  -0.376 *** -0.347 ***  -0.377 *** -0.339 ***  -0.387 ** -0.340 **  -0.315 * -0.283  -0.681 *** -0.609 **  -0.658 ** -0.580 **  0.149  0.218  -0.095  -0.157  
lnMTB  0.122  0.147  0.133  0.163 *  0.010  0.043  0.077  0.105  0.517 * 0.477 *  0.440  0.368  0.065  -0.043  0.225  0.069  
ASSET GROWTH  0.497 ** 0.443 **  0.726 *** 0.676 **  0.298  0.271  0.793 * 0.836 *  1.375  1.247  1.144  1.129  -0.024  0.063  -3.027 * -2.623 ** 
UNLISTED T       -0.198  -0.136       -0.298  -0.258       -0.654  -0.918       2.262  3.788 ** 
HORIZONTAL       -0.231  -0.382       -0.254  -0.158       -0.320  0.014           
CROSS BORDER       -0.189  -0.177       0.102  0.202       -0.677  -0.741       1.094  2.591 ** 
RUNUP       0.126  0.044       -0.374  -0.298       0.598  0.495       0.900  1.751 ** 
STDEV       0.119  0.182       0.172  -0.328       -0.473  -0.462       0.162  0.497 * 
C  0.266  -0.665  0.355  -0.677  1.637  1.026  2.400  2.116  -2.136  -3.623 **  -1.064  -2.634  -0.114  0.992  -3.194  -1.856  
                                         
Obs.  229  229  211  211  118  118  106  106  80  80  76  76  31  31  29  29  
McFadden R2  0.452  0.462  0.498  0.506  0.443  0.453  0.509  0.514  0.534  0.554  0.577  0.599  0.402  0.412  0.510  0.584  
Time-Fixed  No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes  
Industry-Fixed   No   Yes     No   Yes    No   No     No   No    No   No     No   No    No   No     No   No   
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In Tobit regressions (3) and (4), I test the explanatory power of the determinants of M&A 
financing for ship-owning acquirers. In regression (3), I find a negative coefficient of deal size 
in both the overall and M&C samples. However, as indicated in regression (4), I find a positive 
and significant relation between cash payment and acquirer’s asset growth. The significance of 
the acquirer’s asset growth is still robust in the M&C sample. For shipping service acquirers, 
the negative coefficient of deal size and the positive coefficient of the acquirer’s assets are 
significant after controlling other factors in both the overall and M&C samples (see regressions 
(5) and (6)). Moreover, the findings from regression (6) are consistent with previous evidence 
despite statistical insignificance. Specifically, the percentage of cash is positively related to 
concern for control loss (CONTROL LOSS) and acquirer’s debt-raising capacity 
(COLLATERAL), but negatively to information asymmetry (UNLISTED T, CROSS-
BORDER, STDEV). The columns of regression (7) and (8) illustrate the estimation results for 
non-shipping acquirers, but no meaningful implication is found. The only significant variable 
is the acquirer’s asset growth in regression (8). However, the association between cash payment 
and asset growth is negative, which is inconsistent with the previous expectation. 
 
3.6.4. Logit Regression Results 
In this section, I assess the determinants of the payment method in shipping M&As in logit 
regressions (see Appendix C). The reason for employing the logit estimation is that this 
methodology can reflect the binary characteristics of the financing decision: cash or non-cash 
(stock and others). Assuming that the percentage of cash in M&A payment is not linearly 
associated with the independent variables, logit estimation can possess an advantage of better 
specification in describing the M&A financing decision. Accordingly, I divide the sample into 
two groups. The cash group consists of deals where the percentage of cash is over 80%, and 
the non-cash group includes all other deals (stock financing, mixed with others, cash-below-
80%). In logit regression, the cash group takes the value of one and the non-cash group takes 
the value of zero. 
Table 3.14 provides the results of logit regressions of the choice of payment method in shipping 
M&As. I find that the results of Tobit regressions generally still hold in logit estimation. In 
regressions (1) and (2), the use of cash is positively associated with the acquirer’s assets and 
asset growth, but negatively with the deal size, which is consistent with the result of Tobit  
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Table 3.14 Logit Regressions of Cash Financing by Acquirer’s Segments 
This table reports logit regression estimates of M&A financing, taking the value of one for cash financing (the percentage of cash is between 80% and 100%) and zero otherwise. CONTROL LOSS is the ratio of deal 
value to the sum of market capitalisations of the acquirer four weeks prior to the deal announcement and deal value winsorised at the top and bottom 5% levels. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets of the 
acquirer at the year-end prior to the deal announcement winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. COLLATERAL is obtained using the ratio of tangible assets (Property, Plant and Equipment) to total assets of the 
acquirer at the year-end prior to the deal announcement. lnASSET is the logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets from the year-end prior to the deal announcement. CASH HOLDING is the ratio of cash and equivalents 
to total assets of the acquirer at the year-end prior to the deal announcement. lnDEAL VALUE is the logarithm of the transaction value. lnMTB is the logarithm of the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer four weeks 
prior to the deal announcement winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. ASSET GROWTH is the growth rate of the acquirer’s total assets in the year prior to the deal announcement winsorised at the top and bottom 
1% levels. UNLISTED T, HORIZONTAL and CROSS BORDER are indicator variables equal to one for acquisitions of unlisted targets, different nationalities of acquirers and targets and within either ship-owning or 
shipping services segments. RUNUP is the cumulative stock price returns of the acquirer over the year prior to the deal announcement. STDEV is the annualised standard deviation of daily stock returns of the acquirer 
during the two years prior to the deal announcement. 
    All   Shipping   Shipping Services   Others 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                                         
Panel A: All Sample                                        
                                                                                  
CONTROL LOSS  -1.409  -1.751  -1.604  -1.868  -2.007  -2.619 *  -2.472 * -3.116 **  4.620  4.691  5.148  4.979  -5.359  -5.554  -6.014  -5.104  
LEVERAGE  -0.758  -1.425  -0.245  -0.870  -0.925  -1.483  -0.651  -1.093  -1.145  -2.148  -0.064  -1.086  -1.661  -1.617  0.964  0.585  
COLLATERAL  0.207  0.413  0.003  0.294  -0.831  -0.456  -1.524  -1.127  1.507  2.404 *  1.480  2.495  1.648  1.666  -0.410  -0.216  
lnASSET  0.327 *** 0.331 ***  0.252 ** 0.256 **  0.154  0.143  0.045  0.041  0.925 *** 1.020 ***  0.936 *** 0.998 **  0.474  0.465  0.319  0.376  
CASH HOLDING  -0.097  -0.387  -0.253  -0.593  -1.254  -1.241  -1.836  -2.221  -0.303  -0.421  0.952  0.661  1.835  1.589  -0.903  -0.972  
lnDEAL VALUE  -0.281 *** -0.257 ***  -0.273 *** -0.247 **  -0.218 * -0.162  -0.172  -0.127  -0.739 *** -0.820 ***  -0.784 *** -0.845 ***  -0.066  -0.065  0.105  0.078  
lnMTB  0.066  0.109  0.041  0.099  0.037  0.086  0.073  0.117  0.395  0.456  0.354  0.410  -0.257  -0.247  -0.361  -0.317  
ASSET GROWTH 0.373 * 0.332  0.504 ** 0.457 *  0.247  0.209  0.653  0.678  0.844  0.868  0.790  0.875  -0.058  -0.075  -3.815  -4.094  
UNLISTED T       -0.573 * -0.560       -0.468  -0.395       -1.070  -1.424       -1.372  -1.290  
HORIZONTAL       -0.151  -0.269       -0.402  -0.270       -0.144  0.119           
CROSS BORDER       -0.160  -0.112       0.058  0.088       -0.754  -0.679       1.934  1.849  
RUNUP       0.122  0.074       -0.336  -0.252       0.404  0.256       -1.145  -1.154  
STDEV       -0.685  -0.731       -0.584  -0.794       -1.007  -0.853       -4.050  -4.106  
C  -0.452  -2.119 **  0.805  -1.078  1.504  0.168  3.300  1.868  -4.068 ** -6.753 ***  -2.831  -5.316 *  -2.246  -1.975  1.726  -0.330  
                                         
Obs.  330  330  307  307  176  176  161  161  104  104  99  99  50  50  47  47  
McFadden R2  0.116  0.151  0.130  0.169  0.115  0.157  0.140  0.179  0.161  0.210  0.205  0.253  0.262  0.264  0.395  0.398  
Time-Fixed  No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes  
Industry-Fixed   No   Yes     No   Yes     No   No     No   No     No   No     No   No     No   No     No   No   
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    All   Shipping   Shipping Services   Others 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                                         
Panel B: M&C Sample                                        
                                                                                  
CONTROL LOSS  -0.345  -0.963  -0.707  -1.335  -0.760  -1.453  -1.431  -2.207  7.197 * 6.046  7.881 * 6.255  -7.722    -67.868   
LEVERAGE  -0.486  -1.047  -0.207  -0.685  -1.619  -2.026  -1.777  -1.900  -1.184  -1.702  -0.907  -1.440  1.581    17.570   
COLLATERAL  0.041  0.355  0.004  0.304  -0.665  -0.355  -1.245  -1.203  1.538  2.275  1.880  2.797  2.310    -1.160   
lnASSET  0.467 *** 0.444 ***  0.398 ** 0.351 *  0.297  0.283  0.210  0.171  1.094 *** 1.073 ***  1.151 ** 1.093 **  0.385    -2.793   
CASH HOLDING  -0.968  -1.284  -0.994  -1.327  -2.507  -2.590  -2.861  -3.262  -1.039  -1.030  0.724  0.806  1.122    2.029   
lnDEAL VALUE  -0.434 *** -0.398 ***  -0.421 *** -0.363 **  -0.438 ** -0.389 **  -0.414 * -0.375  -0.850 *** -0.807 **  -0.913 *** -0.845 **  -0.058    0.907   
lnMTB  0.180  0.218  0.186  0.225  0.092  0.141  0.159  0.216  0.647 * 0.626  0.692  0.648  -0.256    -1.267   
ASSET GROWTH 0.601 ** 0.568 **  0.841 ** 0.807 **  0.304  0.266  0.859  0.969  1.287  1.290  1.210  1.296  0.408    0.370   
UNLISTED T       -0.566  -0.499       -0.686  -0.623       -0.758  -1.130           
HORIZONTAL       -0.513  -0.669       -0.594  -0.491       -0.752  -0.455           
CROSS BORDER       -0.112  -0.087       0.289  0.511       -0.571  -0.707       8.325   
RUNUP       0.207  0.118       -0.229  -0.063       0.790  0.738       -11.934   
STDEV       -0.861  -1.029       -0.098  -0.936       -0.789  -0.760       -34.953   
C  -1.179  -2.788 **  0.275  -1.308  1.236  0.193  2.944  2.420  -5.379 ** -7.377 ***  -4.504  -6.233  -2.720    30.960   
                                         
Obs.  229  229  211  211  118  118  106  106  80  80  76  76  31        
McFadden R2  0.163  0.199  0.187  0.219  0.172  0.206  0.215  0.244  0.206  0.237  0.251  0.281  0.359        
Time-Fixed  No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No  Yes   No     No    
Industry-Fixed   No   Yes     No   Yes     No   No     No   No     No   No     No   No     No         No       
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regression. One different observation from Tobit regression is the negative and significant 
impact of target public status. Consistent with the information asymmetry hypothesis, acquirers 
are less likely to use cash in acquisitions of non-public targets. For ship-owning acquirers, the 
only significant result is the negative coefficient of the deal size in the M&C sample. With the 
exception of the result of regression (4) for the M&C sample, the use of cash among ship-
owning acquirers is negatively associated with deal size. 
Consistent with the results of Tobit regression, the use of cash in the financing decision of 
shipping service acquirers is positively associated with the size of the acquirer’s assets, but 
negatively with the deal size. Moreover, in this acquirer group, the concern for corporate 
control loss wields a significant influence on the use of cash for M&A payment when the post-
announcement ownership over the target is over 50% (see Panel B). For the others acquiring 
group, no significant association with the use of cash is found. 
 
3.7. Summary of Chapter 
In this chapter, I attempt to draw an all-encompassing map of M&As in the shipping industry. 
For this purpose, I obtain an extensive sample of shipping M&As during 1990–2014 from 
Thomson-Reuter SDC with industrial classification criteria that can include a broad range of 
shipping M&A activity. Since classification flaws leading to the inclusion of heterogeneous 
deals and ambiguous (or misleading) segmentation are detected in the previous shipping M&A 
literature, deals in the sample are categorised into a new segmentation consisting of three broad 
sectors and 11 sub-sectors based on information in a variety of hand-collected materials. This 
process allows for sifting out deals that are not considered shipping M&As and for providing 
a clear-cut categorisation within the shipping industry. 
The multitudinous analysis on shipping M&A activity in this chapter presents several 
interesting findings. While some of the findings are consistent with those in the previous M&A 
studies in corporate finance literature, others are shipping-specific, reflecting idiosyncratic 
features of the industry. First of all, reviewing the annual volume of transactions, shipping 
M&As come in waves, and the period is quite similar to those in M&A history. In terms of 
both the number of transactions and deal value, shipping M&A activity reached its peak during 
the mid-2000s concurrent to the sixth M&A wave. It is generally known that M&As at that 
time were largely triggered by a conjoint of availability of low-interest financing and a market 
sentiment that was enthusiastic for growth. Despite a substantial decline following the 2008 
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financial crisis, recent years have witnessed a revival of shipping M&A activity. This ongoing 
round of the M&A wave in the shipping industry is mainly driven by financially troubled 
shipping companies that regard business consolidation as a method of industry rationalisation 
to adjust current over-supply, as well as financial investors who seek investment opportunities 
in shipping assets at a considerable discount from fundamental values due to the prolonged 
recession. 
Second, the segment analysis on shipping M&A activity reveals that both horizontal 
concentration and vertical integration play a key role in shaping the shipping industry. 
Horizontal transactions that are salient in the liner (including diversified) shipping, port and 
logistics segments have been motivated primarily by competition-promoting deregulation in 
shipping, privatisation of port operation, a requirement of global-wide service coverage 
resulting from offshore manufacturing, and ongoing globalisation. As such, the three segments 
demonstrate a clear tendency towards concentration and are dominated by fewer and larger 
leading players. Vertical integration in the shipping industry is primarily led by liner (including 
diversified) shipping companies. To serve customer needs for coordinating production lines on 
a global basis, shipping companies have extended their operations to cover a wider range of 
supply chain management, such as stevedoring, distribution and land transportation. 
Third, I find shipping-specific features in geographical distribution of M&A deals. In terms of 
nationality mix, cross-border transactions constituent a fairly large proportion of shipping 
M&A activity, confirming that shipping is truly an international business. Compared with 
findings in previous M&A studies and statistics in the entire database that satisfy similar 
sample selection criteria, the share of cross-border deals in shipping is considerably higher than 
in other industries. In addition, another striking geographical feature in shipping M&As is that 
the North American region is a relatively minor market. Instead, Europe and Asia (combining 
East Asia and Southeast Asia) are the largest business consolidation markets for the shipping 
industry. Particularly noticeable is the rise of the Asian shipping M&A market in most recent 
years. 
Fourth, cash is a dominant form of financing in shipping M&As. Consistent with the 
explanation that the M&A wave in shipping during the second half of the 2000s was largely 
driven by ample bank credit, the use of cash as an M&A payment was the most popular during 
a similar period. Despite a marginal decline due to a deadlock in bank lending after the 2008 
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financial crisis, cash still outweighs other forms of M&A financing as a currency for M&A 
deals. 
Fifth, I find that acquisition premiums are negatively associated with the target size, which is 
consistent with the results of Alexandridis et al. (2013). Moreover, supporting the mis-
valuation hypothesis (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) and related empirical evidence (Dong et al., 
2006), the higher target mis-valuation is associated with the lower acquisition premium. 
Finally, I find that M&A financing in the shipping industry is associated with the size of 
acquirers and target firms. While cash-financed deals are likely to be carried out by larger 
acquirers, the probability of stock financing is higher as the deal size increases. 
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4.  VALUE CREATION IN SHIPPING M&As 
4.1. Introduction 
Business consolidation has played a critical role in shaping the current concentrated structure 
of the shipping industry. Since the shipping M&A market is multi-faceted with various types 
of participants, there are plenty of motivations that lead firms to pursue business consolidation. 
While the drivers of M&As can vary among different types of transactions, participants and 
industries, the most frequently quoted are complementing organic growth, pursuing operational 
or financial synergies, enhancing market position and business diversification. In the maritime 
spectrum, leading players have also taken advantage of M&As for fleet expansion and 
diversification, cost reduction, access to regional markets (including clients and specialty) and 
wider control over the global supply chain (Alexandridis and Singh, 2016). 
Given the motives behind individual transactions, the primary goal of business consolidation 
is value enhancement for the shareholders of companies involved through, for example, 
materialisation of synergistic gains or improvement of market power and operational efficiency. 
Particularly, from the acquirer’s viewpoint, since an M&A deal can be de facto regarded as an 
investment project requiring a sizeable capital injection, it should provide the acquiring firm 
with discernible benefits. Nonetheless, the general consensus in corporate finance literature is 
that M&As tend to be value destroying for acquiring firms, while the bulk of gains from the 
transactions are channelled to shareholders of target firms. In the vast majority of studies 
assuming that the stock market is fully efficient in assessing potential value creation from 
M&As, abnormal returns for shareholders of acquiring firms around transaction announcement 
have been found to be negative or, at best, negligible, while those for target shareholders are 
significantly positive (Bruner, 2002). In a stark contrast to previous evidence in the corporate 
finance literature, research focussing on business consolidation in the shipping and related 
transportation service industries has documented that both acquiring and target firms can 
achieve positive gains in M&A transactions. With a few exceptions, most of those studies have 
found that acquirers realise positive CARs with statistical significance around the deal 
announcement, although a larger share of gains is still captured by targets (Alexandrou et al., 
2014; Andreou et al., 2012; Darkow et al., 2008; Panayides and Gong, 2002). 
Previous literature in the corporate finance area devoted to the value creation effect in M&A 
activity has proposed several explanations for the tendency of value destruction for acquiring 
firms, including managerial hubris or overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Roll, 1986), 
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overpayment of acquisition premium (Eccles et al., 1999; Varaiya and Ferris, 1987), 
managerial entrenchment (Harford et al., 2012; Masulis et al., 2007) and complexity in post-
merger integration (Alexandridis et al., 2013; Shrivastava, 1986), to name a few. In contrast, 
the most commonly quoted explanation for the positive abnormal returns for acquiring firms 
in shipping M&As is that shipping business consolidation is driven by a strategic decision for 
enhanced operational productivity, which results in a positive response from the stock market. 
In an industry characterised by high asset tangibility and volatility in earnings and asset value, 
the ability to utilise assets to their full potential constitutes a critical success factor for future 
business proliferation, and M&As can provide valuable opportunities for redistributing 
resources that might previously have been allocated in an inappropriate manner. 
Further, it is well known that since the success of business amalgamation depends on a plethora 
of factors, gains from M&As are driven by deal- or firm-specific or market-wide characteristics, 
such as method of payment (Faccio and Masulis, 2005; Travlos, 1987), the involved companies’ 
size in terms of market capitalisations (Alexandridis et al., 2013; Moeller et al., 2004), the 
public status of the target (Chang, 1998; Faccio et al., 2006), pre-announcement market-to-
book valuations of companies involved (Dong et al., 2006), the degree of investor protection 
among countries (Bris and Cabolis, 2008), market valuation or cycle (Bouwman et al., 2009), 
the degree of competition in the corporate takeover market (Alexandridis et al., 2010) and 
cultural incompatibility (Ahern et al., 2015). Existing shipping M&A studies have found some 
interesting associations between value creation drivers and abnormal returns that contradict 
conventional wisdom in corporate finance or are believed to be shipping-specific. For example, 
Alexandrou et al. (2014) find that acquisitions of publicly listed targets that generally tend to 
be value destroying (Faccio et al., 2006; Loderer and Martin, 1990) for acquiring firms creates 
higher acquirer gains than those of private firms in shipping M&As. It is also revealed that 
cross-border deals outperform domestic deals in terms of synergistic gains (Alexandrou et al., 
2014; Darkow et al., 2008), confirming that shipping and related transportation services are 
truly international industries.70 
While the above studies offer some valuable insights concerning the value creation effect in 
shipping business consolidation by documenting that both acquiring and target firms achieve 
tangible gains from M&As and that the impact of deal characteristics differs from conventional 
                                                          
70 Nonetheless, it should be noted that the two studies document different results in relations between acquirer gains and 
nationality mix. Darkow et al. (2008) report higher abnormal returns to acquirers in cross-border deals than in domestic deals. 
However, this relation is converse in Alexandrou et al. (2014). 
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wisdom, they draw conclusions based on either anecdotal observations that can barely be 
generalised or on a sample that is too extensive and might be subject to heterogeneity or 
ambiguous classification across different segments within the shipping industry. Especially 
since the SIC system fails to provide a clear-cut categorisation of business areas within the 
shipping industry, as discussed in the previous chapter, it is problematic to overlook possible 
variations in the value creation effect across different segments (e.g. tramp, liner, offshore, 
passenger, port, logistics). Indeed, despite a general conclusion regarding positive acquirer 
gains, there is evidence that acquirers in the tramp sector experience negative or zero gains 
(Samitas and Kenourgios, 2007; Syriopoulos and Theotokas, 2007).71 Moreover, although a 
large share of shipping M&As have been undertaken by non-shipping acquirers in more recent 
years, such as financial institutions and conglomerates, previous studies have failed to consider 
their motives and ability to improve the valuations of the targets. 
To this end, this chapter investigates the value creation effect and the determinants of 
acquisition gains in shipping M&A transactions during 1990–2016 using a carefully selected 
sample. The most notable contribution of this chapter lies in the sample, which can reflect deal 
characteristics and actual business areas of companies involved in shipping M&As. As 
explained in great detail in the previous chapter, I went through all transactions with hand-
collected information and constructed a comprehensive map of M&A activity in the shipping 
industry. Using the ever bias-free sample, this chapter provides valuable insights concerning 
the effectiveness of business combinations within the shipping industry and highlights some 
specific features regarding how the gains vary by deal characteristics and segments. 
Consistent with evidence in the previous shipping M&A studies, I also find that both acquirer 
and target firms benefit from business consolidation activity, though much larger gains are 
channelled into target firms. The five-day CARs to acquirers and targets are 1.6% and 7.6%, 
respectively. Moreover, the synergistic gain calculated using the market value-weighted 
average of CARs is 2.9%, and all the gains are statistically significant at the conventional levels. 
While this paper’s finding of positive acquirer gains contradicts one of the stylised facts in the 
general corporate finance literature, it suggests that M&A transactions in the shipping industry 
are value enhancing and driven by pursuit of synergistic value (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 
1993). 
                                                          
71 In Samitas and Kenourgios (2007), while the five-day CARs are negative before and around the deal announcement, those 
of post-announcement period are generally positive. 
 
 
129 
 
Further analysis on the impact of deal- and firm-specific factors and variations in value creation 
among the segments within the shipping industry also indicates divergence from findings in 
the previous M&A literature. Although those relationships do not strongly hold in the 
multivariate analysis, univariate analysis offers rather interesting observations. First, acquirer 
returns are positive even in acquisitions of publicly listed targets that typically tend to be value 
destroying for acquiring firms (Faccio et al., 2006; Loderer and Martin, 1990). Despite the 
relative outperformance of buying private firms, acquisitions of public firms create the five-
day CAR for acquirers of 1% with statistical significance when the target ownership acquired 
exceeds 50%. Second, consistent with the international nature of the shipping industry, cross-
border deals outperform domestic deals for both acquirers and targets, and the higher gain in 
cross-border transactions is pronounced for ship-owning acquirers, implying that extending the 
geographical reach provides a competitive edge for shipping companies. Third, contradicting 
the evidence of negative gains in stock-financed deals (Martin, 1996; Travlos, 1987), acquirers 
achieve positive abnormal returns in equity offers. Particularly interesting is that acquirer gains 
in equity offers are numerically higher than those in cash offers, which are largely regarded as, 
at least, less value destroying. The higher acquirer gains in stock-for-stock deals are largely 
driven by the acquisition of private targets, consistent with Chang (1998) and Fuller et al. 
(2002). Fourth, although acquirers in most segments achieve positive abnormal returns with 
statistical significance, acquirer CARs for liner shipping companies are below the sample 
average, while those for tramp and offshore companies are significantly higher. Finally, 
abnormal returns for acquiring and target firms in the shipping M&A deals are relatively well 
explained by the size-related factors (market capitalisations, total assets) of companies 
involved, consistent with the findings in Moeller et al. (2004) and Alexandridis et al. (2013). 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 describes the dataset and sample 
statistics. Section 4.3 documents the empirical results based on aggregate and segment analyses. 
Section 4.4 provides a summary of the chapter. 
 
4.2. Sample Description 
This section describes the sample of shipping M&As during 1990–2014. However, the sample 
in this thesis is explained in great detail in the previous sections. Accordingly, no further sample 
description is provided in this section in order to conserve space. For the details of the sample, 
see Table 3.4 in Section 3.4. 
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4.3. Empirical Results 
4.3.1. Aggregate Analysis 
4.3.1.1. CARs and Synergistic Gains 
In order to calculate CARs in shipping M&As, stock prices of acquirers and targets are 
downloaded from the Thomson Reuters Datastream. The CAR is calculated by adding the 
market-adjusted return for days t-n to t+n, where t is the transaction announcement day and n 
is from one to five. Daily market return is calculated using the corresponding country’s 
Datastream value-weighted market index return (see Appendix D). CARs are winsorised at the 
top and bottom 1% levels to remove outliers. 
Table 4.1 reports five-day CARs to acquirers and targets. The sample is partitioned into four 
groups according to pre- and post-announcement target ownership, as noted in the previous 
chapter, in order to identify potential difference in the value creation effect by the level of 
ownership over target firms: (1) majority, deals where acquirers own less than 10% of targets’ 
share prior to the transaction announcement and seek to acquire more than 50% after its 
completion; (2) control, deals where acquirers own between 10% and 50% prior to the 
acquisition announcement and seek to acquire more than 50% after the deal; (3) minority, 
where acquirers own less than 50% after the deal; and (4) remaining interest, deals where 
acquirers own more then 50% prior to the deal announcement. Similar to findings in the 
previous literature on M&As in the shipping industry, I also find that both acquiring and target 
firms in shipping realise positive gains through consolidation activity. On average, the five-
day CARs are 1.6% and 7.6% for acquirers and targets, respectively.72 Except for the acquirer 
CAR in the remaining interest group, all other abnormal returns are statistically significant at 
conventional levels across the levels of target ownership acquired. 
Alexandrou et al. (2014) find target abnormal returns to be positively associated with the level 
of ownership acquired through shipping M&A transactions, whereas the relation between 
acquirer abnormal returns and the level of ownership is non-monotonic. They report that 
acquiring firms achieve 2.0% of CAR [-3, +1] when they purchase controlling stake (50% ~ 
99.9%) of target ownership after deal completion. However, when the target ownership sought 
                                                          
72 There is no significant variations in 3-day to 11-day CARs. 
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are 100% and less than 50%, the abnormal returns are 0.6% and 0.7% over the same event 
window, respectively, and the mean differences from the controlling stake group are 
statistically significant. I also find comparable relations between the level of target ownership 
and abnormal returns to acquirers and targets.73 Both acquirers and target in the majority and 
the control groups achieve more abnormal returns than those in the minority and remaining 
interest groups. The five-day CAR to the acquirers in the control group is 2.5%, slightly higher 
than that in the majority group, but there is no statistical difference in the mean. However, the  
 
Table 4.1 CARs by Pre-and-Post Announcement Target Ownership 
CAR is the five-day cumulative abnormal return calculated by adding the market-adjusted return for days t-2 to t+2, where t is the acquisition 
announcement day. In order to calculate the daily return, the corresponding country’s Datastream value-weighted market index returns are 
used. Abnormal returns are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. Transactions are partitioned into four groups according to the pre- 
to post-announcement changes in ownership of the target firm: (1) majority, deals where acquirers own less than 10% of targets’ share prior 
to the transaction announcement and seek to acquire more than 50% after its completion; (2) control, deals where acquirers own between 
10% and 50% prior to the acquisition announcement and seek to acquire more than 50% after the deal; (3) minority, where acquirers own 
less than 50% after the deal; and (4) remaining interest, deals where acquirers own more than 50% prior to the deal announcement. ***, ** 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
      
Acquirer 
  
Target 
        
      
ALL Mean   1.6% ***   7.6% *** 
 Median  0.3%   3.1% *** 
 N  1,378   658  
        
(1) Majority Mean  2.2% ***  14.4% *** 
 Median  0.6%   9.6% *** 
 N  820   163  
        
(2) Control Mean  2.5% ***  9.7% *** 
 Median  0.1%   6.9% *** 
 N  93   64  
        
(3) Minority Mean  0.9% **  4.1% *** 
 Median  0.2%   1.7% *** 
 N  301   355  
        
(4) Remaining Interest Mean  -0.1%   7.3% *** 
 Median  -0.4%   1.2%  
 N  164   76  
        
Mean Difference (1) - (2)   -0.3%     4.7% ** 
        
 (1) - (3)  1.3% **  10.3% *** 
        
 (1) - (4)  2.2% ***  7.1% *** 
 
                                                          
73 Nonetheless, it should be noted that the classification of the level of target ownership in this paper does not match exactly 
with that in Alexandrou et al. (2014). Since they consider only post-announcement target ownership, there might be potential 
difference in grouping the deals. For instance the deals in Remaining Interest group of this chapter’s sample could be 
included in their controlling stake (50% ~ 99.9%) or full ownership (100%) groups. 
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acquirer CARs in the minority and the remaining interest groups are considerably lower than 
that in the majority group by 1.3% and 2.2%, respectively, with a significant difference in mean. 
For shareholders of target firms, the abnormal returns are, in general, positively associated with 
the level of target ownership. The average five-day CAR to target firms is 14.4% in the majority 
group, significantly higher than those in the control, minority and remaining interest groups by 
4.7%, 10.3% and 7.1%, respectively. 
From the analysis of CARs according to the level of target ownership, it becomes obvious that 
the inclusion of the minority and remaining interest groups dilutes the wealth creation effects 
for the shareholders of acquiring and target firms. Accordingly, I perform further analysis with 
the deals in the overall sample and in the combined majority and control groups (M&C sample 
henceforth) separately. Table 4.2 presents CARs to acquirers and targets, as well as synergy 
gains. In the M&C sample, the five-day CARs to acquirers and targets are 2.1% and 13.3%, 
respectively. Both are higher than corresponding abnormal returns in the overall sample, and 
the mean differences are significant at conventional levels. Synergy is calculated using the 
market value-weighted average of abnormal returns, and market value is the size of market 
capitalisations four weeks prior to the transaction announcement. The average combined 
benefit to acquirers and targets is 2.9% (1.9%) in the M&C sample (overall sample), confirming 
that shipping M&A activity can create additional value. Except the median of acquirer CAR in 
the overall sample, both means and medians of all gains are positive and statistically significant 
at conventional levels. 
 
Table 4.2 CARs to Acquirers and Targets, and Synergy 
CAR is the five-day cumulative abnormal return calculated by adding the market-adjusted return for days t-2 to t+2, where t is the deal 
announcement day. In order to calculate the daily return, the corresponding country’s Datastream value-weighted market index is used. 
Abnormal returns are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. Synergy is calculated using market value-weighted average abnormal 
returns, and market value is the size of market capitalisations four weeks prior to the deal announcement. All sample includes all deals, while 
the M&C sample consists of deals in the majority and control groups. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
  All Sample   M&C Sample   Mean Difference (M&C - All) 
  
Acquirer 
CAR 
Target 
CAR 
Synergy   
Acquirer 
CAR 
Target 
CAR 
Synergy 
  
Acquirer 
CAR 
Target 
CAR 
Synergy 
                     
Mean 1.6% *** 7.6% *** 1.9% ***  2.2% *** 13.1% *** 2.9% ***  0.6% * 5.5% *** 0.9%  
Median 0.3%  3.1% *** 1.4% **  0.5% * 8.5% *** 2.8% ***        
N 1,378  658  94  913  227  41        
Max 61.9%  61.9%  22.3%  61.9%  61.9%  22.3%        
Min -23.1%  -23.1%  -19.4%    -23.1%  -23.1%  -9.1%                
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4.3.1.2. CARs by Deal Characteristics 
Since the success of business amalgamation largely depends on a plethora of factors, the 
previous literature has identified determinants of the gains from M&A activity. The factors can 
be deal- or firm-specific or market-wide, including method of payment (Travlos, 1987), market 
capitalisation of the acquirer (Moeller et al., 2004), public status of the target (Faccio et al., 
2006), pre-announcement market-to-book valuations of bidder and target (Dong et al., 2006), 
the degree of investor protection among countries (Bris and Cabolis, 2008), market valuation 
or cycle (Bouwman et al., 2009), the degree of competition in the corporate takeover market 
(Alexandridis et al., 2010) and the complexity in combining business or the size of transaction 
value (Alexandridis et al., 2013), to name a few. 
As presented in Table 4.3, further analysis reveals several relations between gains from M&As 
and deal characteristics in the shipping industry. First, bidders realise more gains from 
acquisitions of non-publicly listed targets than from those of publicly listed targets. The five-
day acquirer CAR is 2.3% (1.9%) in bidding non-public targets in the M&C sample (overall 
sample), which is significantly higher compared to bidding publicly listed targets. Second, 
cross-border deals create more value for both acquiring and target firms than domestic deals. 
Although the mean difference is significant only for target CARs in the M&C sample, abnormal 
returns in cross-border deals is numerically higher than those in domestic deals. Finally, 
acquirer CARs in both cash- and stock-financed deals are positive, and acquiring firms achieve 
numerically less gains when they pay for the deals with cash. The five-day CAR to acquirers 
in cash offers is 2.3% (1.6%) in the M&C sample, lower than in an equity offer, but the mean 
difference is insignificant. 
The finding on the association between acquirer CAR and target public status is inconsistent 
with the result in Alexandrou et al. (2014), who investigate the impact of the public status of 
target firms on abnormal returns in shipping M&As. They document that the four-day acquirer 
CAR over the event window of [-3, +1] are 2.1% and 0.9% in acquisitions of public targets and 
private targets, respectively, and the mean difference is significant at the 1% level. However, 
there are plausible explanations for the outperformance in the acquisition of private targets 
compared to bidding public companies. The higher acquirer gain from buying non-public 
targets can be attributable to the so-called ‘liquidity discount’ (Fuller et al., 2002; Koeplin et 
al., 2000). That is, non-public targets have less negotiation power than publicly listed firms 
due to a lack of liquidity, as they cannot be readily traded in the market. As Alexandridis et al. 
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(2010) document a negative association between the level of competition and acquisition 
premium, acquirers are less likely to overpay to private targets. Moreover, acquisition of a 
private target ends with the emergence of block-holders when closely held targets are paid with 
stock (Chang, 1998). Those block-holders can play a pivotal role in monitoring efficient post-
merger consolidation activity. The previous literature has generally concluded that acquiring 
firms gain more in purchasing non-publicly listed targets than in purchasing publicly listed 
targets. Fuller et al. (2002) and Moeller et al. (2004) document positive bidders’ gains in  
 
Table 4.3 CARs to Acquirer and Target by Deal Characteristics 
CAR is the five-day cumulative abnormal return calculated by adding the market-adjusted return for days t-2 to t+2, where t is the acquisition 
announcement day. Abnormal returns are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. Non-public targets include private, subsidiary and all 
other public statuses except ‘public’. Cross-border is a group of deals where the acquirer and target are located in different domiciles. Cash 
(stock) is a group of deals financed with pure cash (stock), and mixed/others comprises all remaining others. M&C means a subsample 
consisting of deals with post-announcement target ownership over 50%. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
        All Sample   M&C Sample 
        Acquirer CAR Target CAR   Acquirer CAR Target CAR 
             
By Target Public Status            
             
 Public Target Mean  0.3%     1.0% *   
  Median  0.1%     0.2%    
  N  219     95    
             
 Non-Public Target Mean  1.9% ***    2.3% ***   
  Median  0.4%     0.5%    
  N  1159     818    
             
Mean Difference (Non-Public - Public)  1.5% ***    1.3% **   
             
Cross-Border vs Domestic            
             
 Cross-border Mean  1.9% *** 8.3% ***  2.5% *** 16.9% *** 
  Median  0.7%  3.3%   1.0%  10.8%  
  N  507  235   330  80  
             
 Domestic Mean  1.5% *** 7.2% ***  2.0% *** 11.0% *** 
  Median  0.1%  3.0%   0.2%  7.4%  
  N  871  423   583  147  
             
Mean Difference (Domestic - Cross-Border)  -0.4%  -1.0%   -0.5%  -5.8% ** 
             
By Method of Payment            
             
 Cash Mean  1.6% *** 10.8% ***  2.3% *** 14.5% *** 
  Median  0.4%  4.4%   0.9%  10.8%  
  N  276  253   170  111  
             
 Stock Mean  2.6% ** 3.4%   3.2% ** 3.1%  
  Median  0.5%  3.2%   0.5%  3.9%  
  N  84  24   67  19  
             
 Mixed/Others Mean  3.4% *** 15.7% ***  3.8% *** 18.6% *** 
  Median  1.7%  9.0%   1.7%  14.0%  
  N  142  29   123  23  
             
Mean Difference (Cash - Stock)  -0.9%  7.4% ***  -0.9%  11.4% *** 
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acquisitions of private and subsidiary targets, whereas negative gains are found when buying 
public firms in the US M&As. Conn et al. (2005) and Faccio et al. (2006) report similar results 
in UK and European M&As, respectively. 
I also find that cross-border deals outperform domestic deals for both acquiring and target firms. 
The mean difference in acquirer CAR is not significant, while that in target CAR is significant. 
Since cross-border deals are associated with additional frictions, including differences in 
cultures (Ahern et al., 2015), accounting standards and financial regulations (Rossi and Volpin, 
2004), there have been contradicting findings regarding the association between abnormal 
return and inter-border transaction. Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) report higher abnormal return 
with Canadian acquirers than US acquirers in acquisitions of Canadian targets. Conn et al. 
(2005) find that UK acquirers gain less in cross-border than in domestic deals. On the other 
hand, Doukas and Travlos (1988) report that multinational companies achieve more abnormal 
returns when they expand geographical reach. Danbolt and Maciver (2012) find that both 
acquirers and targets gain more abnormal returns in cross-border deals than domestic 
acquisitions. Specifically, an increase in abnormal returns to target firms is significant when 
they are sold to acquirers from countries with superior governance systems. Harris and 
Ravenscraft (1991) find that target firms achieve higher abnormal returns when acquired by 
foreign bidders with relatively strong currency. In shipping M&As, Alexandrou et al. (2014) 
find that CAR to target is higher in cross-border deals, as well as providing more combined 
economic value in terms of dollars. However, contrary to the results in this paper, they find 
that CAR to acquirers is higher in domestic deals. They explain that cross-border deals are 
strategically decided for better synergistic value, and the higher (lower) gain to target (acquirer) 
in those deals is attributable to entry premium. Given the international nature of the shipping 
industry, it is likely that shipping companies buy foreign firms for strategic reasons, such as 
enhancing market share or side-lining competitors from specific markets. However, as revealed 
in the previous chapter, I fail to find any evidence in the sample that shipping acquirers pay 
additional or excessive premiums for entering foreign markets. The average premium in 
domestic deals in the M&C sample is 32.9%, while that in cross-border deals is 36.4%, and the 
mean difference is insignificant (see Table 3.8). Instead, one possible explanation for the results 
of numerically higher acquirer CARs in cross-border transactions is the relatively strong 
bargaining power of bidders. In the M&C sample, the relative asset size (acquirer over target) 
is 7.8 times in cross-border deals, which is significantly higher than 5.5 times in domestic 
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deals.74 
The relation between acquirer abnormal returns and method of payment is of particular interest 
in this study, as the results are opposed to general conclusions in previous M&A research. Since 
Travlos (1987) documented greater abnormal returns to acquiring firms in cash offers than in 
equity offers, it is generally evidenced that acquirers suffer losses from stock-financed deals, 
whereas deals paid with cash are, at least, non-value-destructive (Brown and Ryngaert, 1991; 
Draper and Paudyal, 2006; Martin, 1996). One of the most frequent arguments for the higher 
abnormal return to acquirers in cash bids is the signalling effect; that is, the stock market 
perceives cash offers as indicators that acquirers are confident in future returns after deal 
completion. However, there is also an argument that the impact of the financing method in 
M&A transactions on abnormal return is not constant, but instead varies according to a number 
of variables. For example, Chang (1998) show that acquirers experience a positive abnormal 
return in stock-financed deals when targets are privately held firms, while cash offers for 
private targets do not have significant abnormal returns to acquirers. Fuller et al. (2002) report 
a similar finding in that abnormal returns to acquirers in buying non-public targets increase 
when deals are stock-financed. Nationality mix also matters. Conn et al. (2005) present that 
acquirers achieve slightly higher abnormal returns in cash-financed deals than in non-cash-
financed deals when targets are located in the same countries. On the other hand, in cross-
border deals, non-cash deals create positive abnormal returns to acquirers, while cash-financed 
deals do not have any significant gain. Accordingly, I further investigate acquirer CARs 
according to a combination of deal characteristics. 
Table 4.4 presents CAR to acquirers according to target public status, nationality mix and 
method of payment. Based on the results in the M&C sample, it is clear that the impact of each 
deal-specific factor on acquirer abnormal return depends on a combination of other factors. 
First, the higher abnormal return to acquirer in acquisitions of non-public targets compared to 
those of publicly traded targets is significant only in stock-financed deals. On average, the 
mean difference in five-day CARs to acquirer between acquisitions of public and non-public 
targets is 6.4% and significant at the 1% level in stock-financed deals, while that in cash-
financed deals is 0.9% without statistical significance. In addition, the association between 
target public status and M&A financing varies according to nationality mix. While the higher 
acquirer’s gain in acquisitions of non-public targets is pervasive across the methods of payment  
                                                          
74 In the all sample, relative asset size is 8.8 times in cross-border deals, while that in domestic deals is 5.5 times. 
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Table 4.4 CAR to Acquirers by Deal Characteristics 
CAR is the five-day cumulative abnormal return calculated by adding the market-adjusted return for days t-2 to t+2, where t is the acquisition 
announcement day. Abnormal returns are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. Non-public targets include private, subsidiary and all 
other public statuses except ‘public’. Cross-border is a group of deals where the acquirer and target are located in different domiciles. Cash 
(stock) is a group of deals financed with pure cash (stock), and mixed/others comprises all remaining others. The combined number of 
observations of the method of payment is less than that of the overall group, as information on financing mix is available only for 815 deals. 
The left-hand side reports statistics for all deals, while the right-hand side reports those for the M&C subsample consisting of deals with post-
announcement target ownership over 50%. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
        All Sample   M&C Sample 
        All 
Public 
Target 
Non-Public 
Target 
(Non-Public 
 - Public) 
  All 
Public 
Target 
Non-Public 
Target 
(Non-Public 
 - Public) 
                     
All All Mean  1.6% *** 0.3%  1.9% *** 1.5% ***  2.2% *** 1.0% * 2.3% *** 1.3% * 
  Median  0.3%  0.1%  0.4%     0.5%  0.2%  0.5%    
  N  1,378  219  1,159     913  95  818    
                     
 Cash Mean  1.6% *** 0.1%  2.2% *** 2.1% **  2.3% *** 1.6% * 2.5% *** 0.9%  
  Median  0.4%  0.0%  0.5%     0.9%  0.6%  1.1%    
  N  276  81  195     170  42  128    
                     
 Stock Mean  2.6% ** -1.4%  4.2% ** 5.6% ***  3.2% ** -1.3%  5.1% ** 6.4% *** 
  Median  0.5%  0.2%  0.7%     0.5%  0.1%  1.1%    
  N  84  25  59     67  20  47    
                     
 Mixed/Others Mean  3.4% *** 0.4%  3.7% *** 3.2%   3.8% *** 1.8%  4.0% *** 2.2%  
  Median  1.7%  -0.2%  2.0%     1.7%  0.3%  1.9%    
  N  142  14  128     123  12  111    
                     
  (Cash - Stock)     -1.0%   1.5%   -2.0%         -0.9%   2.9% ** -2.6%       
                     
Domestic All Mean  1.5% *** -0.9% * 1.9% *** 2.8% ***  2.0% *** -1.4% ** 2.4% *** 3.8% *** 
  Median  0.1%  -0.4%  0.3%     0.2%  -0.7%  0.5%    
  N  871  134  737     583  52  531    
                     
 Cash Mean  1.6% *** -1.3% ** 2.7% *** 4.1% ***  2.1% *** -0.8%  2.9% *** 3.6% *** 
  Median  0.5%  -0.6%  1.1%     0.9%  -0.7%  1.6%    
  N  189  54  135     122  25  97    
                     
 Stock Mean  2.1%  -2.9% * 3.6% * 6.5% **  2.9%  -2.0%  4.6% * 6.6% ** 
  Median  0.1%  -1.0%  0.3%     0.2%  -0.5%  0.6%    
  N  57  13  44     46  12  34    
                     
 Mixed/Others Mean  3.6% *** -5.1% ** 4.4% *** 9.4% ***  4.1% *** -4.0% * 4.6% *** 8.6% *** 
  Median  1.9%  -2.7%  2.1%     1.9%  -2.7%  2.1%    
  N  92  7  85     80  5  75    
                     
  (Cash - Stock)     -0.6%   1.5%   -0.9%         -0.7%   1.3%   -1.7%       
                     
Cross-Border All Mean  1.9% *** 2.2% ** 1.8% *** -0.4%   2.5% *** 4.0% *** 2.3% *** -1.7%  
  Median  0.7%  1.5%  0.5%     1.0%  3.8%  0.8%    
  N  507  85  422     330  43  287    
                     
 Cash Mean  1.6% * 3.0% ** 1.0%  -2.0%   2.8% * 5.1% ** 1.5%  -3.6%  
  Median  0.3%  1.3%  0.0%     0.8%  3.9%  -0.3%    
  N  87  27  60     48  17  31    
                     
 Stock Mean  3.5% ** 0.3%  6.0% ** 5.7% *  3.9% * -0.2%  6.5% ** 6.6% * 
  Median  2.2%  2.1%  3.4%     2.2%  2.1%  3.4%    
  N  27  12  15     21  8  13    
                     
 Mixed/Others Mean  2.8% ** 5.9%  2.3% ** -3.6%   3.3% ** 5.9%  2.8% ** -3.1%  
  Median  1.5%  5.4%  1.4%     1.4%  5.4%  1.3%    
  N  50  7  43     43  7  36    
                     
  (Cash - Stock)     -1.8%   2.7%   -5.0% *       -1.2%   5.3% ** -5.0%       
                     
(Domestic - Cross-Border)                   
 All   -0.4%  -3.1% *** 0.1%     -0.5%  -5.4% *** 0.1%    
 Cash   -0.1%  -4.3% *** 1.7%     -0.7%  -5.9% *** 1.4%    
 Stock   -1.3%  -3.2%  -2.3%     -1.1%  -1.9%  -1.9%    
  Mixed/Others     0.8%   -11.0% ** 2.0%         0.7%   -9.9% ** 1.8%       
 
 
 
138 
 
in domestic deals, inter-border acquirers have significantly higher returns in acquisitions of 
non-public targets only when the deals are equity offers. 
Second, the numerically higher CAR to acquirers in stock-financed deals compared to cash 
offers is largely driven by acquisitions of non-public targets. The association between acquirer 
CAR and method of payment varies depending on the target’s public status. Consistent with 
findings in Travlos (1987), cash-financed deals create significantly higher abnormal return to 
acquirers than stock-financed deals in acquisitions of publicly listed targets. Although the 
relation remains the same in both domestic and cross-border deals, the mean difference in 
acquirer CAR between cash- and stock-financed deals is significant only in cross-border deals. 
On the other hand, despite no significance in mean difference, acquirers have numerically 
higher abnormal return in equity offers than in cash offers when targets are non-public firms. 
This is also consistent with findings in Chang (1998) and Fuller et al. (2002). 
Third, the association between CAR to acquirers and nationality mix also varies according to 
the target’s public status. The result of higher acquirer CAR in cross-border deals than in 
domestic deals is significant when targets are publicly listed firms. In acquisitions of publicly 
listed firms, acquirers achieve 4.0% of the five-day CAR in cross-border deals, while they 
suffer significantly negative five-day CARs (-1.4%) in domestic deals. The mean difference is 
significant at the 1% level, and the association is pervasive across payment methods. On the 
other hand, in acquisitions of non-public firms, acquirers have numerically higher abnormal 
return in domestic deals than in cross-border deals. 
 
4.3.1.3. The Impact of Firm Valuation on CARs 
Another strand of M&A literature focusses on the relations between abnormal returns and 
valuations of acquiring and target firms. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes‐Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004) suggest theoretical models that market-wide mis-valuation triggers M&A 
waves and affects acquisition performance and the choice of financing mix. According to their 
hypothesis, over-valued acquirers, measured by higher MTB and Tobin’s Q, are more likely to 
overpay, and consequently, acquirer abnormal return is negatively associated with the degree 
of over-valuation. Dong et al. (2006) perform empirical tests on the relations between CARs 
and two valuation proxies (MTB and price-to-residual income) using the sample of M&A deals 
during 1987–2000. Although the results varies according to the periods (between 1980s and 
1990s) and test models (between uni-variate and multi-variate models), they generally 
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conclude that target valuation is negatively associated with CARs to both acquirers and targets, 
while acquirer valuation is positive associated with target CAR, but negatively with acquirer 
CAR. On the other hand, Lang et al. (1989) and Servaes (1991) argue that higher valuation is 
a proxy for a firm’s performance and growth potentiality. Accordingly, higher acquirer 
valuation is positively associated with abnormal return. Bouwman et al. (2009) find that 
acquirers experience higher abnormal returns in a high valuation market despite long-term 
underperformance due to herding behaviour of management. 
Table 4.5 analyses how abnormal returns relate to valuations of acquirers and targets in 
shipping M&As. The MTB ratio is used as a proxy for valuation and measured using the market 
 
Table 4.5 CARs to Acquirer and Target by MTB Ratio Terciles 
ACAR (TCAR) is the five-day cumulative abnormal return to acquirer (target) calculated by adding the market-adjusted return for days t-2 
to t+2, where t is the acquisition announcement day. In order to calculate the daily return, the corresponding country’s Datastream value-
weighted market index returns are used. Abnormal returns are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. MTB is the market-to-book ratio 
of the acquirer (target) four weeks prior to the deal announcement and winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. In each year, MTBs are 
ranked into terciles with ‘small’ as the lowest tercile. Panel A reports CARs for all deals in the overall sample. Panel B reports CARs for a 
subsample of deals where both acquirer and target are publicly listed companies. M&C means a subsample consisting of deals with post-
announcement target ownership over 50%. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
        Acquirer MTB Terciles   Target MTB Terciles 
    Small Medium Large 
(Large - 
Small) 
 Small Medium Large 
(Large - 
Small) 
                                          
Panel A: Overall Sample     
                     
ACAR All Sample Mean  2.7% *** 1.1% ** 1.9% *** -0.8%   1.9% ** -0.8%  0.9%  -1.0%  
  Median  0.6%  0.8% * 0.5%     0.1%  0.0%  1.3%    
  N  291  289  313     33  43  49    
                     
 
M&C 
Sample 
Mean  3.2% *** 1.7% *** 2.8% *** -0.4%   5.0% *** -0.4%  2.6%  -2.4%  
  Median  0.6%  1.2% ** 0.9% *    4.4% ** 0.3%  1.5%    
  N  204  195  213     20  21  19    
                     
TCAR All Sample Mean  7.6% *** 8.1% *** 9.0% *** 1.3%   10.1% *** 6.9% *** 8.6% *** -1.5%  
  Median  3.4%  4.4% ** 1.8%     3.8% ** 4.7% *** 4.2% ***   
  N  44  46  28     144  127  140    
                     
 
M&C 
Sample 
Mean  14.8% *** 12.9% *** 13.5% ** -1.2%   13.9% *** 15.4% *** 10.9% *** -2.9%  
  Median  8.7% ** 6.6% * 3.8%     7.8% ** 11.6% *** 6.8% ***   
  N  22  19  12     52  53  54    
                                         
Panel B: Public Acquirer and Target     
                     
ACAR All Sample Mean  -0.4%  0.2%  0.9%  1.3%   1.6% * -0.7%  0.6%  -1.0%  
  Median  0.2%  0.2%  1.0%     0.1%  0.7%  1.3%    
  N  35  40  41     39  41  41    
                     
 
M&C 
Sample 
Mean  0.7%  2.5%  1.4%  0.6%   3.2% ** 1.2%  2.4%  -0.8%  
  Median  1.4%  3.1% * -0.3%     2.7% ** 0.0%  1.9%    
  N  16  18  21     17  22  17    
                     
TCAR All Sample Mean  8.3% *** 7.8% *** 8.9% *** 0.6%   11.9% *** 7.5% *** 5.0% *** -7.0% ** 
  Median  4.3% * 4.2% ** 2.4%     4.3% * 4.1% * 4.9% ***   
  N  41  42  34     46  43  44    
                     
 
M&C 
Sample 
Mean  14.2% *** 18.1% *** 7.2% * -7.0%   17.9% *** 14.6% *** 6.0% ** -11.8% ** 
  Median  7.1% * 12.2% *** 1.4%     10.8% ** 11.6% *** 6.2% ***   
    N   19   20   14        21   23   19       
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and book values of share four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement (winsorised at the 
top and bottom 1% levels). In each year, acquirers and targets are ranked based on their MTBs, 
respectively, and partitioned into terciles. The yearly sorting ensures that the findings in this 
paper are not affected by any fluctuations in the time-series. Since the MTB ratios and 
significance in mean difference are already documented in the previous chapter, only CARs 
for each tercile and mean difference are reported in the table (see Table 3.10).75 In addition, 
the current sample includes both public and non-public acquirers and targets. I separately report 
the results for a sub-sample that consists of deals where both acquirer and target are publicly 
traded firms in Panel B, for the sake of comparison with the findings in the previous research. 
The results demonstrate no significant association between acquirer MTB and abnormal returns 
to acquirers and targets. Moreover, apart from significance in the mean difference between the 
top and bottom terciles, the relation between acquirer valuation and CAR varies across post-
announcement target ownership and public status of acquiring and target firms. The results 
support only the negative association between target MTB and target CAR when both acquirer 
and target are publicly listed firms (see Panel B). The results are robust across post-
announcement target ownership. In the M&C sample, the average CAR to target is 6.0% in the 
top tercile of target MTB, significantly lower by 11.8% than in the bottom tercile. 
 
4.3.1.4. Firm Size and CARs 
I further examine the size effect in abnormal returns on acquiring and target firms. Moeller et 
al. (2004) find smaller acquirers to realise positive abnormal returns, while larger firms suffer 
negative abnormal returns. They attribute the negative abnormal returns for larger acquirers to 
overpayment, since hubris is more of a problem in larger firms. On the other hand, Alexandridis 
et al. (2013) find the negative association between acquirer size and abnormal returns for the 
acquirer to be driven primarily by losses from acquisitions of large-sized targets. In addition, 
although they document that larger targets tend to be paid with less premium, acquisitions of 
those large targets still more value-destructive to acquirers due to complexity in post-merger 
consolidation. 
To estimate the relation between size-related factors and abnormal returns for acquiring and 
                                                          
75 Note that all mean differences in MTBs between top and bottom terciles are significant across post-announcement target 
ownership and public status of acquirers and targets. 
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target firms in shipping M&A activity, the sample is partitioned into terciles based on acquirer 
and target sizes, respectively. Acquirer (target) size refers to the market capitalisations of the 
acquirer four weeks prior to the transaction announcement. Since the sample includes both 
public and non-public firms, I also consider deal value (or transaction value) and total assets 
of acquirers and targets. Asset values are from the year-end prior to the deal announcement. To 
ensure that the findings remain free from any time-series swings, I sort the size-related factors 
in each year. 
Table 4.6 reports the associations between size-related factors and CARs to acquirers and 
targets in shipping M&As.76 I find evidence supporting the negative relation between acquirer 
size and acquirer CAR in Moeller et al. (2004). Based on the M&C sample, acquirers in the 
top tercile (large) of acquirer size realise five-day CARs of 1.5%, while those in the bottom 
tercile (small) earn 5.2% (see Panel A). The mean difference between top and bottom terciles 
is significant at the 1% level, and the association remains unchanged in the overall sample. 
Similarly, I also find a negative association between the acquirer’s assets and CARs to 
acquiring firms. The five-day CAR to acquirer in the top tercile of acquirer asset is 1.0% in the 
M&C sample, which is significantly lower than that (4.3%) in the bottom tercile (see Panel B). 
On the other hand, acquirer CARs according to deal value and target size (and asset) fail to 
reveal any remarkable pattern or relation. 
In addition, CARs to targets are positively associated with acquirer size-related factors, but 
negatively associated with target size-related factors. With regard to acquirer size, the five-day 
CAR to target in the top tercile is 20.5%, and significantly higher than 5.5% in the bottom 
tercile (see Panel A) in the M&C sample. The negative association between acquirer size and 
target CAR is robust in the overall sample. Similarly, target CAR is also negatively associated 
with acquirer assets. The five-day CAR to target firms in the top tercile of acquirer asset is 
14.5% in the M&C sample (see Panel B). The mean difference from the bottom tercile is 
significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, target CAR is negatively associated with target 
size and asset (see Panels D and E). The CAR to targets in the top tercile of target size is 12.6%, 
and significantly lower than that (18.1%) in the top bottom. In addition, target CAR in the top 
tercile of target asset (12.7%) is also significantly lower than that in the bottom tercile (18.4%). 
The negative associations between target CARs and target size-related factors are identical in 
the overall sample. 
                                                          
76 Since the statistics for acquirer and target sizes, deal value and significance in mean difference between top and bottom 
terciles are already documented in the previous chapter (see Table 3.9), only CAR for each tercile and mean difference are 
reported in the table. 
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Table 4.6 CARs to Acquirer and Target by Acquirer Size (Assets), Deal Value and Target Size (Assets) 
ACAR (TCAR) is the five-day cumulative abnormal return to acquirer (target) calculated by adding the market-adjusted return for days t-2 
to t+2, where t is the acquisition announcement day. In order to calculate the daily return, the corresponding country’s Datastream value-
weighted market index returns are used. Abnormal returns are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. Acquirer (target) size is the market 
capitalisations of the acquirer (target) four weeks prior to the transaction announcement. Acquirer (target) assets are from the year-end prior 
to the deal announcement. Deal value is the transaction value. M&C means a subsample consisting of deals with post-announcement target 
ownership over 50%. The size-related variables are ranked into terciles in each year, with ‘small’ as the lowest tercile. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
      ACAR   TCAR 
      Small Medium Large (Large - Small)   Small Medium Large (Large - Small) 
                    
Panel A: By Acquirer Size 
                                       
All Mean  4.8% *** 0.8% * 1.0% ** -3.8% ***  6.5% ** 5.8% ** 13.1% *** 6.6% ** 
 Median  1.7% ** 0.0%  0.5%     2.7%  1.8%  6.9% **   
 N  276  281  275     20  45  48    
                    
M&C Mean  5.2% *** 1.9% *** 1.5% *** -3.7% ***  5.5% * 10.5% ** 20.5% *** 15.0% *** 
 Median  1.7% ** 0.0%  0.9% **    2.5%  9.0% ** 15.6% ***   
  N   193   194   186         9   17   27       
                    
Panel B: By Acquirer Assets 
                                       
All Mean  3.5% *** 1.2% *** 0.4% * -3.1% ***  3.7% ** 12.1% *** 7.7% *** 4.0% * 
 Median  0.6%  0.2%  0.5% **    0.8%  6.8% *** 3.8% **   
 N  419  396  411     46  63  90    
                    
M&C Mean  4.3% *** 1.5% *** 1.0% ** -3.4% ***  5.1% ** 21.6% *** 14.5% *** 9.4% *** 
 Median  1.3% * 0.3%  0.6% *    2.5%  14.0% ** 11.0% ***   
  N   279   275   263         21   22   38       
                    
Panel C: By Deal Value 
                                       
All Mean  2.0% *** 1.6% *** 1.6% *** -0.4%   7.8% *** 8.2% *** 11.5% *** 3.7% ** 
 Median  0.0%  0.5%  0.8% *    2.5% * 2.7% ** 7.0% ***   
 N  270  287  268     125  156  191    
                    
M&C Mean  2.7% *** 2.5% *** 2.3% *** -0.4%   16.1% *** 12.4% *** 15.7% *** -0.5%  
 Median  -0.1%  0.8%  1.2% *    8.7% ** 9.9% *** 10.8% ***   
  N   185   185   155         33   62   98       
                    
Panel D: By Target Size 
                                       
All Mean  0.3%  0.8%  0.3%  0.0%   11.4% *** 9.9% *** 6.8% *** -4.6% *** 
 Median  0.8%  0.1%  0.5%     5.7% *** 4.3% *** 4.1% ***   
 N  48  43  55     153  142  156    
                    
M&C Mean  2.7% ** 1.0%  1.7%  -1.0%   18.1% *** 11.7% *** 12.6% *** -5.4% * 
 Median  2.2% * 0.1%  0.9%     12.6% *** 8.1% *** 8.4% ***   
  N   25   20   25         52   61   66       
                    
Panel E: By Target Assets 
                                       
All Mean  1.6% * -0.3%  1.8% *** 0.2%   11.6% *** 7.3% *** 6.0% *** -5.6% *** 
 Median  0.3%  -0.3%  1.4% **    4.7% *** 2.9% *** 2.9% ***   
 N  116  92  92     144  207  237    
                    
M&C Mean  2.2% ** 0.4%  1.9% * -0.3%   18.4% *** 11.7% *** 12.7% *** -5.8% * 
 Median  0.5%  1.0%  1.2%     14.6% *** 7.1% *** 8.7% ***   
  N   69   56   40         42   74   86       
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4.3.2. Segment Analysis 
4.3.2.1. CARs by Market Segment 
In this section, I further investigate potential value creation differentials among segments. 
Table 4.7 presents CARs by business segments of acquiring and target firms. The CAR in each 
segment is compared to the average of all deals in the sample (both overall and M&C samples). 
Panel A reports CARs by the acquirer’s segments. Based on the M&C sample, except for liner 
ship-owning acquirers and targets of logistics acquirers, all acquirers and targets achieve 
positive five-day CARs with statistical significance across segments. Specifically, offshore  
 
Table 4.7 CARs to Acquirer and Target by Business Segments 
ACAR (TCAR) is the five-day cumulative abnormal return to acquirer (target) calculated by adding the market-adjusted return for days t-2 
to t+2, where t is the acquisition announcement day. In order to calculate the daily return, the corresponding country’s Datastream value-
weighted market index returns are used. Abnormal returns are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. Panel A reports CARs to acquirer 
and target by the acquirer’s business segment, while Panel B reports CARs by the target’s business segment. M&C means a subsample 
consisting of deals with post-announcement target ownership over 50%. (Segment - All) indicates mean the difference in CAR between each 
segment and sample. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
        
All 
  Ship-Owning   Shipping Services   Others 
          Tramp Liner Diversified Offshore Passenger Other   Port Logistics Other   Financial Industrial 
                               
Panel A: By Acquirer Business Segment 
                                                              
ACAR All Mean  1.6% ***  3.4% *** 0.4%  1.2% ** 2.6% *** 0.7%  1.3%   1.2% * 2.0% *** 2.5% ***  1.9%  1.2% ** 
  Median  0.3%   0.6%  -0.3%  0.3%  0.8%  -0.3%  0.5%   0.0%  0.2%  1.2% *  0.3%  0.9% ** 
  N  1,378   110  64  276  107  82  46   178  177  104   50  184  
                               
 (Segment - All)   1.8% * -1.2% * -0.5%  1.0%  -0.9% * -0.3%   -0.5%  0.3%  0.9%   0.2%  -0.4%  
                               
 M&C Mean  2.2% ***  3.8% ** 0.7%  1.0% ** 4.0% *** 1.9% ** 1.6% *  2.0% ** 1.9% ** 2.5% ***  4.5% * 2.4% *** 
  Median  0.5% *  0.7%  -1.1%  0.2%  3.2% *** -0.4%  1.0%   0.2%  -0.1%  1.3% *  0.8%  1.7% ** 
  N  913   74  43  159  73  57  32   110  142  90   25  108  
                               
 (Segment - All)   1.6%  -1.5%  -1.2% ** 1.8% * -0.3%  -0.6%   -0.2%  -0.3%  0.3%   2.3%  0.2%  
                               
TCAR All Mean  7.6% ***  11.6% *** 11.1% ** 6.1% *** 7.3% ** 9.9% *** 11.3% **  8.0% *** 3.0% * 16.4% ***  7.2% *** 5.4% *** 
  Median  3.1% ***  6.6% *** 3.1%  3.4% ** 2.5%  2.2%  15.3% ***  2.7%  1.3%  13.4% ***  2.6% * 1.8% * 
  N  658   84  19  98  35  29  11   41  30  19   137  155  
                             
 (Segment - All)   4.0% ** 3.5%  -1.5%  -0.3%  2.3%  3.7%   0.4%  -4.6% ** 8.8% **  -0.4%  -2.2% ** 
                               
 M&C Mean  13.1% ***  18.1% *** 19.1% ** 10.3% *** 13.0% ** 10.5% ** 22.3% ***  15.5% *** 2.3%  23.0% ***  13.3% *** 8.7% ** 
  Median  8.5% ***  14.9% *** 11.9% * 8.0% *** 5.9%  2.2%  23.4% ***  13.3% *** 0.8%  18.6% ***  5.0%  4.7%  
  N  227   33  8  38  16  15  5   18  12  11   38  33  
                               
   (Segment - All)     5.0% * 6.0%   -2.8%   -0.1%   -2.6%   9.2% ***   2.4%   -10.8% *** 9.9% **   0.2%   -4.4%   
                               
Panel B: By Target Business Segment 
                                                              
ACAR All Mean  1.6% ***  2.0% *** 1.3% ** -0.8%  2.9% *** 0.7%  2.1% **  0.9% ** 1.4% ** 2.3% ***  5.9% ** 1.7% *** 
  Median  0.3%   0.7%  0.1%  -2.1%  1.4% * -0.1%  0.9%   0.2%  0.2%  0.1%   3.5%  0.4%  
  N  1,378   175  86  43  126  82  63   249  202  179   14  159  
                               
 (Segment - All)   0.4%  -0.3%  -2.4% ** 1.2%  -1.0%  0.5%   -0.7%  -0.2%  0.6%   4.3% * 0.1%  
                               
 M&C Mean  2.2% ***  1.9% ** 1.8% ** 1.1%  4.8% *** 1.9% ** 3.1% ***  1.2% * 1.5% ** 2.2% **  9.9% * 2.5% *** 
  Median  0.5% *  0.9%  0.1%  -1.0%  3.2% ** 0.4%  0.9%   0.3%  0.2%  0.1%   5.7%  0.4%  
  N  913   116  62  18  80  48  43   144  149  141   7  105  
                               
 (Segment - All)   -0.3%  -0.4%  -1.1%  2.6% * -0.3%  0.9%   -1.0%  -0.7%  0.0%   7.7%  0.3%  
                               
TCAR All Mean  7.6% ***  8.3% *** 9.2% *** 4.6% *** 7.3% *** 6.0% *** 1.9%   9.5% *** 7.6% *** 19.6% ***  7.6%  8.1% *** 
  Median  3.1% ***  4.0% *** 2.6%  3.5% ** 2.5% * 3.0% ** 0.8%   3.5% ** 1.3%  16.3% ***  0.2%  3.0%  
  N  658   168  37  77  84  77  29   76  51  16   7  36  
                             
 (Segment - All)   0.7%  1.6%  -3.0% ** -0.3%  -1.6%  -5.7% ***  1.9%  0.0%  12.0% **  0.0%  0.5%  
                               
 M&C Mean  13.1% ***  16.3% *** 15.6% ** 5.7% * 7.7% ** 9.4% *** 11.4% **  16.1% *** 15.5% ** 23.3% ***  43.7%  12.3% ** 
  Median  8.5% ***  12.2% *** 9.6% * 4.6%  2.5%  7.3% *** 6.6%   6.1% * 5.6%  23.4% ***  43.7%  11.6% ** 
  N  227   59  15  19  31  34  6   24  14  9   1  15  
                               
   (Segment - All)     3.2%   2.5%   -7.4% ** -5.3% * -3.7% * -1.7%     3.0%   2.4%   10.2% *   30.6%   -0.8%   
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ship-owning acquirers achieve significantly higher CARs than the sample average by 1.8%. 
On the other hand, diversified ship-owning acquirers earn significantly lower abnormal returns 
than the average by 1.2% in the five-day CAR. For the other segments, CARs hardly differ 
from the average. Regarding abnormal returns to target (also based on the M&C sample), target 
firms of tramp and other ship-owning, and other shipping service acquirers, realise significantly 
higher CARs than the average by 5.0%, 9.2% and 9.9%, respectively. However, target firms of 
logistics acquirers earn 10.8% less CAR than the average. 
Since the sample includes not only purely horizontal consolidations, but inter-segmental deals 
(e.g. vertical integrations, congeneric deals and diversifications), it is less likely that CARs by 
acquirers correspond to those by target segments. Accordingly, I also explore variations in 
abnormal returns among target sectors (see Panel B). Different from CARs by acquirer business 
segments, except for acquirers of diversified ship-owning targets and targets in the financial 
segment, all other acquirers and targets realise positive CARs with statistical significance. 
While acquirers of offshore ship-owning targets still earn significantly higher CARs than the 
sample average by 2.6% (in the M&C sample), abnormal returns to acquirers of other target 
segments do not vary significantly. On the other hand, abnormal returns to targets according to 
target segments demonstrate considerably different patterns from those according to acquirer 
segments. The CARs to diversified, offshore and passenger ship-owning targets are 
significantly lower than the average by 7.4%, 5.3% and 3.7%, respectively. Only other shipping 
service targets realise significantly higher CAR than the average by 10.2%. 
The above analysis of the relation between abnormal returns and business areas demonstrates 
that the value creation effect in shipping M&As varies among segments. In addition, it might 
be conjectured that abnormal return in each segment is not constant, but affected by business 
areas of acquirers or targets. Accordingly, I examine abnormal returns by a combination of 
business segments of acquiring and target firms (transaction type henceforth). To present 
meaningful and manageable findings, I classify all deals into eight transaction types based on 
main sectors: (1) ship-owning acquirer and target, (2) ship-owning acquirer and shipping 
service target, (3) ship-owning acquirer and other target, (4) shipping service acquirer and 
target, (5) shipping service acquirer and ship-owning target, (6) shipping service acquirer and 
other target, (7) other acquirer and ship-owning target, and (8) other acquirer and shipping 
service target. The types (1) and (4) can be broadly regarded as horizontal consolidations 
(including congeneric deals), types (2) and (5) are vertical integrations (or related-
diversifications), and others are diversifications. This classification ensures that I can document 
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more comprehensive and detailed findings than previous research on shipping M&As. For 
example, Alexandrou et al. (2014) report abnormal returns in shipping M&As across three 
main sectors (freight shipping, passenger shipping, cargo handling) based on the acquirer’s SIC 
codes. Although they document abnormal returns in focus-increasing (horizontal deals) and 
diversification (vertical deals) deals for the entire sample, the impact of the two types of 
transactions on each sector is not dealt with. Similarly, Andreou et al. (2012) investigate M&As 
in four major transportation modes (railroad, trucking, shipping, freight forwarding), reporting 
abnormal returns in intra- and inter-segment transactions without variations among segments. 
Moreover, as noted in the previous chapter, classification based on SIC in the two studies fails 
to provide clear-cut segmentation within the shipping industry. 
Table 4.8 presents abnormal returns to acquirers and targets by transaction types and mean 
differences in CARs between each transaction type and the sample average. Based on the M&C 
sample, acquirers earn positive and significant abnormal returns in most transaction types 
except (5) shipping service acquirer and ship-owning target. Target firms also realise positive 
and significant abnormal returns except for (2) ship-owning acquirer and shipping service 
target and (6) shipping service acquirer and other target. Despite statistical insignificance of 
the CARs to acquirers or targets in the three transaction types of (2), (5) and (6), they are 
numerically positive, confirming that shipping M&A activity is, at least, non-value-destructive. 
The results of the t-test for mean difference in CARs indicate that the magnitude of abnormal 
return varies among transaction types. In general, acquirers gain more in acquisitions of targets 
in different segments, while targets gain more in takeovers from acquirers in the same segment, 
which is consistent with the findings in Alexandrou et al. (2014). More specifically, based on 
the M&C sample, although the abnormal returns to ship-owning acquirers exhibit only 
marginal variations according to target segments (2.1%, 2.3% and 1.8% in acquisitions of ship-
owning, shipping service and other targets, respectively), shipping service acquirers achieve 
much lower five-day CARs in acquisitions of shipping service targets (1.5%) than those of 
ship-owning (2.8%) and other (4.1%) targets. Specifically, the mean difference between the 
sample average and CAR to shipping service acquirers in purchasing other targets is significant 
at the 10% level. 
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Table 4.8 CARs to Acquirer and Target by Transaction Types 
ACAR (TCAR) is the five-day cumulative abnormal return to acquirer (target) calculated by adding the market-adjusted return for days t-2 
to t+2, where t is the acquisition announcement day. In order to calculate the daily return, the corresponding country’s Datastream value-
weighted market index returns are used. Abnormal returns are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. M&C means a subsample consisting 
of deals with post-announcement target ownership over 50%. (Segment - All) indicates mean difference in CAR between each segment and 
sample. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 Business Segment   ACAR   TCAR 
Acquirer Target  All Sample M&C Sample  All Sample M&C Sample 
                         
 All All Mean 1.6% *** 2.2% ***  7.6% *** 13.1% *** 
Median 0.3%  0.5% *  3.1% *** 8.5% *** 
N 1,378   913     658   227   
             
(1) Ship-Owning Ship-Owning Mean 1.5% *** 2.1% ***  9.1% *** 13.8% *** 
Median 0.4%  0.7% *  4.2% *** 10.2% *** 
N 417  272   230  101  
          
(Segment - All) -0.1%   -0.1%     1.5%   0.7%   
 
            
(2) Ship-Owning Shipping 
Services 
Mean 2.2% ** 2.3% **  5.5% ** 11.0%  
Median 0.1%  0.1%   3.4% * 9.0%  
N 175  114   13  3  
          
(Segment - All) 0.6%   0.1%     -2.1%   -2.1%   
             
(3) Ship-Owning Other Mean 1.1% * 1.8% **  8.6% *** 17.8% ** 
Median 0.3%  0.0%   3.3%  14.0% ** 
N 93  52   33  11  
          
(Segment - All) -0.5%   -0.4%     1.0%   4.7%   
             
(4) Shipping 
Services 
Shipping 
Services 
Mean 1.5% *** 1.5% **  8.5% *** 16.4% *** 
Median 0.2%  0.0%   2.9% * 10.8% *** 
N 351  261   58  26  
          
(Segment - All) -0.2%   -0.7%     0.9%   3.3%   
             
(5) Shipping 
Services 
Ship-Owning Mean 2.0%  2.8%   8.0% ** 10.3% ** 
Median 0.1%  0.1%   2.4%  12.5% *** 
N 28  21   22  10  
          
(Segment - All) 0.3%   0.6%     0.4%   -2.8%   
             
(6) Shipping 
Services 
Other Mean 3.1% *** 4.1% ***  6.1%  6.3%  
Median 1.0%  1.3%   1.5%  0.6%  
N 80  60   10  5  
          
(Segment - All) 1.5% * 1.9% *   -1.5%   -6.8%   
             
(7) Other Ship-Owning Mean 2.3% *** 4.4% ***  4.4% *** 8.3% *** 
Median 0.9%  1.5%   1.8% ** 4.7% * 
N 130  74   220  53  
          
(Segment - All) 0.6%   2.1% *   -3.2% *** -4.8% * 
             
(8) Other Shipping 
Services 
Mean 0.2%  0.9% *  12.0% *** 19.6% *** 
Median 0.5%  1.6% **  4.3% ** 8.1%  
N 104  59   72  18  
          
(Segment - All) -1.4% *** -1.3% **   4.4% ** 6.5%   
 
On the other hand, targets generally realise higher abnormal return in deals with acquirers in 
the same segment. The five-day CARs to ship-owning targets are 13.8%, 10.3% and 8.3% 
when the business segments of acquirers are ship-owning, shipping service and other, 
respectively. Especially, CARs to ship-owning targets in takeovers from other acquirers is 
significantly lower than the sample average by 4.8% at the 10% significance level. Similarly, 
the five-day CAR to shipping service targets is higher in deals with shipping service acquirers 
(16.4%) than those with ship-owning acquirers (11.0%). However, shipping service targets 
realise the highest CAR when purchased by acquirers in the other segment (19.6%). Abnormal 
 
 
147 
 
return to acquiring firms in the other segment is very distinguishable by target segment. Other 
acquirers realise significantly higher and lower CARs than the sample average in acquisitions 
of ship-owning targets (4.4%) and shipping service targets (0.9%), respectively. 
 
4.3.2.2. CARs by Market Segment and Period 
In the previous chapter, aggregate fluctuations in shipping M&A activity are observed. In terms 
of the number of deals, the shipping acquisition market reached its first peak in the late-1990s, 
and the second one in the mid-2000s. A number of previous studies on M&As have found 
consolidation markets during different periods to be characterised by different factors. For 
example, Alexandridis et al. (2012) identify that the sixth merger wave during 2003–2007 was 
driven by relatively abundant liquidity. Moreover, compared to the fifth wave during 1993–
1999, deals during the sixth wave are characterised by lower acquirer over-valuation, more 
cash offers, less takeover competition and less management hubris. Strikingly, they find that 
despite the lower premium during the sixth wave, acquiring firms still suffer as much losses as 
during the fifth wave. Dong et al. (2006) also present differences in the association between 
valuation and abnormal returns to acquirers between the 1990s and 2000s. 
Accordingly, I examine variations in CARs to acquiring and target firms in shipping M&As by 
periods, as presented in Table 4.9. Based on the M&C sample (see Panel B), CARs to both 
acquirers and targets are generally positive and statistically significant, with the exception of 
acquirer CAR in the 1990–1994 period. Despite the numerically negative abnormal returns to 
acquirers during 1990–1994, there is no statistical significance. In addition, acquirers generally 
achieve the highest five-day CAR during 2005–2009, while targets do so during 2010–2014. 
However, abnormal returns to acquirers according to periods vary among transaction types.77 
First, ship-owning acquirers realise the highest CAR during 2005–2009 in acquisition of ship-
owning and shipping service targets (see transaction types (1) and (2) in Panel B). In target 
acquisitions in the other segment, ship-owning acquirers achieve marginally higher CAR in 
2000–2004 than in 2005–2009. Second, shipping service acquirers achieve the highest CAR 
during 2010–2014 regardless of targets’ business segments (see transaction types (4), (5) and 
(6) in Panel B). Third, acquirers in the other segment have the highest CAR during 2010–2014  
                                                          
77 Due to low numbers of observations in each transaction type, however, target CAR by periods do not reveal any consistent 
pattern. 
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Table 4.9 CARs to Acquirer and Target by Periods 
ACAR (TCAR) is the five-day cumulative abnormal return to acquirer (target) calculated by adding the market-adjusted return for days t-2 to 
t+2, where t is the acquisition announcement day. In order to calculate the daily return, the corresponding country’s Datastream value-weighted 
market index returns are used. Abnormal returns are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. M&C means a subsample consisting of deals 
with post-announcement target ownership over 50%. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
  
 Transaction Type 
  ACAR   TCAR 
  
1990 
–1994 
1995 
–1999 
2000 
–2004 
2005 
–2009 
2010 
–2014 
  
1990 
–1994 
1995 
–1999 
2000 
–2004 
2005 
–2009 
2010 
–2014 
                        
Panel A: All Sample                      
                                                
All Mean  0.6%  1.0% ** 1.2% ** 2.4% *** 2.1% ***  3.8% *** 7.3% *** 9.4% *** 6.7% *** 9.3% *** 
 Median  -0.3%  0.3%  0.1%  0.7%  0.4%  1.1%  1.8%  5.1% *** 4.7% *** 2.7% * 
 N  118  295  259  367  339  76  138  125  173  146  
                        
(1) Mean  0.7%  0.4%  1.4% ** 2.8% *** 1.9% *  5.1% ** 7.4% *** 11.4% *** 8.4% *** 12.2% *** 
 Median  -0.3%  0.3%  0.4%  1.1%  0.4%  1.5%  1.6%  8.4% *** 6.2% *** 3.7%  
 N  46  102  84  103  82  19  60  51  65  35  
                        
(2) Mean  0.6%  1.1% ** 2.4% ** 4.8% ** -0.1%  4.3%          -     0.0%  7.8% ** 7.9%  
 Median  -0.4%  0.8% * 0.5%  0.2%  -1.1%  4.3%          -     -0.6%  3.4%  7.9%  
 N  14  30  26  61  44  2          -     3  7  1  
                        
(3) Mean  1.9%  1.5%  -1.0%  2.2%  0.3%  10.7%  0.3%  15.3% ** 13.7% ** -1.5%  
 Median  0.6%  0.3%  0.5%  -0.5%  -0.6%  5.1%  -2.3%  10.0%  10.7% ** -1.3%  
 N  12  20  11  26  24  5  8  8  8  4  
                        
(4) Mean  -0.9%  1.3%  0.9%  0.7%  3.4% ***  1.2%  3.7%  11.5% ** 8.2% ** 13.5% ** 
 Median  -1.8% * 0.3%  -0.1%  0.6%  1.3%  -1.3%  3.3%  15.0% ** 2.0%  2.7%  
 N  24  73  75  86  93  6  12  10  15  15  
                        
(5) Mean  -6.3%  3.7%         -    -0.1%  2.7%  10.3% ** 7.7% ** 0.2%  1.3%  12.9%  
 Median  -6.3%  0.0%         -    1.5%  2.2%  5.6%  7.8% ** -2.4%  1.3%  -1.7%  
 N  2  14         -    6  6  6  8  3  1  4  
                        
(6) Mean  1.5%  0.2%  3.4% * 2.7% ** 5.7% **  -11.4%  38.8%  3.7%  12.0%  14.5%  
 Median  0.9%  3.5%  0.3%  0.6%  1.3%  -11.4%  38.8%  0.6%  12.0%  14.5%  
 N  5  13  21  21  20  2  1  5  1  1  
                        
(7) Mean  2.8% * 0.8%  1.3%  2.4% ** 3.8% *  2.1%  7.1% ** 6.2% *** 2.0%  4.7% ** 
 Median  2.1%  0.7%  1.5%  1.6% * 0.4%  1.0%  0.9%  4.5% ** 1.8%  3.3% * 
 N  11  29  23  33  34  33  38  38  51  60  
                        
(8) Mean  -0.7%  2.5% * -1.3%  1.5% * -1.0%  3.6%  13.9% ** 14.5% * 8.8% *** 14.6% *** 
 Median  -0.7%  0.8%  -0.5%  2.1% ** 0.0%  1.0%  5.2%  4.5%  5.3% ** 2.4%  
  N   4  14  19  31  36    3  11  7  25  26  
                        
Panel B: M&C Sample                     
                                                
All Mean  -0.2%  1.7% *** 2.0% *** 3.1% *** 2.4% ***  9.8% ** 12.8% *** 15.2% *** 10.5% *** 15.5% *** 
 Median  -0.7%  0.3%  0.3%  1.2% ** 0.6%  9.9% ** 7.5% *** 14.2% *** 6.6% *** 7.7% ** 
 N  69  189  159  258  238  18  49  51  59  50  
                        
(1) Mean  0.6%  1.2% * 3.1% *** 3.8% *** 0.7%  3.4%  11.3% *** 12.8% *** 14.5% *** 22.7% *** 
 Median  -1.0%  0.7%  1.9% ** 3.1% *** 0.1%  1.5%  7.7% ** 10.2% *** 9.7% *** 12.9% ** 
 N  29  69  51  72  51  5  26  29  27  14  
                        
(2) Mean  -1.1%  1.1%  1.8%  6.5% ** -1.0%  9.0%          -              -     12.0%          -     
 Median  -0.1%  0.7%  0.1%  0.2%  -1.2%  9.0%          -              -     12.0%          -     
 N  10  18  13  41  32  1          -              -     2          -     
                        
(3) Mean  -3.7%  1.6%  2.9%  2.3%  1.4%  28.8%  10.7%  24.3%  23.9%  -1.7%  
 Median  -3.7%  0.2%  0.3%  -1.1%  0.6%  28.8%  10.7%  11.6%  23.9%  -1.7%  
 N  1  16  5  14  16  2  2  3  2  2  
                        
(4) Mean  -1.8%  1.1%  0.6%  0.6%  4.0% ***  3.7%  4.8%  25.6% *** 10.9% ** 53.0% *** 
 Median  -1.7%  0.0%  -0.9%  0.5%  1.5%  0.9%  2.4%  23.2% *** 6.6%  48.6% *** 
 N  15  48  56  67  75  3  6  5  9  3  
                        
(5) Mean  -6.3%  5.2%         -    1.8%  2.6%  23.3% * 8.5% **          -              -     -2.9%  
 Median  -6.3%  -0.4%         -    4.7%  2.2%  23.3% * 11.6% ***          -              -     -2.9%  
 N  2  10         -    4  5  2  7          -              -     1  
                        
(6) Mean  0.6%  4.2% * 5.0% * 2.9% ** 5.5% *  -11.4%  38.8%  0.6%          -     14.5%  
 Median  0.6%  5.3% ** 3.0%  0.6%  1.3%  -11.4%  38.8%  0.6%          -     14.5%  
 N  4  7  14  19  16  2  1  1          -     1  
                        
(7) Mean  3.6%  2.6%  3.5%  4.2% ** 6.5% **  19.2%  22.0% * 12.0% ** 2.1%  4.9%  
 Median  1.8%  1.2%  1.5%  2.7% * 1.1%  10.8%  4.9%  12.7% ** 1.4%  3.1%  
 N  6  16  12  19  21  3  6  10  14  20  
                        
(8) Mean  -1.9%  3.4%  -2.3%  2.0% ** 0.8%             -     55.2%  27.2%  5.3% * 21.1% ** 
 Median  -1.9%  1.8%  -1.5%  2.5% * 1.7% *             -     55.2%  17.1%  5.3% * 4.4%  
  N   2  5  8  22  22               -      1  3  5  9  
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Table 4.10 CARs to Acquirer and Target by Shipping Market Cycles 
ACAR (TCAR) is the five-day cumulative abnormal return to acquirer (target) calculated by adding the market-adjusted return for days t-2 to 
t+2, where t is the acquisition announcement day. In order to calculate the daily return, the corresponding country’s Datastream value-weighted 
market index returns are used. Abnormal returns are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. M&C means a subsample consisting of deals 
with post-announcement target ownership over 50%. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Transaction 
Type 
  ACAR  TCAR 
 (1) 1990 
      –2001 
(2) 2002 
     –2008 
(3) 2009 
      –2014 
 Mean Difference  (1) 1990 
      –2001 
(2) 2002 
     –2008 
(3) 2009 
      –2014 
 Mean Difference 
    (1) - (2) (1) - (3) (2) - (3)     (1) - (2) (1) - (3) (2) - (3) 
                              
Panel A: All Sample                         
                                                        
All Mean  1.0% *** 2.0% *** 2.0% ***  -1.1% *** -1.0% ** 0.0%  7.0% *** 7.5% *** 8.7% ***  -0.5%  -1.7%  -1.2%  
 Median  0.2%  0.5%  0.5%         2.1% ** 5.0% *** 2.9% **        
 N  517  464  397         271  207  180        
                              
(1) Mean  0.7% * 2.0% *** 2.4% **  -1.4% ** -1.7% * -0.3%  7.8% *** 9.2% *** 11.8% ***  -1.4%  -4.0%  -2.6%  
 Median  0.2%  0.5%  0.9%         2.2% * 6.2% *** 5.6% **        
 N  182  132  103         108  73  49        
                              
(2) Mean  1.3% ** 4.7% ** -0.4%  -3.4% * 1.7% * 5.1% **  1.3%  5.9% * 12.4%  -4.6%  -11.2% * -6.6%  
 Median  0.5%  0.2%  -1.2%         -0.4%  3.4%  12.4%        
 N  53  71  51         4  7  2        
                              
(3) Mean  1.1%  1.7%  0.4%  -0.6%  0.7%  1.3%  9.2% ** 4.9% ** 11.4% **  4.3%  -2.1%  -6.5%  
 Median  0.5%  -0.1%  -0.5%         2.5%  3.6% * 6.2%        
 N  35  32  26         16  9  8        
                              
(4) Mean  1.3% * 0.3%  2.9% ***  1.0%  -1.6% * -2.6% **  3.0%  11.0% *** 12.2% **  -8.0% ** -9.2% * -1.2%  
 Median  -0.1%  0.0%  1.3% *         1.8%  6.9% ** 2.7%        
 N  135  111  105         21  20  17        
                              
(5) Mean  2.5%  5.4% * -0.8%  -2.9%  3.3%  6.2% *  8.8% *** 0.5%  12.9%  8.3% ** -4.1%  -12.4%  
 Median  -0.2%  5.0% * 0.6%         6.3% ** -0.5%  -1.7%        
 N  16  4  8         14  4  4        
                              
(6) Mean  -0.2%  3.3% ** 6.1% **  -3.5% * -6.3% ** -2.8%  3.7%  6.3%  14.5%  -2.6%  -10.8%  -8.2%  
 Median  0.6%  0.6%  2.0%         -0.4%  2.4%  14.5%        
 N  24  31  25         4  5  1        
                              
(7) Mean  1.0%  2.5% ** 3.5% **  -1.5%  -2.5%  -1.0%  5.2% *** 4.6% *** 3.2% *  0.6%  2.0%  1.4%  
 Median  0.8%  1.5%  0.8%         1.2%  4.3% *** 1.5%        
 N  48  40  42         85  64  71        
                              
(8) Mean  1.1%  0.6%  -0.9%  0.5%  2.0% * 1.5%  13.2% ** 9.7% *** 13.3% ***  3.5%  -0.1%  -3.6%  
 Median  -0.2%  1.6% ** 0.1%         4.5%  7.9% ** 2.4%        
  N   24  43  37                 19  25  28               
                              
Panel B: M&C Sample                       
                                                        
All Mean  1.5% *** 2.8% *** 2.3% ***  -1.4% ** -0.9%  0.5%  13.5% *** 11.1% *** 15.2% ***  2.4%  -1.7%  -4.1%  
 Median  0.2%  0.9% * 0.8% *         10.2% *** 8.4% *** 7.1% **        
 N  323  316  274         87  79  61        
                              
(1) Mean  1.4% ** 4.0% *** 1.0%  -2.5% *** 0.5%  3.0% ***  10.4% *** 14.4% *** 19.8% ***  -4.1%  -9.4% * -5.3%  
 Median  0.5%  3.1% *** 0.4%         9.7% *** 10.0% *** 10.8% **        
 N  121  84  67         44  36  21        
                              
(2) Mean  1.0%  5.7% ** -0.6%  -4.7% ** 1.5%  6.2% **  9.0%  12.0%          -      -3.0%            -               -    
 Median  0.4%  0.1%  -1.2%         9.0%  12.0%          -            
 N  32  45  37         1  2          -            
                              
(3) Mean  1.8%  2.1%  1.4%  -0.3%  0.3%  0.6%  28.2% ** 5.5%  11.1%  22.7% * 17.1%  -5.6%  
 Median  0.2%  -0.6%  0.6%         21.1% * 5.5%  13.4% *        
 N  18  18  16         5  2  4        
                              
(4) Mean  1.2%  0.1%  3.5% ***  1.0%  -2.3% * -3.4% ***  7.0% * 15.8% *** 41.4% **  -8.8% * -34.4% ** -25.6% * 
 Median  -0.8%  0.0%  1.4%         2.4%  23.2% *** 48.6% **        
 N  91  88  82         10  12  4        
                              
(5) Mean  3.3%  6.7% * 0.0%  -3.4%  3.2%  6.6%  11.8% ***          -     -2.9%           -     14.6%            -    
 Median  -0.6%  8.2% * 0.6%         13.4% ***          -     -2.9%        
 N  12  3  6         9          -     1        
                              
(6) Mean  0.8%  4.7% ** 6.0% **  -3.9% * -5.2% ** -1.3%  5.4%  0.6%  14.5%  4.7%  -9.2%  -13.9%  
 Median  -0.2%  3.0% * 1.7%         0.4%  0.6%  14.5%        
 N  16  24  20         3  1  1        
                              
(7) Mean  2.5%  4.2% ** 6.4% **  -1.7%  -3.8%  -2.1%  21.4% ** 4.9% ** 4.8%  16.5% ** 16.6% ** 0.1%  
 Median  0.8%  1.5%  1.3%         7.2%  4.7% * 1.8%        
 N  24  27  23         11  21  21        
                              
(8) Mean  1.9%  0.7%  0.8%  1.3%  1.1%  -0.2%  34.2% * 5.3% * 21.1% **  28.9% * 13.1%  -15.8% * 
 Median  1.8%  0.7%  1.8% **         36.1% ** 5.3% * 4.4%        
  N   9  27  23                 4  5  9               
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in acquisitions of ship-owning targets and during 2005–2009 in acquisitions of shipping service 
targets. 
From another period perspective, I also examine how abnormal returns in shipping M&As vary 
by shipping market cycles. For this purpose, the sample period is arbitrarily divided into three 
phases centred on the 2002–2008 period when shipping companies experienced an 
unprecedentedly booming market. This classification is also consistent with the waves of 
shipping M&A activity reviewed in the previous chapter. 
Table 4.10 illustrates relations between abnormal returns and shipping market condition. Based 
on the M&C sample (see Panel B), there is no period when acquirers and targets have negative 
abnormal returns. Interestingly, a negative correlation exists between CARs to acquirers and 
targets. Although the negative correlation does not hold strongly across different transaction 
types, acquirer CAR generally increases from the 1990–2001 period to the 2002–2008 period, 
and decreases from the 2002–2008 period to the 2009–2014 period, and vice versa for target 
CAR. In addition, ship-owning acquirers achieve the highest five-day CAR during the 2002–
2008 period regardless of target business segments (see transaction types (1), (2) and (3)). In 
2002–2008, the mean difference in CAR from those in other periods are significant except 
when targets firms are in the other segment. 
 
4.3.2.3. CARs by Market Segment and Deal Characteristics 
Earlier in this chapter, I reviewed how abnormal returns in shipping M&As differ depending 
on deal characteristics, as well as variations in the impact of those characteristics by 
combinations of other factors. In this section, I examine variations in the impact of deal-specific 
factors by transaction type. Table 4.11 reports abnormal returns to acquirers by target public 
status, nationality mix and method of payment. Based on the M&C sample, although acquirers 
achieve more abnormal returns in acquisitions of non-public targets than those of public targets 
in transaction types (1), (2), (4), (5), (7) and (8), the mean difference in the five-day CARs is 
significant only in transaction types (2) and (5). Acquirers have significantly negative returns 
in acquisitions of publicly listed targets in transaction type (5). 
With regard to nationality mix, the segment analysis presents very mixed results depending on 
transaction type. Although the mean difference in CARs to acquirers between domestic and 
cross-border deals is significant only in transaction (5), the direction of mean difference differs 
across transaction types. Specifically, different from the numerically higher CAR to acquirers 
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Table 4.11 CAR to Acquirer and Deal Characteristics by Transaction Type 
ACAR is the five-day cumulative abnormal return to acquirer calculated by adding the market-adjusted return for days t-2 to t+2, where t is the acquisition announcement day. In order to calculate the daily return, the 
corresponding country’s Datastream value-weighted market index returns are used. Abnormal returns are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. M&C means a subsample consisting of deals with post-announcement 
target ownership over 50%. Non-public target includes private, subsidiary and all other public statuses except ‘public’. Cross-border is a group of deals where the acquirer and target are located in different domiciles. 
Cash (stock) is a group of deals financed with pure cash (stock), and mixed/others comprises all remaining others. The combined number of observations concerning the method of payment is less than that of the overall 
group, as information on financing mix is available only for 815 deals. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Transaction 
Type 
      Target Public Status   Domestic vs Cross-Border   Method of Payment 
      Public Non-Public 
Mean Difference 
(Non-Public - Public) 
  Domestic Cross-Border 
Mean Difference 
(Domestic - Cross-Border) 
  Cash Stock Mixed/Others 
Mean Difference 
(Cash - Stock) 
                          
(1) All Mean  -0.1%  2.0% *** 2.1% ***  1.5% *** 1.6% *** -0.1%  1.8% ** 2.2% * 3.4% *** -0.4%  
  Median  -0.4%  0.7% *    0.1%  0.8%    0.5%  1.2%  2.1% *   
  N  101  316    241  176    88  30  56   
                          
 M&C Mean  1.4% * 2.3% *** 0.8%  1.8% *** 2.5% *** -0.6%  2.6% *** 2.2%  4.0% *** 0.4%  
  Median  0.2%  0.9% **    0.5%  1.2% *    1.2% * 0.6%  2.2% **   
    N   60  212        165  107        55  24  48      
                          
(2) All Mean  2.3%  2.2% ** -0.1%  1.1% * 4.4% ** -3.3% *  4.0%  2.9%  6.4%  1.1%  
  Median  0.5%  0.1%    -0.2%  0.5%    0.3%  2.2%  2.5%   
  N  12  163    114  61    11  4  3   
                          
 M&C Mean  -1.5%  2.5% ** 4.0% **  1.1%  5.3% * -4.2%  6.9%  1.3%  8.4%  5.5%  
  Median  -0.6%  0.1%    -0.3%  0.7%    -8.1%  1.1%  8.4%   
  N  5  109    80  34    4  3  2   
                                                    
(3) All Mean  3.4% *** 0.6%  -2.8% **  0.8%  1.9%  -1.1%  0.1%  3.1%  -4.3%  -3.0%  
  Median  2.2% ** -0.4%    -0.4%  0.5%    0.4%  0.7%  -1.5%   
  N  17  76    66  27    16  4  3   
                          
 M&C Mean  2.5%  1.7% ** -0.8%  1.2%  3.2% * -2.0%  2.3%  3.3%  -1.2% * -1.0%  
  Median  0.3%  -0.2%    -0.4%  0.3%    1.9%  -1.1%  -1.2% *   
    N   3  49        37  15        8  3  2      
                          
(4) All Mean  0.3%  1.5% *** 1.2%  1.9% *** 0.9% * 1.0%  1.5% * 0.4%  2.0% * 1.2%  
  Median  -0.1%  0.2%    0.2%  0.0%    0.6%  -1.8%  0.3%   
  N  21  330    213  138    58  20  37   
                          
 M&C Mean  -0.4%  1.6% *** 2.0%  2.0% ** 0.9% * 1.1%  1.7% * 1.4%  2.0%  0.3%  
  Median  -1.2%  0.1%    -0.1%  0.3%    0.9%  -1.3%  0.3%   
  N  10  251    156  105    43  17  35   
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(5) All Mean  -1.9%  3.5%  5.5% *  -1.6%  11.0% * -12.6% *  -2.2%  -5.8% * -1.9%  3.6%  
  Median  -0.4%  0.1%    -0.6%  2.9%    -0.8%  -4.7%  -1.4%   
  N  8  20    20  8    7  4  5   
                          
 M&C Mean  -3.8% * 5.5%  9.3% **  -1.5%  16.6%  -18.1% *  -1.8%  -5.8% * -1.3%  4.0%  
  Median  -1.9%  1.3%    -0.6%  4.6%    -0.8%  -4.7%  -0.5%   
    N   6  15        16  5        5  4  4      
                          
(6) All Mean  4.3% ** 3.0% *** -1.3%  3.3% ** 2.7% ** 0.6%  2.4% ** 13.4%  10.0% ** -11.1%  
  Median  3.4% ** 0.7%    1.0%  1.0%    1.0%  13.4%  5.7%   
  N  6  74    54  26    24  2  11   
                          
 M&C Mean  6.8% ** 3.9% *** -2.9%  4.5% *** 3.2% ** 1.3%  2.5% ** 31.3%  13.3% ** -28.8%  
  Median  8.8% ** 0.9%    1.3%  2.1% *    1.0%  31.3%  5.8%   
  N  3  57    42  18    22  1  9   
                                                    
(7) All Mean  -0.4%  3.5% *** 3.9% ***  2.4% ** 2.0% * 0.4%  -0.9%  12.3% * 8.2% * -4.2%  
  Median  0.0%  1.4%    1.0%  0.8%    0.0%  2.8%  7.6% *   
  N  42  88    93  37    22  9  10   
                          
 M&C Mean  2.7%  4.5% *** 1.8%  4.7% *** 3.6% ** 1.1%  1.2%  13.5% * 8.0% * -5.4%  
  Median  1.0%  1.5%    1.5%  1.7%    1.5%  2.8%  5.9%   
    N   6  68        49  25        9  8  9      
                          
(8) All Mean  -0.2%  0.3%  0.5%  0.1%  0.3%  -0.2%  0.0%  0.2%  2.5%  2.3%  
  Median  -0.7%  0.8% *    -0.1%  1.4% **    -0.6%  -0.5%  1.7%   
  N  12  92    70  34    19  9  10   
                          
 M&C Mean  0.1%  1.0% * 0.9%  1.1%  0.6%  0.5%  -1.1%  0.1%  1.1%  1.1%  
  Median  0.1%  1.8% ***    1.5% ** 1.9% **    0.5%  -0.9%  1.5%   
    N   2  57        38  21        8  6  7      
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in cross-border deals in Table 4.3, acquirers achieve higher abnormal returns in domestic deals 
in transaction types (4), (6), (7) and (8). However, the results indicate that ship-owning 
acquirers (in transaction types (1), (2) and (3)) earn more returns in cross-border deals than in 
domestic deals, which is consistent with the international nature of the shipping industry. 
In addition, I also find that the association between acquirer CAR and method of payment 
varies among transaction types. Different from the numerically higher CAR to acquirers in 
equity offers in Table 4.3, acquirers gain more in cash-financed deals in transaction types (1), 
(2), (4), (5) and (8). However, there is no significance difference in mean between cash- and 
stock-financed deals across transaction types. 
Table 4.12 illustrates abnormal returns to targets by nationality mix in shipping M&As. Based 
on the M&C sample, ship-owning targets achieve significantly higher abnormal returns only  
 
Table 4.12 CAR to Target by Nationality Mix 
CAR is the five-day cumulative abnormal return to target firm calculated by adding the market-adjusted return for days t-2 to t+2, where t is 
the acquisition announcement day. In order to calculate the daily return, the corresponding country’s Datastream value-weighted market index 
returns are used. Abnormal returns are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. M&C means a subsample consisting of deals with post-
announcement target ownership over 50%. Cross-border is a group of deals where the acquirer and target are located in different domiciles. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Transaction 
Type 
    All Sample 
  
M&C Sample 
    Domestic Cross-Border (Domestic - Cross-Border) 
  
Domestic Cross-Border (Domestic - Cross-Border) 
                
(1) Mean  7.9% *** 10.5% *** -2.7%  11.2% *** 16.7% *** -5.5% * 
 Median  3.9%  5.1%    9.2% 11.0%   
  N   124  106        53  48      
                
(2) Mean  2.0%  7.6% ** -5.6% *  0.6% 16.2% -15.6% 
 Median  0.6%  5.7% *    0.6% 16.2%   
 N  5  8    1 2   
                                
(3) Mean  11.2% *** 2.6% 8.6% **  20.6% ** 5.5% 15.1% * 
 Median  5.1%  1.0%    21.1% ** 5.5%   
  N   23  10        9  2      
                
(4) Mean  6.1% *** 12.7% *** -6.6% *  13.0% *** 21.7% ** -8.7% 
 Median  2.7%  3.6%    7.5% ** 19.7% **   
 N  37  21    16 10   
                                
(5) Mean  12.1% ** -0.6% 12.6% ***  11.5% *** -0.1% 11.6% 
 Median  8.6% ** -0.5%    13.4% *** -0.1%   
  N   15  7        9  1      
                
(6) Mean  -2.4%  14.7% * -17.1% **  -2.7% 19.6% -22.3% 
 Median  0.6%  12.0% *    0.6% 19.6%   
 N  5  5    3 2   
                                
(7) Mean  4.8% *** 3.3% ** 1.4%  6.4% ** 15.3% ** -8.9% 
 Median  1.8% * 1.4%    3.0% 7.1%   
  N   158  62        42  11      
                
(8) Mean  11.9% *** 12.4% *** -0.5%  19.5% ** 20.3% * -0.8% 
 Median  3.1%  8.6% **    8.1% 16.4%   
  N   56  16        14  4      
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when acquired by ship-owning companies (see transaction type (1)). This is inconsistent with 
the numerically higher abnormal returns to ship-owning acquirers in cross-border deals 
regardless of the business segments of targets indicated in Table 4.11. On the other hand, 
despite no significance in mean difference, shipping service targets earn higher CAR in cross-
border deals across acquirer business segments (see transaction types (2), (4) and (8)). 
I also examine the association between target CAR and method of payment. However, due to 
the low number of observations, results are available only in transaction types (1) and (4), 
which are intra-segmental deals in the ship-owning and shipping services segments, 
respectively. Thus, only the meaningful and significant results are reported here (the tabulated 
results for the full sample are available in Appendix E). Consistent with the findings in Table 
4.3, both ship-owning and shipping service targets achieve higher abnormal returns in cash-
financed deals, and the mean difference in CAR from stock-financed deals is significant. 
Specifically, ship-owning targets realise the five-day CARs of 15.3% and 5.8% in cash and 
equity offers, respectively, when acquirers are ship-owning firms. Similarly, the five-day CARs 
to shipping service targets are 22.3% and 10.8% in cash and equity offers, respectively. 
 
4.3.2.4. The Impact of Firm Valuation on CARs by Market Segment 
In this part, I extend the previous analysis on the association between abnormal returns and 
valuations of acquirers and targets into each transaction type. Earlier in this chapter, I failed to 
find any relation between acquirer valuation and abnormal returns. Only abnormal return to 
targets is negatively associated with target valuation when both acquirers and targets are 
publicly listed firms. However, the segment analysis reveals a meaningful relation between 
valuations and abnormal returns in some transaction types. Due to the low number of 
observations, however, results are unavailable for some transaction types. Thus, I present 
results in selected transaction types with statistical significance in the M&C sample. The 
tabulated results for the full sample are available in Appendices F and G for acquirer and target 
valuations, respectively. 
Table 4.13 analyses how abnormal returns relate to acquirer MTB as a proxy of valuation in 
each transaction type in shipping M&As. Acquirers and targets are ranked based on their MTBs 
in each year, respectively, and partitioned into terciles. Based on the M&C sample, I find 
significant relations between acquirer MTB and CAR for ship-owning acquirers. The results 
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indicate that CAR to ship-owning acquirers is positively associated with acquirer MTB in intra-
segmental deals (see transaction type (1)), but negatively in inter-segmental deals (see 
transaction types (2) and (3)). The mean differences in CARs between large and small terciles 
are significant at conventional levels in the three transaction types. However, the relation 
between acquirer MTB and target CAR is significant only in transaction type (1). The CAR to 
ship-owning target is 8.7% in the top tercile of ship-owning acquirer MTB, and significantly 
lower than that in bottom tercile by 12.0%. 
 
Table 4.13 CARs and Acquirer Valuation by Transaction Type 
ACAR (TCAR) is the five-day cumulative abnormal return to acquirer (target) calculated by adding the market-adjusted return for days t-2 to 
t+2, where t is the acquisition announcement day. In order to calculate the daily return, the corresponding country’s Datastream value-weighted 
market index returns are used. Abnormal returns are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. A MTB is the market-to-book ratio of the 
acquirer four weeks prior to the deal announcement and winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. In each year, MTBs are ranked into 
terciles, with small as the lowest tercile. The left-hand side reports statistics for all deals, while the right-hand side reports those for the M&C 
subsample consisting of deals with post-announcement target ownership over 50%. (Large - Small) indicates the mean difference in CAR 
between top and bottom terciles. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Transaction 
Type 
      All Sample   M&C Sample 
      Small Median Large (Large - Small)   Small Median Large (Large - Small) 
                     
(1) A MTB Mean  0.74  1.85  6.05  5.31 ***  0.90  2.04  5.74  4.84 *** 
  Median  0.68  1.55  4.12     0.75  1.59  3.62    
  N  94  94  94     66  62  66    
    
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ACAR Mean  2.3% ** 1.0% * 2.1% ** -0.1%   1.5% * 1.3% * 4.0% *** 2.5% ** 
  Median  1.5% * 0.3%  0.9%     1.4% * 0.3%  2.9% **   
  N  76  85  89     56  56  62    
    
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TCAR Mean  13.5% *** 11.1% ** 5.8% * -7.7% *  20.6% *** 17.9% ** 8.7% * -12.0% * 
  Median  6.7% * 7.3% * -0.2%     12.6% ** 16.2% ** 2.5%    
  N  25  16  18     16  8  13    
                                          
(2) A MTB Mean  0.65  1.45  4.08  3.43 ***  0.60  1.57  4.39  3.79 *** 
  Median  0.60  1.43  1.98     0.46  0.92  2.46    
  N  42  45  42     27  33  27    
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ACAR Mean  8.7% ** 0.7%  -1.0%  -9.7% ***  10.5% ** -0.9%  0.5%  -10.0% ** 
  Median  0.6%  0.3%  -0.8%     1.3%  -0.1%  -0.6%    
  N  40  44  42     26  32  27    
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TCAR Mean           -     8.9% ** 0.6%                   -              -     9.0%  12.0%                   -     
  Median           -     7.1% * 0.6%              -     9.0%  12.0%    
    N            -      5  1                 -      1  2      
                     
(3) A MTB Mean  1.05  3.80  7.65  6.60 ***  1.92  2.40  9.74  7.83 ** 
  Median  1.14  1.80  2.93     1.16  1.90  3.38    
  N  18  20  18     13  8  13    
                     
 ACAR Mean  0.8%  2.3% * 1.7%  0.9%   3.4% ** 4.8%  -0.2%  -3.5% * 
  Median  2.3% ** 0.0%  0.3%     1.3%  3.9%  -1.1%    
  N  17  20  17     12  8  13    
                     
 TCAR Mean  15.3%  0.2%  0.0%  -15.3%            -     2.8%  -0.6%                   -     
  Median  9.0%  0.2%  -0.6%              -     2.8%  -0.6%    
  N  3  1  3              -     1  1    
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Table 4.14 illustrates the relation between target valuation and abnormal returns to acquiring 
and target firms. Consistent with the findings in Table 4.5, CAR to targets is negatively 
associated with target MTB, while there is no significant relation with CAR to acquirers. 
Specifically, the negative association between target MTB and CAR to targets is significant in 
transaction types (1) and (8). In other transaction types, there is not enough observations or the 
relation is not significant. In intra-segmental deals in the ship-owning segment, the five-day 
CAR to target in the top tercile of target MTB is 8.8%, significantly lower than that in the 
bottom tercile by 13.2% (see transaction type (1)). When shipping service targets are acquired 
by firms in the other segment, target CAR in the top tercile is only 0.9%, which is not 
significant, while that in the bottom tercile is 21.8%. 
 
Table 4.14 CAR and Target Valuation by Transaction Type 
ACAR (TCAR) is the five-day cumulative abnormal return to acquirer (target) calculated by adding the market-adjusted return for days t-2 to 
t+2, where t is the acquisition announcement day. In order to calculate the daily return, the corresponding country’s Datastream value-weighted 
market index returns are used. Abnormal returns are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. T MTB is the market-to-book ratio of the 
target four weeks prior to the deal announcement and winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. In each year, MTBs are ranked into terciles, 
with small as the lowest tercile. The left-hand side reports statistics for all deals, while the right-hand side reports those for the M&C subsample 
consisting of deals with post-announcement target ownership over 50%. (Large - Small) indicates the mean difference in CAR between top 
and bottom terciles. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
Transaction 
Type 
      All Sample   M&C Sample 
      Small Median Large (Large - Small)   Small Median Large (Large - Small) 
                     
(1) T MTB Mean  0.49  1.23  4.36  3.87 ***  0.60  1.16  5.13  4.54 *** 
  Median  0.46  1.12  2.05     0.58  1.08  1.84    
  N  53  56  53     27  28  27    
                     
 ACAR Mean  1.3%  -0.1%  1.2%  -0.2%   3.3%  2.4%  3.0% * -0.2%  
  Median  -0.1%  -0.4%  2.2%     1.6%  1.2%  2.1%    
  N  16  19  25     10  15  14    
                     
 TCAR Mean  14.8% *** 11.8% *** 5.7% *** -9.1% ***  21.8% *** 14.8% *** 8.6% *** -13.2% *** 
  Median  6.6% ** 10.3% *** 3.2% **    12.2% ** 13.1% *** 6.9% ***   
  N  49  44  48     23  22  22    
                                          
(8) T MTB Mean  0.70  1.65  5.76  5.06 ***  0.79  1.72  8.35  7.56 ** 
  Median  0.58  1.35  2.94     0.67  1.35  2.94    
  N  21  26  21     7  9  7    
                     
 ACAR Mean  2.4%  1.9%  0.9%  -1.5%   5.0%  5.0%  0.9%  -4.2%  
  Median  5.0%  2.9% * 0.9%     5.0%  5.0%  0.9%    
  N  3  3  1     1  1  1    
                     
 TCAR Mean  18.5% *** 10.2% ** 9.7% * -8.8%   28.6% ** 29.1% ** 0.9%  -27.8% ** 
  Median  14.7% *** 1.1%  4.1%     17.1%  28.5% ** 1.9%    
    N   17  21  15        5  5  6      
 
4.3.2.5. Firm Size and CARs by Market Segment 
Finally, I investigate the effect of size-related factors on abnormal returns according to 
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transaction types. Earlier in this chapter, I find CAR to acquirers to be negatively associated 
with size-related factors of the acquirer. In addition, CAR to targets is found to be positively 
related with size-related factors of the acquirer, but negatively with those of the target. In this 
section, I further examine variations in those associations among transaction types. For this 
purpose, acquirers and targets in each transaction type are ranked based on five size-related 
factors (acquirer size and asset, deal value, and target size and asset) and partitioned in terciles, 
respectively. Due to a low number of observations, results are unavailable for some transaction 
types. Thus, I report results in selected transaction types with statistical significance in the 
M&C sample. The tabulated results for the full sample are available in Appendices H through 
K. Since no significant association between target size and abnormal returns to acquiring and 
target firms is found, those results are not discussed here. 
Table 4.15 illustrates statistics for acquirer size terciles and corresponding CARs to acquirers 
and targets. In transaction type (5), the mean difference in acquirer size between the top and 
bottom tercile is not significant. Similar to the findings in Table 4.6, acquirer CAR is negatively 
 
Table 4.15 CARs and Acquirer Size by Transaction Type 
ACAR (TCAR) is the five-day cumulative abnormal return to the acquirer (target) calculated by adding the market-adjusted return for days t-
2 to t+2, where t is the acquisition announcement day. In order to calculate the daily return, the corresponding country’s Datastream value-
weighted market index returns are used. Abnormal returns are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. ‘A size’ is the market capitalisations 
of the acquirer four weeks prior to the transaction announcement. In each year, ‘A sizes’ are ranked into terciles, with small as the lowest 
tercile. The left-hand side reports statistics for all deals, while the right-hand side reports those for the M&C subsample consisting of deals 
with post-announcement target ownership over 50%. (Large - Small) indicates mean difference in CAR between top and bottom terciles. ***, 
** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Transaction 
Type 
    All Sample   M&C Sample 
   Small Median Large (Large - Small)  Small Median Large (Large - Small) 
                    
Panel A: A size                                     
                    
(1) Mean  107.42  547.07  4,679.20  4,571.78 ***  124.16  481.79  5,034.46  4,910.30 *** 
 Median  57.94  468.98  2,762.53     51.68  414.15  2,566.58    
 N  86  88  86    59  58  59   
          
 
        
 
(2) Mean  159.26  982.41  5,280.85  5,121.59 ***  124.83  778.69  4,639.25  4,514.42 *** 
 Median  67.60  302.43  2,243.97    92.86  292.11  1,340.79   
 N  41  38  41     26  29  26    
          
 
        
 
(3) Mean  158.60  832.50  5,940.99  5,782.39 ***  214.55  742.99  1,516.79  1,302.25 ** 
 Median  65.07  303.04  2,201.10     91.04  140.34  1,154.16    
 N  19  20  19     12  12  12    
          
 
        
 
(4) Mean  124.84  949.35  7,995.21  7,870.36 ***  164.36  891.25  8,166.56  8,002.21 *** 
 Median  64.71  712.88  4,462.06     67.47  680.16  4,244.46    
 N  74  79  74     53  63  53    
          
 
        
 
(6) Mean  144.07  1,068.29  3,563.26  3,419.19 ***  151.15  1,089.88  4,447.18  4,296.03 ** 
 Median  22.34  459.90  1,456.31     15.55  346.34  1,456.31    
 N  17  16  17     11  17  11    
          
 
        
 
(7) Mean  130.17  1,466.35  13,584.29  13,454.12 **  47.51  1,458.10  4,683.53  4,636.02 ** 
 Median  47.54  299.86  3,976.54     31.11  117.49  798.70    
 N  29  34  29    18  20  18   
          
 
        
 
(8) Mean  571.55  2,571.59  13,597.79  13,026.24 ***  910.13  2,439.55  11,079.54  10,169.42 *** 
 Median  136.04  789.73  6,844.11    136.04  627.19  5,018.54   
  N   26  31  26        18  18  18      
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Panel B: ACAR                                     
                    
(1) Mean  4.4% *** 1.8% ** 0.7%  -3.7% ***  4.3% *** 2.4% ** 1.2%  -3.2% ** 
 Median  3.5% *** 0.3%  0.4%     4.0% *** 1.5%  0.3%    
 N  79  80  75     55  54  50    
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) Mean  6.7% ** 2.9%  -1.4% * -8.1% ***  9.4% ** 1.7%  -1.4%  -10.9% *** 
 Median  2.3%  -0.3%  -0.3%     2.3%  -0.2%  -0.7%    
 N  39  36  41     26  27  26    
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(6) Mean  8.0% ** 3.3%  2.7%  -5.4% *  11.3% ** 3.6% ** 3.3%  -8.0% * 
 Median  6.0% * 1.4%  -0.3%     9.9% ** 3.4% ** -0.3%    
 N  17  15  17     11  16  11    
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(8) Mean  0.5%  -0.7%  0.0%  -0.4%   -0.4%  0.5%  1.7% ** 2.1% ** 
 Median  1.5%  0.3%  0.9%     0.3%  1.9%  1.9% **   
 N  23  27  25     16  15  18    
        
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
    
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Panel C: TACR                   
        
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
    
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
(1) Mean  4.7%  9.7% ** 15.4% *** 10.8% **  6.2%  21.1% ** 18.9% *** 12.8% ** 
 Median  2.5%  4.1%  12.2% ***    2.5%  13.2%  13.0% ***   
  N   10  19  29        6  6  25      
 
associated with acquirer size in transaction types (1), (2) and (6). However, I find a positive 
relation between acquirer size and CAR in transaction type (8). Regarding abnormal return to 
target, the positive association with acquirer size is significant only in transaction type (1). 
The associations between acquirer asset and abnormal returns to acquirers and targets are 
similar to the findings in acquire size (See Table 4.16). Abnormal return to acquirers is 
negatively associated with acquirer asset in transaction types (2) and (4). Specifically, in 
transaction type (2), acquirer CAR in the top tercile of acquirer asset is negative and 
significantly lower than that in the bottom tercile by 9.4%. Consistent with the finding in 
acquirer size, the positive relation between acquirer asset and abnormal returns to targets is 
significant only in transaction type (1). 
 
Table 4.16 CARs and Acquirer Asset by Transaction Type 
ACAR (TCAR) is the five-day cumulative abnormal return to acquirer (target) calculated by adding the market-adjusted return for days t-2 to 
t+2, where t is the acquisition announcement day. In order to calculate the daily return, the corresponding country’s Datastream value-weighted 
market index returns are used. Abnormal returns are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. ‘A asset’ is the total asset of the acquirer at 
the year-end prior to the deal announcement. In each year, ‘A assets’ are ranked into terciles, with small as the lowest tercile. The left-hand 
side reports statistics for all deals, while the right-hand side reports those for the M&C subsample consisting of deals with post-announcement 
target ownership over 50%. (Large - Small) indicates mean difference in CAR between top and bottom terciles. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
Transaction 
Type 
    All Sample   M&C Sample 
   Small Median Large (Large - Small)  Small Median Large (Large - Small) 
                    
Panel A: A Asset                                       
                    
(1) Mean  324.63  1,246.65  9,576.64  9,252.01 ***  295.99  1,122.90  8,995.09  8,699.10 *** 
 Median  161.17  878.80  5,108.87     138.31  879.23  4,671.92    
 N  148  153  148    96  97  96   
          
 
        
 
(2) Mean  252.45  2,072.27  9,165.27  8,912.81 ***  372.79  2,903.64  6,832.33  6,459.54 *** 
 Median  147.76  1,064.46  8,007.61     171.87  1,112.34  5,120.38    
 N  57  64  57    38  40  38   
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(3) Mean  735.37  2,995.81  7,414.44  6,679.07 ***  1,102.89  3,584.81  3,662.52  2,559.64 ** 
 Median  249.04  935.42  5,705.65     182.15  976.14  1,717.17    
 N  30  25  30     16  16  16    
          
 
        
 
(4) Mean  170.88  872.23  10,442.76  10,271.88 ***  174.77  819.80  9,488.76  9,313.99 *** 
 Median  121.27  724.03  3,530.23     121.27  599.87  2,817.68    
 N  119  122  119     89  88  89    
    
 
 
 
             
(6) Mean  331.93  806.89  2,759.78  2,427.85 ***  386.45  753.80  3,006.00  2,619.55 *** 
 Median  61.40  450.03  2,380.44     104.34  399.10  2,900.95    
 N  22  31  22     16  22  16    
    
 
 
 
   
 
        
 
(7) Mean  485.63  5,701.24  84,946.35  84,460.72 ***  232.68  1,806.51  32,293.28  32,060.61 ** 
 Median  87.71  1,554.53  18,964.60     55.51  286.39  4,935.47    
 N  45  44  45     23  26  23    
    
 
 
 
   
 
        
 
(8) Mean  923.90  5,949.31  51,140.59  50,216.68 ***  1,232.48  2,442.75  50,932.68  49,700.20 *** 
 Median  306.96  2,286.62  14,615.90     263.57  1,276.03  12,500.39    
 N  38  41  39    21  26  21   
        
  
  
  
      
  
                
  
Panel B: ACAR                                       
    
 
 
 
   
 
        
 
(2) Mean  4.6% *** 4.6% ** -1.7% ** -6.3% ***  7.5% *** 2.3%  -1.8% ** -9.4% *** 
 Median  1.9%  0.1%  -0.9%     3.7% * -0.6%  -1.2%   
 N  53  51  55     35 33  37   
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
(4) Mean  2.7% ** 1.6% ** 0.0%  -2.7% **  2.9% ** 1.2%  0.6% -2.4% * 
 Median  0.1%  0.9%  0.0%     -0.1% 0.0%  0.5%   
 N  102  116  98     80 87  71   
        
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
    
  
      
  
  
  
Panel C: TCAR                                       
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
(1) Mean  -0.8%  13.2% *** 10.3% *** 11.1% ***  -0.5% 18.4% *** 16.8% *** 17.3% * 
 Median  0.5%  8.4% ** 6.7% **    1.4% 13.3% ** 13.0% ***  
  N   24  35  43        8  18  28      
 
In the previous analysis in Table 4.6, I find that CARs to acquirers and targets have no 
significant association with deal value. However, the segment analysis indicates the significant 
impact of deal value on CARs in several segments (see Table 4.17). In transaction type (2), 
acquirer CAR is negatively associated with deal value. On the other hand, the relation between 
target CAR and deal value varies among segments. When the acquirers are ship-owning firms, 
target CAR is positively related to deal value (see transaction types (1) and (3)). However, in 
intra-segmental deals in the shipping service segment, target CAR is negatively associated with 
deal value (see transaction type (4)). 
 
Table 4.17 CARs and Deal Value by Transaction Type 
ACAR (TCAR) is the five-day cumulative abnormal return to acquirer (target) calculated by adding the market-adjusted return for days t-2 to 
t+2, where t is the acquisition announcement day. In order to calculate the daily return, the corresponding country’s Datastream value-weighted 
market index returns are used. Abnormal returns are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. Deal value is the transaction value. In each 
year, deal vals are ranked into terciles, with small as the lowest tercile. The left-hand side reports statistics for all deals, while the right-hand 
side reports those for the M&C subsample consisting of deals with post-announcement target ownership over 50%. (Large - Small) indicates 
mean difference in CAR between top and bottom terciles. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Transaction 
Type 
    All Sample   M&C Sample 
   Small Median Large (Large - Small)  Small Median Large (Large - Small) 
                    
Panel A: Deal Value 
                                        
 
 
160 
 
(1) Mean  9.66  74.88  669.51  659.86 ***  23.12  138.86  992.61  969.50 *** 
 Median  5.28  52.04  316.80     12.69  96.94  546.99    
 N  145  143  145     84  85  84    
                    
(2) Mean  4.14  24.24  156.15  152.01 ***  8.12  26.12  203.72  195.61 *** 
 Median  1.17  10.69  78.27     1.25  15.21  114.00    
 N  38  42  39     23  23  23    
                    
(3) Mean  6.58  22.54  164.16  157.57 ***  7.50  44.81  175.60  168.10 ** 
 Median  3.47  11.00  87.18     3.60  12.01  35.15    
 N  26  29  26     11  16  11    
                    
(4) Mean  5.48  31.36  539.59  534.11 ***  7.23  36.22  693.60  686.37 *** 
 Median  3.55  17.53  147.10     4.30  18.31  245.32    
 N  86  86  86     58  63  58    
                    
(5) Mean  15.74  89.90  292.77  277.03 ***  11.78  133.05  398.83  387.06 ** 
 Median  7.98  45.38  149.52     8.85  105.99  154.13    
 N  12  12  12     7  10  7    
                    
(6) Mean  6.36  32.60  238.38  232.03 **  61.24  40.20  244.43  183.19 * 
 Median  1.47  17.42  102.85     3.97  29.60  94.63    
 N  20  22  20     15  17  14    
                    
(7) Mean  7.40  51.97  385.23  377.83 ***  17.38  119.92  494.66  477.29 *** 
 Median  3.94  30.07  175.06     7.64  72.23  336.70    
 N  86  76  86     33  32  34    
                    
(8) Mean  6.49  43.19  569.81  563.31 ***  21.31  425.18  796.98  775.67 ** 
 Median  3.63  15.97  153.23     8.87  79.86  354.83    
  N   44  40  44        18  22  18      
                    
Panel B: ACAR 
                                        
(2) Mean  1.8%  3.5% * -0.1%  -1.9%   5.6% * 0.6%  -0.6%  -6.2% * 
 Median  0.3%  -0.4%  -0.4%     -0.6%  -0.7%  0.3%    
  N   32  33  34        20  18  22      
                    
Panel C: TCAR 
                                        
(1) Mean  7.0% *** 8.5% *** 15.0% *** 8.0% ***  8.8% ** 11.3% *** 20.8% *** 12.0% *** 
 Median  2.6%  2.5%  11.0% ***   3.5%  12.9% *** 14.5% ***  
 N  56  55  66     24  28  37    
                    
(3) Mean  -5.7% ** 13.7% * 9.7% ** 15.4% ***  -1.7%  20.2% * 22.5% ** 24.3% * 
 Median  -5.8% ** 9.6%  6.3% *    -1.7%  19.0% * 22.5% **   
 N  5  5  14     2  4  2    
                    
(4) Mean  12.4% ** 9.2% ** 13.7% ** 1.3%   31.3% ** 20.4% ** 15.4% ** -15.9% ** 
 Median  5.0%  4.2%  6.8% *    26.7% ** 18.4% ** 6.7%    
  N   10  17  15        4  6  12      
 
Table 4.18 reports statistics for target asset in each tercile and corresponding CARs to acquiring 
and target firms. Segmental analysis presents rather different results from the previous analysis. 
Earlier in this chapter, I find a negative relation between target CAR and target asset, as well 
as no significant relation with acquirer CAR. However, there is no significant relation between 
target CAR and target asset by segment. Rather, acquirer CAR is positively related with target 
asset in ship-owning intra-segmental deals (see transaction type (1)). 
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Table 4.18 CARs and Target Asset by Transaction Type 
ACAR is the five-day cumulative abnormal return to acquirer calculated by adding the market-adjusted return for days t-2 to t+2, where t is 
the acquisition announcement day. In order to calculate the daily return, the corresponding country’s Datastream value-weighted market index 
returns are used. Abnormal returns are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. T asset is the total asset of the target at the year-end prior 
to the deal announcement. In each year, T assets are ranked into terciles, with small as the lowest tercile. The left-hand side reports statistics 
for all deals, while the right-hand side reports those for the M&C subsample consisting of deals with post-announcement target ownership 
over 50%. (Large - Small) indicates mean difference in CAR between top and bottom terciles. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
Transaction 
Type 
   All Sample  M&C Sample 
    Small Median Large (Large - Small)   Small Median Large (Large - Small) 
                    
Panel A: T Asset 
                                        
(1) Mean  188.59  652.38  2,044.45  1,855.86 ***  168.75  778.31  2,196.02  2,027.27 *** 
 Median  140.83  581.09  1,354.39     117.65  646.49  1,438.69    
 N  101  94  93     47  45  47    
                    
(4) Mean  36.42  303.96  1,451.50  1,415.08 ***  40.32  260.05  1,401.69  1,361.37 *** 
 Median  18.15  163.54  869.96    16.65  122.93  616.19   
 N  41  39  36    24  23  24   
                    
(7) Mean  139.22  662.81  2,570.59  2,431.37 ***  137.94  484.56  1,413.91  1,275.97 *** 
 Median  91.78  525.24  1,807.92     73.87  364.50  1,071.74    
 N  82  99  77     20  25  21    
                    
(8) Mean  58.88  186.03  988.49  929.61 ***  84.97  469.76  927.71  842.74 *** 
 Median  41.17  152.25  528.21     36.04  146.77  483.52    
  N   37  34  36        10  14  11      
                    
Panel B: ACAR 
                                        
(1) Mean  0.5%  2.1%  0.5%  0.0%   -0.5%  2.4%  2.9% ** 3.4% * 
 Median  -0.1%  -0.4%  0.1%     0.7%  -0.4%  1.6%    
  N   46  27  40        28  20  22      
 
4.3.3. Multivariate Regressions on Determinants of CARs 
In this section, I use a multivariate framework to test the robustness of the relations between 
abnormal returns and factors examined earlier in this chapter. Furthermore, I report the 
estimation results according to business segments (ship-owning, shipping services and other) 
and shipping market cycles (1990–2001, 2002–2008 and 2009–2014). 
For controlling firm- and deal-specific variables that are found to affect acquirer abnormal 
returns, each sample is estimated in two specifications. In the first specification, I control 
variables that are found to affect acquirer abnormal returns in the univariate tests. I find that 
acquiring firms achieve positive abnormal returns in cross-border (CROSS-BORDER), cash-
financed (CASH), stock-financed (STOCK) and publicly listed target (PUBLIC TARGET) 
deals. Moreover, the results of univariate tests also indicate that acquirers achieve higher 
abnormal returns when the business segments of targets differ (DIVERSIFICATION). On the 
other hand, CAR to acquirers is found to be negatively associated with acquirer size-related 
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factors (market size and total asset). I therefore include a logarithm of acquirer total asset (lnA 
ASSET) at the end of year prior to the deal announcement as an explanatory variable.78 The 
second specification for each sample includes two additional controls that are insignificant in 
the univariate tests, but have been found to influence acquirer abnormal return in the previous 
literature. One is acquirer market-to-book ratio (lnA MTB), as in Dong et al. (2006), and the 
other is deal size (lnDEAL VALUE), as in Alexandridis et al. (2013). Moreover, I also consider 
value creation effects in high valuation markets (HIVAL) using the de-trended monthly price-
earnings ratio of the S&P500, as in Bouwman et al. (2009), and the pre-announcement runup 
of the acquiring firms using the cumulative stock returns over the year prior to the deal 
announcement. 
Table 4.19 reports the OLS regression results where the dependent variable is the five-day 
abnormal return to acquirers. Although the direction of sign and significance varies across 
business segments and periods, the results indicate that acquirer asset, cross-border, stock 
financing, diversification and acquirer runup comprise major determinants of abnormal return 
to acquiring firms. Specifically, the negative impact of acquirer asset on CAR to acquirers is 
quite consistent across business segments and shipping market cycles. The results are robust 
after controlling market-to-book ratio, deal size, high valuation market and runup. Based on 
the M&C sample (see Panel B of Table 4.19), I find that CARs to acquiring firms are higher in 
cross-border and diversification deals, which is consistent with the results of univariate tests. 
In addition, abnormal returns for acquirers are negatively related to runup.79 
However, as noted in section 4.3.3, there are variations across business segments of acquiring 
firms. For ship-owning acquirers, the coefficients of cross-border and cash-financed are 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. On the other hand, 
the coefficient of acquirer asset is negative and significant at the 1% level. The significance of 
coefficients of acquirer asset remain robust after controlling market-to-book ratio and deal 
value. The negative coefficient of runup also holds for ship-owning acquirers. In the shipping 
service segment, acquirer CAR is positively related to diversification deals, but negatively  
                                                          
78 Although acquirer size (market capitalisation four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement) is also found to be 
negatively associated with acquirer abnormal return in the previous sections, either acquirer total asset or acquirer size have 
to be chosen due to the concern for multicollinearity. The correlation between the two size-related factors is 79.4% (79.5%) in 
the all sample (M&C sample). I select acquirer asset as an explanatory variable due to the much larger number of observations. 
In addition, there is no significant difference in the results of multivariate regression estimations when I perform the tests with 
acquirer size. 
79 The negative relation between pre-announcement run-up in the stock price of acquiring firms and announcement returns 
implies that the possibility of information leakage is not serious since the event study analysis generally assumes that abnormal 
returns prior to the announcement is evidence of information leakage in the pre-announcement period.  
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Table 4.19 Acquirer Return Regression 
This table reports OLS regression estimates of acquirer abnormal returns on the size of acquirer assets and other deal- and firm-specific characteristics. Acquirer return is the five-day cumulative abnormal returns 
calculated by adding the market-adjusted returns for days t-2 to t+2, where t is the acquisition announcement day. Abnormal returns are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. CROSS-BORDER, CASH, STOCK 
and PUBLIC TARGET are indicator variables that take the value of one for acquisitions with different nationalities of acquirers and targets, pure cash financing, pure stock financing and publicly listed targets, respectively. 
DIVERSIFICATION is an indicator variable that takes the value of one when the acquirer and targets are in different segments among ship-owning, shipping services and others, and zero otherwise. lnA ASSET is the 
logarithm of acquirer total assets at the year-end prior to the deal announcement. lnA MTB is the logarithm of the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer four weeks prior to the deal announcement and winsorised at the top 
and bottom 1% levels. lnDEAL VALUE is the logarithm of the transaction value. HIVAL is an indicator variable that takes the value of one when acquisitions occur in a high valuation market using the de-trended 
monthly price-earnings ratio of the S&P500 index. RUNUP is the cumulative stock price returns of the acquirer over the year prior to the deal announcement. p-values are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
    
All 
Acquirers 
  
Ship-Owning 
Acquirers 
  
Shipping Service 
Acquirers 
  
Other 
Acquirers 
  1990–2001   2002–2008   2009–2014 
                                    
Panel A : All Sample                                                                   
                                    
CROSS-BORDER  0.012 ** 0.007  0.018 ** 0.018  0.006  -0.005  0.008  0.016  0.011  0.002  0.014  -0.004  0.011  0.018  
  (0.032)  (0.436)  (0.019)  (0.142)  (0.526)  (0.728)  (0.527)  (0.462)  (0.211)  (0.926)  (0.147)  (0.758)  (0.280)  (0.210)  
CASH  0.002  0.001  0.014  0.014  -0.009  -0.017  -0.018  -0.027  -0.006  -0.007  0.006  0.002  0.003  -0.005  
  (0.731)  (0.947)  (0.126)  (0.274)  (0.488)  (0.264)  (0.230)  (0.186)  (0.632)  (0.748)  (0.627)  (0.890)  (0.829)  (0.734)  
STOCK  0.013  0.002  0.015  0.020  -0.009  -0.077 ***  0.052 ** 0.042  0.034 * -0.026  0.001  0.011  0.006  0.002  
  (0.241)  (0.877)  (0.352)  (0.298)  (0.693)  (0.005)  (0.023)  (0.150)  (0.090)  (0.416)  (0.956)  (0.585)  (0.753)  (0.921)  
PUBLIC TARGET  -0.006  -0.008  -0.013  -0.011  0.010  0.025  -0.008  -0.011  -0.009  0.009  -0.019  -0.025  0.014  0.015  
  (0.419)  (0.465)  (0.198)  (0.478)  (0.614)  (0.336)  (0.577)  (0.641)  (0.418)  (0.743)  (0.191)  (0.110)  (0.353)  (0.428)  
DIVERSIFICATION 0.009  0.008  0.006  -0.007  0.014  0.017       0.008  -0.012  0.023 ** 0.028 *  -0.007  -0.002  
  (0.146)  (0.414)  (0.441)  (0.609)  (0.205)  (0.287)       (0.469)  (0.661)  (0.030)  (0.051)  (0.545)  (0.882)  
lnA ASSET  -0.009 *** -0.014 ***  -0.010 *** -0.015 ***  -0.011 *** -0.016 ***  -0.003  -0.011 ***  -0.005 * -0.014 **  -0.008 *** -0.011 ***  -0.013 *** -0.016 *** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.189)  (0.007)  (0.058)  (0.023)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
lnAMTB    -0.005 *    -0.007 *    -0.019 ***    0.010 *    0.026 **    -0.015 ***    0.013 ** 
    (0.082)    (0.094)    (0.007)    (0.074)    (0.010)    (0.000)    (0.027)  
lnDEALVALUE    0.004 *    0.001    0.006 *    0.005    -0.001    0.007 **    -0.001  
    (0.054)    (0.692)    (0.056)    (0.300)    (0.794)    (0.010)    (0.795)  
HIVAL    -0.002    -0.014    -0.007    0.006    0.010    -0.010    -0.007  
    (0.795)    (0.299)    (0.652)    (0.779)    (0.609)    (0.434)    (0.662)  
RUNUP    -0.035 ***    -0.044 ***    0.014    -0.076 ***    -0.057 **    -0.028 **    -0.056 *** 
    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.392)    (0.000)    (0.010)    (0.022)    (0.000)  
C  0.058 *** 0.095 ***  0.072 *** 0.130 ***  0.079 *** 0.106 ***  0.029  0.056  0.033  0.086  0.042 ** 0.052 *  0.108 *** 0.158 *** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.006)  (0.169)  (0.206)  (0.190)  (0.195)  (0.048)  (0.086)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
                                    
Obs.  1,226  531  607  259  408  171  211  101  378  66  459  227  389  238  
Adj. R2  0.046  0.114  0.057  0.150  0.067  0.182  0.064  0.335  0.023  0.311  0.050  0.203  0.094  0.161  
Time-Fixed  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   No  No   No  No   No  No  
Industry-Fixed  Yes  Yes   No  No   No  No   No  No   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
                                                                        
Panel B: M&C Sample                                                                   
                                    
CROSS-BORDER  0.016 ** 0.011  0.027 *** 0.017  0.009  -0.005  0.002  0.013  0.023 * -0.023  0.019  0.010  0.010  0.014  
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All 
Acquirers 
  
Ship-Owning 
Acquirers 
  
Shipping Service 
Acquirers 
  
Other 
Acquirers 
  1990–2001   2002–2008   2009–2014 
                                    
  (0.023)  (0.350)  (0.005)  (0.311)  (0.459)  (0.818)  (0.901)  (0.718)  (0.062)  (0.404)  (0.110)  (0.555)  (0.444)  (0.468)  
CASH  0.007  0.002  0.031 ** 0.023  -0.009  -0.022  -0.031  -0.041  0.005  0.000  0.015  0.008  0.005  -0.008  
  (0.423)  (0.880)  (0.013)  (0.173)  (0.555)  (0.265)  (0.224)  (0.275)  (0.755)  (0.991)  (0.319)  (0.657)  (0.744)  (0.691)  
STOCK  0.017  -0.006  0.019  0.011  0.010  -0.071 **  0.046  0.028  0.069 *** 0.003  -0.008  -0.011  0.008  -0.001  
  (0.208)  (0.757)  (0.294)  (0.633)  (0.718)  (0.044)  (0.148)  (0.538)  (0.005)  (0.936)  (0.743)  (0.683)  (0.729)  (0.965)  
PUBLIC TARGET  -0.006  -0.007  -0.019  -0.021  -0.007  0.017  -0.008  0.001  -0.029  0.005  -0.008  -0.034  0.019  0.016  
  (0.601)  (0.676)  (0.190)  (0.313)  (0.811)  (0.685)  (0.811)  (0.980)  (0.112)  (0.876)  (0.723)  (0.204)  (0.393)  (0.559)  
DIVERSIFICATION 0.012  0.016  0.005  -0.007  0.028 ** 0.025       0.009  0.023  0.023 * 0.037 *  0.003  0.007  
  (0.116)  (0.243)  (0.584)  (0.689)  (0.046)  (0.247)       (0.542)  (0.551)  (0.085)  (0.059)  (0.853)  (0.748)  
lnAASSET  -0.010 *** -0.017 ***  -0.011 *** -0.015 ***  -0.010 *** -0.010  -0.004  -0.015 *  -0.009 *** -0.004  -0.009 *** -0.014 ***  -0.011 *** -0.015 *** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.114)  (0.291)  (0.051)  (0.006)  (0.746)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.000)  (0.003)  
lnAMTB    -0.007    -0.010 *    -0.021 **    0.010    0.042 ***    -0.016 ***    0.014  
    (0.100)    (0.055)    (0.021)    (0.265)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.113)  
lnDEALVALUE    0.004    0.001    0.004    0.005    0.002    0.004    0.000  
    (0.103)    (0.836)    (0.384)    (0.531)    (0.757)    (0.256)    (0.975)  
HIVAL    0.014    0.008    0.008    0.031    0.014    0.021    0.002  
    (0.282)    (0.668)    (0.712)    (0.403)    (0.521)    (0.285)    (0.932)  
RUNUP    -0.026 **    -0.032 *    0.026    -0.098 ***    -0.086 **    -0.014    -0.048 *** 
    (0.024)    (0.050)    (0.261)    (0.001)    (0.021)    (0.438)    (0.006)  
C  0.065 *** 0.100 ***  0.074 *** 0.127 ***  0.074 *** 0.079  0.039  0.041  0.062 * -0.033  0.052 * 0.047  0.102 *** 0.161 *** 
  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.131)  (0.225)  (0.585)  (0.058)  (0.721)  (0.052)  (0.263)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
                                    
Obs.  817  339  392  163  305  121  120  55  234  45  313  139  270  155  
Adj. R2  0.051  0.109  0.097  0.203  0.067  0.195  0.073  0.414  0.070  0.385  0.063  0.294  0.093  0.167  
Time-Fixed  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   No  No   No  No   No  No  
Industry-Fixed   Yes   Yes     No   No     No   No     No   No     Yes   Yes     Yes   Yes     Yes   Yes   
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related to acquirer asset (see Panel B). Interestingly, stock financing is found to affect abnormal 
returns to acquiring firms negatively in this segment. Consistent with Alexandridis et al. (2013), 
I find the negative and significant coefficient of the deal size. For acquirers in the other segment, 
the negative impact of runup is significant in both samples. 
The negative impact of acquirer asset on CARs to acquirers is robust across different periods. 
Except in the specification of controlling acquirer valuation and deal size in the 1990–2001 
period (in the M&C sample), the coefficient of acquirer asset is negative and significant at the 
1% level. On the other hand, the significance of other explanatory variables (cross-border, 
stock financing, acquirer valuation) are not robust across different specifications or shipping 
market cycles. 
Finally, Table 4.20 reports the OLS regression results where the dependent variable is the five-
day abnormal returns to targets.80 Similar to the patterns in multivariate regressions for acquirer 
CARs, the direction of sign and significance vary across business segments and periods for 
target CARs. Specifically, no significant patterns in the relation between target CARs and 
independent variables are found in the M&C sample. Accordingly, discussion in this section is 
based on the results for the overall sample. It is found that target CARs are positively associated 
with CASH (when the deal is paid 100% in cash), but negatively with DIVERSIFICATION 
(when the acquirer and target are involved in different business segments) and TASSET (the 
size of the target’s total assets). The impact of cash payment and diversification is largely 
driven by target firms in the ship-owning segment, while the negative association between 
target CARs and assets is attributable to target firms in the shipping services segment. 
                                                          
80 Due to the low number of observations, the regression result for Other Targets in the M&C sample is not reported here.  
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Table 4.20 Target Return Regression 
This table reports OLS regression estimates of target abnormal returns on the size of target assets and other deal- and firm-specific characteristics. Target returns are the five-day cumulative abnormal returns calculated 
by adding the market-adjusted returns for days t-2 to t+2, where t is the acquisition announcement day. Abnormal returns are winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. CROSS-BORDER, CASH and STOCK are 
indicator variables that take the value of one for acquisitions with different nationalities of acquirers and targets, pure cash financing and pure stock financing, respectively. DIVERSIFICATION is an indicator variable 
that takes the value of one when the acquirer and targets in the different segments among ship-owning, shipping services and others, and zero otherwise. lnTASSET is the logarithm of target total assets at the year-end 
prior to the deal announcement. lnTMTB is the logarithm of the market-to-book ratio of the target four weeks prior to the deal announcement and winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. p-values are reported in 
brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
    
All 
Targets 
  
Shipping 
Targets 
  
Shipping Service 
Targets 
  
Other 
Targets 
  1990–2001   2002–2008   2009–2014 
                                    
Panel A: All Sample                                                                   
                                    
CROSS-BORDER  0.026 * 0.026   0.019  0.007   0.049  0.061   -0.025  0.014   0.019  0.005   0.009  0.008   0.063 * 0.070 * 
  (0.064)  (0.137)   (0.249)  (0.752)   (0.146)  (0.120)   (0.663)  (0.790)   (0.405)  (0.902)   (0.602)  (0.703)   (0.091)  (0.075)  
CASH  0.049 *** 0.049 ***  0.059 *** 0.052 **  0.033  0.042   -0.032  -0.072 *  0.038 * 0.017   0.055 *** 0.062 ***  0.046  0.033  
  (0.000)  (0.003)   (0.000)  (0.010)   (0.282)  (0.227)   (0.562)  (0.089)   (0.081)  (0.652)   (0.003)  (0.002)   (0.152)  (0.314)  
STOCK  -0.047  -0.039   -0.031  -0.017   -0.046  0.081   -0.420 ** -0.374 ***  -0.086  -0.029   -0.070  -0.042   0.022  0.002  
  (0.196)  (0.372)   (0.423)  (0.716)   (0.723)  (0.571)   (0.016)  (0.004)   (0.115)  (0.719)   (0.174)  (0.464)   (0.807)  (0.984)  
DIVERSIFICATION  -0.028 ** -0.036 **  -0.037 ** -0.051 **  0.004  0.012        -0.010  -0.023   -0.043 ** -0.042 **  -0.034  -0.042  
  (0.048)  (0.040)   (0.019)  (0.012)   (0.892)  (0.744)        (0.669)  (0.568)   (0.018)  (0.036)   (0.307)  (0.218)  
lnTASSET  -0.015 *** -0.013 **  -0.008  -0.009   -0.029 *** -0.026 **  -0.037 ** -0.015   -0.007  0.000   -0.006  -0.005   -0.036 *** -0.025 ** 
  (0.001)  (0.027)   (0.123)  (0.239)   (0.007)  (0.033)   (0.011)  (0.193)   (0.283)  (0.998)   (0.327)  (0.515)   (0.001)  (0.033)  
lnTMTB    -0.005     0.001     -0.034 ***    0.025     -0.036 ***    -0.003     0.007  
    (0.319)     (0.926)     (0.005)     (0.136)     (0.004)     (0.657)     (0.482)  
C  0.157 *** 0.141 **  0.105 *** 0.161 ***  0.216 *** 0.146 *  0.350 *** 0.195 *  0.130 ** 0.039   0.103 * 0.085   0.271 *** 0.227 ** 
  (0.000)  (0.010)   (0.003)  (0.003)   (0.001)  (0.060)   (0.001)  (0.061)   (0.026)  (0.745)   (0.078)  (0.183)   (0.008)  (0.029)  
                                    
Obs.  588  411   422  285   131  103   35  23   220  88   199  170   169  153  
Adj. R2  0.063  0.069   0.060  0.077   0.075  0.158   0.315  0.527   0.041  0.142   0.099  0.104   0.116  0.110  
Time-Fixed  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   No  No   No  No   No  No  
Industry-Fixed  Yes  Yes   No  No   No  No   No  No   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
                                                                       
Panel B: M&C Sample                                                                  
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All 
Targets 
  
Shipping 
Targets 
  
Shipping Service 
Targets 
  
Other 
Targets 
  1990–2001   2002–2008   2009–2014 
                                    
                                    
CROSS-BORDER  0.070 ** 0.049   0.053  0.010   0.108  0.079   0.025     0.032  -0.048   0.009  0.012   0.194 ** 0.158 * 
  (0.018)  (0.135)   (0.110)  (0.806)   (0.141)  (0.292)   (0.773)     (0.532)  (0.599)   (0.781)  (0.711)   (0.016)  (0.057)  
CASH  0.008  0.024   0.002  0.002   0.063  0.086   -0.204 **    -0.026  -0.066   0.047  0.063 *  -0.023  -0.023  
  (0.778)  (0.431)   (0.938)  (0.953)   (0.389)  (0.209)   (0.032)     (0.601)  (0.476)   (0.136)  (0.050)   (0.715)  (0.707)  
STOCK  -0.128 ** -0.097   -0.107 ** -0.076   -0.266  0.021   -0.780 ***    -0.193 ** -0.105   -0.103 * -0.066   -0.112  -0.111  
  (0.016)  (0.102)   (0.049)  (0.234)   (0.262)  (0.929)   (0.001)     (0.034)  (0.464)   (0.084)  (0.289)   (0.370)  (0.424)  
DIVERSIFICATION  -0.036  -0.061 *  -0.040  -0.069 *  -0.046  -0.044        0.079  0.065   -0.093 *** -0.080 **  -0.103  -0.114 * 
  (0.215)  (0.055)   (0.223)  (0.065)   (0.500)  (0.524)        (0.152)  (0.477)   (0.005)  (0.015)   (0.133)  (0.097)  
lnTASSET  -0.010  -0.011   0.008  0.006   -0.055 ** -0.050 **  -0.027     -0.004  -0.015   0.008  0.005   -0.016  -0.021  
  (0.260)  (0.295)   (0.426)  (0.613)   (0.029)  (0.037)   (0.286)     (0.818)  (0.578)   (0.424)  (0.635)   (0.537)  (0.440)  
lnTMTB    -0.028 **    -0.014     -0.069 **         -0.030     -0.001     -0.039 * 
    (0.020)     (0.347)     (0.012)          (0.407)     (0.930)     (0.080)  
C  0.243 *** 0.189 *  0.065  0.143   0.453 *** 0.351 **  0.667 ***    0.267 ** 0.106   -0.019  -0.029   0.305 * 0.375  
  (0.003)  (0.055)   (0.358)  (0.128)   (0.004)  (0.030)   (0.001)     (0.042)  (0.687)   (0.877)  (0.821)   (0.084)  (0.043)  
                                    
Obs.  202  159   147  113   43  37   12     68  34   76  71   58  54  
Adj. R2  0.100  0.134   0.073  0.083   0.228  0.442   0.936     0.176  0.208   0.225  0.227   0.258  0.298  
Time-Fixed  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes   Yes    No  No   No  No   No  No  
Industry-Fixed   Yes   Yes     No  No    No  No    No      Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  
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4.4. Summary of Chapter 
In this chapter, I investigate the value creation effect of M&As in the shipping industry. Using 
an extensive sample of shipping M&A deals occurring during 1990–2014, I examine abnormal 
returns to acquiring and target firms across different business sectors, periods and transaction 
types. Overall, the results indicate that both acquiring and target firms in the shipping industry 
achieve positive and significant abnormal returns from M&A transactions, though a much 
larger part of gains from consolidation is captured by target firms. On average, the five-day 
CARs to acquirers and targets are 1.6% and 7.6%. Specifically, the positive acquirer gain in 
shipping M&As conflicts considerably with evidence in the general M&A literature. In the 
review of empirical evidence on gains from M&As, Bruner (2002) concludes that abnormal 
returns to bidders is not significant despite some exceptions. However, the finding of positive 
and significant abnormal return to acquiring firms in this paper is consistent with evidence in 
the existing shipping M&A studies. 
This study reveals several interesting observations concerning the relations between abnormal 
return and deal- and firm-specific factors in shipping M&As, some of which are consistent with 
evidence in the previous M&A literature, while others are believed to be specific to the shipping 
industry. Although the findings are based on univariate analysis, and not strongly confirmed in 
multivariate analysis, they offer fruitful avenues for future research. First, the results indicate 
that acquirer gain is positive when targets are non-publicly listed companies. Specifically, 
consistent with the finding in Chang (1998), the higher CAR to acquirer in acquisitions of 
private targets is noticeable in stock-financed deals. However, there is an observation that 
acquiring firms realise positive gains with statistical significance, even in acquisitions of 
publicly listed targets that have broadly been regarded as value-destroying deals in the previous 
M&A literature. Second, cross-border deals outperform domestic deals for both acquirers and 
targets, confirming that shipping is truly an international industry. Third, CARs to acquirers 
and targets are positive in both cash and equity offers. This finding differs from general findings 
in the previous M&A literature. Specifically, the positive abnormal return to acquirers in stock-
financed deals is statistically significant and numerically higher than acquirer CARs in cash 
offers. The higher acquirer gain is found to be largely driven by acquisitions of non-public 
targets. Fourth, market valuations generally fail to account for abnormal return to acquirers and 
targets. Only the negative association between target CAR and target valuation is found in deals 
between publicly listed acquirers and targets. Fifth, CAR to acquiring firms is negatively 
related to size-related factors of acquirers (market size and total asset). Sixth, target abnormal 
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return is positively associated with size-related factors of acquirers, but negatively with those 
of targets.  
Furthermore, the segment analysis reveals variations in abnormal returns to acquirers and 
targets according to business segments. Acquiring firms generally achieve higher gains from 
diversification deals, while targets realise higher gains from horizontal deals. Additionally, the 
outperformance of cross-border deals is salient among ship-owning acquirers, while abnormal 
returns for other types of acquirers in cross-border deals are not significant or are lower than 
those in domestic deals. Consistent with evidence in the existing M&A studies, I find that cash 
offers create more value for acquirers in horizontal deals in the ship-owning and shipping 
service segments, although the mean difference from equity offers is not significant. Acquirer 
MTB is positively associated with acquirer CAR in horizontal deals, but negatively in 
diversification deals in the ship-owning segment. The negative association between target 
MTB and target CAR is also found in horizontal deals in the ship-owning segment and non-
shipping bidders’ acquisitions of ship-owning targets. 
Overall, the findings in this chapter suggest that shipping M&As are mutually beneficial for 
both acquiring and target firms and are positively perceived in the stock market. In addition, I 
also highlight variations in acquisition gains according to deal characteristics (method of 
payment, nationality mix, public status) and business segments of involved firms.  
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5.  CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHUR RESEARCH 
5.1.  Summary of Findings and Conclusions 
This thesis offers an exhaustive insight on investment, financing and M&A activity in the 
shipping industry from various perspectives ranging from the evolution of research 
contributions to empirical evidence on deal and firm characteristics and the value creation 
effect. For this purpose, Chapter 2 examines how progress has been made in research on 
shipping finance and investment (including M&As). While profound changes in the business 
practice of shipping finance and investment since the 1990s have triggered a voluminous body 
of research in this area, to date, there have been no attempts to present comprehensive review 
of published academic achievements. However, in sharp contrast, a great deal of academic 
interest has addressed theoretical development, conceptualisation and future research 
directions in areas relevant to transportation. Accordingly, this chapter aims to fill the research 
gap by analysing 137 scholarly articles published in 43 academic journals during 1979–2017. 
From the findings in the bibliometric section, it is obvious that the shipping finance and 
investment literature has gradually expanded its academic focus to address contemporary issues 
in the shipping industry, including alternative funding sources, investment valuation, corporate 
governance and risk management. Research development on the topic of business 
consolidation in the maritime spectrum has also been remarkable, mainly focussing on 
announcement returns in M&As. Furthermore, a comprehensive synthesis of research findings 
on shipping finance and investment has offered an invaluable source of information for both 
academic researchers and shipping practitioners. As indicated in the synthesis of research 
findings, shipping financial management is largely influenced by industry-specific 
characteristics. Thus, managers of shipping companies need to understand the potential 
associations between those factors for better investment and financing decision making. In 
addition, the future research agendas that this chapter highlights based on the critical discussion 
can serve as a stepping stone for researchers in this area.  
Chapter 3 illustrates consolidation activity in the shipping industry over the last few decades, 
and several interesting characteristics are highlighted. The review of research developments in 
the area of shipping finance and investment indicates that, despite increasing academic 
attention paid to shipping M&As since the 2000s, business consolidation activity in the 
shipping industry remains largely unmapped. Specifically, while most extant shipping business 
consolidation studies have focussed on M&A motivations and the value creation effects in 
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horizontal transactions in some specific segments in the shipping (e.g. liner and port) and 
related transportation (e.g. logistics service providers) industries, they have been less likely to 
consider other key aspects of acquisition activity, such as takeover premiums and M&A 
financing. Moreover, the sample selection criteria employed in previous shipping M&A 
research have been found to be problematic due to ambiguity in their categorisation of various 
sub-sectors within the shipping industry and the inclusion of irrelevant acquirers and targets. 
Using a dataset of 2,261 carefully selected M&A transactions in the shipping industry during 
1990–2014, Chapter 3 provides a clear-cut categorisation of constituent firms by business areas 
consisting of three broad sectors and 11 sub-sectors. The findings in Chapter 3 shed light on 
several important aspects in shipping M&As that have remained largely under-explored in the 
previous literature devoted to business consolidation in the shipping industry. The analysis on 
business areas reveals that while intra-segmental deals in the liner ship-owning, port and 
logistics segments are major pillars of shipping M&A activity, other types of transactions, such 
as vertical integration between transportation service providers across different supply chain 
sectors, diversification towards non-shipping areas and participation of financial and industrial 
acquirers, are also noticeable. Moreover, Chapter 3 presents several deal and firm 
characteristics that outline shipping M&A activity. First, cross-border transactions are more 
frequently carried out in shipping than in other industries. Second, while Europe has been the 
major M&A market for shipping companies, the share of the Asian region is growing 
significantly. Finally, the vast majority of shipping M&A deals are paid with cash. 
In addition, Chapter 3 examines the determinants of acquisition premiums. The results indicate 
that the size and valuation of target firms comprise the main drivers of premiums paid in 
shipping M&As. Specifically, while the prediction regarding the relation between target size 
and premium is rather conflicting, the results document that acquisition premium is negatively 
associated with target size in shipping M&As, which is consistent with the findings in 
Alexandridis et al. (2013). In addition, the negative relation between premium and target 
valuation reported in Chapter 3 provides empirical support for the mis-valuation hypothesis 
(Dong et al., 2006; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). Chapter 3 further investigates M&A payment 
choice in the shipping industry. Since financing mix in the business consolidation has a 
significant impact on post-merger capital structure and corporate governance, previous studies 
have suggested a variety of explanations for the choice of payment method. Chapter 3 examines 
the impact of the concern for corporate control loss, debt-raising and financial distress costs, 
and information asymmetry between constituent firms. Supporting the theoretical prediction of 
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Hansen (1987) that an increase in information asymmetry leads to the acquirers’ choice of 
stock-for-stock exchange, the results indicate that the use of cash is negatively associated with 
the level of the deal size. In addition, larger acquirers generally prefer cash financing due to 
their relatively lower level of financial constraints. The findings of Chapter 3 commonly 
suggest that managers of shipping companies should pay particular attention to the deal 
structuring process. Since post-merger integration requires the time-consuming and costly task 
of combining physical assets, the managerial system and the corporate culture of constituent 
firms, the deal structuring process should ensure that the inherent risks are clearly considered 
and that acquisition gains are properly shared between acquiring and target firms through the 
choice of financing mix and the size of the offer premium.  
Chapter 4 provides empirical evidence concerning the value creation effect in shipping M&As. 
Despite the assumption that the rationale behind business consolidation is firm value 
maximisation through synergistic gain, the general conclusion in the corporate finance 
literature is that M&As tend to be value destroying for acquirers, while the vast majority of 
gains created around the deal announcement is captured by target firms. Contrary to this 
phenomenon, most shipping and transportation M&A studies report significantly positive 
CARs for acquirers, though much larger gains are still channelled to targets (Alexandrou et al., 
2014; Andreou et al., 2012; Darkow et al., 2008; Panayides and Gong, 2002; Samitas and 
Kenourgios, 2007). However, as discussed in Chapter 3, the samples used in those studies fail 
to provide a detailed categorisation of various segments within the shipping industry or else 
include (exclude) irrelevant (shipping-related) transactions. Accordingly, taking advantage of 
the carefully selected dataset, Chapter 4 investigates the value creation effect for acquiring and 
target firms and variations in abnormal returns by business areas and deal- and firm-specific 
factors. 
Consistent with the findings in the previous studies on shipping business consolidation, the 
results in Chapter 4 indicate that the five-day CARs for both acquiring and target firms are 
positive in shipping M&As. With a few exceptions in the liner or diversified segments, 
acquirers and targets in most segments achieve positive gains. The segment analysis finds that 
bidders generally achieve more gains in acquisitions of targets in different segments, while 
horizontal deals are more value enhancing for targets. Furthermore, CARs by deal and firm 
characteristics also demonstrate variations, some of which are distinct from previous evidence 
in the general corporate finance literature, while others are consistent. First, despite the 
outperformance of acquisitions of non-publicly listed targets (Chang, 1998), acquirers still 
 
 
173 
 
achieve significantly positive abnormal returns when targets are publicly listed firms, which 
largely tends to be value destroying. Second, given the importance of the global network 
facilitating efficient and cost-effective supply chain management, cross-border deals 
outperform domestic deals for both acquiring and target firms. Third, distinct from previous 
evidence (e.g. Travlos, 1987), stock-financed deals create positive abnormal returns for 
acquirers, and the acquirer CARs in stock-to-stock exchange are numerically higher than those 
in cash offers. Finally, consistent with the hubris hypothesis (Moeller et al., 2004), acquirer 
gains are negatively associated with firm size. 
Chapter 4 also documents variations in acquisition gains by business areas of involved firms. 
First, while CARs to acquiring firms are positively associated with diversification deals, target 
firm achieve higher gains in horizontal transactions. Second, ship-owning acquirers realise 
significantly higher acquisition gains in cross-border deals than in domestic transactions. 
Finally, CARs to ship-owning and non-shipping acquirers are negatively associated with firm 
valuation of shipping targets. Based on the findings in Chapter 4, it can be argued that M&A 
activity in the shipping industry is value enhancing for combined entities, and that the impact 
of the value creation drivers can be altered by some industrial or sector-specific characteristics. 
Shipping companies seeking inorganic growth through M&As should be aware of those 
associations from their engagement in the cultivation and integration process. 
Overall, this thesis revisits previous evidence on business consolidation and offers valuable 
insights into the characteristics and value creation effect in the shipping M&A activity. By 
highlighting several shipping-specific features in terms of business areas, the payment method, 
nationality mix, premium, firm size and valuations in shipping M&As, the findings in this 
thesis extend the understanding of the market for corporate takeover. 
 
5.2. Suggestions for Further Research 
Despite several important contributions, the findings in this thesis can be extended and further 
developed for a better understanding of M&As in the shipping industry. Accordingly, this 
section sets potential fruitful avenues for future research. 
First of all, evidence concerning the choice of payment method in shipping M&As in Chapter 
3 can be further investigated by highlighting the impact of pre-merger corporate ownership of 
constituent firms on post-merger corporate control. According to Stulz (1988), acquirers with 
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concentrated ownership tend to choose cash financing, since the corporate control of major 
shareholders is threatened in stock-to-stock exchange. However, it is likely that the association 
between the choice of cash and the voting rights of major shareholders is non-linear, as the 
desire to maintain corporate control is not strong when the ownership of acquiring firms is 
already well diffused or the dominant position is not affected by stock-financed deals. In line 
with this argument, Faccio and Masulis (2005) report that an acquirer’s tendency to choose 
cash financing is particularly significant when the controlling shareholders’ voting right is in 
the range of 20–60%. Similarly, Martin (1996) document the positive association between the 
use of cash and management ownership at an intermediate level between 5% and 25%. 
Furthermore, the likelihood of cash financing to avoid loss of corporate control is also affected 
by the pre-merger ownership structure of target firms. When a target is controlled by a small 
number of dominant shareholders, stock-to-stock exchange can result in creating additional 
block-holders, which is likely to threaten the voting power of major shareholders of acquiring 
firms. Thus, future research can offer valuable insight into M&A financing in the shipping 
industry by investigating how the choice of payment method is affected by the possibility of 
corporate control loss by incorporating pre-merger ownership of acquiring and target firms. 
Second, the result of the positive gains for both acquiring and target firms in Chapter 4 can be 
further developed to examine takeover motives in the shipping industry. While motivations for 
takeover are broadly categorised into synergy, hubris and agency problem, previous literature 
on the value creation effect in M&As suggests that those motivations can be distinguished by 
examining the associations between gains for the acquirer, target and combined firms. 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) propose a set of correlations between the gains to separate 
the different motives. Specifically, M&As driven by synergistic motive are value enhancing, 
and the positive gains created from the deals are channelled into both acquiring and target firms 
(Bradley et al., 1988; Seth et al., 2000). Thus, gains for targets are positively associated with 
those for acquirers and combined firms. When acquisitions are motivated by managers’ over-
estimation of potential synergies (hubris), there are zero gains and those deals are nothing more 
than a transfer of wealth from acquirers to targets (Roll, 1986). Accordingly, gains for targets 
are negatively associated with those for acquirers. Since hubris-driven deals fail to create 
additional gains, there is no correlation between target and total gains. Finally, if acquisitions 
are driven by agency motives, self-interested managers of acquiring firms tend to maximise 
their own wealth at the expense of their shareholders (Jensen, 1986). As a consequence, M&As 
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are value destroying and gains for targets are negatively associated with those for the acquirer 
and combined firms. 
While the general conclusion of this thesis indicates that shipping M&As are motivated by 
synergy gains, based on the finding that both acquiring and target firms achieve positive 
abnormal returns around the announcement date, most of extant studies point out that motives 
for takeovers can exist concurrently (Bradley et al., 1988; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Seth 
et al., 2000). For instance, Hodgkinson and Partington (2008) argue that the agency motive 
could exist even in deals with positive gains for both acquiring and targets firms when there 
are some synergistic by-products. Thus, future research can offer further insight into the value 
creation effect by investigating takeover motivations in shipping M&As. 
Third, pertaining to the above point, future research can address the potential association 
between acquisition gains and evolution in the corporate governance of shipping companies, 
which is especially under-explored. As reviewed in Chapter 2, the transformation of shipping 
companies from family-owned to corporate entities questions the impact of corporate 
governance on firm performance in the shipping industry, traditionally labelled as conservative. 
Given that acquisitions are regarded as investment projects seeking to complement organic 
growth, it can be conjectured that there exist variations in abnormal returns by attributes and 
quality of corporate governance among shipping companies, as reported in Andreou et al. 
(2014) that board size, presence of governance committee and busy directors are negatively 
associated with over-investment problem. Alexandridis et al. (2017a) find that hubris in large-
size deals, which previously tend to be value destroying (Malmendier and Tate, 2008), has 
diminished during the post-2008 period, and positive abnormal returns for acquiring firms are 
largely attributed to improvements in corporate governance quality. Accordingly, research on 
this topic can offer valuable contributions to the areas of both corporate governance and 
business consolidation alike. 
Finally, another interesting extension of this thesis is to investigate the impact of horizontal 
consolidation on the market structure and the potential anti-competition effect in the shipping 
industry. Since business consolidation could result in market concentration and, as a 
consequence, adverse price effects (i.e. price increase from collusion), M&As have been under 
intense scrutiny by anti-trust authorities. Notable examples in the shipping industry are the 
rejections of the P3 Network, a strategic alliance of the three largest liner operators (Maersk 
Line, MSC and CMA CGM) by the Chinese government in 2014, and the Ocean Network 
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Express, a consolidation of the liner segments of three major Japanese shipping companies 
(NYK, MOL and K-Line) by the US Federal Maritime Commission in 2017. 
However, the anti-competition effects from business consolidation remain a matter of on-going 
debate with two conflicting views. The traditional view of structure-conduct-performance 
(SCP) emphasises reductions in competition and collusions in an oligopolistic or oligopsonistic 
market (e.g. Bain, 1951). By contrast, the efficiency structure hypothesis argues that market 
concentration is an outcome of better performance of efficient participants (e.g. Demsetz, 1973). 
Thus, it is important to examine the relation between concentration following M&As and 
contestability in the shipping market. While Sys (2009) and Luo et al. (2014) find consolidation 
to fuel concentration in the liner segment, Lam et al. (2007) highlights that the container 
shipping market still remains contestable. However, the finding in Merikas et al. (2014) that 
increase in market concentration positively influences spot freight rates in the VLCC tanker 
sector allegedly suggests the collusive pricing. Accordingly, it is necessary to analyse how 
M&As affect competition and contestability in the shipping market more comprehensively. 
A promising direction for this topic may be the investigation of the abnormal returns of rival 
firms around the announcement date. Since the early works of Eckbo (1983) and Stillman (1983) 
rejecting the collusive pricing effect based on the finding that rivals earn positive abnormal 
returns on merger announcements, but negative on anti-trust complaints, there have been a 
plethora of alternative explanations, such as the ‘acquisition probability hypothesis’ (Song and 
Walkling, 2000) and the ‘future growth hypothesis’ (Gaur et al., 2013) by taking advantage of 
rivals’ stock market reaction. Moreover, Fee and Thomas (2004) argue that sources of 
acquisition gains (e.g. collusion on price, efficiency gains) can be identified by examining the 
associations with abnormal returns of customer, supplier and rival firms upon announcement. 
Thus, by examining the rival’s reaction to the deal announcement, future research can provide 
evidence on sources of acquisition gains, market contestability and up- and down-stream 
effects in shipping M&As. 
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B. Tobit Estimation81 
In the estimation, the Tobit model is defined as follows: 
𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝛽′𝑥𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 
where 𝑦𝑖
∗ is the latent variable, 𝛽 is a 𝑛 × 1 vector of unknown parameters, 𝑥𝑖 is a 𝑛 × 1 vector 
of known constants and 𝑢𝑖 are residuals that are assumed to be normally distributed with zero 
mean and variance 𝜎2. Since the dependent variable is the share of cash in M&A currency, it 
has both left and right censoring points of 0 and 100, respectively; 
                                                         𝑦𝑖 = 𝐿1𝑖    if  𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝐿1𝑖 
                                                             = 𝑦𝑖
∗     if  𝐿1𝑖 < 𝑦𝑖
∗ < 𝐿2𝑖 
                                                             = 𝐿2𝑖      if  𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝐿2𝑖, 
where 𝐿1𝑖 (0) and 𝐿2𝑖 (100) are the lower and upper limits, respectively. 
The log likelihood function for estimation of the parameters 𝛽 and 𝜎 is given as: 
𝐿 (𝛽, 𝜎 𝑦𝑖, 𝑥𝑖, 𝐿1𝑖 , 𝐿2𝑖)
= ∑ log𝐹((𝐿1𝑖 − 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖) 𝜎⁄  )
𝑦𝑖=𝐿1𝑖
+ ∑ log𝑓((𝑦𝑖 − 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖) 𝜎⁄ )
𝐿1𝑖<𝑦𝑖<𝐿2𝑖
+ ∑ log (1 − 𝐹((𝐿2𝑖 − 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖) 𝜎⁄ ))
𝑦𝑖=𝐿2𝑖
, 
where 𝐹  and 𝑓  are cumulative distribution and density functions, respectively. Denoting 
Φ[(𝐿1𝑖 − 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖) 𝜎⁄ ] and Φ[(𝐿2𝑖 − 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖) 𝜎⁄ ] by Φ1𝑖 and Φ2𝑖, respectively, and correspondingly 
for 𝜙1𝑖 and 𝜙2𝑖, by definitions, the conditional expectation of 𝑦𝑖is 
𝐸 (𝑦𝑖 𝐿1𝑖 < 𝑦𝑖
∗ < 𝐿2𝑖) = 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖 +  𝜎
𝜙1𝑖 − 𝜙2𝑖
Φ2𝑖 − Φ1𝑖
 
In addition, the unconditional expectation of 𝑦𝑖 is 
𝐸(𝑦𝑖) = Φ1𝑖𝐿1𝑖 + 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖(Φ2𝑖 − Φ1𝑖) + 𝜎(𝜙1𝑖 − 𝜙2𝑖) + (1 − Φ2𝑖)𝐿2𝑖. 
 
                                                          
81 For more details of Tobit models, see Amemiya (1984) and Maddala (1986). 
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C. Logit Estimation82 
In the estimation, the logit model is defined as follows: 
𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝛽′𝑥𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 
where 𝑦𝑖
∗ is the latent variable, 𝛽 is a 𝑛 × 1 vector of unknown parameters, 𝑥𝑖 is a 𝑛 × 1 vector 
of known constants and 𝑢𝑖 are residuals that are assumed to be logistically distributed. Since 
the dependent variable is Cash when the share of cash is over 50% or not,  
                                        𝑦𝑖
∗ = 1    if  the share of cash is over 50% 
                                             = 0    otherwise 
The logistic function of any random variable 𝐹 is defined as: 
𝐹(𝑧𝑖) =
1
1 − 𝑒−𝑧𝑖
 
Denoting 𝑃𝑖  by the probability that 𝑦𝑖 = 1  (i.e. the share of cash is over 50%), the logit 
estimation would be 
𝑃𝑖 (𝑦𝑖 = 1 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖) = 𝐹(𝛽
′𝑥𝑖) =
1
1 − 𝑒−𝛽′𝑥𝑖
 
 
  
                                                          
82 For more details of logit models, see Brooks (2014). 
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D. Acquirer and Target Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Following Brown and Warner (1985), stock returns around the announcement date is estimated 
in a standard market model using OLS as following: 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡)  is the return of firm 𝑖  at time t, the announcement date, and 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the 
corresponding country’s Datastream value-weighted market index return. 
The market model parameters, ‘𝛼’ and ‘𝛽’, are estimated over one year prior to the deal 
announcement from trading day -255 to -6. The minimum observation length is required to be 
60 days. Cumulative abnormal returns over the event window [t1, t2] are calculated as following: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1,𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡1
 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) and 𝑡2 − 𝑡1 is the length of event window. 
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E. CAR to Target by Method of Payment 
CAR is the five-day cumulative abnormal return to target firm calculated by adding the market-adjusted return for days t-2 to t+2, where t is the acquisition 
announcement day. In order to calculate the daily return, the corresponding country’s Datastream value-weighted market index returns are used. Abnormal returns 
are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% levels. M&C means a subsample consisting of deals with post-announcement target ownership over 50%. Cross-border 
is a group of deals where the acquirer and target are located in different domiciles. Cash (Stock) is a group of deals financed with pure cash (stock) and 
Mixed/Others comprises all remaining others. The combined number of observations of the method of payment is less than that of all group as information on 
financing mix is available only for 815 deals. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Transaction 
Type 
    All Sample  M&C Sample 
   Cash Stock Mixed/Others (Cash - Stock)   Cash Stock Mixed/Others (Cash - Stock) 
                    
(1) Mean  13.4% *** 5.5% * 25.2% *** 7.9% **  15.3% *** 5.8% * 26.1% *** 9.6% ** 
 Median  7.0% *** 2.5%  22.8% ***    12.2% *** 5.7% * 24.6% ***   
 N  91  17  11     51  13  10    
                                        
(2) Mean  4.4% *               -     9.0%               -      0.6%               -     9.0%               -     
 Median  2.4%               -     9.0%     0.6%               -     9.0%    
  N   6                -      1        1                -      1      
                    
(3) Mean  7.5%               -     20.6% **               -      12.1%               -     20.6% **               -     
 Median  -0.6%               -     23.9% **    2.8%               -     23.9% **   
 N  11               -     3    5               -     3   
                                        
(4) Mean  12.3% *** 8.6% ** -0.3%  3.7%   22.3% *** 10.8% * -0.3%  11.5% ** 
 Median  4.3%  8.1% * 0.4%     28.2% *** 10.8% * 0.4%    
  N   22  3  3        11  2  3      
                    
(5) Mean  23.0% * 0.5%  16.0% * -15.4%   10.0%  0.5%  16.0% * -15.4%  
 Median  15.1%  0.5%  16.0% *    11.6% * 0.5%  16.0% *   
 N  4  2  2     3  2  2    
                                        
(6) Mean  13.8% * -23.1%  0.4%               -      18.0%  -23.1%  0.4%               -     
 Median  13.3% * -23.1%  0.4%     14.5%  -23.1%  0.4%    
  N   6  1  1        3  1  1      
                    
(7) Mean  6.6% *** -16.2%  1.7%               -      8.2% ** -16.2%  -1.3%               -     
 Median  1.8%  -16.2%  2.9% *    4.4%  -16.2%  -1.3%    
 N  79  1  6     23  1  1    
                                        
(8) Mean  12.8% ***              -     33.2%               -      17.7% **               -     33.2%               -     
 Median  5.3% *               -     33.2%     8.1%               -     33.2%    
  N   34                -      2        14                -      2      
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F. CARs and Acquirer Valuation by Transaction Type (Full) 
ACAR (TCAR) is the five-day cumulative abnormal return to acquirer (target) calculated by adding the market-adjusted return for days t-2 to t+2, where t is the 
acquisition announcement day. In order to calculate the daily return, the corresponding country’s Datastream value-weighted market index returns are used. 
Abnormal returns are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% levels. A MTB is the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer four weeks prior to the deal announcement 
and winsorised at the top and bottom 1% levels. In each year MTBs are ranked into terciles with Small being the lowest tercile. The left-hand side reports statistics 
for all deals, while the right-hand side reports those for the M&C subsample consisting of deals with post-announcement target ownership over 50%. (Large - 
Small) indicates mean difference in CAR between top and bottom terciles. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Transaction 
Type 
      All Sample   M&C Sample 
      Small Median Large (Large - Small)   Small Median Large (Large - Small) 
                     
(1) A MTB Mean  0.74  1.85  6.05  5.31 ***  0.90  2.04  5.74  4.84 *** 
  Median  0.68  1.55  4.12     0.75  1.59  3.62    
  N  94  94  94    66  62  66   
                     
 ACAR Mean  2.3% ** 1.0% * 2.1% ** -0.1%   1.5% * 1.3% * 4.0% *** 2.5% ** 
  Median  1.5% * 0.3%  0.9%     1.4% * 0.3%  2.9% **   
  N  76  85  89    56  56  62   
                     
 TCAR Mean  13.5% *** 11.1% ** 5.8% * -7.7% *  20.6% *** 17.9% ** 8.7% * -12.0% * 
  Median  6.7% * 7.3% * -0.2%     12.6% ** 16.2% ** 2.5%    
  N  25  16  18    16  8  13   
                                          
(2) A MTB Mean  0.65  1.45  4.08  3.43 ***  0.60  1.57  4.39  3.79 *** 
  Median  0.60  1.43  1.98     0.46  0.92  2.46    
  N  42  45  42     27  33  27    
                     
 ACAR Mean  8.7% ** 0.7%  -1.0%  -9.7% ***  10.5% ** -0.9%  0.5%  -10.0% ** 
  Median  0.6%  0.3%  -0.8%     1.3%  -0.1%  -0.6%    
  N  40  44  42     26  32  27    
                     
 TCAR Mean           -     8.9% ** 0.6%                   -              -     9.0%  12.0%                   -     
  Median           -     7.1% * 0.6%              -     9.0%  12.0%    
    N            -      5  1                 -      1  2      
                     
(3) A MTB Mean  1.05  3.80  7.65  6.60 ***  1.92  2.40  9.74  7.83 ** 
  Median  1.14  1.80  2.93     1.16  1.90  3.38    
  N  18  20  18     13  8  13    
                     
 ACAR Mean  0.8%  2.3% * 1.7%  0.9%   3.4% ** 4.8%  -0.2%  -3.5% * 
  Median  2.3% ** 0.0%  0.3%     1.3%  3.9%  -1.1%    
  N  17  20  17     12  8  13    
                     
 TCAR Mean  15.3%  0.2%  0.0%  -15.3%           -     2.8%  -0.6%                   -     
  Median  9.0%  0.2%  -0.6%              -     2.8%  -0.6%    
  N  3  1  3              -     1  1    
                                          
(4) A MTB Mean  1.33  3.26  10.48  9.15 ***  1.38  4.51  11.73  10.35 *** 
  Median  1.04  2.52  5.88     1.38  2.94  6.57    
  N  79  87  79    57  63  57   
                     
 ACAR Mean  2.2% ** 0.8%  2.0% * -0.1%   2.3% ** 0.6%  2.6% * 0.4%  
  Median  0.9%  0.6%  0.3%     0.5%  0.2%  1.0%    
  N  69  81  79    53  60  57   
                     
 TCAR Mean  6.8%  10.3%  4.4%  -2.4%            -     17.3% *          -                       -     
  Median  6.8%  8.7%  4.4%              -     13.6%          -       
    N   1  8  1                 -      3           -          
                     
(5) A MTB Mean  1.44  3.42  2.69  1.25 **  1.07  3.25  2.65  1.57  
  Median  1.13  2.65  2.72    1.07  2.68  2.65   
  N  5  7  5     1  8  1    
                     
 ACAR Mean  0.1%  2.5% * -5.3%  -5.5%   18.3%  -1.8%  2.2%  -16.1%  
  Median  -8.5%  1.9% * -5.3%    18.3%  0.1%  2.2%   
  N  3  6  2    1  6  1   
                     
 TCAR Mean  -3.0%  29.5%  -2.4%  0.7%            -     -2.9%          -                       -     
  Median  -3.0%  29.5%  -2.4%              -     -2.9%          -       
  N  1  2  1             -     1          -       
                                          
(6) A MTB Mean  1.20  3.49  7.28  6.08 ***  1.20  3.44  7.84  6.64 ** 
  Median  0.78  1.85  4.17    0.71  1.85  4.17   
  N  20  19  20    14  17  14   
                     
 ACAR Mean  5.5% ** 4.4% ** 3.2%  -2.3%   5.0% ** 3.3% ** 7.6% ** 2.6%  
  Median  3.0% * 3.3%  0.4%     1.1%  3.7% ** 1.6%    
  N  20  18  20    14  16  14   
                     
 TCAR Mean  0.6%  8.3%          -                       -              -     0.6%          -                       -     
  Median  0.6%  8.3%          -                 -     0.6%          -       
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    N   1  2           -                     -      1           -          
                     
(7) A MTB Mean  1.01  1.97  5.24  4.23 ***  1.24  2.70  4.72  3.48 *** 
  Median  0.83  1.70  3.65     0.98  1.71  3.55    
  N  29  33  29    16  20  16   
                     
 ACAR Mean  0.8%  2.6%  5.0% *** 4.2% **  3.1% * 6.9% ** 5.4% ** 2.4%  
  Median  -0.4%  -0.2%  2.7% *    0.0%  1.5%  2.4%    
  N  28  32  27     16  20  14    
                     
 TCAR Mean  -2.8%  1.1%  11.9%  14.6%   -2.4%  3.0%          -                       -     
  Median  -3.2%  0.1%  18.5%     -2.4%  3.0%          -       
  N  10  11  3     2  2          -       
                                          
(8) A MTB Mean  1.23  1.38  7.01  5.78 ***  0.64  1.64  5.46  4.83 *** 
  Median  0.56  1.34  4.47     0.47  1.34  5.46    
  N  29  28  29     17  20  17    
                     
 ACAR Mean  -1.0%  0.8%  -0.7%  0.4%  -0.7%  3.0% *** -0.5%  0.2%  
  Median  0.2%  1.9%  -0.6%    0.3%  3.1% *** 0.0%   
  N  26  27  25     15  18  15    
                     
 TCAR Mean  55.2%  4.4%  1.4%  -53.7%            -     29.8%          -                       -     
  Median  55.2%  4.4%  0.0%             -     29.8%          -       
    N   1  1  3                 -      2           -          
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G. CARs and Acquirer Size by Transaction Type (Full) 
ACAR (TCAR) is the five-day cumulative abnormal return to acquirer (target) calculated by adding the market-adjusted return for days t-2 to t+2, where t is the 
acquisition announcement day. In order to calculate the daily return, the corresponding country’s Datastream value-weighted market index returns are used. 
Abnormal returns are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% levels. A Size is the market capitalisations of the acquirer four weeks prior to the transaction 
announcement. In each year A Sizes are ranked into terciles with Small being the lowest tercile. The left-hand side reports statistics for all deals, while the right-
hand side reports those for the M&C subsample consisting of deals with post-announcement target ownership over 50%. (Large - Small) indicates mean difference 
in CAR between top and bottom terciles. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Transaction 
Type 
      All Sample   M&C Sample 
      Small Median Large (Large - Small)   Small Median Large (Large - Small) 
                     
(1) A Size Mean  107.42  547.07  4679.20  4571.78 ***  124.16  481.79  5034.46  4910.30 *** 
  Median  57.94  468.98  2762.53     51.68  414.15  2566.58    
  N  86  88  86     59  58  59    
                     
 ACAR Mean  4.4% *** 1.8% ** 0.7%  -3.7% ***  4.3% *** 2.4% ** 1.2%  -3.2% ** 
  Median  3.5% *** 0.3%  0.4%     4.0% *** 1.5%  0.3%    
  N  79  80  75     55  54  50    
                     
 TCAR Mean  4.7%  9.7% ** 15.4% *** 10.8% **  6.2%  21.1% ** 18.9% *** 12.8% ** 
  Median  2.5%  4.1%  12.2% ***   2.5%  13.2%  13.0% ***  
  N  10  19  29    6  6  25   
                                         
(2) A Size Mean  159.26  982.41  5280.85  5121.59 ***  124.83  778.69  4639.25  4514.42 *** 
  Median  67.60  302.43  2243.97     92.86  292.11  1340.79    
  N  41  38  41     26  29  26    
                     
 ACAR Mean  6.7% ** 2.9%  -1.4% * -8.1% ***  9.4% ** 1.7%  -1.4%  -10.9% *** 
  Median  2.3%  -0.3%  -0.3%     2.3%  -0.2%  -0.7%    
  N  39  36  41     26  27  26    
                     
 TCAR Mean  2.4%  8.0% ** 8.6%  6.2%            -     9.0%  12.0%                     -     
  Median  2.4%  8.0% ** 1.8%              -     9.0%  12.0%    
    N   2  2  3                 -      1  2      
                     
(3) A Size Mean  158.60  832.50  5940.99  5782.39 ***  214.55  742.99  1516.79  1302.25 ** 
  Median  65.07  303.04  2201.10     91.04  140.34  1154.16    
  N  19  20  19    12  12  12   
                     
 ACAR Mean  0.7%  2.2% * 1.1%  0.4%  0.2%  4.3% * 1.6%  1.4%  
  Median  -0.9%  2.3% ** -0.1%     -0.9%  2.4%  0.3%    
  N  17  18  18    11  10  11   
                     
 TCAR Mean  2.8%  12.4%  -1.6%  -4.3%  2.8%             -     -0.6%  -3.4%  
  Median  2.8%  0.2%  -1.6%     2.8%             -     -0.6%    
  N  1  3  2    1             -     1   
                                         
(4) A Size Mean  124.84  949.35  7995.21  7870.36 ***  164.36  891.25  8166.56  8002.21 *** 
  Median  64.71  712.88  4462.06    67.47  680.16  4244.46   
  N  74  79  74    53  63  53   
                     
 ACAR Mean  2.3% ** 2.2% ** 1.5% * -0.8%   2.9% ** 2.9% ** 0.9%  -2.0%  
  Median  1.1%  1.0%  0.3%     0.6%  0.9%  0.3%    
  N  66  78  67     50  62  47    
                     
 TCAR Mean            -    6.6% ** 16.4% *                     -              -     10.1%  31.7%                     -     
  Median            -    4.3% * 10.9%              -     10.1%  31.7%    
    N            -     5  3                 -      2  1      
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(5) A Size Mean  420.49  4176.59  7861.20  7440.71  120.10  3813.52  25940.88  25820.78  
  Median  342.28  224.13  2737.03     120.10  387.13  25940.88    
  N  4  7  4     1  8  1    
                     
 ACAR Mean  3.2%  -5.2%  5.2%  2.0%   -8.5%  3.1%  2.2%  10.7%  
  Median  1.5%  -5.2%  2.8%     -8.5%  1.7%  2.2%    
  N  4  4  3    1  6  1   
                     
 TCAR Mean            -    -2.9% ** 61.9%                     -              -     -2.9%                -                         -     
  Median            -    -2.9% ** 61.9%              -     -2.9%                -       
  N            -    2  1              -     1                -       
                                         
(6) A Size Mean  144.07  1068.29  3563.26  3419.19 ***  151.15  1089.88  4447.18  4296.03 ** 
  Median  22.34  459.90  1456.31     15.55  346.34  1456.31    
  N  17  16  17    11  17  11   
                     
 ACAR Mean  8.0% ** 3.3%  2.7%  -5.4% *  11.3% ** 3.6% ** 3.3%  -8.0% * 
  Median  6.0% * 1.4%  -0.3%     9.9% ** 3.4% ** -0.3%    
  N  17  15  17     11  16  11    
                     
 TCAR Mean  -6.6%  12.0%               -                         -              -     0.6%                -                         -     
  Median  -6.6%  12.0%               -                 -     0.6%                -       
    N   1  2                -                     -      1                 -          
                     
(7) A Size Mean  130.17  1466.35  13584.29  13454.12 **  47.51  1458.10  4683.53  4636.02 ** 
  Median  47.54  299.86  3976.54     31.11  117.49  798.70    
  N  29  34  29     18  20  18    
                     
 ACAR Mean  5.8% ** 2.6% * 0.3%  -5.5% *  5.6% * 7.5% ** 2.7%  -2.9%  
  Median  1.5%  0.8%  -0.5%    1.5%  1.5%  -0.7%   
  N  26  31  26     17  17  15    
                     
 TCAR Mean  6.0%  -0.1%  2.5%  -3.5%   5.0%             -     -4.5%  -9.6%  
  Median  7.9% * 2.0%  -0.7%     5.0%             -     -4.5%    
  N  3  12  8    2             -     2   
                                         
(8) A Size Mean  571.55  2571.59  13597.79  13026.24 ***  910.13  2439.55  11079.54  10169.42 *** 
  Median  136.04  789.73  6844.11    136.04  627.19  5018.54   
  N  26  31  26    18  18  18   
                     
 ACAR Mean  0.5%  -0.7%  0.0%  -0.4%   -0.4%  0.5%  1.7% ** 2.1% ** 
  Median  1.5%  0.3%  0.9%     0.3%  1.9%  1.9% **   
  N  23  27  25     16  15  18    
                     
 TCAR Mean            -    27.6%  2.9%                     -              -     55.2%  4.4%                     -     
  Median            -    27.6%  4.4%              -     55.2%  4.4%    
    N            -     2  3                 -      1  1      
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H. CARs and Acquirer Asset by Transaction Type (Full) 
ACAR (TCAR) is the five-day cumulative abnormal return to acquirer (target) calculated by adding the market-adjusted return for days t-2 to t+2, where t is the 
acquisition announcement day. In order to calculate the daily return, the corresponding country’s Datastream value-weighted market index returns are used. 
Abnormal returns are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% levels. A Asset is the total asset of acquirer at the year-end prior to the deal announcement. In each 
year A Assets are ranked into terciles with Small being the lowest tercile. The left-hand side reports statistics for all deals, while the right-hand side reports those 
for the M&C subsample consisting of deals with post-announcement target ownership over 50%. (Large - Small) indicates mean difference in CAR between top 
and bottom terciles. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Transaction 
Type 
      All Sample   M&C Sample 
      Small Median Large (Large - Small)   Small Median Large (Large - Small) 
                     
(1) A Asset Mean  324.63  1246.65  9576.64  9252.01 ***  295.99  1122.90  8995.09  8699.10 *** 
  Median  161.17  878.80  5108.87     138.31  879.23  4671.92    
  N  148  153  148    96  97  96   
                     
 ACAR Mean  2.9% *** 0.3%  1.4% ** -1.5% *  3.6% *** 0.3%  2.4% *** -1.2%  
  Median  0.5%  -0.3%  1.9% ***    2.4% ** -0.3%  2.1% ***   
  N  130  118  122     86  79  77    
                     
 TCAR Mean  -0.8%  13.2% *** 10.3% *** 11.1% ***  -0.5%  18.4% *** 16.8% *** 17.3% * 
  Median  0.5%  8.4% ** 6.7% **    1.4%  13.3% ** 13.0% ***   
  N  24  35  43     8  18  28    
                                        
(2) A Asset Mean  252.45  2072.27  9165.27  8912.81 ***  372.79  2903.64  6832.33  6459.54 *** 
  Median  147.76  1064.46  8007.61     171.87  1112.34  5120.38    
  N  57  64  57     38  40  38    
                     
 ACAR Mean  4.6% *** 4.6% ** -1.7% ** -6.3% ***  7.5% *** 2.3%  -1.8% ** -9.4% *** 
  Median  1.9%  0.1%  -0.9%    3.7% * -0.6%  -1.2%   
  N  53  51  55     35  33  37    
                     
 TCAR Mean  9.0%  1.5%  7.3% * -1.7%              -    9.0%  12.0%                -     
  Median  9.0%  -0.3%  3.4%                -    9.0%  12.0%    
    N   1  3  5                  -     1  2      
                     
(3) A Asset Mean  735.37  2995.81  7414.44  6679.07 ***  1102.89  3584.81  3662.52  2559.64 ** 
  Median  249.04  935.42  5705.65     182.15  976.14  1717.17    
  N  30  25  30    16  16  16   
                     
 ACAR Mean  3.0% ** -0.1%  0.7%  -2.3%   2.6% * 0.4%  2.2%  -0.4%  
  Median  1.3%  -0.7%  0.5%    0.7%  -0.2%  0.3%   
  N  28  23  27     16  14  15    
                     
 TCAR Mean  11.4%  7.7%  1.9%  -9.5%             -    8.4%  -0.6%                -     
  Median  6.9%  9.0% * -0.6%                -    8.4%  -0.6%    
  N  4  3  5                -    2  1    
                                        
(4) A Asset Mean  170.88  872.23  10442.76  10271.88 ***  174.77  819.80  9488.76  9313.99 *** 
  Median  121.27  724.03  3530.23     121.27  599.87  2817.68    
  N  119  122  119     89  88  89    
                     
 ACAR Mean  2.7% ** 1.6% ** 0.0%  -2.7% **  2.9% ** 1.2%  0.6%  -2.4% * 
  Median  0.1%  0.9%  0.0%     -0.1%  0.0%  0.5%    
  N  102  116  98     80  87  71    
                     
 TCAR Mean  10.9%  1.7%  17.9% *** 7.0%   12.3%  6.6%  31.6% ** 19.3%  
  Median  10.2%  2.0%  10.9% **    13.6%  6.6%  31.7% **   
    N   4  4  11        3  1  5      
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(5) A Asset Mean  555.80  4678.97  6744.92  6189.11 *  361.23  4847.24  9490.40  9129.17  
  Median  91.30  588.44  3286.53     97.70  441.71  734.14    
  N  10  12  10     5  11  5    
                     
 ACAR Mean  13.2%  -1.1%  0.1%  -13.1%   7.1%  4.3%  3.2%  -3.9%  
  Median  5.6%  -0.4%  2.2%     5.6%  -0.4%  2.2%    
  N  6  11  5     4  9  3    
                     
 TCAR Mean  8.1%  3.6%  19.6%  11.4%   18.6%  2.9%                -                   -     
  Median  8.1%  2.1%  -0.1%    18.6%  -0.1%                -      
  N  2  3  3     1  3                -      
                                        
(6) A Asset Mean  331.93  806.89  2759.78  2427.85 ***  386.45  753.80  3006.00  2619.55 *** 
  Median  61.40  450.03  2380.44     104.34  399.10  2900.95    
  N  22  31  22     16  22  16    
                     
 ACAR Mean  8.3% *** 1.4%  0.7%  -7.6% ***  8.3% ** 2.3% ** 3.7% * -4.7%  
  Median  4.6% * 1.2%  0.2%    4.5%  1.3%  1.3%   
  N  22  28  20    15  22  14   
                     
 TCAR Mean  -6.6%  7.6%                -                   -                 -    0.6%                -                   -     
  Median  -6.6%  0.6%                -                  -    0.6%                -      
    N   1  3                 -                     -     1                 -         
                     
(7) A Asset Mean  485.63  5701.24  84946.35  84460.72 ***  232.68  1806.51  32293.28  32060.61 ** 
  Median  87.71  1554.53  18964.60     55.51  286.39  4935.47    
  N  45  44  45    23  26  23   
                     
 ACAR Mean  1.7%  2.7% ** 1.9% * 0.2%   6.4% ** 4.1% ** 1.8%  -4.6%  
  Median  0.6%  0.8%  1.5%     1.6%  0.4%  1.3%    
  N  37  39  40     20  26  19    
                     
 TCAR Mean  8.8% * 0.6%  2.3%  -6.5%  5.0%              -    -3.8%  -8.9%  
  Median  4.7%  0.1%  2.7%     5.0%              -    -2.4%    
  N  11  11  15     2              -    3    
                                        
(8) A Asset Mean  923.90  5949.31  51140.59  50216.68 ***  1232.48  2442.75  50932.68  49700.20 *** 
  Median  306.96  2286.62  14615.90     263.57  1276.03  12500.39    
  N  38  41  39     21  26  21    
                     
 ACAR Mean  1.5%  -0.3%  -0.9%  -2.4%  0.9%  0.1%  1.9% ** 1.1%  
  Median  1.6% * 0.7%  0.1%    1.5%  0.5%  2.5% ***   
  N  28  33  34     15  22  18    
                     
 TCAR Mean  14.4%  -0.4%  20.2%  5.8%   55.2%              -    4.4%  -50.7%  
  Median  -1.8%  -0.4%  9.4%     55.2%              -    4.4%    
    N   3  1  4        1               -     1      
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I. CARs and Deal Value by Transaction Type (Full) 
ACAR (TCAR) is the five-day cumulative abnormal return to acquirer (target) calculated by adding the market-adjusted return for days t-2 to t+2, where t is the 
acquisition announcement day. In order to calculate the daily return, the corresponding country’s Datastream value-weighted market index returns are used. 
Abnormal returns are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% levels. Deal Val. is the transaction value. In each year Deal Vals are ranked into terciles with Small 
being the lowest tercile. The left-hand side reports statistics for all deals, while the right-hand side reports those for the M&C subsample consisting of deals with 
post-announcement target ownership over 50%. (Large - Small) indicates mean difference in CAR between top and bottom terciles. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Transaction 
Type 
      All Sample   M&C Sample 
      Small Median Large (Large - Small)   Small Median Large (Large - Small) 
                     
(1) Deal Val. Mean  9.66  74.88  669.51  659.86 ***  23.12  138.86  992.61  969.50 *** 
  Median  5.28  52.04  316.80    12.69  96.94  546.99   
  N  145  143  145    84  85  84   
                     
 ACAR Mean  2.1% ** 0.5%  1.9% *** -0.2%  3.0% *** 1.6% * 2.6% *** -0.4%  
  Median  0.3%  0.7%  1.2% *    2.3% ** 0.5%  1.2% *   
  N  82  80  105    56  54  61   
                     
 TCAR Mean  7.0% *** 8.5% *** 15.0% *** 8.0% ***  8.8% ** 11.3% *** 20.8% *** 12.0% *** 
  Median  2.6%  2.5%  11.0% ***   3.5%  12.9% *** 14.5% ***  
  N  56  55  66    24  28  37  
 
                                          
(2) Deal Val. Mean  4.14  24.24  156.15  152.01 ***  8.12  26.12  203.72  195.61 *** 
  Median  1.17  10.69  78.27    1.25  15.21  114.00   
  N  38  42  39    23  23  23   
                     
 ACAR Mean  1.8%  3.5% * -0.1%  -1.9%  5.6% * 0.6%  -0.6%  -6.2% * 
  Median  0.3%  -0.4%  -0.4%    -0.6%  -0.7%  0.3%   
  N  32  33  34    20  18  22   
                     
 TCAR Mean  7.1%  4.3%  9.8%  2.7%          -     0.6%  16.2%           -     
  Median  7.1%  1.3%  9.0%            -     0.6%  16.2%   
    N   1  5  3                -      1  2      
                     
(3) Deal Val. Mean  6.58  22.54  164.16  157.57 ***  7.50  44.81  175.60  168.10 ** 
  Median  3.47  11.00  87.18    3.60  12.01  35.15   
  N  26  29  26    11  16  11   
                     
 ACAR Mean  1.8%  0.4%  4.5% * 2.8%  3.1%  2.0% * 2.0%  -1.0%  
  Median  0.5%  0.4%  1.4%    1.7%  0.5%  -1.2%   
  N  19  17  17    9  8  8   
                     
 TCAR Mean  -5.7% ** 13.7% * 9.7% ** 15.4% ***  -1.7%  20.2% * 22.5% ** 24.3% * 
  Median  -5.8% ** 9.6%  6.3% *    -1.7%  19.0% * 22.5% **   
  N  5  5  14    2  4  2   
                                          
(4) Deal Val. Mean  5.48  31.36  539.59  534.11 ***  7.23  36.22  693.60  686.37 *** 
  Median  3.55  17.53  147.10    4.30  18.31  245.32   
  N  86  86  86    58  63  58   
                     
 ACAR Mean  2.9% ** 1.9% ** -0.1%  -3.0% *  2.0% * 3.9% ** 0.0%  -1.9%  
  Median  0.2%  0.6%  0.3%    0.2%  1.3%  0.8%   
  N  58  66  68    45  52  44   
                     
 TCAR Mean  12.4% ** 9.2% ** 13.7% ** 1.3%  31.3% ** 20.4% ** 15.4% ** -15.9% ** 
  Median  5.0%  4.2%  6.8% *    26.7% ** 18.4% ** 6.7%   
  
  N   10  17  15        4  6  12      
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(5) Deal Val. Mean  15.74  89.90  292.77  277.03 ***  11.78  133.05  398.83  387.06 ** 
  Median  7.98  45.38  149.52    8.85  105.99  154.13   
  N  12  12  12    7  10  7   
                     
 ACAR Mean  4.7%  -4.0% ** -1.7%  -6.4%  9.3%  -4.8% ** -0.6%  -9.9%  
  Median  4.8%  -3.4% ** -0.4%    10.5%  -2.7%  0.3%   
  N  4  6  8    3  7  5   
                     
 TCAR Mean  8.0%  6.7% * 14.9%  6.8%  13.3%  8.9% ** 9.2%  -4.0%  
  Median  2.8%  8.6% ** -0.1%    13.3%  11.6% ** 9.2%   
  N  4  7  5    2  5  2   
                                         
(6) Deal Val. Mean  6.36  32.60  238.38  232.03 **  61.24  40.20  244.43  183.19 * 
  Median  1.47  17.42  102.85    3.97  29.60  94.63   
  N  20  22  20    15  17  14   
                     
 ACAR Mean  2.7% * -0.6%  8.3% ** 5.6% *  3.6%  5.5% *** 7.1% * 3.5%  
  Median  0.5%  0.1%  4.1%    -0.1%  3.7% ** 3.3%   
  N  17  17  18    13  12  13   
                     
 TCAR Mean  14.8%  0.2%  4.7%  -10.1%  38.8%  -1.9%            -               -     
  Median  12.0%  0.4%  0.6%    38.8%  0.5%            -       
    N   3  3  3        1  4             -          
                     
(7) Deal Val. Mean  7.40  51.97  385.23  377.83 ***  17.38  119.92  494.66  477.29 *** 
  Median  3.94  30.07  175.06    7.64  72.23  336.70   
  N  86  76  86    33  32  34   
                     
 ACAR Mean  1.7%  2.4% * 3.7% ** 2.0%  3.1%  8.9% *** 4.5%  1.4%  
  Median  0.8%  0.8%  1.7%    -0.6%  3.1%  0.8%   
  N  36  24  28    21  13  11   
                     
 TCAR Mean  2.9%  7.6% *** 8.4% *** 5.6% *  16.2%  10.8% ** 9.9% ** -6.3%  
  Median  0.2%  1.8%  4.8% **    13.4%  6.2%  4.5%   
  N  41  49  55    8  12  20   
                                         
(8) Deal Val. Mean  6.49  43.19  569.81  563.31 ***  21.31  425.18  796.98  775.67 ** 
  Median  3.63  15.97  153.23    8.87  79.86  354.83   
  N  44  40  44    18  22  18   
                     
 ACAR Mean  -1.2%  2.2% ** 0.7%  1.9%  0.4%  2.4% * -1.6%  -2.0%  
  Median  -1.3%  2.1% ** 0.3%    -0.8%  1.5%  0.7%   
  N  18  23  15    10  13  7   
                     
 TCAR Mean  9.6% ** 18.1% *** 15.2% *** 5.6%  26.7%  24.8% ** 13.2%  -13.5%  
  Median  2.9%  9.9% * 10.8% **    17.1%  10.8%  5.3%   
    N   16  15  19        3  9  5      
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J. CARs and Target Asset by Transaction Type (Full) 
ACAR (TCAR) is the five-day cumulative abnormal return to acquirer (target) calculated by adding the market-adjusted return for days t-2 to t+2, where t is the 
acquisition announcement day. In order to calculate the daily return, the corresponding country’s Datastream value-weighted market index returns are used. 
Abnormal returns are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% levels. T Size is the market capitalisations of the target four weeks prior to the transaction announcement. 
In each year T Sizes are ranked into terciles with Small being the lowest tercile. The left-hand side reports statistics for all deals, while the right-hand side reports 
those for the M&C subsample consisting of deals with post-announcement target ownership over 50%. (Large - Small) indicates mean difference in CAR between 
top and bottom terciles. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Transaction 
Type 
      All Sample   M&C Sample 
      Small Median Large (Large - Small)   Small Median Large (Large - Small) 
                     
(1) T Size Mean  94.58  342.23  1124.94  1030.36 ***  107.77  368.85  1198.75  1090.98 *** 
  Median  44.80  172.73  859.25     41.64  204.69  869.00    
  N  60  64  60     31  35  31    
                     
 ACAR Mean  0.8%  0.7%  0.9%  0.0%  2.0%  4.7% * 2.2%  0.2%  
  Median  0.7%  -0.9%  1.3%     1.0%  0.6%  2.2%    
  N  22  19  34     17  12  18    
                     
 TCAR Mean  13.1% *** 13.0% *** 9.3% *** -3.8%   15.8% *** 16.0% *** 15.6% *** -0.1%  
  Median  7.3% *** 9.7% *** 5.7% ***   11.7% ** 14.2% *** 6.7% *   
  N  48  53  53     22  29  27    
                                          
(2) T Size Mean  113.94  387.69  539.05  425.11               -     150.88              -                   -     
  Median  113.94  227.07  539.05                 -     153.34              -       
  N  2  6  2                 -     4              -       
                     
 ACAR Mean  1.2%  -3.6%  -0.2%  -1.3%              -     -2.6%              -                   -     
  Median  1.2%  -3.6%  -0.2%                 -     -0.7%              -       
  N  2  2  2                 -     3              -       
                     
 TCAR Mean  2.0%  10.8% ** 4.5%  2.5%               -     11.0%              -                   -     
  Median  2.0%  9.0% * 4.5%                -     9.0%              -       
    N   2  5  2                    -      3               -          
                     
(3) T Size Mean  225.81  176.26  1917.62  1691.81 *              -     233.83              -                   -     
  Median  80.71  85.89  1100.10                 -     83.10              -       
  N  6  12  6                 -     7              -       
                     
 ACAR Mean  4.9%  4.2%  2.1%  -2.7%               -     3.7%              -                   -     
  Median  4.9%  4.2%  1.2%                 -     3.7%              -       
  N  2  2  4                 -     2              -       
                     
 TCAR Mean  18.7% * 5.5% * 6.0%  -12.8%  23.9%  6.2%  23.9%  0.0%  
  Median  16.4% * 3.6%  -0.6%    23.9%  2.8%  23.9%   
  N  4  9  5     1  5  1    
                                          
(4) T Size Mean  121.76  114.67  1076.11  954.35 **  326.98  264.32  1836.68  1509.70 * 
  Median  55.62  36.02  463.21     55.62  107.29  654.40    
  N  19  12  17    7  8  7   
                     
 ACAR Mean  0.9%  -3.5%  -1.6%  -2.5%   -0.7%  0.0%  -8.8%  -8.1%  
  Median  -0.7%  -5.2% * -0.7%     -0.7%  0.0%  -8.8%    
  N  3  3  4     2  2  1    
                     
 TCAR Mean  10.9% ** 10.4% ** 12.3% ** 1.3%  16.8% ** 20.7% ** 19.0% ** 2.2%  
  Median  4.4%  6.2%  4.8%     13.6% * 23.2% ** 17.6% **   
    N   17  10  14        7  7  6      
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(5) T Size Mean  64.34  344.45  1111.38  1047.04  40.57  111.94  219.82  179.25  
  Median  64.34  84.47  1111.38    40.57  108.23  219.82   
  N  2  8  2     1  4  1    
                     
 ACAR Mean  -0.1%  -4.0%              -                   -      0.8%  -5.3%              -                   -     
  Median  -0.1%  -2.7%              -        0.8%  -2.7%              -       
  N  2  3              -        1  3              -       
                     
 TCAR Mean  7.9%  15.4% * -3.5%  -11.4%   18.6%  9.1%  -0.1%  -18.7%  
  Median  7.9%  8.6%  -3.5%     18.6%  11.6%  -0.1%    
  N  2  7  2     1  3  1    
                                         
(6) T Size Mean  62.55  1100.52  73.45  10.90              -     31.81              -                   -     
  Median  62.55  40.02  73.45                -     28.10              -       
  N  1  10  1                 -     6              -       
                     
 ACAR Mean  2.7%  -0.5%  0.1%  -2.6%               -     2.7%              -                   -     
  Median  2.7%  -0.5%  0.1%                 -     2.7%              -       
  N  1  2  1                -     1              -       
                     
 TCAR Mean  0.6%  6.3%  23.3%  22.7%               -     7.7%              -                   -     
  Median  0.6%  7.2%  23.3%                 -     7.6%              -       
    N   1  6  1                    -      4               -          
                     
(7) T Size Mean  66.58  263.06  1642.56  1575.98 ***  66.08  240.17  675.29  609.21 *** 
  Median  43.70  164.81  804.97     56.28  175.10  533.59    
  N  58  58  58     17  18  17    
                     
 ACAR Mean  -0.7%  -3.8%  2.4%  3.1%   3.1%  -11.4%  15.8%  12.7%  
  Median  -0.1%  -1.8%  2.0%     -0.7%  -11.4%  15.8%    
  N  15  6  10    3  1  1   
                     
 TCAR Mean  4.8% * 3.4% * 6.0% *** 1.1%   11.1% * 5.2%  7.6% * -3.4%  
  Median  3.0%  0.6%  5.1% ***   8.7%  4.6%  2.6%    
  N  48  50  51     11  16  17    
                                         
(8) T Size Mean  59.90  170.24  1013.07  953.17 ***  647.09  204.46  1211.19  564.10  
  Median  38.80  122.31  636.10     110.56  117.48  362.77    
  N  23  29  23     7  11  7    
                     
 ACAR Mean  5.0%  1.5%  0.9%  -4.2%   5.0%  5.0%  0.9%  -4.2%  
  Median  5.0%  2.9% * 0.9%    5.0%  5.0%  0.9%   
  N  1  5  1    1  1  1   
                     
 TCAR Mean  14.1% ** 19.3% *** 6.3% ** -7.8% *  19.0% * 29.3% ** 8.9%  -10.1%  
  Median  1.6%  5.3%  4.7% **    11.7%  28.5% ** 3.6%    
    N   20  23  18        5  7  6      
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K. List of Abbreviation 
 
Abbreviation 
 
Full Name  
 
Abbreviation 
 
Full Name 
AHP 
 
Analytic Hierarchy Process  
 
IPO 
 
Initial Public Offering 
ANN 
 
Artificial Neural Network  
 
IRR 
 
Internal Rate of Return 
ARIMA 
 Autoregressive Integrated 
 Moving Average 
 
 
KAGB 
 
Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch 
ARR  Accounting Rate of Return   KG  Kommanditgesellschaft 
BDI 
 
Baltic Dry Index  
 
KS 
 
Kommandittselskap 
BDTI 
 
Baltic Dirty Tanker Index  
 
LIFFEX 
 London International Financial 
 Futures Exchange 
BFI 
 
Baltic Freight Index  
 
LTV 
 
Loan-To-Value 
BHARs 
 
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns  
 
M&C Sample 
 
Majority and Control Sample 
BIFFEX 
 Baltic International Freight Futures  
Exchange 
 
 
MCDM 
 
Multi-Criteria Decision Making 
CAPEX 
 
Capital Expenditures  
 
MRS 
 
Markov Regime Switching 
CAPM 
 
Capital Asset Pricing Model  
 
MTB 
 
Market-to-Book ratio 
CARs 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
 
NPV 
 
Net Present Value 
CDFs 
 
Contracts-for-Difference  
 
NYMEX 
 
New York Mercantile Exchange 
DCF 
 
Discounted Cash-Flows  
 
OECD 
 Organization for Economic  
Co-operation Development 
DEA 
 
Differential Evolution Algorithm  
 
OSRA 
 
Ocean Shipping Reform Act 
DJCA 
 
Dow Jones Composite Average  
 
OTC 
 
Over-The-Counter 
EBITDA 
 Earnings Before Interest, Taxes,  
Depreciation and Amortisation 
 
 
PCA 
 
Principal Component Analysis 
ECA 
 
Export Credit Agency  
 
PE 
 
Private Equity 
ERR 
 
Economic Rate of Return  
 
PIPE 
 Private Investment in  
Public Equity 
ES 
 
Expected Shortfall  
 
ROA 
 
Real Options Analysis 
FFAs 
 
Forward Freight Agreements  
 
RV 
 
Relative Valuation 
GA 
 
Genetic Algorithm  
 
S&P 
 
Sales and Purchase 
GARCH 
 Generalized Autoregressive Conditional  
Heteroscedasticity 
 
 
SCM 
 
Supply Chain Management 
GDP 
 
Gross Domestic Product  
 
SEO 
 
Seasoned Equity Offering 
GED 
 
Generalized Error Distribution  
 
SIC 
 
Standard Industrial Classification 
GISC 
 
Global Services Cyclical Index  
 
TEU 
 
Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit 
GTO 
 
Global Terminal Operator  
 
UTADIS 
 
Utilities Additives Discriminants 
HHI 
 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index  
 
VaR 
 
Value-at-Risk 
IMAREX 
 
International Maritime Exchange  
 
VLCC 
 
Very Large Crude Carrier 
IPE 
 
International Petroleum Exchange  
 
WACC 
 Weighted Average of  
Cost of Capital 
 
